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Summary 
English	
The	central	focus	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	the	substantive	interaction	between	socio-economic	
rights	and	the	right	to	administrative	justice	in	addressing	poverty	under	South	African	law.	The	
hypothesis	behind	the	research	is	that	the	normative	purposes	and	values	of	socio-economic	and	
administrative	justice	rights	are	profoundly	complementary	and	can	thus	be	strengthened	as	tools	
for	 addressing	 poverty.	 This	 analysis	 will	 be	 accomplished	 within	 the	 recognised	 context	 of	 a	
transformative	constitutional	framework	and	a	democratic	developmental	state	that	is	eminently	
powerful	 in	 its	 potential	 to	 remedy	 South	 Africa’s	 past,	 to	 strive	 towards	 the	 egalitarian	
transformation	of	our	society	and	to	attain	the	concrete	alleviation	of	the	realities	of	poverty	and	
hardship.	The	 argument	 is	 firstly	built	 on	 the	 concepts	of	 transformative	 constitutionalism	and	
participatory	 democracy,	 which	 characterise	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 and	 the	 South	
African	 developmental	 state.	 Our	 Constitution	 enables	 the	 socio-economic	 transformation	 of	
South	 African	 society	 from	 one	 which	 is	 racially	 divided	 and	 unequal	 to	 one	 which	 supports	
prosperity	 for	 all.	 In	 addition	 to	 addressing	material	 deprivations	 of	 those	 in	 need,	 notions	 of	
participation	 and	 agency	 of	 poor	 and	 marginalised	 communities	 are	 central	 to	 achieving	 this	
transformation.	 Furthermore,	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 the	 concept	 of	 South	 Africa	 as	 a	
developmental	state	as	opposed	to	a	welfare	state,	has	taken	root.	A	developmental	state	excels	in	
the	basics	of	public	administration	and	intervenes	strategically	in	the	economy	to	promote	socio-
economic	 development.	 A	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 South	 African	
developmental	 state	 is	 that	 it	 must	 be	 people-oriented	 and	 capable	 of	 addressing	 the	 socio-
economic	 needs	 of	 its	 entire	 population,	 especially	 the	 poor,	 marginalised	 and	 historically	
disadvantaged.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 by	 developing	 the	 interlinkages	 between	 administrative	 justice	
and	 socio-economic	 rights,	 the	 vision	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 and	 effective	 socio-
economic	transformation	can	be	supported.	It	is	the	current	conception	of	the	South	African	state	
that	should	frame	the	development	of	policy	and	law	in	the	arena	of	poverty	reduction,	both	in	
terms	of	substance	and	process.	
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Afrikaans	
Die	hoofdoel	van	hierdie	tesis	is	om	die	wesenlike	interaksie	tussen	sosio-ekonomiese	regte	en	die	
reg	op	administratiewe	geregtigheid	in	die	hantering	van	armoede	ingevolge	die	Suid-Afrikaanse	
reg	te	ondersoek.	Die	hipotese	vir	die	navorsing	is	dat	die	normatiewe	doeleindes	en	waardes	van	
sosio-ekonomiese	 regte	 en	 die	 reg	 op	 administratiewe	 geregtigheid	mekaar	 inherent	 aanvul	 en	
dus	versterk	kan	word	as	instrumente	om	armoede	te	hanteer.	Hierdie	ontleding	word	uitgevoer	
binne	 die	 erkende	 konteks	 van	 ’n	 transformasiegerigte	 konstitusionele	 raamwerk	 en	 ’n	
demokratiese	 ontwikkelingstaat	wat	 oor	 besondere	potensiaal	 beskik	 om	Suid-Afrika	 se	 verlede	
reg	 te	 stel,	 na	 die	 egalistiese	 transformasie	 van	 ons	 samelewing	 te	 streef	 en	 die	 realiteite	 van	
armoede	 en	 swaarkry	 op	 konkrete	 wyse	 te	 verlig.	 Die	 argument	 word	 eerstens	 gegrond	 op	 die	
begrippe	 van	 transformasiegerigte	 konstitusionalisme	 en	 deelnemende	 demokrasie	 wat	 die	
Grondwet	van	die	Republiek	van	Suid-Afrika	en	die	ontwikkelingstaat	kenmerk.	Ons	Grondwet	
stel	ons	 in	staat	om	 ’n	rasseverdeelde	en	ongelyke	Suid-Afrikaanse	samelewing	sosio-ekonomies	
te	 transformeer	 tot	 een	 wat	 voorspoed	 vir	 almal	 ondersteun.	 Benewens	 die	 hantering	 van	 die	
materiële	ontberinge	van	diegene	in	nood,	is	die	deelname	en	wil	van	arm	en	gemarginaliseerde	
gemeenskappe	 van	 deurslaggewende	 belang	 om	hierdie	 transformasie	 te	 bewerkstellig.	 Boonop	
het	die	konsep	van	Suid-Afrika	as	 ’n	ontwikkelingstaat	eerder	as	 ’n	welsynstaat	oor	die	afgelope	
paar	 jaar	 begin	 posvat.	 ’n	 Ontwikkelingstaat	 blink	 uit	 in	 die	 grondbeginsels	 van	 openbare	
administrasie,	 en	 onderneem	 strategiese	 ingrypinge	 in	 die	 ekonomie	 om	 sosio-ekonomiese	
ontwikkeling	 aan	 te	 moedig.	 ’n	 Wesenskenmerk	 van	 die	 diskoers	 oor	 die	 Suid-Afrikaanse	
ontwikkelingstaat	 is	 dat	 dit	mensgerig	moet	wees	 en	 in	 die	 sosio-ekonomiese	 behoeftes	 van	 sy	
hele	bevolking,	veral	arm,	gemarginaliseerde	en	histories	benadeelde	mense,	moet	kan	voorsien.	
Hierdie	navorsing	voer	aan	dat	die	visie	van	 ’n	demokratiese	ontwikkelingstaat	en	doeltreffende	
sosio-ekonomiese	 transformasie	 ondersteun	 kan	 word	 deur	 die	 onderlinge	 verbande	 tussen	
administratiewe	geregtigheid	en	sosio-ekonomiese	regte	te	ontwikkel.	Die	huidige	opvatting	van	
die	 Suid-Afrikaanse	 staat	 behoort	 dus	 die	 inhoud	 sowel	 as	 die	 proses	 van	 beleids-	 en	
regsontwikkeling	op	die	gebied	van	armoedeverligting	te	rig.	
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Democracy	is	the	government	of	the	people,	for	the	people,	by	the	people.		
-	Abraham	Lincoln	
	
	
	
A	functioning,	robust	democracy	requires	a	healthy,	educated	participatory	followership,	
and	an	educated,	morally	grounded	leadership.	
-	Chinua	Achebe	 	
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1	1	Background		
1	1	1	Poverty	in	South	Africa		
The	 purpose	 of	 the	Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	Africa	 1996,	 as	 stated	 in	 the	
Preamble,	includes	healing	the	divisions	of	the	past	and	improving	the	quality	of	life	of	all	
citizens.	 The	 historical	 divisions	 and	 conditions	 of	 poverty	 that	 existed	 pre-apartheid	
continue	to	 impact	on	South	African	society	and	manifest	deprivation	in	a	multitude	of	
ways.1	Twenty-two	years	after	democracy	arrived	 in	South	Africa,	enduringly	high	 levels	
of	 poverty	 and	 racial	 inequality	 are	 still	 evident	 in	 the	 high	 unemployment	 rate,	 low	
quality	of	education,	spatial	segregation,	large	expanses	of	informal	settlements	and	high	
mortality	 rate.	The	current	situation	of	poverty	 in	South	Africa	and	 the	 trends	over	 the	
past	22	years	of	democracy,	do	indicate	improvements	and	reduction	in	poverty,	in	large	
part	 due	 to	 the	widespread	 provision	 of	 a	 government	 “social	wage”	made	 up	 of	 social	
grants,	 free	 housing,	 free	 education,	 free	 health	 services,	 and	 free	 basic	 services	 for	
indigent	people.	However,	 the	data	distinctly	demonstrates	 that	poverty	 and	 inequality	
persists	 and	 therefore	 that	 substantial	 redress	 is	 still	 required	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	
laudable	aims	of	the	Constitution,	as	laid	out	in	the	Preamble.	2		
1	1	2	A	Transformative	Constitution		
It	 is	 widely	 accepted	 that	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 is	 a	 progressive	 and	
transformative	document,	the	purpose	of	which	is	to	regulate	public	power	and	to	frame	
																																								 																				
1 For a historical account of the impact of colonialism, apartheid and capitalism on South African society, see S 
Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa: 1652–2002 (2002). 
2 See the latest data: Statistics South Africa, Community Survey 2016 <http http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za> 
(accessed 20-09-2017). The definition and measurement of poverty includes factors such as income, access 
to basic services, access to assets, human capital, political freedoms and social capital. This encapsulating 
approach to poverty allows for reflection on the experience of poverty and the multiplicity of interventions 
required to address it. See chapter three for a more in-depth discussion of the situation of poverty in South 
Africa and the conceptualisation of the multi-dimensionality of poverty.  
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“an	 objective,	 normative	 value	 system”3	 in	 a	 post-apartheid	 society.	 This	 system	 of	
normative	values	seeks	to	fulfil	a	constitutional	imperative	to	remedy	South	Africa’s	past	
and	“transform	our	society	into	one	in	which	there	will	be	human	dignity,	 freedom	and	
equality”.4	This	is	vividly	expressed	specifically	in	the	Preamble	to	the	Constitution,	and	
then	 in	 section	 7(1),	 in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 (Chapter	 2)	 and	 generally	 throughout	 the	
Constitution.		
In	particular,	the	South	African	Constitution	is	internationally	acclaimed	for	its	inclusion	
of	justiciable	civil,	political	and	socio-economic	rights	in	the	Bill	of	Rights.	This	prudence	
embodies	the	recognition	that	full	transformation	from	an	apartheid	society	requires	both	
a	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 legal-political	 structures	 that	 upheld	 it,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
transformation	of	 the	devastating	 social	 and	economic	consequences	of	 its	policies	 and	
laws.	The	overwhelming	 levels	of	poverty	still	 felt	 to	a	disproportionate	extent	by	those	
discriminated	against	during	apartheid,	severely	undermine	the	transformation	project	if	
not	addressed.5	
1	1	3	A	democratic	developmental	state	
While	South	Africa	still	battles	these	numerous	developmental	challenges	-	especially	in	
recent	 years,	 with	 declining	 economic	 growth	 rates	 -	 long-term,	 sustainable	 socio-
economic	 transformation	 is	 crucial.	 The	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 theoretical	
framework,	as	adopted	in	the	National	Development	Plan	2030,	will	be	applied	to	South	
Africa’s	recent	experience	and	current	situation	in	order	to	identify	and	explore	the	kind	
of	institutional	and	policy	reforms	necessary	for	sustainable	growth	and	development	in	
South	Africa.	The	central	claim	of	this	study	is	that	competent,	efficient	and	accountable	
state	 institutions	 and	 participatory	 processes	 are	 positively	 correlated	 with	 socio-
economic	development.		
																																								 																				
3 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) para 54. 
4 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 8. 
5 Para 8. 
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Unlike	 in	 the	 Asian	 developmental	 states,	 rather	 than	 being	 inimical	 to	 development,	
democracy	 is	 integral	 to	 development	 in	 South	 Africa.6	 South	 Africa	 is	 founded	 on	 a	
representative,	 deliberative	 and	 participatory	 democracy.	 Nevertheless,	 only	 a	 very	 few	
African	states	have	managed	to	fully	implement	the	developmental	state	in	actual	terms.	
Botswana,	Mauritius,	South	Africa	and	Uganda	to	a	large	extent,	are	seen	as	adopting	the	
developmental	state	framework.	However,	despite	the	fact	that	in	South	Africa	all	sectors	
of	 society	 and	 bi-partisan	 politics	 largely	 adopted	 the	 National	 Development	 Plan	
(‘NDP’),	there	is	a	lack	of	the	requisite	political	leadership	for	coherent	policy	formulation	
and	implementation	of	the	NDP.	South	Africa	post-apartheid	fits	with	the	categorisation	
of	a	democratic	developmental	state:	the	ongoing	dire	situation	of	poverty	and	inequality	
in	the	country	requires	a	concerted	socio-economic	and	democratic	effort.7		
1	1	4	Socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	
The	 achievement	 of	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 transformation	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state	requires	a	“collaborative	enterprise”.8	The	legislature,	the	executive,	
the	judiciary	and	all	organs	of	state	are	all	bound	by	the	Bill	of	Rights	and	are	obliged	to	
“respect,	protect,	promote	and	fulfil”	its	mandates.9	This	“collaborative	enterprise”	is	not	
only	 an	 obligation	 upon	 the	 state,	 but	 also	 upon	 non-state,	 private	 actors,	 to	 varying	
extents.10	South	Africans	and	civil	society	are	also	empowered	to	pressurise	state	and	non-
state	 actors	 to	 enforce	 these	 mandates	 through	 litigation,	 the	 political	 process,	
																																								 																				
6 O Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa (2010); T Mkandawire 
“Thinking about developmental states in Africa” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (2001) 289-313; P Evans 
Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (1995); P B Evans What will the 21st Century 
Developmental State Look Like? Paper presented at Conference at the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
(2006) (Unpublished. On file with the author); and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Reclaiming Policy Space: Domestic resource mobilization and developmental states (2007) UNCTAD 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aldcafrica2007_en.pdf> (accessed 31-05-2016). 
7 O J David & L E Asuelime The Theory and Practice of the Developmental State: 
A Comparative Assessment of South Africa’s and Malaysia’s Development Regional Conference on Building 
Democratic Developmental States for Economic Transformation in Southern Africa 20 – 22 July 2015, Pretoria, 
South Africa <http://www.developmentalstatesconference.com/wpcontent/uploads/ 2015/07/15-Lucky-
Aseulime-and-David-Ojochenemi.pdf> (accessed 31-05-2016).  
8 T Bollyky The Role of Public Impact Litigation in Addressing the Conditions of the Poor in Post Apartheid 
South Africa presented at the Foundation for Human Rights Conference Celebrating a Decade of Democracy: A 
focus on the last ten years of South Africa's Democracy and the advancement of rights (Durban 22-25 January 
2004) 1. 
9  Section 7(2) and 8(1). 
10  Section 8(3) & (4). 
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involvement	 in	 public	 policy,	 law	 and	 administrative	 decision-making	 processes	 and	
political	 action.	 Accountability	 through	 the	 media,	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 the	
judiciary	and	independent	public	institutions	is	vital	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
Socio-economic	 rights	 in	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 are	 an	 important	 tool	 in	
litigation	 and	 for	monitoring	 and	 advocacy	 to	hold	 the	 government	 accountable	 for	 its	
obligations	 to	 secure	 for	all	members	of	 society	a	basic	 set	of	goods	–	education,	 social	
security,	health	care,	food,	water,	shelter,	access	to	land	and	housing.11	 Justiciable	socio-
economic	rights	assist	in	ensuring	the	realisation	of	the	State’s	constitutional	obligations	
to	 the	 poor.12	 This	 dissertation	 will	 analyse	 what	 these	 rights	 have	 been	 able	 to	
accomplish	 for	the	poor	and	marginalised	 in	South	Africa	since	the	end	of	apartheid	22	
years	 ago,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	
reduce	poverty	through	economic	development,	social	welfare	and	empowerment.	I	will	
examine	 the	 courts’	 interpretation	 of	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	
the	stance	the	courts	have	taken	on	participatory	and	procedural	elements	of	these	rights	
and	the	enforcement	of	remedies.	
The	right	to	just	administrative	action13	is	also	a	constructive	tool	for	the	assessment	and	
enforcement	of	efforts	to	address	poverty,	and	for	ensuring	an	empowered	voice	for	the	
poor	 and	marginalised.14	 The	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 is	 an	 important	 vehicle	 for	
protecting	socio-economic	rights,	for	example	in	earlier	cases	on	social	security	rights	in	
																																								 																				
11  Sections 26, 27, 28(1)(c) and 29. 
12 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010); D Brand 
Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative politics LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2009); K 
Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 151, 153; K Young, “A Typology of 
Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review” (2010) 8 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 385; See chapter four for a full discussion of the role of socio-
economic rights in addressing poverty in a democratic developmental state. See chapter four for an extensive 
discussion of the role of socio-economic rights in addressing poverty in a democratic developmental state. 
13 Section 33. 
14 See for example Premier, Mpumalanga, and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-aided 
Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) para 1; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape 
v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) para 265. See chapter five for a detailed discussion of the 
substantive and procedural elements of the right to just administrative action, in the context of addressing 
poverty. 
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the	High	Courts.15	More	recently	however,	in	cases	relating	to	education,	water,	housing	
and	basic	services,	the	interpretation	of	administrative	justice	requirements	of	procedural	
fairness	and	reasonableness	in	particular,	have	brought	mixed	results	for	the	realisation	of	
socio-economic	rights	for	the	poor.16	Since	administrative	law	and	administrative	justice	
rights	 comprises	 the	 “general	 principles	 of	 law	 which	 regulate	 the	 organisation	 of	
administrative	institutions	and	the	fairness	and	efficacy	of	the	administrative	process,”17	it	
can	 assist	 “in	 facilitating	 poor	 people’s	 right	 to	 be	 heard	 and	 to	 participate	 in	 socio-
economic	decision-making	that	affects	their	rights”18	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
Furthermore,	the	right	to	reasonable	administrative	action	plays	a	vital	democratic	role	in	
requiring	the	administration	to	account	for	their	decisions.	
This	 dissertation	 portends	 two	 distinct	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 impacts	 on	 the	 attainment	 of	 socio-economic	 transformation.	 The	
first	is	the	critical	role	of	the	state	in	addressing	poverty.	The	second	is	the	relationship	
between	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 and	 the	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 the	 South	
																																								 																				
15 A series of successful court challenges have been brought under administrative law, by indigent individuals 
affected by the withdrawal of social security benefits amidst the ongoing systemic problems in the 
administration of social grants in the Eastern Cape. See Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (2) SA 849 (E); Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, 
Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2001 (9) BCLR 899 (SE); Mbanga v Member of the Executive Council for 
Welfare 2002 (1) SA 359 (SA); Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E); 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxusa; Rangani v 
Superintendent-General, Department of Health and Welfare, Northern Province 1999 (4) SA 385 (T). 
16 See for example: Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) (not appropriate for a court to 
give a quantified content to what constitutes “sufficient water” and introduction of pre-paid water meters did 
not violate right to water, equality or just administrative action); Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 
212 (CC) (required city authority to ensure procedural fairness before taking a decision to disconnect electricity 
supply of tenants); Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (2) 
BCLR 99 (CC) (affirmed legislative competence of province to pass Slums Act related to housing; procedural 
elements related to evictions in Slums Act deemed unconstitutional); Head of Department: Mpumalanga 
Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (withdrawal of the function of a school 
governing body to determine the language policy of a school, the appointment of an interim committee and the 
subsequent alteration of the schools language policy by HOD were unlawful, however court ordered that right 
to education for excluded learners must be addressed by the school and HOD); Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC) (MEC ordered to make decision on settlement upgrade, and 
rights to sanitation and lighting not recognised).  
17 L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 54-55; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012); and M 
Burns & M Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution (2007) 3-72. 
18 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 53. 
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African	 Constitution	 in	 addressing	 poverty.	 There	 is	 considerable	 literature	 on	 the	
former19	and	this	dissertation	is	primarily	concerned	with	the	latter.	
1	2	Rationale	and	motivation	
1	2	1	Using	human	rights	law	to	address	poverty	and	inequality	
A	majority	of	 South	Africans	 still	 experience	deeply	entrenched	poverty	and	 inequality,	
twenty-two	 years	 after	 the	 end	 of	 apartheid.	 It	 is	 visible	 in	 structural	 socio-economic	
terms	where	many	people	 still	 do	not	have	 access	 to	housing,	 electricity,	water,	 health	
care,	 employment	and	quality	education.	 It	 is	 also	expressed	 in	 the	 sense	of	 frustration	
and	disempowerment	expressed	and	experienced	by	poor	people.20	Policy	and	legislative	
efforts	to	combat	poverty	and	inequality	over	the	past	two	decades	have	certainly	made	
inroads	 and	 advanced	 democratic	 development	 in	 South	 Africa.	 The	 courts	 have	 also	
played	 an	 integral	 role	 in	 respecting,	 promoting,	 protecting	 and	 fulfilling	 the	 human	
rights	of	poor	people.		
The	 realisation	 of	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 transformation	 requires	 collaboration	
between	the	legislature,	the	executive,	the	judiciary	and	all	organs	of	state,	as	well	as	the	
private	 sector.	 Human	 rights	 law	 can	 assist	 in	 combatting	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 by	
applying	a	normative	 framework	to	 interventions	or	to	 inaction	on	the	part	of	 the	state	
and	 non-state	 actors.	 The	 legacy	 of	 apartheid	 and	 the	 ongoing	 challenge	 of	 socio-
																																								 																				
19 See F Cachalia “Separation of Powers, Active Liberty and the Allocation of Public Resources: The E-Tolling 
Case” (2015) 132(2) SALJ 285–312; S Friedman “Enabling Agency: The Constitutional Court and Social Policy” 
(2016) 91(1) Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 19–39; J Fowkes Building the 
Constitution (2016); J Fowkes “Latest Developments in the South African Court’s Most Expansive Socio-
Economic Rights Doctrine — The Need for Meaningful Engagement about Meaningful Engagement” Blog of the 
IACL, AIDC, 9 August 2017 <https://iacl-aidc-blog.org/2017/08/09/analysis-latest-developments-in-the-south-
african-courts-most-expansive-socio-economic-rights-doctrine-the-need-for-meaningful-engagement-about-
meaningful-engagement/> (accessed 3-10-2017) ; J Klaaren “A Delicate Dialogue: Courts, the Executive and 
Social Policy in South Africa” in D Plaatjies (ed) Future Inheritance: Building State Capacity in Democratic 
South Africa (2011) 118–30; J Klaaren “A Second Look at the South African Human Rights Commission, 
Access to Information, and the Promotion of Socio-economic Rights” (2005) 2 Human Rights Quarterly 539–
61; G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction (2015) chap 4; S Woolman The 
Selfless Constitution: Experimentalism and Flourishing as Foundations of South Africa’s Basic Law (2013). 
20 See discussion of service delivery protests as evidence of inadequate service delivery as well as frustration 
at the lack of effective voice and participation in service delivery by poor people in: J Dugard “Urban Basic 
Services” in Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance (2015) 275-309, 286-291; and R 
Pithouse “The University of Abahlali baseMjondolo’ (2007) <http://abahlali.org/node/2814/> (accessed 15-
06-2017). 
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economic	development	means	that	South	Africa	 is	 struggling	to	overcome	high	rates	of	
poverty,	 defined	 broadly	 as	 multiple	 deprivations,	 including	 disempowerment.	 The	
underlying	 rationale	 for	 this	 dissertation	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 application	 of	 human	
rights	law	to	the	ongoing	manifestations	of	poverty	and	inequality	in	order	to	ameliorate	
material	conditions,	as	well	as	create	a	sense	of	agency	and	empowerment	for	people.		
1	2	2	Applying	an	integrated	human	rights	law	approach	to	poverty	reduction	
The	 international	and	national	human	rights	discourse	on	poverty	reduction,	requires	a	
multi-dimensional	approach	in	policy	and	law	to	address	poverty.	The	multi-dimensional	
nature	 of	 poverty	 from	 a	 development	 economics’	 perspective	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	
various	 socio-economic	 and	 civil	 and	 political	 rights	 identified	 in	 international	 human	
rights	 law	and	 reflected	 in	 the	South	African	Bill	 of	Rights.	Both	 socio-economic	 rights	
and	 civil	 and	 political	 rights,	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 information	 and	
administrative	justice,	are	relevant	to	poverty	reduction.	As	Amartya	Sen	pointed	out	in	
Development	as	Freedom,21	the	reduction	of	poverty	needs	to	be	tangibly	felt	through	an	
individual	experience	of	autonomy	and	empowerment	and	through	a	systemic	experience	
of	improvement	in	the	actual	living	conditions	of	poor	people.		
The	inclusion	of	justiciable	civil,	political	and	socio-economic	rights	in	the	Bill	of	Rights	
of	the	South	African	Constitution,	symbolises	an	understanding	that	full	transformation	
from	an	apartheid	society	requires	both	a	reconfiguration	of	the	legal-political	structures	
that	 upheld	 it,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 devastating	 social	 and	 economic	
consequences	of	its	policies	and	laws.	In	this	dissertation,	I	explore	the	complementarity	
of	administrative	 justice	and	socio-economic	rights,	 in	how	they	can	be	interpreted	and	
utilised	to	tackle	poverty	and	inequality,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
	
	
																																								 																				
21 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999). 
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1	2	3	Recognising	the	transformative	complementarity	of	socio-economic	rights	and	
administrative	justice	to	address	poverty	in	a	democratic	developmental	state	
The	 aims	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 for	 socio-economic	 transformation	
through	economic	progress	coupled	with	social	welfare,	are	intertwined	with	the	need	to	
lift	people	out	of	a	 sense	of	despair	at	 their	 situation	and	empower	 them	to	be	actively	
engaged	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 country.	 It	 also	means	 that	 in	 the	 current	 state	 of	
South	 Africa,	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 accountability	 of	 public	 institutions	 are	
necessary	 to	a	developmental	state.	Due	to	the	rapid	transformations	 in	 the	nature	and	
structure	 of	modern	 society	 and	 the	 rise	 in	 prominence	 of	 human	 rights,	 the	 realm	 of	
administrative	law	has	begun	to	widen	and	deepen	into	socio-economic	spheres.	Societal	
and	political	changes,	such	as	 the	rise	of	 the	welfare	state	and	the	developmental	state,	
have	had	a	 significant	 impact	on	 the	 role	of	 contemporary	 administrative	 law.	There	 is	
extensive	debate	about	the	political	relationship	between	the	judiciary,	the	executive	and	
the	 legislature,	 and	 between	 private	 and	 public	 actors.	 In	 the	 present	 South	 African	
political,	economic	and	legal	dispensation,	they	have	a	direct	and	indirect	impact	on	the	
ongoing	situation	of	the	poor.	It	 is	within	this	context	that	this	dissertation	proposes	to	
investigate	 the	 complementary	 role	 of	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights	
that	 can	better	 serve	 the	 transformative	project	 of	 the	Constitution,	 in	 a	 South	African	
democratic	developmental	state.		
1	3	Research	aims	and	hypotheses		
The	 primary	 research	 question	 investigated	 in	 this	 dissertation	 is	 the	 complementary	
contribution	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	to	tackling	poverty	and	
inequality,	in	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state. A	number	of	cases	related	
to	 the	 rights	 to	 social	 security,	 education,	 housing	 and	water	 in	 particular,	 have	 come	
before	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 over	 the	 past	 22	 years	 and	 illustrated	 the	 potential	
complementarity	 between	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 just	 administrative	
action	in	addressing	poverty.	However,	the	interdependence	of	these	rights	in	the	context	
of	poverty	has	not	been	properly	 explored	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	 courts,	 or	 in	 the	
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legal	literature,	and	therefore	lacks	conceptual	clarity	and	coherence.	In	this	dissertation	I	
investigate	 the	 conceptual	 underpinnings	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	
justice	 in	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 with	 a	 view	 to	 elucidating	 their	 mutually	
supportive	and	reinforcing	potential	as	partners	 in	the	project	of	poverty	reduction	in	a	
democratic	developmental	state,22	with	distinct	but	interconnected	roles	to	play.		
The	 argument	 is	 firstly	 built	 on	 the	 concepts	 of	 transformative	 constitutionalism,	
participatory	 democracy	 and	 autonomy,	 which	 characterise	 the	 South	 African	
Constitution	 and	 the	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 As	 introduced	
above,	 our	 Constitution	 enables	 the	 socio-economic	 transformation	 of	 South	 African	
society	from	one	which	is	racially	divided	and	unequal	to	one	which	supports	prosperity	
for	all.	 In	addition	to	addressing	material	deprivations	of	 those	 in	need,	mechanisms	to	
support	 participation	 and	 agency	 of	 poor	 and	marginalised	 communities	 are	 central	 to	
achieving	this	transformation.		
Over	the	past	decade,	the	concept	of	South	Africa	as	a	developmental	state	as	opposed	to	
a	welfare	 state,	 has	 taken	 root,	 but	 unlike	 the	Asian	developmental	 states,	 needs	 to	 be	
imbued	 with	 the	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	 democratic	 notions	 embedded	 in	 our	
transformative	 Constitution.23	 A	 developmental	 state	 excels	 in	 the	 basics	 of	 public	
administration,	 maintains	 autonomous	 institutions	 and	 intervenes	 strategically	 in	 the	
economy	 to	 promote	 socio-economic	 development.	 A	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	
discourse	 of	 the	 South	 African	 developmental	 state	 is	 that	 it	must	 be	 people-oriented,	
accountable	and	capable	of	addressing	the	socio-economic	needs	of	its	entire	population,	
especially	 the	 poor,	 marginalised	 and	 historically	 disadvantaged.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 by	
developing	 the	 interlinkages	 between	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights,	
																																								 																				
22 See footnote 2 above and the discussion of poverty in chapter three. Various terms are used to refer to anti-
poverty measures. These include: poverty reduction, poverty relief, poverty alleviation and poverty eradication. 
Although they do not mean the same thing, the terms are often used interchangeably and without explanation. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a detailed discussion of the different terms, but suffice it 
to say that the term ‘poverty reduction’ is preferred and used throughout this dissertation. See 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/02/05/povertyreductioninpractice> (accessed 22-09-
2017). 
23 South African National Planning Commission “National Development Plan Vision 2030: Our Future – Make it 
Work” <http://www.gov.za/speeches/national-development-plan-2030-31-aug-2016-0000> (accessed 29-09-
2016). 
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the	 vision	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 and	 effective	 socio-economic	
transformation	can	be	supported.	It	is	the	current	conception	of	the	South	African	state	
that	should	frame	the	development	of	policy	and	law	by	the	executive,	the	legislature	and	
the	judiciary	in	the	area	of	poverty	reduction,	both	in	terms	of	substance	and	process,	and	
the	interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	by	the	judiciary.	
1	4	Methodology		
Historically,	 poverty	 has	 been	 defined	 and	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 money	 or	 income.	
Although	the	monetary	poverty	line	approach	provides	a	clear	and	accessible	definition	of	
absolute	 poverty	 and	 allows	 for	 various	 types	 of	 regional	 and	 global	 comparisons,	 it	
nonetheless	 has	 considerable	 shortcomings.	 More	 recently	 there	 is	 a	 trend	 towards	 a	
relative	approach	to	poverty	based	on	multiple	dimensions.24	The	experience	of	poverty	is	
thus	 being	 recognised	 as	multi-faceted,	 subject	 to	 volatility	 and	 encompasses	 time	 and	
relativity	 elements.	 It	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 material	 and	 psychological	 deprivations	
experienced	 by	 the	 poor.	 There	 is	 also	 a	much	 greater	 recognition	 of	 the	 non-material	
aspects	of	deprivation,	such	as	inclusion,	participation	and	empowerment.		
This	 dissertation	 examines	 the	 multi-dimensional	 concept	 of	 poverty	 in	 development	
economics25	 and	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 poverty	 reduction,	 which	
includes	 socio-economic	 rights,	 civil	 and	 political	 rights,	 and	 newer	 “hybrid”	 types	 of	
rights	 such	 as	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice.26	 These	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	
foundations	 embody	 the	 notion	 that	 for	 an	 individual	 or	 community	 to	 truly	 be	
transformed	and	freed	from	the	cycle	of	poverty,	not	only	must	their	material	needs	be	
met,	 but	 their	 autonomy	 and	 participation	 in	 the	 decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 lives	must	
																																								 																				
24 See the Multidimensional Poverty Index published for the first time in the 2010 Human Development Report 
<http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi> (accessed 12-09-2015). 
25 See chapter three. 
26 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Human Rights and Poverty 
Reduction: A Conceptual Framework (2004); and Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to 
Poverty Reduction Strategies (2006) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
PovertyReductionen.pdf>  (accessed 10-07-2016). 
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also	be	respected.	This	is	the	premise	of	Amartya	Sen’s	capability	definition	of	poverty.27	
It	 says	 that	 poverty	 is	multidimensional	 in	 nature	 and	 its	 opposite,	 well-being,	 can	 be	
thought	 of	 as	 the	 quality	 of	 a	 person’s	 life.	 Thus,	 the	 level	 of	 well-being	 depends	 on	
whether	and	how	well	a	person	can	do	or	be	the	things	he	or	she	has	reason	to	value,	for	
example	how	well	a	person	can	participate	 in	 the	 life	of	a	community	and	be	 free	 from	
hunger.	 The	 concept	 of	 “capability”	 refers	 to	 a	 person’s	 freedom	 or	 opportunities	 to	
achieve	well-being	in	this	sense.28	
In	order	for	the	full	impact	of	the	rights	in	the	Constitution	to	be	felt	amongst	the	poor,	
substance	 must	 be	 given	 to	 these	 rights,	 and	 not	 mere	 rhetoric.	 This	 dissertation	
therefore,	 analyses	 the	 content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 as	
interpreted	 by	 the	 Courts,	 for	 interlinkages	 and	 mutual	 reinforcement	 in	 overcoming	
multi-dimensional	poverty	 and	 inequality.	The	primary	 role	of	 socio-economic	 rights	 is	
the	 provision	 of	 the	 material	 needs	 of	 people,	 namely	 water,	 housing,	 income	 (social	
security),	 education	and	 food.	The	primary	 role	of	 the	 right	 to	administrative	 justice	 in	
this	 context,	 is	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	 right	 of	 recipients	 of	 government	 services	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 decisions	 affecting	 their	 access	 to	 such	 services,	 and	 to	 compel	
government	 actors	 to	 justify	 their	 conduct	 with	 reference	 to	 their	 constitutional	
obligations.		
This	dissertation	will	thus	focus	on	the	judicial	interpretation	and	enforcement	of	socio-
economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	and	their	interaction	in	relation	to	addressing	
poverty	 and	 inequality	 in	 a	 democratic,	 developmental	 South	 Africa.	 I	 will	 explore	 a	
complementary	judicial	interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	
that	can	better	serve	the	transformative	project	of	the	Constitution,	by	engaging	with	the	
normative	 purposes	 and	 values	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 just	
administrative	action.	
																																								 																				
27 A Sen “Well-being, agency and freedom: the Dewey lectures 1984” Journal of Philosophy (1985) 82; A Sen 
Commodities and Capabilities (1985); A Sen Development as Freedom (1999). 
28 Sen Development as Freedom. See also S Van Der Berg A capabilities approach to the judicial review of 
resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2015). 
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1	5	Overview	of	chapters	
The	 second	 chapter	 articulates	 the	 foundational,	 legal-philosophical	 and	 political-
economy	tenets	of	the	dissertation.	I	discuss	the	origination	and	evolution	of	the	concept	
of	 transformative	constitutionalism	in	South	Africa	 in	relation	to	the	goal	of	addressing	
poverty	 and	 inequality	 and	 as	 a	 normative	 framework	 for	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	state.	Our	transformative	Constitution,	and	in	particular	the	Bill	of	Rights,	
has	 a	 critical	 role	 to	 play	 in	 advancing	 poverty	 reduction	 through	 the	 courts,	 the	
legislature	 and	 the	 executive.	 I	 explore	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 as	 the	
foundation	 upon	which	 the	 South	African	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 is	 built	 and	
held	to	account.		
This	is	followed	by	an	overview	of	the	history	of	the	developmental	state	globally	and	in	
South	 Africa.	 This	 section	 explores	 the	 discourse	 of	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 in	government	 statements,	policy	pronouncements	and	documents	
after	the	end	of	apartheid	in	1994.	It	examines	the	stated	intention	to	move	away	from	a	
welfare	 state,	 as	 the	 government	 seeks	 to	 address	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 through	
economic	 growth	 and	 long-term	 institutional	 capability.	 It	 then	 describes	 what	
constitutes	a	democratic	developmental	state	-	as	defined	by	Peter	Evans	and	termed	the	
21st	century	developmental	state.29	
The	enhancement	of	human	capabilities	 and	 the	attainment	of	 equity,	 two	key	aims	of	
the	democratic	 developmental	 state,	 requires	 the	 efficient	 provision	 of	 collective	 goods	
such	 as	 health,	 education	 and	 social	welfare,	 which	 in	 turn	 depends	 on	 administrative	
capacity	 and	 democratic	 structures.	 Based	 on	 development	 theory,	 in	 particular	 Sen’s	
work,	 Evans	 observes	 that	 development	 strategies	 and	 policy	 must	 be	 derived	 from	
democratic	 public	 deliberation.30	Deliberative	 and	 participatory	 democratic	 institutions	
are	thus	essential	elements	of	the	South	African	democratic	developmental	state.	In	the	
																																								 																				
29 P Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state: potentialities and pitfalls” in O Edigheji (ed) 
Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa (2010) 37-58.  
30 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in SA. His three strands of development theory are largely based on A Sen Development as Freedom 
(1999), the initiator of the “capability approach” in development theory. See chapter two. 
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chapter	 I	 then	 discuss	 the	 links	 between	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	 forms	 of	
democracy	 and	 broader	 attainment	 of	 socio-economic	 development.	 I	 explore	 Sen’s	
notion	 of	 the	 “constituent”	 relationship	 between	 development	 and	 democracy,	
understood	more	broadly	 in	 the	context	of	human	 lives,31	as	 reinforcing	 the	democratic	
developmental	state.	
The	 third	 chapter	 commences	with	 a	 description	 of	 the	multi-dimensional	 elements	 of	
poverty	reflected	in	development	economics.	This	is	followed	by	a	contextual	description	
of	 the	 multi-dimensional	 situation	 of	 poverty	 in	 South	 Africa,	 which	 still	 requires	
widespread	 redress.	 I	 then	 set	 out	 the	 human	 rights	 discourse	 in	 relation	 to	 poverty	
reduction,	 at	 an	 international	 and	national	 level.	 I	 also	 discuss	 those	 civil	 and	political	
rights	 relevant	 to	 poverty	 reduction,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice.	 The	
section	will	 explore	 the	 links	 between	 the	multi-dimensional	 nature	 of	 poverty	 from	 a	
development	 economics’	 perspective	 and	 the	 various	 socio-economic	 and	 participatory	
rights	identified	in	international	human	rights	law	and	in	the	South	African	Bill	of	Rights.	
A	multi-faceted	approach	 in	policy	and	 law	 is	 required	 to	address	poverty,	both	 from	a	
normative	 and	 experiential	 perspective	 of	 poverty.	 A	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 in	 designing	 and	 applying	 poverty	 reduction	 measures,	 needs	 to	
consider	 the	 tangible,	 lived	 experience	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 agency	 as	well	 as	 the	meagre	 living	
conditions	of	poor	people	in	South	Africa.			
In	 chapters	 four	 and	 five	 I	 analyse	 the	 philosophical	 and	 historical	 underpinnings	 of	
socio-economic	rights	and	just	administrative	action	in	the	South	African	jurisprudence.	
The	right	to	administrative	justice	and	socio-economic	rights	are	all	instruments	that	can	
be	 sharpened	 further	 to	 tackle	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	
state	and	thereby	transform	our	society	from	its	oppressive	past.		
The	debate	about	the	normative	values	and	purpose	of	the	socio-economic	provisions	of	
the	 1996	Constitution	 and	 in	 particular,	 the	 judicial	 involvement	 in	 their	 realisation,	 is	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 four.	 This	 debate	 reflects	 the	 underlying	 tension	 within	 the	
																																								 																				
31 Sen Development as Freedom 347. 
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separation	 of	 powers	 doctrine	 as	 facilitating	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 under	
certain	circumstances,	and	at	 the	same	time	 frustrating	social	 justice	 through	an	overly	
deferential	 approach	 when	 the	 executive	 and	 administration	 neglects	 the	 needs	 and	
interests	of	 the	poor.	The	chapter	sketches	the	typical	 fears	raised	regarding	the	role	of	
the	 judiciary	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ideological	 legitimacy	of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 and	 the	
institutional	legitimacy	and	competence	of	courts	in	socio-economic	matters.	It	explores	
and	 expands	 the	 legitimate	 constitutional	 role	 of	 the	 South	 African	 Courts	 in	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state.	 It	 looks	 at	 the	 substantive	 and	 collaborative	
interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	in	the	Constitution,	the	evaluation	of	government	
compliance	with	the	duties	they	impose,	the	adjudication	of	the	validity	of	legislation	and	
policy	 in	 the	 socio-economic	 realm	 and	 the	 remedies	 for	 state	 non-compliance	 with	
socio-economic	obligations.	
Chapter	 five	 provides	 a	 South	 African	 analysis	 of	 the	 potential	 (and	 actual)	 role	 of	
administrative	 law	 in	 poverty	 reduction,	 in	 relation	 to	 access	 to	 material	 benefits	 and	
poor	 people’s	 sense	 of	 empowerment	 and	 autonomy	 over	 their	 lives.	 This	
conceptualisation	of	administrative	 justice	will	be	placed	alongside	the	work	that	socio-
economic	 rights	 are	 able	 to	 do	 for	 the	 poor	 and	 marginalised,	 within	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.	Due	to	the	applicability	of	administrative	justice	to	a	wide	spectrum	
of	topics,	the	South	African	courts	have	considered	a	number	of	cases	on	the	use	of	the	
right	 to	 just	 administrative	 action	 to	 protect	 and	 advance	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 poor.	 In	
chapter	five,	the	history,	scope	of	application	and	content	of	this	right	is	firstly	outlined	
and	thereafter	 the	efficacy	and	substance	of	 the	right	 in	cases	related	to	social	security,	
housing,	water	and	education	rights	is	analysed.		
Finally,	in	chapter	six,	I	explore	the	interdependence	of	human	rights	in	the	South	African	
jurisprudence,	with	a	 focus	on	socio-economic	and	administrative	 justice	 rights.	 I	make	
suggestions	for	a	proactive,	substantive,	democratic	adjudicatory	approach	for	the	courts,	
in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 the	 conceptual	 interconnections	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	 justice,	 and	 thereby	 advance	 a	 South	African	 democratic	 developmental	
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state.	I	then	examine	the	critical	issues	regarding	the	interaction	between	socio-economic	
rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 relation	 to	 addressing	 poverty	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state:	the	scope	of	application	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	
justice;	the	corresponding	duties	under	these	rights;	the	overlap	and	complementarity	of	
reasonableness	 review;	 the	 concept	 of	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 and	 its	 synergy	 with	
procedural	 fairness;	 and	 remedies	 and	 their	 enforcement.	 I	 outline	 a	 complementary	
judicial	interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	that	can	better	
serve	the	transformative	project	of	the	Constitution.		
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CHAPTER 2: Socio-economic transformation in a South 
African democratic developmental state 
 
2	1	Introduction	
Mass	poverty	in	its	various	guises,	continues	to	present	a	considerable	challenge	for	South	
Africa.32	 Notwithstanding	 ongoing	 debates	 about	 how	 best	 to	 describe	 and	 measure	
poverty,	while	poverty	remains	very	widespread,	the	available	data	points	to	a	reduction	
in	extreme	destitution	in	recent	years.	This	 is	to	a	 large	extent	due	to	the	redistributive	
targeting	and	successful	impact	of	a	number	of	laws,	policies	and	programmes	aimed	at	
addressing	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 implemented	 in	 the	 country	 since	 the	 demise	 of	
apartheid.	 The	 transformation	 from	 a	 racially-based,	 resource-biased	 society	 to	 an	
egalitarian	 one	where	 all	 enjoy	 the	 aims,	 values	 and	 rights	 upheld	 in	 our	Constitution,	
requires	a	concerted	effort	by	all	institutional	players	to	redress	the	material	as	well	as	the	
psycho-socio-political	deficiencies	that	continue	to	inhibit	the	full	enjoyment	of	our	new	
democracy	for	approximately	half	the	population.		
This	chapter	articulates	the	theoretical,	legal-philosophical	and	political-economy	tenets	
of	 the	 dissertation,	 beginning	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 transformative	 constitutionalism.	 The	
origin	and	evolution	of	 the	 concept	of	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 in	South	Africa	
and	what	 it	means	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 goal	 of	 addressing	poverty	 and	 inequality	will	
firstly	be	discussed.	The	Constitution,	 and	 in	particular	 the	Bill	 of	Rights,	has	 a	 critical	
role	 to	play	 in	 advancing	poverty	 reduction	 through	 the	 courts,	 the	 legislature	 and	 the	
executive.	The	rights	to	life,	equality,	dignity,	administrative	 justice	and	socio-economic	
rights,	 it	 will	 be	 argued,	 are	 all	 instruments	 that	 can	 be	 sharpened	 further	 to	 tackle	
poverty	and	inequality	and	thereby	transform	our	society	from	its	shackled	past.	
Transformative	 constitutionalism	 is	 the	 legal-philosophical	 framework	 for	 the	 South	
African	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 (evolved	 from	 a	 welfare	 state)	 as	 it	 seeks	 to	
																																								 																				
32 See chapter three. 
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eradicate	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 The	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 must	 be	
underpinned	 by	 the	 values	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 autonomy	 in	 its	 quest	 to	
achieve	an	egalitarian	society	free	of	poverty.	I	argue	that	the	South	African	government’s	
shift	in	the	last	decade	from	a	welfare	state	approach	to	a	developmental	state	approach,	
both	 in	 its	discourse	and	 its	 long-term	plans	and	policies,	 accentuates	 the	need	 for	 the	
state	 to	 be	 more	 interventionist	 in	 the	 economy	 in	 order	 to	 address	 poverty	 and	
inequality	 and	 for	 giving	 individuals	 more	 autonomy	 over	 their	 own	 development.33	 I	
outline	the	political-economy	underpinnings	of	the	South	African	government’s	historical	
and	 current	 policy	 responses	 to	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 inequality	 and	 the	 collaborative	
role	of	all	players	in	society	in	the	democratic	development	project.		
In	the	following	sections	I	analyse	the	links	between	public	reasoning,	democracy	and	the	
attainment	 of	 socio-economic	 justice,	 as	 fundamental	 to	 a	 democratic	 developmental	
state.	Sen	argues	that	the	attainment	of	social	justice,	without	public	reasoning	based	on	
participatory	 and	 deliberative	 democratic	 models,	 is	 not	 possible.	 I	 then	 examine	 the	
participatory	and	deliberative	dimensions	of	democracy	in	the	South	African	Constitution	
that	 support	 the	 transformation	 project.	 These	 aspects	 of	 the	 Constitution	 aid	 the	
development	of	South	Africa	by	providing	a	voice	 for	people	deeply	affected	by	poverty	
and	 mechanisms	 for	 deliberation	 on	 solutions	 and	 participation	 in	 decision-making.	 I	
argue	 that	 administrative	 justice	 can	 potentially	 play	 a	 complementary	 role	 to	 socio-
economic	rights	in	a	transformative	constitution	for	the	poor	and	marginalised,	as	well	as	
to	the	notion	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	in	addressing	poverty	and	inequality.		
This	 chapter	 thus	 lays	 the	 theoretical	 foundations	 for	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	
interconnectedness	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	
poverty	in	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state	that	follows	in	the	subsequent	
																																								 																				
33 See for example the following perspectives of South Africa’s “neo-liberal” model of development, as opposed 
to a democratic developmental state approach: UNRISD “Redistributive, Neo-liberal or New Paradigm: New 
Directions in Social Policy in South Africa” (March 2015) <http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/ 
(httpAuxPages)/0AB630FF08F614C1C1257E22003056F5/$file/PB11e%20NDSP%20South%20Africa.pdf> 
(accessed 20-07-2016); S Vally & E Motala (eds) Education, Economy and Society (2012). I argue here that 
the National Development Plan, industrial policy and other economic policies reflect at least on paper, a 
developmental state approach. 
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chapters.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	 widespread	 poverty,	 the	 work	 that	 socio-
economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	can	do	together	to	support	the	poor	to	access	
material	benefits,	as	well	as	to	have	a	say	over	the	form	and	delivery	of	those	benefits	and	
rights,	 is	 equally	 necessary	 to	 overcome	 poverty.	 Participation	 and	 empowerment	 are	
central	means	and	ends	in	our	transformative	Constitution,	as	well	as	in	the	notion	of	a	
South	African	democratic	developmental	state.		
2	2	Transformative	constitutionalism	
This	 section	 will	 discuss	 the	 origin,	 content	 and	 implications	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
transformative	constitutionalism	in	South	Africa,	against	the	backdrop	of	the	situation	of	
poverty	 and	 inequality	 sketched	 above	 and	 as	 an	 overarching	 legal	 and	 normative	
framework	 for	 a	 South	African	democratic,	 developmental	 state.	A	brief	 account	of	 the	
concept	 of	 “transformative	 constitutionalism”,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 South	 African	
Constitution,	is	presented	here	in	order	to	lay	the	legal-philosophical	foundations	for	the	
role	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	 poverty	 and	
inequality	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 The	 notion	 of	 “transformative	
constitutionalism”	 supported	 herein	 embraces	 both	 an	 outcomes-based	 and	 an	
institutional	reform	view,	as	it	links	to	the	need	for	substance	and	form	in	remedying	the	
situation	of	poverty	faced	by	many	in	the	country.34	An	outcomes-based	view	refers	to	the	
achievement	of	the	visible	amelioration	of	the	situation	of	poverty	for	millions	of	people,	
where,	 for	 example,	 access	 to	 housing,	 quality	 education	 and	 health	 services	 results	 in	
improved	quality	of	 life	 and	educational	 attainment.	An	 institutional	 view	 refers	 to	 the	
processes	 that	 must	 ensure	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 institutions,	 the	 effective	 fulfilment	 of	
their	role	and	the	inclusion	of	the	voices	of	poor	people	in	determining	the	substance	of	
poverty	reduction	interventions.	The	Constitution,	and	in	particular	the	Bill	of	Rights,	has	
a	critical	role	to	play	 in	advancing	poverty	reduction	through	the	courts,	 the	 legislature	
and	the	executive,	in	an	evolving	democratic,	developmental	state.	
																																								 																				
34 See D Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative politics LLD thesis University of 
Stellenbosch (2009) 4 and footnotes 12, 13, 14 and 15. I support what Danie Brand refers to as a “results-
oriented” interpretation of transformative constitutionalism, at the same time as supporting the need for 
reform “of the institutions and systems that produce results themselves” as an integral part of transformation.  
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It	 is	 widely	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 is	 a	 progressive	 and	
transformative	 legal	 instrument.35	As	 the	 supreme	 law,	 its	purpose	 is	 to	 regulate	public	
power	and	to	frame	“an	objective,	normative	value	system”36	in	a	post-apartheid	society.	
All	law	and	conduct	must	conform	to	its	provisions,	failing	which	it	is	invalid.	It	is	argued	
here	 that	 it	 applies	 equally	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 conceptions	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	
relationship	 to	 the	 economy,	 society	 and	 citizens,	 discussed	 below	 as	 the	 democratic,	
developmental	 state.	 This	 system	 of	 normative	 values	 seeks	 to	 fulfil	 a	 constitutional	
imperative	 to	 remedy	South	Africa’s	 past	 and	 “transform	our	 society	 into	one	 in	which	
there	 will	 be	 human	 dignity,	 freedom	 and	 equality”,37	 and	 is	 vividly	 expressed	 in	 the	
Preamble	to	the	Constitution,	and	then	in	section	7(1),38	in	the	Bill	of	Rights	(Chapter	2)	
and	throughout	the	Constitution.	
The	South	African	Constitution	embraces	notions	of	participatory	democracy,	social,	and	
economic	 equality,	 protection	 of	 culture,	 openness,	 and	 transparency.	 As	 Karl	 Klare	
points	out	in	his	seminal	article:		
																																								 																				
35 See discussion of the “transformative” vision of the Constitution and the difficulties and potential of 
achieving this vision through the constitutional jurisprudence of the courts in C Albertyn and B Goldblatt 
“Facing the challenges of transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of 
equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248; A J van der Walt “Tentative urgency: Sensitivity for the paradoxes of stability 
and change in the social transformation decisions of the Constitutional Court” (2001) 16 SAPR/PL 1-27; D 
Moseneke “The fourth Bram Fischer memorial lecture: Transforming adjudication” (2002) 18 SAJHR 309; H 
Botha, A J van der Walt and J van der Walt (eds) Rights And Democracy in a Transformative Constitution 
(2003); H Botha “Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2)” (2003) 1 TSAR 20-36; 
M Pieterse “What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SAPL 155-
166; A J van der Walt “Legal history, legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy” (2006) 12 
Fundamina 1-47; S Liebenberg “Needs, rights and transformation: Adjudicating social rights” (2006) 1 Stell LR 
5-36; P Langa “Transformative constitutionalism” (2006) 17(3) Stell LR 351-60; and Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 23-78. 
36 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another  2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) para 54. 
37 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 8.  See also Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 25-28. 
38 7. Rights.- 
(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people 
in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, 
or elsewhere in the Bill. 
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“[T]he	South	African	Constitution,	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	classical	liberal	documents,	is	
social,	 redistributive,	 caring,	 positive,	 at	 least	 partly	 horizontal,39	 participatory,	
multicultural,	 and	 self-conscious	 about	 its	historical	 setting	and	 transformative	 role	 and	
mission.”40		
His	 was	 the	 first	 explicit	 characterisation	 of	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 as	
transformative,	 from	 a	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 perspective.	 This	 view	 of	 the	
Constitution	took	hold	firmly	and	has	been	quoted	many	times	in	academic	literature	and	
court	 judgments.41	 The	 transformative	 nature	 of	 the	 Constitution	 provides	 a	 legal	
normative	 framework	 to	 guide	 “the	 redress	 of	 the	 injustices	 of	 the	 past	 as	 well	 as	 to	
facilitate	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 more	 just	 society	 in	 the	 future”.42	 The	 conception	 of	 a	
democratic,	 developmental	 state	 must	 necessarily	 be	 guided	 then	 by	 transformative	
notions	 of	 participatory	 democracy,	 openness,	 transparency,	 accountability	 and	 socio-
economic	development,	and	embedded	in	the	institutions	that	facilitate	the	delivery	out	
of	poverty.	Klare	described	the	South	African	Constitution	as	a	“transformative”	project	in	
the	following	terms:	
“[A]	 long-term	 project	 of	 constitutional	 enactment,	 interpretation	 and	 enforcement	
committed	 (not	 in	 isolation,	 of	 course,	 but	 in	 a	historical	 context	 of	 conducive	political	
developments)	 to	 transforming	 a	 country’s	 political	 and	 social	 institutions	 and	 power	
relationships	 in	 a	 democratic,	 participatory,	 and	 egalitarian	 direction.	 Transformative	
constitutionalism	 connotes	 an	 enterprise	 of	 inducing	 large-scale	 social	 change	 through	
nonviolent	political	processes	grounded	in	law.”43		
																																								 																				
39 Section 8(2): “A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.” See 
also s 8(3). In addition, the equality provision, section 9(4) is explicitly horizontally applicable. 
40 K Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 151, 153. 
41 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para 262; Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) 
para 157; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
paras 73–74; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) para 142; City of Johannesburg v 
Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W) paras 51–52; Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 
(12) BCLR 1328 (C) para 100; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) 
BCLR 847 (CC) paras 343, 344, 360; and Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v 
Hoërskool 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) para 77. 
42 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 25. 
43 Klare (1998) 14 SAJHR 150 [emphasis added]. 
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Marius	 Pieterse	 describes	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	 as	 an	 essentially	 social-
democratic	model,	quite	distinct	from	the	traditional,	liberal	model	of	constitutionalism,	
and	links	this	understanding	to	at	least	three	critical	aspects	that	make	the	constitution	
“transformative”.44		
Firstly,	the	South	African	Constitution	mandates	the	achievement	of	substantive	equality	
and	social	justice	through	the	provisions	of	sections	9,	26,	27,	28	and	29.	Section	9	of	the	
Constitution	 incorporates	 the	 concept	 of	 substantive	 equality,	 which	 involves	 a	
contextual	 group-based	 approach	 to	 discrimination	 and	 domination	 and	 requires	
remedial	measures	designed	to	rectify	the	destructive	effects	of	entrenched	structures	of	
past	 oppression.	 The	 achievement	 of	 substantive	 equality	 also	 necessitates	 that	 the	
material	consequences	of	social	and	economic	subjugation	be	addressed.45	These	ends	are	
further	supported	by	the	inclusion	of	justiciable	civil,	political	and	socio-economic	rights	
in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights.46	 This	 embodies	 recognition	 that	 full	 transformation	 from	 an	
apartheid	 society	 requires	 both	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 legal-political	 structures	 that	
upheld	 it,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 devastating	 social	 and	 economic	
consequences	of	 its	policies	 and	 laws.	The	overwhelming	 levels	of	poverty	 still	 felt	 to	a	
disproportionate	extent	by	those	discriminated	against	during	apartheid,	will	undermine	
the	transformation	project	if	not	addressed.		
Socio-economic	 rights	 have	 increasingly	 been	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 in	 litigation	 and	 in	
monitoring	 and	 advocacy	 related	 to	 the	 government’s	 obligations	 to	 secure	 for	 all	
members	of	 society	 a	 set	of	 social	 goods	 –	 education,	 social	 security,	health	 care,	 food,	
																																								 																				
44 For a summary of the literature on the meaning of “transformative constitutionalism” see Pieterse (2005) 20 
SAPL 156. Though he acknowledges that his interpretation of the concept is not the only tenable one, nor 
should it restrict other interpretations of transformative constitutionalism. A summation of the concept is 
presented here as a key theoretical argument in this dissertation, that a transformative interpretation of the 
Constitution lends itself to supporting the project of reducing poverty and inequality in the country, in particular 
through socio-economic rights and administrative justice. Substance and process are required for true 
transformation. 
45 Pieterse (2005) 20 SAPL 160; Albertyn and Goldblatt (1998) 14 SAJHR 250-251, 253; Moseneke (2002) 
18 SAJHR 318-319; S Liebenberg and M O'Sullivan (2001), “South Africa's new equality legislation: A tool for 
advancing women's socio-economic equality?” Acta Juridica 73 at 81. 
46 Sections 26, 27, 28 and 29 protect the rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security and 
education, as well as the rights of children to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services. 
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water,	 shelter,	 access	 to	 land	 and	 housing.47	 Justiciable	 socio-economic	 rights	 assist	 in	
monitoring	the	State’s	progressive	realisation	of	its	constitutional	obligations	to	the	poor,	
and	 ultimately	 holding	 the	 State	 accountable	 to	 these	 obligations.	 However	 there	 are	
limits	 to	what	 these	 rights	 have	 been	 able	 to	 achieve.	 This	 is	 due,	 in	 particular,	 to	 the	
reluctance	of	 the	court	to	properly	engage	with	the	substance	of	socio-economic	rights,	
the	 deference	 the	 courts	 have	 shown	 in	 the	 granting	 of	 remedies	 and	 the	 difficulties	
experienced	in	relation	to	the	enforcement	of	these	remedies.48	
Secondly,	 the	 achievement	 of	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 transformation	 requires	 a	
“collaborative	enterprise”.49	The	legislature,	the	executive,	the	judiciary	and	all	organs	of	
state	are	all	bound	by	the	Bill	of	Rights	and	are	obliged	to	“respect,	protect,	promote	and	
fulfil”	 its	 mandates.50	 This	 collaborative	 enterprise	 is	 not	 only	 an	 obligation	 upon	 the	
state,	but	also	upon	non-state	actors.51	As	Pieterse	states,	“much	of	substantive	inequality	
is	 rooted	 in	 private	 interrelations”,52	 therefore,	 comprehensively	 addressing	 “socially	
structured	patterns	of	domination”	and	“the	imbalances	in	private	power,	 is	accordingly	
integral	to	the	transformation	project”.53		
Finally,	linked	to	this	is	the	fostering	of	a	“culture	of	justification”54	for	every	exercise	of	
public	 power,	 where	 public	 power	 is	 kept	 in	 check	 for	 compliance	 with	 human	 rights	
standards	as	essential	for	the	transformative	project.55	Pieterse	argues	that	this	is	starkly	
provided	for	in	section	36	of	the	Constitution,	which	determines	that	rights	may	only	be	
																																								 																				
47 Analysis of the jurisprudence and literature on socio-economic rights as a tool in addressing poverty will be 
undertaken in chapter four, including the evolving concept of “meaningful engagement” and participation in 
socio-economic rights, which ties into administrative justice and participatory democracy. 
48 See K Young, “A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of 
Judicial Review” (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 385; B Ray, “Evictions, Aspirations and 
Avoidance” (2013) 5 Constitutional Court Review 173-232; and K Young “Avoidance of Substance in 
Constitutional Rights” (2013) 5 Constitutional Court Review 233-243. See chapter four for a full discussion of 
the role of socio-economic rights in addressing poverty in a democratic developmental state. 
49 T Bollyky The Role of Public Impact Litigation in Addressing the Conditions of the Poor in Post Apartheid 
South Africa presented at the Foundation for Human Rights Conference Celebrating a Decade of Democracy: A 
focus on the last ten years of South Africa's Democracy and the advancement of rights (Durban 22-25 January 
2004) 1. 
50 Section 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution.  
51 Section 8(3) and (4). Section 39(2). 
52 Pieterse (2005) 20 SAPL 161. 
53 Pieterse (2005) 20 SAPL 161. 
54 See Mureinik “A Bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. 
55 Pieterse (2005) 20 SAPL 161, 163. 
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limited	 by	 laws	 that	 are	 reasonable	 and	 justifiable	 in	 “an	 open	 and	 democratic	 society	
based	 on	 human	 dignity,	 equality	 and	 freedom”.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 derived	 from	
reasonableness	 review	 in	 sections	 26(2)	 and	 27(2),	 which	 requires	 an	 “exercise	 in	
proportionality	 informed	 by	 a	 proper	 analysis	 of	 the	 normative	 commitments	 of	 the	
relevant	rights	and	the	impact	of	the	deprivation	of	the	particular	resource	or	service	at	
issue	on	the	claimant	group”.56	The	rights	of	access	to	 information	(section	32)	and	just	
administrative	action	(section	33)	similarly	play	a	critical	role	in	societal	transformation	in	
that	they	seek	to	keep	a	check	on	public	power	by	providing	citizens	with	the	information	
and	procedural	and	substantive	protection	required	for	empowerment	and	autonomy	of	
the	poor	 and	 vulnerable	 in	 our	 society.57	 The	 right	 to	 just	 administrative	 action58	 is	 an	
increasingly	constructive	 tool,	 for	 the	assessment	and	enforcement	of	efforts	 to	address	
poverty	and	inequality,	and	is	thereby	transformative.59	It	focuses	on	the	implementation	
of	 legislation60	 based	on	 the	broad,	 overarching	 requirements	 of	 lawfulness,	 procedural	
fairness	 and	 reasonableness	 -	 elements	 which	 require	 a	 “culture	 of	 justification”	 when	
rights	are	at	risk.61	The	reasonableness	component	of	administrative	justice,	in	particular,	
insists	on	substantive	justification	for	all	public	action.62	
																																								 																				
56 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 163-198 discussion on reconceiving reasonableness in substantive 
terms, and at 198. 
57 See section 2 5 below and chapter five. 
58 Section 33 of the Constitution:  
“1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be 
given written reasons. 
3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights and must 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate an 
independent and impartial tribunal, 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration.” 
59 See further chapter five on the potential of administrative justice to support transformative 
constitutionalism. 
60 See the exclusion of s 85(2)(b) of the Constitution from the definition of administrative action in section 1 of 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). 
61 Note that section 33(2) includes the right to be given reasons for administrative action, in circumstances 
where rights have been adversely affected. 
62 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
paras 44-45, and Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (8) BCLR 872 
(CC) paras 187-188. In both cases, O’Regan J affirmed that under the 1996 Constitution and PAJA, the review 
functions of the court now have a substantive as well as a procedural ingredient. In assessing the 
reasonableness of administrative action, the circumstances of a case are critical and there are a number of 
factors which are relevant to determining whether a decision is reasonable or not and which require the court 
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As	was	said	in	Premier,	Mpumalanga,	there	are	two	constitutional	imperatives	arising	out	
of	 the	 South	 African	 transformative	 Constitution,	 in	 relation	 to	 addressing	 poverty:	
substantive	 redress	 and	procedural	 fairness.63	The	 challenge	 is	 to	 find	a	proper	balance	
between	these	two	constitutional	imperatives.64	This	inquiry	attempts	to	find	a	harmony	
of	form	and	substance	in	the	context	of	a	transformative	project	that	is	mired	in	political	
and	 ideological	 challenges.65	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-
economic	rights	can	do	for	social	justice	and	poverty	reduction	can	be	complementary	if	
the	provisions	are	interpreted	procedurally	as	well	as	substantively.	In	chapters	four	and	
five	 I	 conduct	 an	analysis	 and	evaluation	of	 the	 case	 law	on	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	justice,	in	search	of	a	mutually	supportive	interpretation	of	these	rights	in	
a	democratic	developmental	state.	
Finally,	 of	 relevance	 to	 this	 thesis,	 is	 the	distinction	Danie	Brand66	 draws	between	 two	
understandings	 of	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 amongst	 legal	 commentators:	 the	
first	 “equates	 transformation	 with	 the	 achievement	 of	 certain	 tangible	 results	 or	
outcomes”67	 such	 as	 the	 reduction	 of	 poverty,	 through	 adjudication;	 the	 second,	 with	
which	Brand	aligns	himself,	“refers	to	the	radical	change	of	the	institutions	and	systems	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
to look into the substance of the decision. Factors to determine whether a decision is reasonable include: “the 
nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the 
decision, the reasons given for the decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of 
the decision on the lives and well-being of those affected.” See further chapter five for an in-depth discussion 
of the substantive and procedural elements of the right to just administrative action, in the context of 
addressing poverty. 
63 Premier, Mpumalanga, and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-aided Schools: Eastern 
Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) para 1. 
64 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) para 
265. 
65 See discussion of the classical liberal undertones of South African legal culture which have been hindering 
the progress of transformative constitutionalism in South Africa namely “formalism, deference to legislative 
choices, and dichotomous conceptions of negative and positive rights, public and private law, law and politics”, 
in: M Pieterse “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 at 
396-399; R Teitel “Transitional Jurisprudence: The role of law in political transformation” (1997) 106 Yale LJ 
2009-2080 at 2056; Klare (1998) 14 SAJHR 152. See a thorough discussion of and response to the limiting 
influence of classic liberal legal culture on transformative constitutionalism in Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 43-75. 
66 Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative Politics 2-3. 
67 Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative Politics 2-3 and notes 4-6. 
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that	produce	results	themselves”	including	“their	processes,	manner	of	operation,	modes	
of	reasoning	and	ways	of	doing	things.”68	
In	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 embrace	 both	 of	 the	 above	 understandings	 of	 transformative	
constitutionalism	 as	 I	 set	 out	 to	 discuss	 the	 role	 and	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 courts	 in	
relation	 to	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice,	 in	 a	 democratic,	
developmental	 state.	 I	 argue	 that	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 and	 a	 democratic,	
developmental	state	requires	that	the	courts	should	aspire	to	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	
poverty	 in	 terms	of	material	 outcomes,	 at	 the	 same	 time	using	 its	 adjudicatory	 powers	
and	 powers	 of	 judicial	 review	 to	 examine	 and	 influence	 “the	 systems	 and	 institutions	
themselves”	in	terms	of	“their	processes”	and	“modes	of	reasoning”.	The	participatory	and	
empowerment	elements	in	achieving	socio-economic	justice	require	a	less	quantifiable	–	
but	 no	 less	 important	 –	 account	 of	 the	 role	 of	 courts	 in	 facilitating	 socio-economic	
transformation,	 through	 the	 rights	 to	 administrative	 justice	 and	 the	 participatory	
elements	of	socio-economic	rights	in	a	democratic,	developmental	state.		
2	3	The	South	African	democratic	developmental	state:	Implications	for	socio-
economic	transformation	
Over	the	past	decade,	there	has	been	a	shift	by	the	South	African	government,	away	from	
the	 market-oriented	 economic-policy	 approach	 towards	 a	 more	 “developmental	 state”	
approach.	This	 is	 primarily	 driven	by	 the	 focus	 on	 the	need	 for	 public-sector	 action	 to	
remove	 binding	 constraints	 to	 growth	 through	 a	 range	 of	 strategic	 public-sector	
interventions.69	The	concept	of	the	“developmental	state”	emerged	out	of	East	Asia	in	the	
																																								 																				
68 Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights and Transformative Politics 4-5 and notes 12-15. See Nancy Fraser’s 
distinction between “affirmative” and “transformative” redistribution in N Fraser “Social justice in the age of 
identity politics: Redistribution, recognition, and participation” in N Fraser & A Honneth Redistribution or 
Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) 7, 45-46. She explains “affirmative redistribution” as 
seeking “to redress maldistribution by altering end-state patterns of allocation, without disturbing the 
underlying mechanisms that generate them”, and hence they are superficial as they “leave intact the deep 
political-economic structures that generate injustice”. “Transformative redistribution” on the other hand, 
“seeks to redress end-state injustices precisely by altering the underlying framework that generates them.” 
69 See national macro-economic policy documents: National Treasury Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) (1996) NT <http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/gear/chapters.pdf> and The Presidency 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) (2005) Presidency 
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1980’s	 and	 1990’s	 and	 is	 generally	 used	 to	 mean	 a	 state	 that	 drives	 development,	 in	
contrast	 to	 a	 wholly	 free-market	 approach,	 in	 a	 centralised	 manner.70	 It	 embodies	
particular	economic	and	political	connotations	for	policies	and	institutional	make-up	of	
states.		
The	concept	of	a	developmental	state	has	evolved	into	the	21st	Century	and	been	adapted	
to	the	South	African	democratic	context	as	a	“democratic	developmental	state”.71	Broadly	
speaking,	the	discourse	in	South	Africa	describes	a	state	that	is	determined	to	influence	
the	 direction	 and	 pace	 of	 economic	 development	 by	 directly	 intervening	 in	 the	
development	 process,	 rather	 than	 relying	 on	 the	 uncoordinated	 influence	 of	 market	
forces	 to	 allocate	 resources.	 This	 is	 achieved	 through	 collaboratively	 establishing	
substantive	social	and	economic	goals	to	guide	the	long-term	process	of	development	and	
placing	 responsibility	 on	 all	 actors	 to	 collectively	 strive	 towards	 those	 goals,72	 and	 is	
encapsulated	in	the	National	Development	Plan	2030.73	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
<http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_4/business_case_viability/BC1_Rese
arch_Material/asgisa.pdf> (accessed 30-05-2016). 
70 See discussions on the evolution of the concept of a “developmental state” from East Asia in C Johnson MITI 
and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925-1975 (1982); A Amsden Asia’s next Giant: 
South Korea and Late Industrialisation (1989); R Wade Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role 
of Government in East Asian Industrialisation (1990); Z Onis “The logic of the developmental state” 
Comparative Politics Vol.24 No.1 (1991) 109-126; M Woo-Cumings (ed) The Developmental State (1999), and 
in particular C Johnson “The Development State: Odyssey of a Concept” 32, in that volume; P Evans Embedded 
Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (1995); P B Evans What will the 21st Century Developmental 
State Look Like? Paper presented at Conference at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2006) (Unpublished. 
On file with the author); and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Reclaiming 
Policy Space: Domestic resource mobilization and developmental states (2007) UNCTAD 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ aldcafrica2007_en.pdf> (accessed 31-05-2016). 
71 See W Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state in South Africa DBSA Development Planning 
Division Working Paper Series No.9 (2009); and various chapters in O Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic 
Developmental State in South Africa (2010). 
72 For discussions on South Africa’s evolution from a welfare state to a developmental state see: M Pieterse 
“Beyond the Welfare State: Globalisation of neo-liberal culture and the constitutional protection of social and 
economic rights in South Africa” Stellenbosch Law Review (2003) 1-28; G Rapholo “Towards becoming a 
developmental state: A focus on poverty alleviation” Service Delivery Review Vol 2 No 3 (2003) 24-27; R Levin 
“Building service effectiveness: Integrated governance and the developmental state” Service Delivery Review 
Vol 3 No 1 (2004) 28-35; O Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa: 
Potentials and Challenges (2010); R Southall “Introduction: Can South Africa be a developmental state?” in S 
Buhlungu, J Daniel, R Southall & J Lutchman (eds) State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006 (2006) pp. xvii-
vlv; COSATU “A developmental state for South Africa?” (2005); S Gelb “A South African developmental State: 
What is possible?” Paper presented at the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust’s Tenth Anniversary Colloquium, 
“Engaging silences and unresolved issues in the political economy of South Africa” 21-23 September 2006, 
Cape Town, South Africa; and B Fine The curious incidence of the developmental state in the night-time Paper 
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This	 section	 will	 briefly	 describe	 the	 origins	 and	 characteristics	 of	 20th	 century	
“developmental	 states”,	 particularly	 looking	 at	 the	 economically	 successful	 East	 Asian	
states.	 Then	 the	 political-economy	 underpinnings	 of	 the	 South	 African	 government’s	
historical	 and	 current	 policy	 responses	 to	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 inequality	 will	 be	
elaborated	and	linked	to	the	transformative	constitutional	project	and	the	role	that	socio-
economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	can	play.		
The	 main	 proposition	 of	 this	 section	 is	 that	 South	 Africa	 can	 be	 categorised	 as	 an	
emerging	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 due	 to	 its	 developmentalist	 approach,	 the	
interventionist	role	of	the	state,	the	emergent	institutional	support	for	the	state’s	capacity	
to	 realise	 its	 developmental	 objectives,	 the	 collaborative	 enterprise	 and	 the	
acknowledgement	of	participatory	democracy	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	transformation	
project.	The	analysis	in	this	section	focuses	on	the	ideological	underpinning	of	the	South	
African	 state,	 the	 institutional	 dimensions	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 and	 aspects	 of	
procedural	democracy	and	challenges	thereto.	
2	3	1	The	origins	and	characteristics	of	the	“developmental	state”	
The	concept	of	a	“developmental	state”	arose	from	an	endeavour	by	Chalmers	Johnson	to	
generalise	about	the	model	pursued	by	many	of	the	East	Asian	nations	post	the	Second	
World	War,	 in	order	 to	 rapidly	modernise	 their	 economies.	 In	his	well-known	study	of	
Japan’s	 modernisation,	 Johnson	 characterised	 the	 basic	 framework	 of	 the	 East	 Asian	
“developmental	 state”	 as	 one	where	 the	 state	 sets	 specific	 development	 goals	 and	 then	
mobilises	 society	 to	 achieve	 industrial	modernisation.74	 The	 idea	 of	 “a	 centralised	 state	
interacting	 with	 the	 private	 sector	 from	 a	 position	 of	 pre-eminence	 so	 as	 to	 secure	
development	objectives”75	is	generally	called	the	“developmental	state”	theory.	Analysing	
these	processes,	Johnson	pointed	out	four	critical	elements	in	the	Japanese	developmental	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
presented at the SANPAD Poverty Conference, 26-30 June 2007, Durban, South Africa SOAS 
<http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/5611/> (accessed 31-05-2016). 
73 National Planning Commission National Development Plan 2030: Our future – make it work 2012 
Presidency <http://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030> (accessed 12-09-2015). 
74 See generally Johnson MITI and the Japanese Miracle. 
75 Wade Governing the Market quoted in Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state 4. 
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state:	 firstly	 the	 bureaucracy	 was	 assigned	 the	 tasks	 of	 planning,	 constructing	 and	
supervising	 industry;	 secondly	 a	 political	 system	 was	 established	 to	 support	 the	
bureaucracy;	 thirdly	 when	 the	 government	 wanted	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 market,	 it	 left	
plenty	of	scope	for	activities	of	private	enterprises;	and	lastly,	political	direction	was	given	
by	the	Ministry	of	International	Trade	and	Industry.76	
Since	 Johnson,	 the	 developmental	 state	 has	 been	 defined	 differently	 by	 scholars	 and	
development	agencies	alike.	Some	scholars	tend	to	emphasis	the	role	of	the	state.	In	this	
category	 are	 scholars	 like	 Manuel	 Castells,	 who	 define	 a	 developmental	 state	 “as	 one	
which	 establishes	 -	 as	 its	 principle	 of	 legitimacy	 -	 its	 ability	 to	 promote	 and	 sustain	
development,	 understood	 as	 the	 combination	 of	 steady	 high	 rates	 of	 economic	 growth	
and	structural	change	in	the	productive	system,	both	domestically	and	in	its	relationship	
with	the	international	economy”.77	
Other	scholars	have	stressed	the	organisational	features	of	the	developmental	state.	They	
identify	 that	 a	 developmental	 state	 must	 also	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 formulate	 and	
implement	its	developmental	agenda.	Key	structural	characteristics	are	autonomy	of	state	
institutions,	 which	 enables	 it	 to	 define	 and	 promote	 its	 strategic	 developmental	 goals,	
and	 its	 “embeddedness”	 -	 that	 is,	 “a	 concrete	 set	 of	 social	 ties	 that	 binds	 the	 state	 to	
society	 and	 provides	 institutionalised	 channels	 for	 the	 continual	 negotiation	 and	
renegotiation	 of	 goals	 and	 policies”.78	 According	 to	 this	 perspective,	 autonomy	 implies	
the	presence	 or	 high	degrees	 of	 coherent	 state	 agencies	 that	 are	 able	 to	 formulate	 and	
implement	coherent	developmental	goals.	A	significant	feature	of	the	autonomous	state	is	
greater	coordination	of	industrial	change	and	economic	adjustment.	
Thandika	 Mkandawire’s	 definition	 aptly	 captures	 both	 the	 structural	 and	 ideological	
features	of	a	developmental	state.	He	defines	the	developmental	state	as	one	where	the	
																																								 																				
76 See generally Johnson MITI and the Japanese Miracle. 
77 M Castells “Four Asian Tigers with a dragon head: A comparative analysis of the state, economy and society 
in the Asian Pacific Rim” in R Appelbaum & J Henderson (eds) States and Development in the Asia Pacific Rim 
(1992) 56. See also Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state 4-6, who provides a useful 
summary of the common characteristics of East Asian developmental states. 
78 Evans Embedded Autonomy 12. 
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main	ideological	underpinning	is	a	“developmentalist”	one,	in	that	the	state	must	ensure	
economic	progress.	 The	 institutional	 aspect	 of	 the	definition	 requires	 the	 state	 to	have	
the	 capacity	 to	 implement	 economic	 policies	 discerningly	 and	 effectively.	 Institutional	
capacity	relies	on	institutional,	technical,	administrative	and	political	factors.	This	type	of	
state	must	be	autonomous	and	strong	enough	to	devise	long-term	economic	policies	and	
not	 be	 captured	 by	 private	 sector	 interests.	 Finally,	 the	 developmental	 state	 must	 be	
accountable	so	that	it	does	not	use	its	autonomy	in	an	illegitimate	manner	and	enables	it	
to	gain	the	support	of	key	social	actors.79	
Though	not	widely	acknowledged	in	the	literature,	developmental	states	at	the	same	time	
also	 implemented	 social	 policies,	 focusing	 on	 non-state	 entities	 such	 as	 families	 and	
firms,	 with	 the	 State	 implementing	 social	 welfare	 programmes.80	 While	 the	 effective	
coordination	 of	 the	 economy	 is	 the	 priority,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 ensure	 minimal	
bureaucratic	 failure.81	 Substantial	 efforts	 were	 made	 to	 ensure	 more	 equitable	
development	 through	 land	 reform,	 relevant	 education	 and	 training,	 support	 for	 small	
enterprise	 and	 provision	 of	 housing	 and	 infrastructure.82	 Improvements	 in	 social	
protection	 focused	 on	 measures	 that	 would	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 employment	 and	 raise	
productivity.	Support	for	light	industry	resulted	in	the	rapid	rise	of	employment,	which	in	
turn	 laid	 the	 basis	 for	 raising	 living	 standards	 without	 considerable	 increase	 in	 pure	
welfare	spending.	Increasing	employment	was	supported	by	restrictions	on	retrenchment	
and	elevated	spending	on	skills	development.83	
In	 summary,	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 developmental	 state	 has	 a	 particular	 intellectual	 history,	
grounded	 primarily	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 industrialisation	 in	 East	 Asian	 states.	 It	
emphasises	 the	ability	of	 the	state	 to	drive	development	by	guiding	capital	 toward	new	
activities	 –	 achieved	under	 largely	 authoritarian	and	centralised	governance.	East	Asian	
																																								 																				
79 T Mkandawire “Thinking about developmental states in Africa” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (2001) 
289-313, 290. 
80 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State 9-10. 
81 See example of South Korea in E Kim “Limits of the authoritarian developmental state of South Korea” in O 
Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa (2010) 97, 111. 
82 Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state 6. 
83 Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state. 
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developmental	 states	 reached	 their	developmental	 goals	under	 authoritarian	 conditions	
in	dominant	party	democratic	systems.		
2	3	2	The	evolution	of	the	democratic	developmental	state	
Peter	Evans	provides	the	theoretical	grounding	for	the	democratic	developmental	state	–	
what	 he	 terms	 the	 21st	 century	 developmental	 state.84	 The	 21st	 century	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 that	 Evans	 depicts	 is	 grounded	 in	 three	 strands	 of	 development	
theory:	the	“new	growth	theory”;	“institutional	approaches”;	and	the	“capability	approach”	
or	 theory	 of	 “capability	 expansion”.85	 These	 theories	 converge	 into	 Evan’s	 main	
proposition	that	“enhancing	human	capabilities”,	as	both	means	and	ends,	is	the	central	
goal	 of	 the	 21st	 century	 developmental	 state.	 This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 welfare	 goal	 but	
simultaneously	 is	critical	 for	sustained	economic	growth	because	“investment	 in	human	
capital	has	the	potential	to	lead	to	social	inclusion	and	economic	growth.”86	Furthermore,	
this	 latter	 approach	 places	 great	 importance	 on	 equity	 concerns.	 Similar	 to	 the	 Asian	
developmental	 states,	 equity	 is	 a	 focal	 goal	 and	 institutional	 architectures	 must	 be	
designed	and	policies	promoted	to	attain	that	goal.87	
Evans	argues	that	the	state	capacities	required	for	the	enhancement	of	human	capabilities	
and	the	attainment	of	equity,	are	the	efficient	provision	of	collective	goods.	This	in	turn	
depends	on	both	administrative	capacity	and	political	 foundations	 that	are	anchored	 in	
“active	 democratic	 structures”.88	 The	 latter	 is	 also	 a	 foundation	 for	 effective	 economic	
management.	 Effective	 provision	 of	 public	 goods,	 including	 health,	 education,	 social	
																																								 																				
84 P Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state: potentialities and pitfalls” in O Edigheji (ed) 
Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa (2010) 37-58. See also: M Zenawi “States and 
market: the neoliberal limitations and the case for developmental state” in Good Growth and Governance in 
Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies edited by Akbar Noman, Kwesi Botchwey, Howard Stein and Joseph 
E. Stiglitz (2012); R Wade Rethinking Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries African Development Bank 
(2009).  
85 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in SA. His three strands of development theory are largely based on A Sen Development as Freedom 
(1999), the initiator of the “capability approach” in development theory. See section 2 6 below. 
86 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA 13. 
87 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA 13. Eidgheji defines “equitable growth” as: “a 
high rate of economic growth combined with equitable distribution of income and wealth, with egalitarianism 
meaning that all segments of society are able to share in the benefits of growth”. 
88 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in SA 38. 
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welfare	and	the	like,	is	a	manifestation	of	social	citizenship,	enhancing	the	well-being	of	
ordinary	 citizens;	 and	 public	 goods	 are	 themselves	 major	 economic	 infrastructure	
required	by	market	agents.89		
Based	 on	 development	 theory,	 in	 particular	 Sen’s	 work,	 Evans	 notes	 that	 because	
development	 is	 about	human	well-being,	 “development	 strategies	 and	policy	 cannot	be	
formulated	 by	 technocrats,	 but	 must	 be	 derived	 from	 democratically	 organised	 public	
deliberation”.90	Deliberative	 and	participatory	democratic	 institutions	are	 thus	essential	
to	21st	century	development.91	 In	 light	of	 this	 theoretical	 foundation,	Evans	presents	 the	
21st	 century	 model	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 as	 fundamentally	 different	 to	 the	 Asian	
developmental	 state	 and	 rather	 more	 similar	 to	 the	 Nordic	 social	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 where	 human	 welfare	 and	 public	 policy	 is	 driven	 by	 deliberative	
mechanisms	 that	 are	 more	 inclusive	 than	 those	 just	 made	 up	 of	 government	 and	 the	
private	 sector.	 Evans	 refers	 to	 these	 deliberative	 mechanisms	 as	 “encompassing	
embeddedness”,	or	as	“synergistic	state-society	relations”.92	
In	 discussing	 the	 links	 between	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	 forms	 of	 democracy	 and	
broader	attainment	of	development,	Sen	argues	that	you	cannot	separate	an	assessment	
of	development	from	the	actual	reality	of	the	lives	that	people	lead	and	the	real	freedom	
they	experience.	He	describes	development	as	more	than	the	improvement	of	“inanimate	
objects	of	convenience”,	such	as	a	rise	in	economic	growth	rates	or	employment	rates	or	
individual	incomes	–	“important	as	they	may	be	as	means	to	the	real	ends”.	The	value	of	
these	 “inanimate	objects	of	 convenience”	depends	on	what	 they	actually	do	 to	enhance	
the	lives	and	freedom	of	the	people	involved.	That	is	what	Sen	sees	as	intrinsic	to	the	idea	
of	 development.	He	 states	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 development	 and	 democracy,	
understood	more	broadly	in	the	context	of	human	lives,	should	be	seen	“partly	in	terms	of	
their	 constitutive	 connection,	 rather	 than	 only	 through	 their	 external	 links”.	 He	 posits	
																																								 																				
89 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in SA 38. 
90 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in SA 43. 
91 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA 14. 
92 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA 14. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 44	
 
that	“political	liberties	and	democratic	rights	are	among	the	constituent	components”	of	
development,	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	they	contribute	to	economic	growth.93	
This	conceptual	framing	by	Evans	and	Sen,	leads	me	to	the	discussion	of	the	evolution	of	
a	democratic,	developmental	South	African	state	and	how	this	notion	can	be	adapted	to	
suit	our	transformative	constitutional	democracy	in	support	of	broad-based,	collaborative	
socio-economic	 transformation.	This	 is	 the	notion	of	 the	 state	 that	best	underpins	 and	
articulates	 the	 institutional	 and	 developmental	 outcomes	 needed	 to	 advance	 South	
Africa,	as	framed	by	a	transformative	constitution.	
2	3	3	The	South	African	democratic	developmental	state	
There	 is	 no	 definitive	 conception	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 in	 South	 Africa	 in	 the	
academic	 literature	 and	 policy	 documents	 of	 government,	 the	 ruling	 African	 National	
Congress	 (‘ANC’)	 party	 and	 its	 alliance	 partners,	 the	 South	 African	 Communist	 Party	
(‘SACP’)	and	the	Congress	of	South	African	Trade	Unions	(‘COSATU’).	The	literature	and	
policy	 documents	 are	 filled	 with	 rhetoric	 and	 ideology	 with	 reference	 to	 the	
developmental	 state.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 concept	 is	 useful	 as	 an	 evolving	 political	 and	
economic	framework	for	South	Africa’s	socio-economic	transformation.	This	section	will	
attempt	to	summarise	the	common	threads	and	elements	 in	the	concept	and	propose	a	
framework	based	on	Evans’	theoretical	construction	outlined	above,	which	lends	itself	to	
supporting	socio-economic	transformation	in	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	
state.	A	successful	South	African	developmental	state	would	thus	be	very	well-placed	to	
be	both	developmental	and	democratic.	
South	 Africa’s	 transition	 to	 democracy	 took	 place	 under	 changing	 global	 conditions.	
These	were	characterised	by	 the	collapse	of	 the	communist	bloc	and	 the	ascendancy	of	
neo-liberal	market	ideology.	A	key	element	of	this	ideology	argued	for	the	primacy	of	the	
market	over	the	state.	This	was	in	stark	contrast	to	the	newly	elected	ANC	government’s	
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Reconstruction	 and	 Development	 Programme	 (‘RDP’),94	 which	 called	 for	 a	 strong	
interventionist	 and	 redistributive	 state.	 The	 RDP	 focused	 on	 meeting	 basic	 needs,	
developing	the	country’s	human	resources,	building	the	economy	and	democratising	the	
state	 and	 society.	 The	 RDP	 document	 defines	 development	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 growing	
economy	 in	 which	 redistribution	 is	 a	 critical	 element	 post-apartheid.	 It	 includes	 the	
preservation	 and	 development	 of	 human	 resources	 in	 the	 form	 of	 skills	 training,	 job-
creation	and	the	provision	of	education,	health	services,	basic	services,	infrastructure	and	
an	adequate	social	security	system.	It	also	strongly	embeds	the	notions	of	representative	
and	participatory	democracy.95	
During	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 freedom,	 some	 progress	 was	 achieved	 in	 addressing	 RDP	
priorities,96	 but	 global	 pressure	 saw	 government	 adopt	 the	 Growth,	 Employment	 and	
Redistribution	 (‘GEAR’)	 policy	 framework.	 Left-orientated	 social	 movements,	 trade	
unions	and	commentators	saw	this	framework	as	a	shift	towards	identifying	the	market	as	
the	 supreme	 agent	 for	 resource	 allocation	 and	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 the	 inherited	
formal	 economy	 would	 be	 the	 determinant	 of	 growth	 and	 development.97	 One	
consequence	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 GEAR	 was	 that	 development	 priorities,	 including	 the	
provision	of	social	services	and	economic	infrastructure,	were	subject	to	fiscal	discipline,	
cost	 recovery	 and	 financial	 sustainability.98	 GEAR	 is	 widely	 acknowledged	 to	 have	
succeeded	 in	 bringing	 about	 macro-economic	 stability,	 but	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	 its	
limited	ability	to	equitably	distribute	the	economic	benefits	of	stability	and	substantially	
reduce	poverty	and	inequality	in	the	country.99		
In	 a	 context	 of	 resource	 scarcity,	 growing	 inequality	 and	 ongoing	wide-spread	 poverty,	
strategic	 choices	 on	 where	 and	 how	 to	 invest	 scarce	 resources	 to	maximise	 social	 and	
economic	 return	 became	 imperative	 in	 South	 Africa.	 Since	 GEAR,	 market	 failure	 in	
																																								 																				
94 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, Cape Town, 15 November 1994 
<http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/governmentgazetteid16085.pdf> (accessed 31-05-2016). 
95 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development. 
96 See section 2 2 on the situation of poverty and trends in South Africa since democracy. 
97 See for example COSATU’s explicit rejection of GEAR <http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2159> 
(accessed 07-12-2016). 
98 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA 12-13. 
99 Edigheji Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in SA 12-13. 
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addressing	 the	 above-mentioned	 developmental	 challenges	 provided	 a	 strong	 rationale	
for	government	intervention.	This	position	was	reinforced	by	a	resurgent	belief	in	the	role	
of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 driver	 of	 economic	 development,	 where	 government	 leads	 growth	
creation	 and	 identifies	 the	major	 beneficiaries	 of	 growth	 through	 active	 interventions,	
such	 as	 infrastructure	 investment,	 job	 creation,	 State-Owned	 Enterprise	 (‘SOE’)	
initiatives,	 sector	 and	 small	 enterprise	 support,	 industrial	 policy,	 targeted	 procurement	
and	 directed	 spatial	 development.100	 In	 fulfilling	 its	 developmental	 role,	 government	
recognised	its	position	as	a	key	facilitating,	partnering	and	collaborative	economic	agent	
through	 planning,	 fixed	 investment	 and	 developmental	 spending.	 Public	 investment	
therefore	became	 a	 key	mechanism	 for	 the	 achievement	of	higher	GDP	growth,	 as	 this	
guides	private	investment	decisions	and	facilitates	social	and	economic	spin-offs.101	
The	 Accelerated	 and	 Shared	 Growth	 Initiative	 for	 South	 Africa	 (‘ASGI-SA’)	 economic	
policy	 framework	announced	by	the	government	 in	 late	2005	confirmed	the	return	 into	
policy	discourse	of	 the	role	of	 the	state,	as	compared	with	 the	mid-1990s.	The	 focus	on	
state	 spending	 on	 infrastructure	 and	 skills	 development,	 and	 the	 selection	 of	 priority	
sectors	both	signified	a	central	role	for	the	state	in	the	economy.	In	the	context	of	ASGI-
SA	 and	 of	 its	 more	 general	 Black	 Economic	 Empowerment	 (‘BEE’)	 strategy,	 the	 state	
identified	 four	 relevant	 developmental	 objectives.	 The	 first	was	 to	 broaden	 the	 base	 of	
BEE	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 promote	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 black	 business	 class	 involved	 in	
producing	goods	and	services.	The	second	was	to	provide	broader	access	to	public	goods	
and	 services	 to	 the	marginalised	 and	 excluded	 poor	 (the	 so-called	 “second	 economy”),	
including	 infrastructure	provision,	 education	and	 skills	 training,	 and	 information	about	
economic	opportunities.	The	third	objective	was	to	reduce	the	costs	of	doing	business	in	
South	 Africa,	 especially	 by	 lowering	 indirect	 costs	 beyond	 the	 shop	 floor,	 that	 is,	
transport,	 communications,	 logistics	 and	 institutional	 aspects	 of	 the	 business	
environment,	 by	 undertaking	 a	 massive	 infrastructure	 expenditure	 programme.	 The	
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fourth	 was	 to	 directly	 create	 semi-skilled	 employment	 by	 promoting	 labour	 intensive	
exports	of	services.	
Increasingly,	over	the	past	ten	years,	the	state	has	thus	asserted	the	goal	of	building	and	
consolidating	a	strong	developmental	state	 in	South	Africa	-	a	developmental	state	 that	
excels	in	the	basics	of	public	administration	and	intervenes	strategically	in	the	economy	
to	 promote	 socio-economic	 transformation.102	 As	 growth	 has	 slowed	 since	 the	 global	
financial	meltdown	in	2008	and	millions	of	jobs	have	been	lost	in	South	Africa,	this	goal	
has	become	more	vital.	
Fine	divides	 the	discourse	on	the	developmental	state	 in	South	Africa	 into	two	schools,	
the	economic	and	the	political.103		The	economic	school	focuses	on	the	economic	policies	
that	the	state	needs	to	adopt	 in	order	to	bring	about	development,	namely	through	the	
array	of	interventions	associated	with	the	East	Asian	model,	especially	protection,	export	
promotion,	 targeted	 investment	and	 finance.	The	political	school,	on	the	other	hand,	 is	
more	 or	 less	 entirely	 concerned	with	 addressing	 the	 issue	 of	whether	 the	 state	has	 the	
capacity	 and	motivation	 to	 adopt	 and	 implement	developmental	 policies.	 In	 particular,	
the	focus	is	upon	whether	the	state	has	the	autonomy,	both	to	adopt	policy	independent	
of	special	interests	and	to	deploy	that	independence	for	broader	developmental	aims.104	
The	 reason	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 consensus	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 developmental	 state	 in	 the	
literature	 appears	 to	 be	 that	 the	 developmental	 state	 has	 sprung	 into	 South	 African	
discourse	 from	 the	 political	 arena	 and	 has,	 until	 recently,	 largely	 been	 rhetorical	 and	
unexamined.	 In	 a	 1998	 ANC	 discussion	 document,	 The	 State,	 Property	 Relations	 and	
																																								 																				
102 T Manuel Budgeting Challenges in the Developmental State Speech by the Minister of Finance at Senior 
Management Service Conference in Cape Town (2004) National Treasury <http://www.treasury.gov.za/ 
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(07-06-2006) Department Foreign Affairs <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2006/mbek0607.htm>  
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103 Fine The curious incidence of the developmental state. 
104 Fine The curious incidence of the developmental state. As J Howell “Reflections on the Chinese State” 
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Social	Transformation,	 the	character	of	 the	 state	 is	defined	as	developmental.	 It	 further	
says	“development	 is	about	 improving	the	quality	of	 life;	 it	 is	about	equity	and	 justice…	
entails	 growing	 the	 economy”.105	 It	 made	 only	 passing	 reference	 to	 state	 capacity	 to	
intervene	 in	order	 to	 facilitate	growth	and	development.	Although	 it	did	not	define	 the	
institutional	 characteristics	 that	 would	 constitute	 the	 transformative	 capacity	 of	 the	
developmental	 state,	 the	 document	 did	 recognise	 the	 need	 to	mobilise	 civil	 society	 to	
participate	in	the	formulation	and	implementation	of	public	policies.		
The	ANC	National	Policy	Conference	Report	(2007)	states	that:		
“However,	 to	 characterise	 monopoly	 capital	 as	 an	 enemy	 of	 the	 NDR	 would	 be	 too	
simplistic.	Rather	our	approach	…	should	be	 to	build	a	strong	developmental	 state,	with	
the	strategic	capacity	and	the	instruments	to	deal	with	these	negative	tendencies,	while	at	
the	same	time	mobilising	private	capital	in	general	to	partner	the	state	in	increasing	rates	
of	investment	and	job-creation.”106		
The	ANC	Policy	Conference	Report	goes	on	 to	 state	 that	broad	consensus	 is	needed	 to	
build	a	developmental	state	that	aspires	to	the	following	attributes:		
“[H]aving	 the	 capacity	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 economy	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 higher	 rates	 of	
growth	 and	 development;	 effecting	 interventions	 that	 address	 challenges	 of	
unemployment,	 poverty	 and	 underdevelopment;	 mobilising	 the	 people	 as	 a	 whole,	
especially	the	poor,	 to	act	as	their	own	liberators	through	participatory	and	representative	
democracy.”107		
Finally,	the	report	states	that	“[w]e	are	building	a	developmental	state	and	not	a	welfare	
state	 given	 that	 in	 a	welfare	 state,	 dependency	 is	 profound”.	 It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 report	
that	the	ANC	did	not	want	to	replicate	wholesale	the	concept	of	the	developmental	state	
from	 the	 Asian	 or	 any	 other	 model,	 but	 rather	 to	 develop	 its	 own	 indigenous	 South	
																																								 																				
105 ANC The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation (1998) ANC 
<https://amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com/1998,+ANC,+State,+Property+Relations,+Social+Transformation> 
(accessed 29-07-2016). 
106 ANC National Policy Conference Report (2007) ANC <http://www.anc.org.za/content/2007-national-policy-
conference> (accessed 29-07-2016). 
107 ANC National Policy Conference Report (2007) ANC <http://www.anc.org.za/content/2007-national-policy-
conference> (accessed 29-07-2016) [own emphasis added]. 
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African	model.	This	model	sees	intervention	in	the	economy	as	generating	higher	rates	of	
inclusive	growth	and	employment	as	a	means	to	end	poverty	and	promoting	participatory	
democracy	where	the	poor	can	“act	as	their	own	liberators”.	
Various	SACP	policy	documents,	as	well	as	articles	in	the	African	Communist,	also	apply	
the	concept	of	the	developmental	state	to	South	Africa.108	But	the	focus	has	been	on	the	
role	 of	 the	 state.	 Here	 again	 there	 is	 a	 similarity	 between	 the	 ANC	 and	 the	 SACP	
definition	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 developmental	 state.	 In	 one	 such	 article,	 “Economic	
Transformation”,	in	the	African	Communist	of	1998,	the	role	of	the	developmental	state	is	
spelt	 out	 as	 “providing	 essential	 social	 services,	 creating	 conditions	 to	 achieve	
development-orientated	 growth,	 promoting	 redistribution	 and	 responding	 to	 market	
failure”.109	No	attempt	was	made	to	elaborate	on	the	developmental	state’s	transformative	
capacity.	However,	like	the	ANC	(and	unlike	the	situation	in	the	Asian	states),	it	stressed	
the	importance	of	the	state	not	foregoing	interaction	with	capital	while	aligning	itself	to	
“a	 progressive/worker	 dominated	 movement”.110	 While	 it	 is	 safe	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	
SACP	 has	 not	 developed	 a	 comprehensive	 state	 transformative	 capacity	 theory,	 its	
conception	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 bears	 resemblance	 to	 Evans’	 broad	 concept	 of	
embeddedness.	
It	 seems	 that	COSATU	both	 lacks	 a	 coherent	 position	 on	 the	 developmental	 state	 and	
that	the	trade	union	movement	has	been	wary	about	the	construction	of	a	developmental	
state	in	South	Africa.	A	critical	examination	of	its	documentation	shows	that	it	tends	to	
define	the	developmental	state	from	an	ideational	standpoint.	This	is	amply	evident	in	a	
draft	 discussion	 paper	 for	 its	 2005	 Central	 Committee	 meeting.	 It	 defines	 the	
developmental	 state	 as	 one	 that	 “drives	 development,	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	 free	 market	
approach”.111	This	state,	for	the	labour	federation,	is	defined	by	both	its	class,	as	well	as	its	
																																								 																				
108 Available at <www.sacp.org.za> (accessed 29-07-2016).  
109 SACP “Economic Transformation” in the African Communist Issue 149 (1998). 
110 SACP “Economic Transformation” in the African Communist Issue 149 (1998). 
111 COSATU “A developmental state for South Africa?”. COSATU suffered a major split in 2014 when eight of its 
member unions joined the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) to support the federation’s then 
general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi. Unions that remained in the federation include the National Union of 
Mineworkers, the National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union and the South African Democratic 
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economic	policy	–	intervening	in	the	economy	to	develop	new	industries.	But	at	another	
level	it	says	that	the	developmental	state	has	the	ability	“to	drive	development	by	guiding	
capital	 toward	 new	 activities	 while	 maintaining	 broad-based	 support,	 including	 from	
workers”.112		
According	to	a	previous	Minister	of	Finance,	Trevor	Manuel:		
“A	developmental	 state	 is	 one	 that	 is	determined	 to	 influence	 the	direction	 and	pace	of	
economic	 development	 by	 directly	 intervening	 in	 the	 development	 process,	 rather	 than	
relying	on	the	uncoordinated	influence	of	market	forces	to	allocate	resources.”113		
This	 is	 a	 reflection	of	 the	 shifts	 in	South	Africa’s	 economic	policy	over	 the	past	decade	
with	an	emerging	consensus	towards	greater	government	intervention.	Manuel,	quoting	
Sen’s	book,	Development	as	Freedom,	stated	that	“[t]he	task	of	a	developmental	state	is	to	
fight	poverty	and	expand	economic	opportunities	for	the	poor.”	The	developmental	state	
has	since	appeared	 in	 the	speeches	of	a	 range	of	Ministers	over	 the	 last	 ten	years,	both	
during	the	Mbeki	era	and	under	President	Jacob	Zuma.114	It	also	underpins	the	National	
Development	Plan	2030,	released	in	2012	by	the	National	Planning	Commission	and	the	
Presidency.115		
In	his	first	State	of	the	Nation	address	as	President	of	South	Africa	in	2009,	Jacob	Zuma	
announced	a	continued	commitment	to	building	a	developmental	state,	improving	public	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Teachers Union. A major source of contention was the unions’ independence in relation to political 
organisations. The split was also related to the ANC’s internal power struggles between those supporting 
President Zuma and those who are either independent or support deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa. See The 
Conversation “Cracks in the ANC’s alliances are showing” 26 July 2016 <https://theconversation.com/cracks-
in-south-africas-governing-alliance-could-cost-the-anc-dearly-63022> (accessed 26-07-2016). 
112 COSATU “A developmental state for South Africa?” 4. 
113 Manuel Budgeting Challenges in the Developmental State. 
114 State of the Nation addresses available at <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za> (accessed 29-07-2016).  
115 President Jacob Zuma appointed the National Planning Commission in May 2010 to draft a vision and 
national development plan for South Africa. The Commission is an advisory body consisting of 26 people drawn 
largely from outside government, chosen for their expertise in critical areas. The Commission consulted widely 
on the plan. They held public forums with thousands of people, had discussions with parliament, the judiciary, 
national, provincial and local government, development finance institutions, state-owned enterprises, unions, 
business, religious leaders and non-profit organizations. See the National Development Plan 2030 
<http://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030> (accessed 29-07-2016).  
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services	 and	 strengthening	 democratic	 institutions.116	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 this,	 he	
committed	 to:	 establishing	 two	 Ministries	 in	 the	 Presidency	 to	 strengthen	 strategic	
planning	and	performance	monitoring	and	evaluation;	involving	State-Owned	Enterprises	
and	Development	Finance	Institutions	in	government	planning	processes	and	improving	
the	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 of	 their	 performance;	 putting	 people	 first	 in	 service	
delivery	 administration;	 ensuring	 professional	 services	 from	 staff	 in	 all	 government	
departments;	and	“a	more	interactive	government”.117	
In	 his	 State	 of	 the	 Nation	 Address,	 2010,	 President	 Jacob	 Zuma	 reaffirmed	 his	
commitment	to	build	a	strong	developmental	state	–	“a	state	that	responds	to	the	needs	
and	 aspirations	 of	 the	 people,	 and	 which	 performs	 better”.	 He	 elaborated	 that	 the	
government	 is	building	a	performance-oriented	 state,	by	 improving	planning	as	well	 as	
performance	monitoring	 and	 evaluation.	 Furthermore,	 he	 committed	 to	 five	 priorities:	
education,	health,	rural	development	and	land	reform,	creating	decent	work,	and	fighting	
crime,	with	education	and	skills	development	at	the	centre	of	the	government’s	policies.	
Gumede	 and	 others	 identify	 a	 number	 of	 essential	 conditions	 for	 a	 successful	 South	
African	democratic	developmental	state.118	First,	 it	requires	the	political	will	and	a	 long-
term	developmental	vision	based	on	broad	national	consensus	amongst	political	parties,	
civil	 society,	 business	 and	 organised	 labour,	 to	 industrialise	 and	 modernise.119	 This	
requires	 mature,	 quality	 leadership	 and	 determination	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 country’s	
																																								 																				
116JG Zuma State of the Nation Address (03-06-2009) Presidency <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za> 
(accessed 29-07-2016). Despite these commitments, President Zuma has been mired in controversy for 
various reasons including, but not limited to, hundreds of corruption charges, patronage, rape charges, use of 
public resources for private benefit, nepotism and state capture in his dealings with the Gupta family, dismissal 
of the Public Protector’s role as a democratic institution and so on. South Africa’s economic decline has also 
been vividly seen and felt in the millions of jobs lost over the past five years whilst he has been President. All of 
this has seriously undermined the potential for building a democratic developmental state under President 
Zuma’s leadership. 
117 Zuma State of the Nation Address (2009). 
118 Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state. See also Edigheji Constructing a Democratic 
Developmental State in South Africa. 
119 See Mont Fleur Scenarios <http://www.montfleur.co.za/about/scenarios.html>; SA Scenarios 2025: The 
future we chose? <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/sascenarios2025_0.pdf>; and Dinokeng 
Scenarios <http://www.dinokengscenarios.co.za> (accessed 29-07-2016). These scenario exercises were 
developed at different points in South Africa’s recent history, with the participation of a wide spectrum of 
society for purposes of identifying a long-term vision for the country, which would then be translated into a 
plan. Presidency National Development Plan. 
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political	 elite.	 All	 stakeholders	 must	 then	 implement	 a	 holistic	 vision	 collaboratively,	
based	on	an	 integrated	 long-term	development	plan.	Successful	 long-term	development	
plans	 integrate	 action	 for	 the	 short	 term,	 medium	 term	 and	 long	 term.	 A	 long-term	
development	plan	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 identification	of	 the	 core	priorities	of	 a	nation.	But	
these	 development	 plans	must	 have	 public	 and	 stakeholder	 legitimacy.120	 The	National	
Development	Plan,	whilst	still	somewhat	contested,121	is	such	a	plan.	
Second,	 a	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	 South	African	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 is	
that	 it	 must	 allow	 for	 participation	 and	 be	 capable	 of	 addressing	 the	 socio-economic	
needs	 of	 its	 entire	 population,	 especially	 the	 poor,	 marginalised	 and	 historically	
disadvantaged.	The	 South	African	democratic	 developmental	 state	must	 be	 the	 kind	of	
state	 that	 fosters	 the	empowerment	of	people	as	opposed	 to	 their	 “dependency”	on	 the	
state.	 It	 is	 vital	 that	ordinary	people	are	 involved	 in	 the	process	of	development	and	as	
they	get	more	involved,	they	must	also	own	the	process.	Whenever	policies	are	developed	
which	 are	 aimed	 at	 addressing	 existing	 socio-economic	 imbalances,	 ordinary	 people	
should	 be	 involved.	 The	 most	 critical	 aspect	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 developmental	 state	 is	
participatory	democracy.	
Third,	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 developmental	 effort	 is	 an	 efficient,	 well-coordinated	 state,	
staffed	 with	 skilled	 employees.	 The	 state	 must	 have	 the	 administrative,	 technical	 and	
political	capacity	and	competency	to	 facilitate	 the	setting	of	national	goals,	develop	the	
right	policies	to	deliver	on	those	goals	and	implement	these	policies.	This	also	means	that	
widespread	corruption	and	the	policy	of	cadre	deployment,	nepotism	and	patronage	must	
be	systematically	abolished.	Furthermore,	the	most	successful	developmental	states	had	a	
central	 coordinating	 centre	 driving	 socio-economic	 transformation.122	 This	 centre	 not	
																																								 																				
120 Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state at 11 explains that although most of the East Asian 
developmental states were autocratic, their development plans had wider legitimacy among the key 
stakeholders in society. In Malaysia for example, the New Economic Policy – its long-term development plan – 
became the official “ideology”. 
121 For example, the NDP calls for a greater mix of energy sources and a greater diversity of IPPs in the energy 
industry, but also includes nuclear power <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2016/07/28/is-eskom-building-a-
case-for-nuclear-power> (accessed 29-07-2016). 
122 In 2001, the Policy, Coordination and Advisory Services Unit (PCAS) was established to coordinate policy 
formulation and monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation. It was however disbanded in 2009. The 
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only	determinedly	addresses	the	economy’s	vulnerabilities,	and	makes	it	competitive,	by	
diversifying	and	identifying	new	niche	manufacturing	products,	but	directly	coordinates	
industrial	 investment,	 actively	 directs	 macro-economic	 policy	 towards	 developmental	
goals	 and	 protects	 and	 promotes	 the	 national	 interest.123	 It	 facilitates	 the	 setting	 of	
national	goals,	makes	use	of	the	market	and	monitors	whether	policies	are	implemented	
and	 are	 having	 the	 desired	 effect.	 Yet	 the	 biggest	 failure	 of	many	 of	 the	 South	African	
government’s	 economic	 reforms	 lies	 in	 minimal	 coordination	 of	 disparate	 economic	
reforms	due	to	a	proliferation	of	economic	policies	and	various	government	departments	
responsible	for	economic	policy	implementation.124	
In	conclusion,	whereas	developmental	states	in	East	Asia	were	authoritarian;	in	the	South	
African	context	and	framework	of	a	transformative	constitution,	the	developmental	state	
has	 to	 be	 democratic.	 Whilst	 this	 is	 different	 to	 Johnson’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	
developmental	state	as	a	soft	authoritarian	state,	it	is	closer	to	Evan’s	broader	definition	
of	 “state	 embeddedness”.	 As	 Gumede	 also	 suggests,	 because	 South	 Africa	 is	 a	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
National Planning Commission was established in 2009, to support Cabinet in long-term planning and 
coordination. The members of the new National Planning Commission (NPC) were announced on 30 April 
2010. The commission was chaired by the then Minister in the Presidency: National Planning Commission 
Trevor Manuel, with ANC heavyweight and business leader Cyril Ramaphosa as his deputy. Also on the team 
were ANC national executive committee member Joel Netshitenzhe and Business Unity South Africa chief 
executive officer Jerry Vilakazi. The 24 people on the team had expertise in areas including finance, industry, 
telecommunications, biotechnology, energy, education, food security and climate change. See “Ramaphosa, 
Godsell on National Planning Commission” Mail & Guardian (30 April 2010). An NPC Secretariat is located in 
the Presidency, staffed with officials and working alongside the Department of Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME). In September 2015 the President appointed a new cohort of National Planning Commissioners to 
support the ongoing implementation of the NDP and its translation into government policy. See 
<http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=20602> (accessed 29-07-2016) for the mandate of the 
new commission, which primarily pertains to the long-term development of the country. 
123 See National Assembly statement on Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP2) by Dr Rob Davies, Minister of 
Trade and Industry, 18 February 2010, http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=117330 
(accessed 23-07-2016). The 2010/11 to 2012/13 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) IPAP2, as it has become 
known, builds on the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) and the 2007/08 IPAP. It represents a 
scaling up of the government’s efforts to promote long-term industrialisation and industrial diversification 
beyond the reliance on traditional commodities and non-tradable services. Its purpose is to expand production 
in value-added sectors with high employment and growth multipliers that compete in export markets as well as 
compete in the domestic market against imports. In so doing, the action plan also places emphasis on more 
labour absorbing production and services sectors, the increased participation of historically disadvantaged 
people and regions in the economy and seeks to facilitate, in the medium term, South Africa’s contribution to 
industrial development in the African region. 
124 Departments of Labour, Economic Development, Small Business Development, Trade and Industry, Public 
Enterprises, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Mineral Resources, Energy, Science and Technology, Rural 
Development and Land Reform, Tourism, National Treasury. See <http://www.gov.za/ about-
government/government-system/national-departments> (accessed 29-07-2016). 
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constitutional	 democracy	 that	 provides	 for	 both	 representative	 and	 participatory	
democracy,	“ordinary	citizens	will	not	only	have	to	be	consulted	but	also	to	be	involved	
and	participate	in	the	decisions,	whether	economic,	political	or	social,	that	affect	them.”	
This	means	that	the	South	African	state	“must	deliver	development	in	both	the	economic	
and	democratic	spheres.”125	
South	Africa’s	prospects	of	overcoming	its	legacy	of	poverty	and	inequality	and	to	offer	a	
way	 ahead	 for	 a	 transformed	 society	 rests	 on	 a	 vision	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	
state.	This	vision	has	now	been	broadly	defined	in	the	National	Development	Plan	and	its	
implications	 have	 begun	 to	 be	 implemented.	 There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 start	 focusing	 on	 how	
effective	 interventions	 can	 further	 socio-economic	 transformation	 in	 South	 Africa,	 to	
bring	 a	 range	 of	 important	 ideas	 to	 a	 wider	 public	 and	 to	 allow	 interaction	 between	
citizens,	 the	 state	 and	 autonomous	 institutions	 that	 will	 place	 a	 broader	 vision	 of	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state	 on	 the	 agenda.	 This	 dissertation	 contributes	 to	
developing	the	concrete	 implications	of	the	democratic,	developmental	state	 in	two	key	
areas	 of	 human	 rights	 law	 –	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice,	 and	
examines	in	particular	the	role	of	the	judiciary	in	facilitating	that	promise,	underpinned	
by	a	transformative	constitution.	
The	 analysis	 has	 pointed	 to	 a	 number	 of	 conclusions.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 the	
developmentalist	 ideology	 of	 the	 South	 African	 state	 has	 been	 tempered	 by	 the	
globalisation	imperatives,	which,	among	others,	give	primacy	to	the	needs	of	the	market.	
Poverty	 has	 decreased	 somewhat	 over	 the	 past	 22	 years	 but	 remains	 widespread	 and	
deeply	entrenched.	At	the	same	time	inequality	has	expanded	to	global	heights.	Further,	
whilst	 the	 government	 continues	 to	 stress	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 people	 in	 its	 policy,	 in	
actual	practice	citizens	and	people	are	frequently	passive	clients,	users	and	customers.		
With	 respect	 to	 the	 structural	 features	 of	 the	 state,	 South	 Africa	 began	 to	 establish	
institutional	 features	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	Among	 the	 notable	 features	
the	South	African	developmental	state	was	the	establishment	of	collaborative,	centralised	
																																								 																				
125 Gumede Delivering the democratic developmental state. 
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leadership	 with	 a	 clear	 vision	 and	 political	 will	 to	 promote	 a	 process	 of	 accumulation	
whose	fruits	would	be	shared	by	all.	For	this	purpose,	the	National	Planning	Commission	
faced	the	momentous	task	of	developing	a	long-term	national	vision	and	plan	for	socio-
economic	 transformation.126	 The	 challenge	 remains	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 non-elites,	 the	
ordinary	people,	 in	the	preparation	and	 implementation	of	a	democratic	developmental	
state,	 and	 towards	 socio-economic	 transformation.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 ongoing	
rampant	 corruption,	 lack	 of	 effective	 political	 leadership	 and	 inefficiencies	 of	 the	 state	
will	continue	to	hamper	many	democratic	and	developmental	outcomes,	unless	broader	
society	 and	 democratic	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 judiciary,	 are	 truly	 able	 to	 assert	
accountability.		
The	National	Development	Plan	2030	(‘NDP’)	states:	
“The	National	Development	Plan	aims	to	eliminate	poverty	and	reduce	inequality	by	2030.	
South	Africa	can	realise	these	goals	by	drawing	on	the	energies	of	its	people,	growing	an	
inclusive	 economy,	 building	 capabilities,	 enhancing	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 state,	 and	
promoting	leadership	and	partnerships	throughout	society.”127	
Notions	 of	 participation,	 capabilities,	 autonomy	 and	 empowerment	 of	 poor	 and	
marginalised	 communities	 are	 central	 to	 considering	 the	 interaction	 between	 socio-
economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	 poverty.	 By	 developing	 the	
interlinkages	 between	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights,	 this	 vision	of	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state	 and	 effective	 socio-economic	 transformation	 can	 be	
supported,	both	in	terms	of	substance	and	process.	The	next	section	will	examine	in	more	
																																								 																				
126 In his State of the Nation Address 2009, President Zuma made an undertaking that government would 
implement BBBEE and affirmative action policies in recognition of the need to correct the imbalances of the 
past. In December 2009, President Zuma announced the names of those who would serve in the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Council, in terms of the BBBEE Council Act 53 of 2003. The functions 
of the council, which is chaired by the President, are to advise government on black economic empowerment, 
review progress in achieving black economic empowerment, provide advice on draft codes of good practice 
and advise on draft transformation charters if required. They are also required to facilitate partnerships 
between organs of state and the private sector that will advance the objectives of the BBBEE Act. “Zuma 
Appoints BBBEE Council” (4 December 2009) <http://www.southafrica.info/news/business/648737.htm> 
(accessed 29-07-2016). 
127 National Planning Commission NDP Executive Summary (2012) 14 <http://www.gov.za/issues/national-
development-plan-2030> (accessed 29-06-2017). 
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depth	the	concepts	of	participatory	democracy,	autonomy	and	Sen’s	capability	approach.	
As	highlighted	by	Evans,	these	should	lie	at	the	heart	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	
seeking	 to	 transform	 deep-seated	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 An	 understanding	 of	 these	
concepts	 will	 assist	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 jurisprudence	 on	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	justice	in	the	chapters	that	follow.	
2	4	Participatory	democracy	
Sen	 argues	 that	 the	 attainment	 of	 social	 justice,	 without	 public	 reasoning	 based	 on	
participatory	 and	 deliberative	 democratic	 models,	 is	 not	 possible.128	 These	 two	
contemporary	 models	 of	 democracy,	 closely	 allied	 with	 direct	 democracy,	 will	 be	
discussed	 in	 this	 section.	 I	 will	 then	 examine	 how	 democracy	 in	 the	 South	 African	
Constitution	 can	be	 characterised	 as	 representative,	 participatory	 and	direct,129	with	 an	
emphasis	on	exploring	the	participatory	provisions	that	must	support	the	transformation	
project	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 namely:	 public	 participation	 in	 legislative	
processes,130	 in	 the	 public	 administration,131	 just	 administrative	 action,132	 and	 socio-
economic	 rights.133	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 vision	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 laid	 down	 in	 our	
Constitution	 is	necessary	 in	order	 for	a	democratic	developmental	state	 to	 facilitate	 the	
transformation	of	South	African	society,	as	outlined	above,	into	one	“based	on	democratic	
values,	social	justice	and	fundamental	human	rights”.	A	democratic	developmental	state	
requires	 vigorous	 discussion,	 debate	 and	 activism	 in	 the	 process	 of	 transformation	 and	
																																								 																				
128 Sen The Idea of Justice. 
129 For a discussion of the conceptions of democracy in the South African Constitution, see I Currie & J De Waal 
The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 15; and T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (2008) 15. See also G Quinot “Snapshot or participatory democracy? Political 
engagement as fundamental human right” (2009) 25 SAJHR 392, 397-399 on participatory democracy; and 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 28-34 on deliberative democracy. 
130 Sections 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160. 
131 Section 195(1)(e).  
132 Section 33. See chapter five. 
133 Sections 25-29. The Constitutional Court has interpreted particular socio-economic rights to include 
participatory elements, most notably in eviction cases where ‘meaningful engagement’ with affected parties 
have been read into s26. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) 
paras 39, 42; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) paras 9–18; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) paras 167, 237–44; Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v 
Premier, KwaZulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) paras 113–14. See detailed discussion of these and more 
recent education-related cases in chapter four.  
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responsiveness	“to	the	 inequalities	and	material	deprivation	that	prevent	certain	groups	
from	participating	as	equals	in	the	creation	of	a	new	society”.134	
2	4	1	Participatory	democracy	in	theory	
In	 The	 Idea	 of	 Justice,	 Sen	 states	 that	 the	 institutional	 structure	 of	 the	 contemporary	
practice	of	democracy	hails	largely	from	the	experience	of	Europe	and	America	over	the	
last	 few	centuries.135	He	 regards	 this	as	a	 remarkable	achievement	as	 these	 institutional	
forms	have	been	effective.	However,	he	is	at	pains	to	point	out	that	while	democracy	in	its	
current	 institutionally	 elaborate	 form	 may	 be	 quite	 new	 and	 Western-centred,	
participatory	governance	in	practice	has	a	much	wider	and	longer	history	in	the	world.136	
Early	expressions	of	democracy	can	be	found	scattered	around	the	globe	from	Greece,	to	
Ancient	India,	to	Japan.	He	states	that	in	fact	the	practice	of	elections	has	a	long	history	
in	 non-Western	 societies,	 as	 does	 “the	 broader	 view	 of	 democracy	 in	 terms	 of	 public	
reasoning	 that	 makes	 it	 abundantly	 clear	 that	 the	 cultural	 critique	 of	 democracy	 as	 a	
purely	regional	phenomenon	fails	altogether”.137	
He	 goes	 on	 to	 give	 the	 example	 of	 Nelson	 Mandela’s	 autobiography,	 Long	 Walk	 to	
Freedom,	where	Mandela	describes	how	impressed	and	influenced	he	was,	as	a	young	boy,	
by	the	democratic	nature	of	the	proceedings	of	the	local	meetings	that	were	held	in	the	
regent’s	house	in	Mqhekezweni:	
“Everyone	who	wanted	 to	 speak	did	 so.	 It	was	democracy	 in	 its	purest	 form.	There	may	
have	been	a	hierarchy	of	 importance	among	the	speakers,	but	everyone	was	heard,	chief	
and	subject,	warrior	and	medicine	man,	shopkeeper	and	farmer,	landowner	and	labourer…	
The	foundation	of	self-government	was	that	all	men	[sic]	were	free	to	voice	their	opinions	
and	equal	in	their	value	as	citizens.”138	
																																								 																				
134 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 34. 
135 Sen The Idea of Justice 322-354. On the institutional history of democracy, see also generally J Dunn 
Democracy: A History (2005), quoted in Sen. 
136 Sen The Idea of Justice 323. 
137 Sen The Idea of Justice 330-332. 
138 N Mandela Long Walk to Freedom (1994) 21, quoted in Sen The Idea of Justice.  
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As	Sen	highlights,	Mandela’s	understanding	of	democracy	was	not	rooted	in	the	political	
practice	 that	 he	 saw	 around	 him	 during	 the	 reign	 of	 apartheid	 based	 on	 a	 European	
system,	 but	 on	 his	 general	 ideas	 about	 political	 and	 social	 equality,	 which	 had	 global	
roots,	and	from	his	observations	of	the	practice	of	participatory	public	discussion	that	he	
found	in	his	local	town.139	
This	recognition,	argues	Sen,	points	to	a	connection	between	the	idea	of	justice	and	the	
practice	of	democracy.	In	contemporary	political	philosophy	the	view	that	democracy	is	
best	 seen	 as	 “government	 by	 discussion”	 has	 gained	 widespread	 support.140	 This	
contemporary	 view	of	 democracy	has	broadened	 considerably,	 so	 that	democracy	 is	 no	
longer	seen	only	 in	terms	of	public	balloting,	but	 in	terms	of	what	 John	Rawls	calls	 the	
“exercise	 of	 public	 reason”.141	 As	 Rawls	 explains	 in	Theory	 of	 Justice,	 the	 conception	 of	
deliberative	 democracy	 is	 founded	on	 the	 importance	 of	 deliberation	 amongst	 citizens,	
when	 they	 exchange	 viewpoints	 and	 debate	 their	 positions	 concerning	 public	 political	
issues.142	
Nancy	Fraser	introduced	the	concept	of	“participatory	parity”	which	advances	the	notion	
that	 “justice	 requires	 social	 arrangements	 that	permit	 all	 (adult)	members	of	 society	 to	
interact	with	one	another	as	peers.”143	For	 “participatory	parity”	 to	exist,	 “it	 is	necessary	
but	not	sufficient	 to	establish	standard	 forms	of	 formal	 legal	equality.”144	She	highlights	
two	additional	conditions	that	must	be	satisfied:	the	first	requires	that	material	resources	
be	distributed	across	society	in	such	a	way	as	to	ensure	participants’	independent	“voice”;	
																																								 																				
139 Sen The Idea of Justice 332. 
140 Sen The Idea of Justice 324.  
141 Sen The Idea of Justice. See J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), and Political Liberalism (1993).  
142 J Rawls Collected Papers (1999) 579-80. See also proponents of deliberative democracy referred to in Sen 
The Idea of Justice 324-326, in particular J Habermas “Three Normative Models of Democracy” in S Benhabib 
(ed) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (1996) 21-30. See further the 
discussion in Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 28-34 on deliberative democracy, and sources referred to in 
note 29 generally: J Habermas Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (trans W Rehg) (1996); A Gutmann & D Thompson Democracy and Disagreement (1996); S 
Benhabib “Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy” in S Benhabib Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (1996); I M Young Inclusion and Democracy (2000) 16–51; D Davis 
Democracy and Deliberation (1999). 
143 Fraser “Social justice in the age of identity politics” in Redistribution or Recognition? 30-31. 
144 Fraser “Social justice in the age of identity politics” in Redistribution or Recognition? 30-31. 
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the	second	requires	that	equal	respect	is	expressed	for	all	participants	and	there	is	equal	
opportunity	for	all	to	achieve	social	esteem.145	
While	there	are	differences	amongst	contemporary	democracy	theorists	about	the	role	of	
public	 reasoning	 in	 politics,	 these	 debates	 are	 not	 critical	 to	 this	 dissertation.	What	 is	
important	 to	note	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	dissertation,	 is	 that	 these	contributions	have	
elevated	 the	 central	 issues	 of	 political	 participation,	 dialogue	 and	 public	 interaction	
within	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 democracy.	 Sen	 argues	 that	 the	 vital	 role	 of	 public	
reasoning	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 democracy	 makes	 the	 entire	 subject	 of	 democracy	 relate	
closely	with	notions	of	justice.	He	thus	reasons	that	since	the	“demands	of	justice”	must	
be	 assessed	 with	 the	 help	 of	 public	 reasoning,	 and	 public	 reasoning	 is	 constitutively	
related	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 democracy,	 there	 is	 a	 direct	 connection	 between	 justice	 and	
democracy.146	The	value	of	 this	broadened	 form	of	democracy,	he	explains,	 is	 firstly	 the	
ability	 to	 make	 people	 take	 an	 interest,	 through	 public	 discussion,	 in	 each	 other’s	
predicaments,	 and	 to	 have	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 others.	 The	 second	
concerns	the	informational	role	of	democracy	which	goes	beyond	its	incentive	functions,	
to	improved	policy-making.147	
His	argument,	based	on	global	evidence,	 is	that	democracy	and	political	and	civil	rights	
tend	to	enhance	freedoms	of	other	kinds	(such	as	human	security)	through	giving	a	voice	
to	 the	marginalised	and	vulnerable	on	 important	policy	 issues,	 and	 thereby	 influencing	
greatly	 their	 developmental	 outcomes.148	 He	 provides	 examples	 of	 areas	 where	 social	
change	has	 been	brought	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 “determined	use	 of	 political	 and	 social	
voice”,	 such	 as	 the	 feminist	 revolution	 and	 achievement	 of	 gender	 equality	 in	 certain	
instances.	More	recently,	this	has	been	witnessed	in	South	Africa	in	the	service	delivery	
protests	by	people	directly	affected,149	 the	student	protests	 for	 free,	quality,	decolonised	
																																								 																				
145 Fraser “Social justice in the age of identity politics” in Redistribution or Recognition? 30-31. 
146 Sen The Idea of Justice 324.  
147 Sen The Idea of Justice 324. 
148 Sen The Idea of Justice 348. 
149 See J Dugard “Urban Basic Services” in Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance 
(2015) 275-309, 286-291, and R Pithouse “The University of Abahlali baseMjondolo’ (2007) 
<http://abahlali.org/node/2814/> (accessed 17-05-2016) who critique the terminology of “service delivery” 
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higher	education	and	the	learner	protests	against	discriminatory	policies	and	practices	at	
schools	 across	 the	 country.150	 This	 mounting	 action	 in	 organised	 movements	 is	 based	
broadly	on	demands	for	human	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	education	(including	tertiary	
education,	quality	education,	non-discriminatory	education),	housing	and	basic	services,	
food,	 basic	 healthcare,	 guarantees	 of	 environmental	 preservation	 and	 the	 right	 to	
employment.	 Sen	 says	 that	 these	 movements	 raise	 awareness	 of	 particular	 societal	
failures,	in	addition	to	public	debates	in	the	media,	by	providing	“a	politically	harder	edge	
to	socially	important	demands”.151	
Democratic	 freedom	 can	 thus	 lead	 to	 more	 effective	 and	 equitable	 policies	 and	 social	
justice.	 A	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 socio-economic	
transformation	 and	 reduce	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 requires	 engagement	 and	 activism	
both	 by	 those	 affected	 by	 injustice,	 poverty	 and	marginalisation,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 who	
contribute	 intellectually	 to	 the	 transformation	 of	 society,	 such	 as	 the	 legal	 fraternity,	
academics,	technocrats	and	the	media.152	
This	 leads	us	 finally	 to	a	discussion	of	participatory	democracy,153	as	distinguished	from	
deliberative	democracy.	Theunis	Roux	distinguishes	between	deliberative	democracy	and	
participatory	 democracy,	 although	 they	 are	 both	 closely	 aligned	 to	 the	model	 of	 direct	
democracy.	 He	 explains	 that	 deliberative	 democracy	 and	 participatory	 democracy	 are	
“superficially	similar”	since	both	are	seen	in	the	context	of	a	response	against	democracy	
producing	 passive	 citizens	 who	 only	 participate	 in	 periodic	 elections.	 He	 goes	 on	 to	
explain	the	difference	between	these	two	forms	of	democracy.	For	theorists,	deliberative	
democracy	 encompasses	 a	 particular	 form	 of	 participation	 –	 deliberation	 –	 that	 may	
nevertheless	legitimate	collective	decisions	even	where	fundamental	disagreement	exists.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
protests and point to the fact that many of these protests are about inadequate service delivery and also about 
a lack of effective voice and participation in the delivery of services. 
150 See R Munusamy “Countdown to Disaster” Daily Maverick (2016-10-21) and numerous other media 
articles on the recent #FeesMustFall protests and their impact on policy on the funding of higher education. 
151 Sen The Idea of Justice 348. 
152 Sen The Idea of Justice 351. 
153 See Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional Law of SA 14-15 and Quinot (2009) 25 SAJHR 397-399. For a 
more detailed examination of participatory democracy, see C Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 
(1970) 22-44; Held Models of Democracy 3 ed (2006) 209–16; Cunningham Theories of Democracy (2002) 
123–41.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 61	
 
Participatory	democracy	in	contrast,	assumes	that	sufficient	and	meaningful	participation	
will	eventually	result	in	agreement	between	citizens	on	the	“right”	decision	in	the	public	
interest.154		
Carole	 Pateman,	 the	 chief	 exponent	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 participatory	 democracy,	 explains	
that	 national,	 representative	 institutions	 are	 not	 sufficient	 for	 democracy.	 In	 order	 to	
maximise	the	participation	of	people,	“‘social	training’	for	democracy”	must	take	place	in	
other	 domains.	 She	 argues	 that	 the	 process	 of	 participation	 in	 itself	 supports	 the	
development	of	psychological	qualities	and	individual	dispositions.	The	major	function	of	
participation	in	participatory	democracy	is	thus	an	educative	one:	through	psychological	
growth	and	enhancement	of	democratic	tools	and	skills.155	
David	 Held	 describes	 participatory	 democracy	 as	 part	 of	 the	 same	 model	 as	 direct	
democracy,	 since	 they	 both	 stress	 the	 value	 of	 citizen	 participation	 in	 the	 making	 of	
collective	decisions.156	In	contemporary	terms,	Roux	explains	participatory	democracy	as	
“an	 attempt	 to	 re-inject	 elements	 of	 direct	 democracy	 into	 modern	 systems	 of	
representative	 democracy.”157	 Participatory	 democracy	 is	 thus,	 in	 this	 sense,	
fundamentally	about	whether	and	how,	citizens	should	be	given	the	right	to	participate	in	
the	making	of	decisions	 that	affect	 them,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	modern	nation-state	
embraces	representative	democracy	as	the	mechanism	by	which	citizens	have	their	say.158	
																																								 																				
154 Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional Law of SA 15–18. 
155 Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 42. According to CB Macpherson, the “circular” problem with 
the approach of participatory democracy is that the two “virtues” of participation, that of promoting a more 
active citizenry and reducing poverty and inequality, “are also its prerequisites”. See CB Macpherson The Life 
and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 99-100, quoted in Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional Law of SA 15. 
In relation to the well-known “circularity problem” of justice as democratic participation also see Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 32 and sources cited by her in notes 40, 41 and 42: N Fraser “Social justice in the age 
of identity politics: Redistribution, recognition and participation’ in N Fraser & A Honneth Redistribution or 
Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) 7-109, 44; J Cohen ‘The economic basis of deliberative 
democracy’ (1989) 6 Soc Philos Policy 25-50; J Cohen ‘Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy’ in 
S Behabib (ed) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (1996) 95-119; S 
Benhabib ‘Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy’ in S Benhabib Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (1996) 78-79; T Roux ‘Democracy’ in S Woolman et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service, September 2006) chapter 10, 18.  
156 Held Models of Democracy 6, 210; Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory 42; Quinot (2009) 25 
SAJHR 397. 
157 Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional Law of SA 14. 
158 Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional Law of SA 14. 
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Held	 notes	 that	 proponents	 of	 participatory	 democratic	 models	 also	 emphasise	 the	
critical	importance	of	transforming	politics	and	democratising	the	institutions	of	the	state	
by	 making	 parliament,	 state	 bureaucracies	 and	 political	 parties	 more	 open	 and	
accountable.159	The	South	African	Constitution	affords	precisely	this	type	of	democracy	in	
various	provisions	discussed	 in	 the	next	section.	These	democratic	aspects	of	 the	South	
African	Constitution	 are	what	makes	 it	 transformative,	 as	discussed	 above,	 and	 in	 turn	
must	necessarily	underpin	the	democratic	developmental	state	and	how	it	engages	with	
and	 includes	 citizens	 in	 decision-making	 through	 its	 capable,	 open	 and	 accountable	
institutions.		
2	4	2	Participatory	democracy	in	the	South	African	Constitution	
The	 South	 African	 Constitution	 is	 said	 to	 recognise	 three	 forms	 of	 democracy:	
representative	democracy,	participatory	democracy	and	direct	democracy.160	At	the	heart	
of	South	Africa’s	transformative	Constitution	lies	a	participatory	democratic	culture	that	
is	integral	to	the	achievement	of	social	justice	and	development	for	all.	This	is	immanent	
both	in	the	legal	text	of	the	Constitution	and	the	judgments	of	the	Constitutional	Court	
over	the	past	22	years,161	as	well	as	in	the	culture	of	social,	economic	and	political	activism	
and	debate	that	has	grown	and	thrived	since	the	advent	of	democracy	in	South	Africa.	
Public	 debate	 and	 activism	 around	 issues	 of	 poverty,	 inequality	 and	 development	 in	
South	 Africa	 spans	 the	 work	 of	 research	 organisations,	 trade	 unions,	 civil	 society	
organisations,	 the	 media,	 and	 academia;	 and	 is	 even	 more	 vividly	 seen	 in	 the	 service	
delivery	protests	of	poor	communities	and	demonstrations	of	mass	movements.	All	of	this	
exchange	 has	 contributed	 to	 an	 ongoing	 policy	 debate	 in	 the	 country	 concerning	
																																								 																				
159 Held Models of Democracy 211, quoted in Quinot (2009) 25 SAJHR 397. 
160 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 14-17. 
161 See sections 1(d), 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160, 195(1)(e). Cases addressing participatory democracy 
that have come before the courts include: Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National 
Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 108, 112–117, 121, 234; Poverty Alleviation Network v President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) paras 33, 40; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Tshabalala-Msimang & Another NNO 2005 (2) SA 530 (C) para 627; Masetlha v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2008 (1) BCLR 1 para 181; Land Access Movement of South Africa v Chairperson of the National 
Council of Provinces 2016 (10) BCLR 1277 (CC) para 58. 
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government’s	 macro-economic	 and	 distributional	 policies	 and	 serves	 to	 augment	 a	
democratic	developmental	state.162	As	Sandra	Liebenberg	writes:	
“Active	debate	and	contestation	concerning	the	nature	of	social	change,	and	the	political	
and	 legal	 reforms	 necessary	 for	 achieving	 it,	 should	 not	 be	 viewed	 as	 antithetical	 to	
transformation,	but	rather	as	integral	to	its	achievement.”163	
The	late	former	Chief	Justice	Langa	elaborated	a	view	of	constitutional	transformation	as	
a	process	of	constant	dialogue	and	contestation	 in	 the	pursuit	of	a	more	 just	 society	as	
follows:	
“[T]ransformation	 is	 not	 a	 temporary	 phenomenon	 that	 ends	 when	 we	 all	 have	 equal	
access	to	resources	and	basic	services	and	when	lawyers	and	judges	embrace	a	culture	of	
justification.	 Transformation	 is	 a	 permanent	 ideal,	 a	 way	 of	 looking	 at	 the	 world	 that	
creates	a	space	in	which	dialogue	and	contestation	are	truly	possible,	in	which	new	ways	
of	being	are	constantly	explored	and	created,	accepted	and	rejected	and	in	which	change	
is	unpredictable	but	the	idea	of	change	is	constant.	This	is	perhaps	the	ultimate	vision	of	a	
transformative,	 rather	 than	 a	 transitional	 Constitution.	 This	 is	 the	 perspective	 that	 sees	
the	 Constitution	 as	 not	 transformative	 because	 of	 its	 peculiar	 historical	 position	 or	 its	
particular	socio-economic	goals	but	because	it	envisions	a	society	that	will	always	be	open	
to	change	and	contestation,	a	society	that	will	always	be	defined	by	transformation.”164	
This	 is	 the	 notion	 of	 deliberative	 democracy,	 as	 a	 particular	 form	 of	 participatory	
democracy,	 discussed	 by	 Sen	 above,	 that	 will	 aid	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 current	
status	 quo	 and	 achievement	 of	 a	more	 just	 society.	 Both	 deliberative	 and	 participatory	
democracy	 are	 necessary	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 Deliberative	 democracy	
can	 contribute	 to	 making	 participatory	 democracy	 more	 meaningful,	 where	 all	
actors/participants	 are	 open	 to	 changing	 their	 views	 and	 there	 are	 no	 fixed	 or	 pre-
conceived	policy	positions.		
																																								 																				
162 See section above on the conception of the South African democratic developmental state. 
163 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 29. 
164 Langa (2006) 17(3) Stell LR 354. 
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Besides	 the	 value	 of	 general	 discussion	 and	 debate	 in	 the	 public	 arena,	 public	
participation	in	the	processes	of	government	is	also	an	integral	part	of	our	constitutional	
democracy.	 One	 of	 the	 founding	 constitutional	 values	 is	 a	 multi-party	 system	 of	
democratic	 government	 based	 on	 accountability,	 responsiveness	 and	 openness.165	 The	
Constitution	 expressly	 provides	 for	 public	 access	 to	 and	 participation	 in	 legislative	
processes,166	as	well	as	the	executive	processes	by	providing	that	among	the	“basic	values	
and	 principles	 governing	 public	 administration”	 is	 that	 “people’s	 needs	 must	 be	
responded	to,	and	the	public	must	be	encouraged	to	participate	in	policy-making”.167		
The	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 in	 several	 cases	 also	 underscored	 the	 centrality	 of	
participatory	 democracy	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	 constitutional	 goals	 and	 values,168	 the	
necessity	 of	 this	 participation	 for	 purposes	 of	 informed	 decision-making169	 and	
acknowledged	 the	duty	of	 the	State	 to	 take	positive	measures	 to	ensure	 that	 the	public	
has	the	effective	capacity	and	opportunity	to	participate	in	decision-making	processes.170	
In	 particular,	 it	 has	 highlighted	 the	 need	 to	 listen	 to	 the	 voices	 of	 the	 poor	 and	
marginalised	in	society.171	The	Court	has	affirmed	that	the	participation	of	the	poor	in	the	
determination	of	their	access	to	benefits	and	services,	endorses	the	values	of	dignity	and	
																																								 																				
165 Section 1(d). 
166 Sections 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160. See Land Access Movement of South Africa v Chairperson of 
the National Council of Provinces 2016 (10) BCLR 1277 (CC) where the applicants sought a declaration that 
the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act 15 0f 2014 was invalid for failure by the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) and the Provincial Legislatures to facilitate adequate public participation as required by 
sections 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
167 Section 195(1)(e). Sections 50 and 51 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
(‘Municipal Systems Act’) affirm the application of the constitutional principles governing public administration 
to the provision of municipal services. 
168 In Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) BCLR 1 para 181, the Constitutional Court 
elaborated upon the goals and values of the Constitution in relation to democracy and participation:  
“[I]t is apparent from the Constitution that the democratic government that is contemplated is a 
participatory democracy which is accountable, transparent and requires participation in decision-
making.” 
See also Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) 
para 121; and Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) 
para 40. 
169 Para 33. 
170 See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 
108, 112–117.  
171 Para 115, where the Constitutional Court highlighted the importance and value of participation by 
marginalised groups in legislative processes in order to give legitimacy to legislation and dignity to those who 
participate. See also the discussion of “meaningful engagement” in the eviction and education cases in 
chapter four. 
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freedom	 as	 well	 as	 gives	 substance	 to	 the	 deliberative	 and	 participatory	 democracy	
envisaged	in	the	Constitution.172	Liebenberg	argues	that	a	lack	of	opportunity	for	people	
to	 air	 their	 concerns	 about	 decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 lives	 can	 be	 a	 major	 source	 of	
disempowerment	 and	 lack	 of	 autonomy.	 She	 asserts	 that	 “meaningful	 participation”	 in	
such	 decisions	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 freedom	 and	 human	 dignity	
because	it	provides	a	sense	of	control	over	one’s	life	and	nourishes	a	sense	of	self-worth	as	
equal	 members	 of	 society.	 Individual	 participation	 in	 decision-making	 thus	 underpins	
participatory	and	deliberative	democracy	and	the	values	of	accountability,	responsiveness	
and	openness	in	the	Constitution.173	
The	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 repeatedly	 affirmed	 that	 deliberative	 and	 participatory	
democracy	 seek	 to	 enhance	 and	 deepen	 representative	 democracy	 and	 the	 values	 of	
freedom	and	dignity,	by	expanding	the	opportunities	 for	people’s	active	participation	in	
decision-making	 processes,	 including	 in	 relation	 to	 cases	 dealing	 with	 their	 access	 to	
socio-economic	 rights.	 It	 is	 about	 more	 than	 mere	 participation	 in	 a	 representative	
democracy	through	regular	elections	and	the	institutional	platforms	provided	for	citizens	
to	 offer	 input,174	 but	 also	 going	 beyond	 to	 creating	 numerous	 fora	 for	 dialogue	 and	
mechanisms	for	participation.	The	aim	is	 to	promote	greater	participation	 in	the	public	
and	private	 institutions	 that	affect	diverse	aspects	of	people’s	 lives.175	Those	particularly	
disadvantaged	groups	who	are	not	easily	able	 to	participate	 in	deliberative	processes	as	
																																								 																				
172 See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 
115, 234 and New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang & Another NNO 2005 (2) SA 530 (C) 
para 627 where Sachs J writes of the importance of dialogue and having a voice in public affairs, to the right to 
dignity. In Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) 
para 234, and quoted again in Land Access Movement of South Africa v Chairperson of the National Council of 
Provinces 2016 (10) BCLR 1277 (CC) para 58, Sachs J stated that “[p]ublic involvement . . . [is] of particular 
significance for members of groups that have been the victims of processes of historical silencing”. He added: 
“It is constitutive of their dignity as citizens today that they not only have a chance to speak, but also 
enjoy the assurance they will be listened to. This would be of special relevance for those who may feel 
politically disadvantaged at present because they lack higher education, access to resources and 
strong political connections. Public involvement accordingly strengthens rather than undermines 
formal democracy, by responding to and negating some of its functional deficits.” 
173 Liebenberg (2008) Acta Juridica 167-168. 
174 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 30. 
175 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights. 
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peers	 or	 political	 equals,	 must	 be	 given	 real	 and	 “meaningful”	 opportunities	 for	
participation.176	
In	order	for	socio-economic	transformation	to	have	a	real	impact	on	the	lives	of	the	poor	
and	marginalised,	their	meaningful	participation	in	the	development	of	law	and	policy	as	
well	 as	 administrative	 decision-making,	 is	 required.	 As	 Sen	 posits	 above,	 democratic	
rights	are	the	“constituent	components”	of	development.	Evans	argues	that	strategies	and	
policies	 for	 development	 should	 not	 be	 formulated	 by	 technocrats	 alone,	 but	 must	
include	“democratically	organised	public	deliberation”.177	Gumede	and	others	also	argue	
that	 in	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 opportunities	 for	 informed	
participation	 can	 lead	 to	 transparent,	 accountable	 dialogue	 and	 debate	 grounded	 in	
reality,	 on	 key	 policy	 choices	 to	 address	 the	 impact	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 This	
resonates	with	a	constitutional	democracy	that	requires	decisions	to	be	considered	in	the	
light	of	certain	fundamental	norms	and	values.		
The	adjudication	of	human	rights	norms	in	the	courts	is	also	a	significant	opportunity	for	
deliberation	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 rights	 from	 the	
perspective	of	the	adjudicators	and	experts	as	well	as	from	the	perspective	of	those	whose	
rights	 are	 affected,	 as	 required	 in	 a	 participatory	 democracy.178	 In	 this	 section	 I	 have	
argued	 that	 the	 combination	 of	 opportunities	 for	 participatory	 democracy	 to	 thrive	 in	
policy	 and	 law-making,	 administrative	 decision-making	 and	 adjudication	 of	 rights,	 are	
critical	elements	of	a	democratic	developmental	state’s	response	to	conditions	of	poverty	
and	 inequality	 in	 South	Africa,	 and	move	us	 closer	 to	 the	 constitutional	 ideal	 of	 social	
justice.		
																																								 																				
176 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 32. 
177 Evans “Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 
State in SA 43. 
178 Evans “Constructing the 21st Century Developmental State” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 
State in SA 33. Liebenberg cautions that there is nevertheless a tension between the Courts as being 
supportive of deliberative and participatory democracy, at the same time as being “a forum for authoritative 
decision-making according to binding legal norms”. 
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2	5	Conclusion	
This	chapter	serves	as	the	theoretical	background	to	the	analysis	of	socio-economic	rights	
and	 administrative	 justice	 jurisprudence	 in	 chapters	 four,	 five	 and	 six.	 I	 described	 the	
concept	 of	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 that	 frames	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	state.	The	South	African	Constitution	is	the	legal	framework	for	the	socio-
economic	 transformation	 of	 South	African	 society	 from	 its	 unequal	 and	 unjust	 past.	 It	
lays	 the	 foundation	 for	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	 processes	 and	 institutions	 to	
imagine	 and	 conceive	 what	 is	 required	 to	 transform	 this	 society.	 These	 processes	 and	
fora,	in	a	democratic	developmental	South	African	state,	must	be	sufficiently	inclusive	of	
a	diversity	of	voices.	They	must	enable	all	groups,	including	those	affected	by	poverty	and	
marginalisation,	 to	participate	meaningfully	as	equals	 to	 remedy	various	manifestations	
of	widespread	socio-economic	deprivation	and	disempowerment	in	South	Africa.	
The	 evolution	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 in	 South	 Africa	 was	 a	 move	 away	 from	 the	
welfare	state	to	a	more	development-oriented	and	empowered	approach,	as	articulated	in	
the	 long-term	vision	 for	 South	Africa,	 the	National	Development	Plan	 2030.	The	South	
African	version	is	envisaged	as	a	democratic	developmental	state,	emphasising	the	critical	
importance	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 autonomous,	 accountable	 and	 capable	
institutions	 supporting	 the	 transformation	 project.	 It	 seeks	 to	 address	 the	 situation	 of	
poverty	 in	 South	 Africa	 in	 a	 way	 that	 recognises	 that	 overcoming	 the	 oppression	 of	
poverty	 is	 not	 just	 a	 matter	 of	 distributing	 material	 benefits	 to	 the	 poor	 but	 also	
incorporating	their	views	in	the	decisions	that	affect	their	lives.		
The	 next	 chapter	 explores	 the	 international	 and	 South	 African	 multi-dimensional	
conceptualisation	of	poverty,	which	incorporates	material	and	empowerment	elements.	I	
then	describe	the	situation	of	poverty	in	South	Africa	in	these	various	paradigms.	Finally,	
I	 link	 a	 development	 economics	 understanding	 of	 poverty	 to	 an	 integrated,	 multi-
dimensional	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 poverty,	 that	 acknowledges	 the	 significant	
intersection	of	socio-economic	and	participatory	rights.		
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CHAPTER 3: Conceptualising poverty for a democratic 
developmental state 
	
3	1	Introduction	
The	next	 sections	examine	 the	different	 conceptions	of	poverty,	 some	of	which	 include	
dimensions	 of	 disempowerment	 and	 inequality,	 and	 a	human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	
poverty.	The	definition	and	measurement	of	poverty,	the	world	over,	remains	contested	
terrain.	 Its	 dimensions	 include	 factors	 such	 as	 income,	 access	 to	 basic	 services,	 assets,	
human	 capital,	 political	 freedoms	 and	 social	 capital.	 This	 broad	 approach	 to	 poverty	
allows	 for	engagement	with	the	reality	of	poverty	and	the	combination	of	 interventions	
required	to	address	it.		
The	 multidimensional	 view	 of	 poverty	 articulates	 that	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 poor	 are	
characterised	 by	 deprivation	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 entitlements	 to	 food,	 health,	 education,	
security	 provisions,	 agency,	 political	 influence	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 term	 “poverty”	 therefore	
encompasses	a	wide	range	of	issues	that	cover	the	spectrum	of	both	socio-economic	and	
civil	 and	political	 rights.	The	human	 rights	 approach	 to	poverty	 framework	 reflects	 the	
fundamental	 interdependence	 of	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights,	 and	 civil	 and	
political	rights.179	
The	 most	 current	 and	 prominent	 development	 economics	 perspectives	 of	 poverty,	
include	 the	 income-based	 perspective,	 basic	 needs,	 sustainable	 livelihoods,	 capability,	
social	 exclusion	 and	 subjective	 well-being	 –	 some	 of	 which	 are	multi-dimensional	 and	
include	 aspects	 of	 “agency”,	 “autonomy”	 and	 inequality,	 and	 some	 of	 which	 are	 more	
narrowly	 construed.	 Several	 of	 these	 are	 also	 applied	 in	 the	 development	 literature	 in	
																																								 																				
179 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Human Rights and Poverty 
Reduction: A Conceptual Framework (2004) 10-12; and B A Andreassen “The human rights and development 
nexus: From rights talk to rights practices” in D Banik (ed) Poverty, Politics and Development: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (2006) 298. 
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South	 Africa	 but	 are	 not	 suitable	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	state.			
This	 chapter	 then	 provides	 a	 contextual	 description	 of	 the	 situation	 of	 poverty	 still	
requiring	widespread	 redress	 in	 South	Africa.	 The	 extent	 of	 and	 trends	 in	 poverty	 and	
inequality	over	the	past	twenty-two	years	of	constitutional	democracy	are	presented	for	
the	purposes	of	understanding	the	multitude	of	challenges	and	monitoring	the	impact	of	
policies,	laws	and	jurisprudence	on	poverty.	The	ability	to	measure	the	efficacy	of	poverty	
reduction	 measures	 implemented	 by	 government	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 court	 cases	 on	
poverty	 reduction	 is	 critical	 for	 tracking	 the	progress	of	 socio-economic	 transformation	
itself	and	assessing	the	effectiveness	of	the	institutions	in	support	thereof.	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 define	 poverty	 for	 the	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	 state,	 and	 apply	 this	 conception	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 jurisprudence	 on	
socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 chapters	 four,	 five	 and	 six.	 A	
democratic	 developmental	 state	 is	 best	 served	 by	 a	 multi-dimensional	 approach	 to	
poverty	most	 closely	 aligned	 to	 Sen’s	 capability	 perspective,	 which	 acknowledges	 both	
material	 needs	 as	 well	 as	 the	 important	 role	 of	 human	 agency	 and	 freedom	 in	
development	and	links	to	an	integrated	human	rights	approach	to	poverty.	
3	2	Global	conceptions	of	poverty	
Sixteen	years	ago,	global	leaders	at	the	World	Summit	for	Social	Development	described	
poverty	 eradication	 as	 an	 ethical,	 political	 and	 economic	 imperative.180	 Since	 then,	
poverty	eradication	has	become	the	overarching	objective	of	development,	as	reflected	in	
the	internationally	agreed	Millennium	Development	Goals	(‘MDG’s),	which	set	the	target	
																																								 																				
180 In September 2000, world leaders came together at the UN Millennium Summit and 189 nations adopted 
the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The Declaration was signed by 147 heads of state and 
governments, who committed their countries to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting 
out a series of time-bound targets to be achieved by 2015. These have become known as the Millennium 
Development Goals. See United Nations “United Nations Millennium Declaration” Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on 18 September 2000 United Nations <http://www.un.org/millennium/ 
declaration/ares552e.htm> (accessed 26-07-2016). 
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of	 halving	 global	 extreme	 poverty	 by	 2015,181	 and	 the	 newly	 agreed	 upon	 Sustainable	
Development	Goals	 (‘SDG’s).182	On	September	25th	2015,	a	United	Nations-led	 initiative	
“Transforming	our	world:	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development”,	saw	countries	
adopt	another	set	of	global	goals	to	end	poverty,	protect	the	planet,	and	ensure	prosperity	
for	all.	The	SDGs	are	an	intergovernmental	set	of	17	ambitious	goals	with	169	targets	to	be	
achieved	 over	 the	 next	 15	 years,	 including:	 “ending	 poverty	 in	 all	 its	 forms	 and	
dimensions,	 including	 by	 eradicating	 extreme	 poverty	 by	 2030”;	 and	 “reducing	
inequalities	 within	 and	 among	 countries”.	 They	 help	 to	 define	 and	 guide	 the	
international,	 regional	 and	 national	 policy	 agendas	 for	 poverty	 eradication	 and	
sustainable	development	until	 2030.	The	goals	 include	numerous	poverty-related	 issues	
and	define	poverty	as	encompassing	various	dimensions.		
Since	the	MDGs	were	agreed	upon,	it	has	been	difficult	to	measure	improvements	in	the	
overall	poverty	levels	and	success	in	achieving	them	erratic.183	An	understanding	of	where	
poverty	exists	and	how	poverty	has	changed	over	time,	depends	firstly	on	developing	an	
adequate	 conceptualisation	 of	 poverty,	 and	 secondly	 on	 how	 it	 is	 then	 measured	 and	
monitored.	In	order	to	fully	comprehend	the	nature	and	extent	of	poverty,	as	well	as	to	
develop	and	evaluate	poverty	 reduction	policies	and	programmes,	 there	must	be	clarity	
on	the	definition	and	measurement	of	poverty.		
Definitions	 of	 poverty	 range	 from	 those	 solely	 focused	 on	 income	 and	 expenditure,	 to	
those	which	look	more	broadly	at	basic	needs	such	as	health	and	education,	and	to	those	
																																								 																				
181 The eight MDGs break down into 21 quantifiable targets, which are measured by 60 indicators that respond 
to the world's main development challenges. They are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve 
universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve 
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and 
develop a Global Partnership for Development.  
182 United Nations “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (21-10-2015) 
United Nations <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> (accessed 10-
07-2016). The document states that the goals and targets are “integrated and indivisible” were developed 
over the course of two years of extensive public consultation and engagement with civil society and other 
stakeholders across the globe, including the poorest and most vulnerable community voices. 
183 United Nations “Rethinking Poverty: Report on the World Social Situation” (2010) United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2010/fullreport.pdf> (accessed 26-07-2016). 
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which	identify	elements	of	social	exclusion,	 inequality	and	disempowerment.184	The	five	
major	perspectives	on	poverty	are:	income	poverty,185	capabilities,186	basic	needs,187	social	
exclusion,188	 sustainable	 livelihoods,189	 and	well-being.190	 These	 span	 broad	 and	 narrow	
and	objective	and	subjective	concepts,	as	well	as	quantitative	and	qualitative	measures.191		
It	 is	unnecessary	 to	delve	 separately	 into	 these	various	perspectives	 for	 the	purposes	of	
this	dissertation,	but	simply	to	highlight	over-arching	insights	and	principles	for	purposes	
of	 analysis	 of	 the	 South	 African	 jurisprudence	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state.	 Julian	 May,	 in	 reviewing	 24	 studies	 of	 poverty	 in	 developing	
countries,	 speaks	 of	 an	 “elusive	 consensus”	when	 it	 comes	 to	definitions,	measurement	
and	analysis	of	poverty.192	Poverty	is	a	“contested	political	concept”193	with	an	inextricable	
																																								 																				
184 The Presidency “Towards an Anti-poverty Strategy for South Africa: A Discussion Document” (2008) The 
Presidency 13 <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/pcsa/economic/draft_antipoverty1008.pdf> 
(accessed 26-07-2016). The draft Strategy does not pin down a definition of poverty for the country per se, but 
broadly defines what it means based on the contemporary literature and research.  
185 See for example World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq> 
(accessed 20-05-2016). 
186 See A Sen “Well-being, agency and freedom: the Dewey lectures 1984” Journal of Philosophy (1985) 82; 
and A Sen Commodities and Capabilities (1985), discussed further below. 
187 See P P Streeten Basic needs: Premises and promises (1979) World Bank 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/912301468190752919/pdf/REP62000Basic00remises0and
0promises.pdf> (accessed 03-08-2016); I Davids “Poverty in South Africa: a development management 
perspective” in I Davids, F Theron, & K J Maphunye (eds) Participatory Development in South Africa: A 
Development Management Perspective (2005); and M Max-Neef Human Scale Development: Conception, 
Application and Further Reflections (1991). 
188 S Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty: Concept, Assessment and Strategy Poverty and Social Development 
Papers No.7 (2003) Asian Development Bank 6-9. See also various other commentators referred to by Osmani 
in footnote 8 for further literature on the concept of social exclusion and its relationship to poverty and 
inequality in particular. See also A Sen Social Exclusion: Concept, Application, and Scrutiny Social 
Development Papers No.1 (2000) Asian Development Bank, regarding the relationship between poverty and 
social exclusion. There is a huge body of literature on inequality as a major driver of poverty, that is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. See also S Liebenberg “Towards an Equality Promoting Interpretation of Socio- 
economic rights in South Africa: Insights from the Egalitarian Liberal Tradition” (2015) 132 South African Law 
Journal 411 – 437. 
189 See for example UK White Paper on International Development “Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for 
the 21st Century” (1997) ODI <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/2622.pdf> (accessed 21-05-2016); Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 15, 16. 
190 See L Camfield Using Subjective Measures of Well-being in Developing Countries (2003); and R Layard 
Happiness: has social science a clue? Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures, delivered on 3, 4, 5 March 2003 at 
the London School of Economics, 9 <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/events/lectures/ layard/RL030303.pdf> (accessed 
12-09-2016). 
191 See May “An elusive consensus” in Choices for the Poor; Alcock Understanding Poverty; Townsend “Post-
1945 poverty research” in Researching Poverty; and Aliber Study of the Incidence and Nature of Chronic 
Poverty and Development Policy. 
192 J May “An elusive consensus: Definitions, measurement and analysis of poverty” in A Grinspun (ed) Choices 
for the Poor: Lessons from National Poverty Strategies (2001). 
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link	and	relationship	between	how	poverty	is	conceptualised,	defined,	explained,	and	the	
policies	designed	to	address	it.194		
Broad	perspectives	of	poverty	include	those	that	are	multi-dimensional	and	based	on	an	
integrated	and	holistic	view	of	poverty,	whilst	those	narrowly	construed	mostly	focus	on	
income	 poverty	 alone.	 Objectively	 defined	 notions	 of	 poverty	 can	 be	 measured	 by	
collecting	quantifiable	data,	such	as	income,	literacy	levels,	calorie	intake	etc.	Subjective	
concepts	encompass	a	view	of	poverty	that	takes	into	consideration	people’s	experiences	
along	a	multiplicity	of	dimensions.195		
Although	 poverty	 lines	 that	 measure	 household	 income	 and	 consumption	 remain	
important,	 if	 not	 dominant,	 a	 more	 holistic	 approach	 has	 evolved	 that	 incorporates	 a	
range	of	well-being	indicators,	inequality	indices,	assessments	of	vulnerability	and	risk	as	
well	 as	 the	 dynamics	 of	 change	 over	 time.196	 In	 addition,	 they	 introduce	 the	 notion	 of	
human	 rights.	 According	 to	 the	 statement	 adopted	 by	 the	 Committee	 on	 Economic,	
Cultural	and	Social	Rights	(‘CESCR’)	of	the	United	Nations	in	2001,	poverty	is	defined	as	
encompassing	a	wide	range	of	features:	
“A	 human	 condition	 characterised	 by	 the	 sustained	 or	 chronic	 deprivation	 of	 the	
resources,	 capabilities,	 choices,	 security	 and	 power	 necessary	 for	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 an	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
193 See P Alcock Understanding Poverty (1993) 3, where he observes: “Most people …claim that their 
understanding of poverty is the correct one, based on logical argument and scientific research. 
[However]…there is no one correct, scientific, agreed definition because poverty is inevitably a political 
concept, and thus inherently a contested one.” 
194 P Townsend “Post-1945 poverty research and things to come” in J Bradshaw & R Sainsbury (eds) 
Researching Poverty (2000) 5. 
195 See Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 9-12, quoting S Carvalho & H White Combining the Quantitative and 
Qualitative approaches to Poverty Measurement and Analysis Technical Paper No. 366 (1997) World Bank. 
196 M Aliber Study of the Incidence and Nature of Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in South Africa: An 
Overview Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper 3 (2001). Households or individuals are understood 
to be in chronic poverty when their condition of poverty endures over a period of time. Different researchers 
propose different time periods as characteristic of chronic poverty (ranging from six months to ten years); this 
means that the household or individual remains below the poverty line for all or virtually all of this period. 
Chronic poverty can be a function of an individual’s characteristics (e.g. elderly, disabled), or of the 
environment (e.g. sustained periods of high unemployment or low-wage employment, landlessness), or a 
combination of the two. 
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adequate	 standard	 of	 living	 and	 other	 civil,	 cultural,	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	
rights.”197	
In	 general,	 economists	 perceive	 poverty	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 resources	 relative	 to	 basic	 needs,	
whereby	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 consumption	 or	 income	 are	 good	 proxies	 for	 needed	
consumables	 like	 food	 or	 clothing.	 Monetary	 wellbeing	 is	 based	 on	 the	 premise	 that	
someone	has	 adequate	 income	 to	meet	minimal	 consumption	 requirements	 for	 human	
welfare.	This	perspective	categorises	people	as	poor	if	their	income	falls	below	a	defined	
income	measure,	 such	as	 the	World	Bank’s	 $1.90	per	day.198	The	poverty	 income	 line	 is	
defined	based	on	the	income	households	require	for	a	specified	amount	of,	for	example,	
food,	housing	and	transportation.		
However,	this	previously	prevalent	notion	that	poverty	is	simply	a	matter	of	low	income	
has	 been	 challenged	 around	 the	 world	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades.	 The	 persistence	 of	
poverty	in	many	parts	of	the	developing	world,	despite	impressive	economic	progress	in	
the	last	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	generated	a	rapid	growth	in	studies	on	poverty	that	
took	 a	 markedly	 different	 perspective	 from	 the	 income	 poverty	 discourse.	 The	 use	 of	
income	 as	 the	 sole	 measurement	 of	 poverty	 has	 been	 critiqued	 as	 an	 insufficient	 and	
																																								 																				
197 United Nations “Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” 
Statement Adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (04-05-2001) United Nations 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/E.C.12.2001.10Poverty-2001.pdf> 
(accessed 26-07-2016). 
198 The international dollar-per-day poverty standard was developed by the World Bank for its 1990 World 
Development Report in order to provide a single global measurement for poverty. To account for exchange 
rates and differences in prices and gross domestic product (GDP), the World Bank had to set a level that would 
be relevant in underdeveloped, developing, and developed countries despite immense differences in the 
meaning of poverty around the world. Generally speaking, earning a dollar per day or less means that a person 
in any country is living in ‘extreme poverty’, which means that that person cannot afford to buy even the most 
basic human necessities. However, ‘one dollar a day’ is not a literal amount of money. Rather, it means a dollar 
a day at purchasing power parity in 1985 prices. Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a way to measure the value 
of currency that allows economists and poverty researchers to compare the standards of living in different 
countries while accounting for differences in both wages and costs of living. In general, PPP refers to the goods 
and services that a currency has the power to buy, typically expressed as a ‘basket’ or ‘bundle’ of necessary 
items. PPP measures how much the same basket or bundle of goods and services costs around the world; 
allowing for exchange rates, the PPP number in each country should allow people to purchase the same basket 
of goods and services that a U.S. dollar can purchase in the United States. Because the dollar-a-day standard 
was conceived in 1990, currency values of 1985 were used as a baseline. In October 2015 the World Bank 
updated the poverty line to $1.90 per day. Nevertheless, the term “dollar a day” is still used because it is 
simpler and easier to remember. To measure “poverty”—as distinguished from “extreme poverty”—the World 
Bank uses a two-dollars-per-day standard, meaning that anyone earning less than two dollars per day is living 
in poverty. See World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq> 
(accessed 20-05-2016).  
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incomplete	picture	of	the	way	in	which	people	perceive	and	experience	poverty,	the	way	
in	which	 they	 escape	 or	 cope	with	 it,	 and	 the	 policy	 interventions	 required	 to	 combat	
poverty.199	 The	 concept	 of	 poverty	 thus	 expanded	 to	 include	 a	 diversity	 of	 aspects	 and	
perspectives.	 The	 preferred	 one	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 dissertation	 is	 Sen’s	 capability	
approach	 as	 its	 multidimensionality	 fits	 best	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state	and	a	transformative	constitution.		
Sen’s	 capability	 approach	 to	 poverty	 recognises	 that	 poverty	 is	 multidimensional	 in	
nature.	Underlying	 the	 capability	 approach	 is	 a	 specific	 conception	 of	what	 constitutes	
human	well-being.	At	a	very	basic	level,	well-being	can	be	thought	of	as	the	quality	of	a	
person’s	being	or	life,	and	living	can	be	seen	as	consisting	of	a	set	of	“functionings”	–	the	
things	that	a	person	values	doing	or	being.	Thus,	the	level	of	well-being	depends	on	the	
level	of	 functionings,	 that	 is,	how	well	 a	person	can	do	or	 “be	 the	 things	he	or	 she	has	
reasons	 to	 value”,	 for	 example	 how	 well	 a	 person	 can	 participate	 in	 the	 life	 of	 a	
community	 or	 be	 free	 from	 hunger.	 The	 concept	 of	 “capability”	 refers	 to	 a	 person’s	
freedom	or	opportunities	to	achieve	well-being	in	this	sense.200	
	In	 terms	 of	 understanding	 poverty,	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 a	 poor	 person	 is	 severe	
restriction	in	opportunities	to	pursue	well-being.	Thus	poverty	consists	of	the	“failure	of	
basic	capabilities	to	reach	certain	minimally	acceptable	levels”.201	However,	not	all	kinds	
of	 capability	 failure	 would	 count	 as	 poverty	 because	 poverty	 indicates	 extreme	
deprivation.	Only	capability	failures	that	are	deemed	to	be	basic	would	count	as	poverty,	
in	 a	 particular	 order	 of	 priority,	 as	 determined	 by	 the	 individuals	 or	 communities	
themselves,	 for	 example	 being	 adequately	 nourished,	 being	 adequately	 clothed	 and	
sheltered,	 avoiding	 preventable	 morbidity,	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 life	 of	 a	 community	 and	
being	able	to	appear	in	public	with	dignity.	Based	on	this	identification	of	failure	across	a	
range	 of	 basic	 capabilities,	 poverty	 thus	 becomes	 a	 multidimensional	 concept.	 It	 no	
longer	 suffices	 to	 conceive	 of	 poverty	 only	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 adequate	 income,	 as	 has	
																																								 																				
199 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 1-8. 
200 A Sen “Well-being, agency and freedom: the Dewey lectures 1984” Journal of Philosophy (1985) 82; A Sen 
Commodities and Capabilities (1985). 
201 A Sen Inequality Reexamined (1992) 109. 
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traditionally	 been	 done.202	 The	 capabilities	 approach	 was	 introduced	 by	 Sen	 as	 a	
comprehensive	framework	for	conceptualising	human	well-being	and	development.203		
It	 is	 evident	 that	 globally,	 notions	 and	 measures	 of	 poverty	 have	 shifted	 from	 a	
preoccupation	with	economic	efficiency	to	an	understanding	of	the	poor	as	citizens	with	
social,	 economic	 and	political	 roles,	 responsibilities	 and	needs.	The	 various	 approaches	
are	not	mutually	exclusive	and	have	many	ideas	in	common.	The	commonalities	involve	
an	 acknowledgement	of	 the	diversity	of	 causes,	 experiences	 and	 strategies	 to	overcome	
poverty.	 The	 sustainable	 livelihoods	 approach	 as	 well	 as	 the	 capabilities	 approach	
recognise	 that	 poverty	 is	 intrinsically	 multi-dimensional	 in	 nature.	 Sen’s	 capabilities	
approach	 argues	 that	 the	 philosophical	 basis	 for	 the	 idea	 of	 human	 welfare	 is	 best	
provided	by	the	concept	of	capability	–	the	ability	of	people	to	 live	the	kind	of	 life	they	
value.	 Poverty	 consists	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 several	 kinds	 of	 basic	 capabilities,	 for	 example,	
being	educated	and	 living	a	 life	of	dignity	 and	 security.	This	 recognition	has	overtaken	
the	initial	notion	that	poverty	was	simply	a	matter	of	earnings.		
Furthermore,	 the	assessment	of	poverty	 and	what	 to	do	about	 it	 in	order	 for	people	 to	
indeed	live	the	lives	they	value	should	be	determined	primarily	by	people	for	themselves.	
Any	attempt	to	assess	the	partly	subjective,	partly	objective	phenomenon	of	poverty	must	
draw	on	the	lived	experiences	of	people	as	perceived	by	themselves.	This	is	the	value	of	
the	sustainable	livelihoods,	well-being	and	the	capabilities	approaches.	The	application	of	
participatory	methods	–	 in	both	assessing	 the	nature	of	poverty	and	understanding	 the	
livelihood	strategies	of	the	poor	–	has	led	to	recognition	of	the	value	of	participation	itself	
for	 the	 poor	 in	 formulating	 and	 implementing	 poverty	 reduction.	 Participation	 is	
recognised	 as	 being	 of	 importance	 “for	 both	 instrumental	 and	 intrinsic	 reasons”.204	
Participation	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 “instrumentally	 important”	 because	 it	 supports	 the	
development	 of	 more	 effective	 poverty	 reduction	 strategies	 through	 listening	 to	 the	
																																								 																				
202 Income and assets are according to this theory, merely instruments that affect well-being. They are not in 
themselves constituents of well-being. Low income should rather be interpreted conceptually as the broader 
concept of inadequate command over economic resources.  See Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 3-4. 
203 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999). 
204 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 2. 
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experiences	 and	 solutions	 offered	 by	 people	 directly	 affected	 by	 poverty,	 and	 it	 is	
“intrinsically	important”	because	participation	in	society	is	a	valuable	as	a	capability	and	
locus	of	empowerment.205	
Finally,	 the	 relationship	 between	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 arises	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 social	
exclusion	 and	 the	 capabilities	 approach.	 Osmani	 explains	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 social	
exclusion	first	appeared	in	the	European	context.206	In	recent	years	the	idea	has	become	
increasingly	 associated	 with	 the	 experience	 whereby	 specific	 individuals	 or	 groups	 of	
people	 are	 excluded	 from	 partaking	 in	 various	 aspects	 of	 social	 life	 such	 as	 the	 labour	
market,	educational	system	or	political	processes.	Exclusion	occurs	on	various	grounds	in	
diverse	 ways,	 including	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 specific	 attributes,	 such	 as	 gender,	 age,	 race,	
religion,	ethnicity,	location,	occupation,	and	disease	(e.g.,	HIV/AIDS),	or	from	occupying	
the	lower	income	strata	and	social	hierarchy.		
If	one	defines	poverty	in	relative	terms,	as	the	social	distance	between	the	average	person	
and	those	at	the	lower	end	of	the	scale,	then	growing	inequality	can	be	said	to	result	in	
growing	 poverty,	 even	 if	 absolute	 standards	 of	 living	 improve.	 As	Osmani	 describes	 it,	
growing	inequality	creates	conditions	for	disempowerment	of	the	poorer	classes,	even	if	
their	 poverty	 has	 been	 relatively	 alleviated.207	 Increasing	 inequality	 tips	 the	 balance	 of	
power	in	favour	of	the	upper	strata,	resulting	in	greater	disempowerment	of	those	in	the	
lower	strata	as	they	become	marginalised	from	various	benefits	and	activities	of	social	life.	
Therefore,	 if	 one	 is	 concerned	 about	 poverty,	 then	 one	 should	 be	 concerned	 about	
inequality	too.		
This	still	raises	the	question	of	what	exactly	is	the	relationship	between	social	exclusion,	
inequality	and	poverty.	From	Sen’s	capabilities	perspective,	one	of	 the	basic	capabilities	
whose	 failure	 counts	 as	 poverty	 is	 the	 capability	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 life	 of	 the	
community.208	Hence	inequality	can	limit	participation	of	the	poor	in	determining	their	
																																								 																				
205 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 2. 
206 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 6. 
207 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 7. 
208 Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 18-25, 87-110. Sen Social Exclusion. 
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lives	 and	 lifting	 themselves	 out	 of	 poverty.	 Social	 exclusion	 suggests	 failure	 of	 this	
capability;	 therefore	 per	 Sen,	 social	 exclusion	 constitutes	 poverty.	 Thus,	 from	 the	
capability	perspective,	social	exclusion	can	be	viewed	as	a	dimension	of	poverty.	Where	
inequality	exacerbates	social	exclusion,	it	can	be	said	to	lead	to	greater	levels	of	poverty.	
What	can	be	garnered	from	these	overlapping	and	complementary	notions	is	that	poverty	
covers	both	material	basic	needs	as	well	 as	capabilities	 to	 live	 the	 life	you	value,	which	
includes	 the	 capability	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 decisions	 related	 to	 that	 life.	 The	 South	
African	 approach	 to	poverty	has	until	 recently	mostly	 espoused	an	 income	perspective,	
but	 is	 moving	 towards	 a	 capability	 approach.209	 A	 democratic	 developmental	 South	
African	state	needs	to	adopt	a	multi-dimensional	approach	to	poverty,	both	 in	terms	of	
the	policy	solutions	it	seeks	to	apply	and	measures	to	reduce	poverty	and	inequality	and	
in	 terms	of	 the	participatory	manner	 in	which	 those	policy	 solutions	are	examined	and	
determined.	 This	 is	 the	 conception	 of	 poverty	 that	 will	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 the	
constitutional	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 South	African	 courts,	 in	 relation	 to	 socio-economic	
rights	and	administrative	justice,	in	the	chapters	that	follow.	
3	3	South	African	approaches	to	poverty	
The	African	National	Congress	(‘ANC’),	as	the	main	political	party	in	South	Africa	since	
the	 advent	 of	 democracy	 in	 1994,	 has	 outlined	 its	 approach	 to	 poverty	 in	 three	 of	 its	
documents.	First,	Ready	to	Govern210	laid	down	plans	on	key	social	and	economic	policies,	
and	affirmed	that	fighting	poverty	and	combating	inequality	are	the	main	aims	of	policy	
intervention.	 Second,	 the	 ANC	 commissioned	 the	 Project	 for	 Statistics	 on	 Living	
Standards	 and	 Development,211	 to	 understand	 in	 greater	 depth	 in	 the	 lead	 up	 to	 the	
country’s	 first	 democratic	 elections,	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 South	 Africans	 lived.	
																																								 																				
209 South African National Planning Commission “National Development Plan Vision 2030: Our Future – Make 
it Work” <http://www.gov.za/speeches/national-development-plan-2030-31-aug-2016-0000> (accessed 20-
09-2017). 
210 African National Congress Ready to Govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa adopted at 
the National Conference (1992). 
211 SALDRU “Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development - South Africans Rich and Poor: 
Baseline Households Statistics” (1993) <http://www.datafirsttest.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/5> 
(accessed 30-05-2016). 
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Third,	 the	 Reconstruction	 and	 Development	 Programme	 (‘RDP’):	 A	 Policy	 Framework212	
presented	 an	 integrated,	 coherent	 socio-economic	 policy	 framework	 in	which	 the	ANC	
and	its	partners	outlined	their	approach	to	poverty	as	five	key	programmes:	meeting	basic	
needs,	developing	human	resources,	building	the	economy,	democratising	the	state	and	
society,	 and	 implementing	 the	 RDP.	 These	 documents,	 amongst	 others,	 marked	 the	
beginning	 of	 how	 poverty	 was	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 post-apartheid	 South	 Africa.	
However,	none	of	them	arrived	at	a	clear	singular	definition	of	poverty.213	
In	 order	 to	 acquire	 comprehensive,	 reliable	 and	 up-to-date	 information	 on	 poverty	 in	
South	Africa,	the	new	democratic	government	officially	commissioned	the	World	Bank	to	
conduct	the	first	official	review	of	poverty	in	South	Africa,	titled	Key	Indicators	of	Poverty	
in	 South	 Africa.214	 The	 report	 focused	 almost	 exclusively	 on	 income	 poverty	 levels	
(incorporating	 the	 MLL	 and	 the	 HSL).	 Thereafter,	 Statistics	 South	 Africa	 (‘StatsSA’)	
assumed	primary	responsibility	for	the	collection	of	periodic	information	and	statistics	in	
order	 to	build	 a	 clear	picture	of	 the	 socio-economic	 conditions	 in	 the	 country	 (beyond	
mere	 income	 levels).215	 This	 is	 done	 periodically	 via	 the	 census,	 the	 general	 household	
surveys	(‘GHS’)	and	income	and	expenditure	surveys.216	
																																								 																				
212 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, Cape Town, 15 November 1994, 
<http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/governmentgazetteid16085.pdf > (accessed 30-05-2016). 
213 Magasela “Towards a Constitution-based definition of poverty” in State of the Nation 52. 
214 World Bank/SALDRU Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa (1995). 
215 In addition, independent researchers and institutions have contributed significantly to the development of 
the understanding of poverty and measurement of its many facets. For example Julian May’s highly regarded 
report titled Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, discussed and analysed the multi-dimensional nature of 
poverty and its various measures. See J May (ed) Poverty and Inequality in South Africa Report prepared for the 
Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality (1998). 
216 In 1996 the post-apartheid government conducted its first population census. This was followed by a 
census in 2001 and 2011 conducted by Statistics SA (Stats SA). A Community Survey was held in 2006 and in 
2016. The census aims to provide comprehensive data for improved planning and to aid development. The 
general household survey (GHS) is an annual household survey conducted by Stats SA since 2002. The survey 
replaced the October Household Survey (OHS), which was introduced in 1993 and was terminated in 1999. 
The survey is aimed at determining the progress of development in the country by measuring, on a regular 
basis, the performance of programmes as well as the quality of service delivery in a number of key service 
sectors in the country. The GHS covers six broad areas, namely education, health and social development, 
housing, household access to services and facilities, food security, and agriculture. Stats SA also conduct an 
Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) every 5 years, which seeks to establish what South Africans spend their 
money on. The last IES was conducted between September 2010 and August 2011. The Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey was first conducted in January 2008 by Stats SA, is specifically designed to measure the 
dynamics of the South African labour market, producing indicators such as employment, unemployment and 
inactivity. See <http://www.statssa.gov.za/> (accessed 30-05-2016). 
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There	are	many	other	contributions	to	the	study	of	poverty	in	South	Africa	showing	the	
levels	 of	 poverty	 and	 trends,	 which	 have	 been	 influential	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	 policy	
concerning	 poverty.	 However,	 these	 reports	 and	 documents	 show	 an	 inconsistency	 in	
their	choice	of	poverty	definition	and	measurement	and	they	predominantly	use	money-
metric	definitions	and	measures	of	poverty.217	In	South	Africa,	income	is	also	used	as	the	
basis	 upon	 which	 eligibility	 for	 government	 grants	 such	 as	 pensions	 and	 housing	
subsidies	are	calculated.218	Due	to	this	 inadequate	conceptualisation	of	poverty	in	South	
Africa,	to	date	there	is	still	no	official	definition	of	poverty.		
The	 challenge	 that	 arises	 is	 how	 to	 measure	 poverty	 in	 multi-dimensional	 conceptual	
terms,	in	order	to	chart	the	“progressive	realisation”	of	a	reduction	in	poverty	over	time,	
the	 achievement	 of	 targets	 such	 as	 the	 MDGs/SDGs	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 rights	 and	
freedoms	in	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state.	Accepting	that	poverty	is	a	
multi-faceted	reality,	no	one	set	of	indicators	will	give	a	complete	picture	of	the	extent	of	
poverty	in	any	given	situation.	A	set	of	holistic	measures	of	poverty	and	inequality,	which	
captures	the	multi-dimensional	nature	of	poverty	and	incorporates	a	qualitative	notion	of	
empowerment,	 is	 required.	 The	 Bill	 of	 Rights,	 as	 the	 supreme	 law	 that	 captures	 the	
transformative	 commitments	 and	 foundational	 values	 adopted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 political	
settlement	in	South	Africa,	should	be	the	basis	for	understanding	poverty	and	designing	
measures	and	policies	in	the	fight	against	poverty	and	inequality.		
Furthermore,	the	conception	of	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state	requires	
policy	 and	 law	 to	 be	 attentive	 to	 the	 participatory	 dimensions	 as	 well	 as	 the	material	
dimensions	of	poverty.	The	economic	direction	set	by	the	developmental	state,	alongside	
																																								 																				
217 See summary of various documents in Magasela “Towards a Constitution-based definition of poverty” in 
State of the Nation 55. 
218 See for example Regulations Relating to the Application for and Payment of Social Assistance and the 
Requirements or Conditions in Respect of Eligibility for Social Assistance [GN R 621 in GG 39007 of 21-07-
2015] in terms of Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, where the financial criteria for eligibility for each of the 
various grants are set out in Annexure B. See also the National Housing Code 2009 have been difficult to 
measure which stipulates that in order to be eligible for a housing subsidy, an applicant's gross monthly 
household income must not exceed R3 500. In both of these instances, income is the only measure of poverty 
used to identify eligibility for these poverty-related programmes. Furthermore, the income thresholds for the 
grants were only adjusted for inflation for the first time since the inception of the grants, in 2009, and in the 
case of the housing subsidy, the income level has not changed in the past 10 years to cater for inflation. 
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the	 crucial	 capacity	 to	 implement	 such	economic	 strategy	 side	by	 side	with	 the	private	
sector,	 must	 be	 underpinned	 by	 the	 socio-economic	 empowerment	 of	 residents	 and	
citizens	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 opportunities	 created.	 This	 understanding	 of	 poverty	
should	encompass	socio-economic	rights	and	civil-political	rights,	as	well	as	participatory	
rights.	 The	 international	 law	 and	 literature	 on	 an	 interdependent,	 human	 rights-based	
approach	 to	 poverty	 provides	 some	 guidance	 and	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	
section	as	a	foundation	for	the	analysis	of	the	interaction	between	socio-economic	rights	
and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 in	 a	 South	 African	
democratic	developmental	state.	
3	4	The	situation	of	poverty	in	South	Africa	
The	purpose	of	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa	1996,	as	contained	in	the	
Preamble,	includes	healing	the	divisions	of	the	past	and	improving	the	quality	of	life	of	all	
citizens.	These	divisions	and	conditions	must	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	impact	
that	colonialism,	apartheid	and	capitalism	has	had	on	South	African	society	over	the	past	
four	 centuries.219	 The	 impact	 is	 still	 largely	 felt	 in	 a	 post-apartheid	 South	 Africa,	
manifesting	 in	 enduringly	 high	 levels	 of	 poverty	 and	 racial	 inequality.	 This	 section	
provides	an	overview	of	the	current	situation	of	poverty	in	South	Africa	and	trends	over	
the	 past	 23	 years	 since	 democracy.	 220	 	 These	manifestations	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality	
																																								 																				
219 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 26. For a historical account of the impact of colonialism, apartheid and 
capitalism on South African society, see S Terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa: 1652–2002 
(2002). 
220 This section provides a summarised but holistic picture of poverty and inequality in South Africa, based on a 
multi-dimensional approach. The data provided is largely based on the Statistics South Africa Census data 
between 1996 and 2011. See Statistics South Africa Census 2011 Statistical Release 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/ publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf> (accessed 16-05-2016). Other 
evidence is drawn from the following sources: 220 Presidency Development Indicators (2014) 4 
<http://www.dpme.gov.za/publications/Reports%20and%20Other%20Information%20Products/Development
%20Indicators%202014.pdf > (accessed 16-06-2017); A Whiteford & D Posel A Profile of Poverty: 
Inequality and Human Development in South Africa (1995); I Woolard & M Leibbrandt “Measuring Poverty 
in South Africa” in H Bhorat, M Leibbrandt, M Maziya, S van der Berg & I Woolard (eds) Fighting Poverty: 
Labour Markets and Inequality in South Africa (2001) 41; H Bhorat, M Leibbrandt, M Maziya, S Van der 
Berg & I Woolard (eds) Fighting Poverty: Labour markets and Inequality in South Africa (2001); C Meth 
& R Dias “Increases in poverty in South Africa: 1999–2002” Development Southern Africa (2004) 21(1) 
59-85; S Van der Berg, R Burger, M Louw, & D Yu, Trends in Poverty and Inequality since the Political 
Transition Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers (2005), <http://www.ber.sun.ac.za/downloads/2005/ 
workingpapers/WP-01-2005.pdf> (accessed 16-05-2016); H Bhorat & R Kanbur (eds) Poverty and Policy in 
Post Apartheid South Africa (2006); H Bhorat, P Naidoo & C Van der Westhuizen Shifts in Non-Income Welfare 
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require	 urgent	 and	 substantial	 redress	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 laudable	 aims	 of	 a	
transformative	Constitution,	as	laid	out	in	the	Preamble.		
	
The	population	of	South	Africa	grew	from	approximately	40,5	million	in	1996	to	about	56	
million	in	2016.221	The	overall	trends	indicate	improvements	and	reduction	in	poverty	–	at	
least	until	the	impact	of	the	global	economic	recession	hit	in	2008	–	chiefly	due	to	higher	
employment	 levels	 combined	with	 increased	government	provision	of	 social	 grants	 and	
basic	services.	However,	inequality	continues	to	prevail,	indicating	that	something	more	
and	different	needs	to	be	done.	
3	4	1	Education	
Despite	 significantly	 increased	 access	 to	 education	 across	 South	 Africa	 since	 1994,	 the	
quality	of	education	for	poor	learners	continues	to	be	a	challenge,	making	it	difficult	for	
poor	 people	 to	 obtain	 decent	 employment	 and	 thereby	 perpetuating	 the	 cycle	 of	
poverty.222	A	 low	quality	 education	 results	 in	 lower	 levels	 of	 employment,	 or	 unskilled,	
insecure	work	in	peripheral	employment.		
The	inequities	based	on	race	of	the	apartheid	regime	have	largely	reproduced	themselves	
along	race	and	class	lines	in	the	education	system.223	The	lack	of	quality	of	education	for	
the	vast	majority	of	poor	 learners	 is	apparent	 from	the	data,	 for	example,	 showing	 that	
children	 from	 poor	 African	 households	 are	 significantly	 more	 likely	 to	 drop	 out	 of	
school.224	 Furthermore,	 in	 2011	 36,5%	 of	 the	 White	 population	 attained	 a	 level	 of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
in South Africa: 1993-2004 Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper No 06/108 (2006) DPRU < 
http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/wp-06108-shifts-non-income-welfare-south-africa-1993-2004> (accessed 18-06-
2017); S van der Berg, M Louw & L Du Toit Poverty Trends since the Transition: What we know (2007); H 
Bhorat & C van der Westhuizen Economic Growth, Poverty and Inequality in South Africa:  The First Decade of 
Democracy (2008). 
221 “Mid-year population estimates, 2016” StatsSA <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/ 
P0302/P03022016.pdf> (accessed 19-06-2017). 
222 See for example N Spaull “Poverty & Privilege: Primary School Inequality in South Africa” International 
Journal of Educational Development 33 (2013) 436-447.  
223 StatsSA Census 2011 30-39. 
224 The term ‘drop-out’ is used here to refer to children of school age who are not attending school and have 
not completed their education. 
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education	higher	than	Grade	12,	compared	to	8,3%	of	the	African	population,	7,4%	of	the	
Coloured	population	and	21,6%	of	Indian	persons	of	Asian	origin.225		
However,	the	proportion	of	African	persons	aged	20	years	who	have	no	schooling	halved	
from	 19,1%	 in	 1996	 to	 8,6%	 in	 2011.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 considerable	 increase	 in	 the	
percentage	of	African	persons	who	completed	higher	education	from	7,1%	in	1996	to	11,8%	
in	2011.226	In	2014,	84%	of	adults	in	South	Africa	were	literate,	up	from	73%	in	2002.227	The	
share	of	5-year	olds	attending	early	childhood	development	facilities	more	than	doubled	
from	39%	in	2002	to	87%	in	2014.228	
The	 problems	 facing	 historically	 black	 schools,	 particularly	 in	 poor	 communities,	 still	
reflect	 the	 long	 history	 before	 1994	 of	 underfunding,	 lack	 of	 adequate	 infrastructure,	
impoverishment,	poor	management	systems,	poorly	trained	educators	and	racially	biased	
curricula.229	Remedying	them	requires	both	improved	resourcing	and	qualitative	changes	
in	systems,	cultures	and	relationships,	in	order	to	prevent	the	ongoing	cycle	of	poverty.		
3	4	2	Income	
The	most	common	way	to	measure	poverty	 in	South	Africa	 is	still	 income-based.	Using	
various	 income	 poverty	 measures,	 the	 number	 of	 people	 living	 in	 poverty	 declined	
between	1999	and	2007,	although	the	rate	of	this	decline	was	slow.230	The	percentage	of	
households	living	in	poverty	also	declined	between	2006	and	2011	but	is	still	high.	Out	of	
100	households,	45	live	below	the	poverty	line.231	
Census	2011	found	that	over	the	past	ten	years,	the	average	annual	household	income	for	
all	households	 in	South	Africa	more	 than	doubled.	 It	was	up	 to	R103	204	 from	R48	385	
recorded	 in	 Census	 2001.	 This	 represents	 an	 increase	 of	 113,3%	 in	 nominal	 terms	 –	 the	
																																								 																				
225 StatsSA Census 2011 36. 
226 StatsSA Census 2011 36. 
227 Presidency Development Indicators 4. 
228 Presidency Development Indicators 4. 
229 Spaull (2013) International Journal of Educational Development.  
230 Presidency Development Indicators 28-29. 
231 Presidency Development Indicators 30. 
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Consumer	Price	Index	indicates	that	income	should	have	increased	by	77,5%	during	this	
period	to	stay	in	line	with	inflation.232		
However,	 the	 income	 of	 the	 richest	 10%	 of	 the	 population	 increased	 at	 a	 faster	 rate.233	
When	 comparing	 the	percentage	 income	of	 the	 richest	 and	poorest	 quintiles,	 the	deep	
structural	 nature	 of	 poverty	 in	 South	Africa	 is	 evident.	Mass	 poverty	 in	 South	Africa	 is	
thus	also	associated	with	very	high	levels	of	inequality.	South	Africa	ranks	among	one	of	
the	most	unequal	societies	 in	the	world.	When	using	the	Gini-coefficient	measurement,	
inequality	increased	from	0.64	in	1995	to	0.67	in	2005	but	has	since	improved	to	0.65	in	
2010/11.234	According	to	the	World	Bank	in	2009,	South	Africa	had	the	highest	gini-index	
in	the	world	at	63.1.235	Although	there	is	a	growing	black	middle	class,	inequalities	are	still	
associated	strongly	with	race	and	gender,	as	well	as	location.	
Census	2011	reflects	the	significant	differences	in	average	annual	household	income	across	
the	different	population	groups.	Black	African-headed	households	have	an	average	annual	
income	of	R60	613	in	2011,	while	Coloured-headed	households	had	an	average	of	R112	172	
in	 2011,	 and	 the	 figure	 for	 Indian/Asian-headed	 households	 was	 R251	 541	 and	 White-
headed	households	had	the	highest	average	household	income	at	R365	134	per	annum.	A	
comparison	with	 the	 figures	 from	2001	does,	however,	 show	a	bigger	 increase	 for	black	
African-headed	households	of	 169,1%	as	opposed	to	an	88,4%	increase	for	white-headed	
households.236	
Poverty	also	still	reflects	apartheid	settlement	patterns.	Most	poor	households	are	found	
in	 the	 former	Bantustan	 regions,	 informal	 settlements	and	historically	black	 townships.	
Poor	households	make	up	just	over	two-thirds	of	the	population	of	the	former	Bantustans	
																																								 																				
232 StatsSA Census 2011 41. 
233 Presidency Development Indicators 27. 
234 Presidency Development Indicators 29. 
235 See World Bank figures for 2009 which give South Africa a 63.1, higher than all other countries on the list - 
Brazil at 54.7 and Honduras at 57 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ southafrica/overview> (accessed 
06-05-2016). Gini index measures the distribution of income or expenditure of individuals or households in an 
economy and how much it deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 indicates perfect 
equality, while an index of 100 represents perfect inequality. 
236 StatsSA Census 2011 41. 
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and,	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country,	 in	 informal	 settlements	 and	 townships.	 In	 the	 former	
Bantustan	regions,	only	a	third	of	poor	households	survive	mainly	on	earned	income.237	
3	4	3	Employment	
The	apartheid	system	deprived	black	households	of	economic	resources,	largely	in	order	
to	prevent	self-employment	and	generate	a	low-wage	labour	force.	A	range	of	laws	limited	
the	access	of	Africans,	in	particular,	to	land,	education,	training	and	healthcare,	markets	
and	finance,	pushing	them	far	away	from	economic	centres.	At	the	same	time,	the	State	
failed	to	build	up	household	and	economic	infrastructure	in	black	communities.	Current	
and	ongoing	high	unemployment	 and	 the	difficulties	 facing	new	and	micro	 enterprises	
reflect,	above	all,	 the	economic	marginalisation	of	 the	majority	of	 the	population	under	
apartheid.	This	marginalisation,	 together	with	 the	 low	quality	of	 education,	 reproduces	
the	deprivation	of	the	poor,	mainly	African	population,	who	generally	find	it	particularly	
difficult	 to	 gain	 the	 skills	 and	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 resources	 required	 to	 take	
advantage	of	economic	opportunities.238	
The	 official	 (narrow)	 unemployment	 rate239	 declined	 from	 29.4%	 in	 September	 2001	 to	
23.6%	in	June	2009,	and	then	increased	again	to	27.7%	in	2017.240	Unemployment	remains	
unacceptably	high.	Over	 the	past	 few	years	South	Africa	witnessed	massive	 job	 losses241	
due	largely	to	the	global	economic	crisis	and	ongoing	decline	in	economic	growth.242		
																																								 																				
237 Presidency Development Indicators 27, 30, 31. 
238 Presidency Towards a Poverty Strategy 31. See also Spaull (2013) International Journal of Educational 
Development. See also discussion of the role of the state in the promotion of economic growth and 
development in chapter two. 
239 This equates the unemployment rate with the number of people who were without work in the week 
preceding the interview, which have taken active steps to look for work and were available for work, and 
excludes discouraged work-seekers. 
240 See Quarterly Labour Force Survey Quarter 1: June 2017 <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/ 
P02111stQuarter2017.pdf> (accessed 14-06-2017). 
241 Van der Berg, Louw & Du Toit Poverty Trends show that approximately 1,7 million jobs were created 
between 1995 and 2002 and 1,2 million between 2002 and 2006. However, it is estimated that 
approximately 870,000 jobs were lost in South Africa in 2009 due to the global recession. See “SA 
unemployment edges lower, job losses halted” Mail & Guardian (9 February 2010). 
242 South Africa experienced an average growth rate of approximately 5% in real terms between 2004 and 
2007. However, the period 2008 to 2012 only recorded average growth just above 2%; to a certain extent the 
effect of the global economic crisis. In 2017 South Africa entered a recession – technically meaning that SA 
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Employment	levels	are	particularly	low	among	the	African	population,	poor	women	and	
young	 people.	 Census	 2011	 results	 show	 that	 among	 the	 black	 African	 population,	 the	
unemployment	 rate	 was	 35,6%	 while	 among	 the	 white	 population	 group	 the	
unemployment	 rate	was	 5,9%.243	 Census	 2011	 results	 also	 show	 that	 the	 unemployment	
rate	among	black	African	women	was	41,2%	based	on	the	official	definition.	In	contrast,	
the	unemployment	rate	among	white	women	was	6,9%.	With	regard	to	the	situation	of	
young	people	in	the	South	African	labour	market,	the	Census	2011	results	show	that	the	
unemployment	rate	among	youth	aged	15-24	years	was	around	50%.244	As	a	result,	these	
groups	suffer	more	from	poverty	and	dependence.		
For	most	households,	the	immediate	cause	of	poverty	is	inadequate	earned	income	due	to	
the	fact	that	working-age	adults	in	poor	households	are	unable	to	find	employment.	Most	
poor	households	depend	on	remittances,	pensions	or	grants	instead	of	wages,	salaries	or	
profits.	As	at	30	April	2017,	3.3	million	people	received	an	old-age	grant	(OAG)	while	12.1	
million	 children	 received	 a	 child	 support	 grant	 (CSG).	 The	 redistribution	 to	 over	 17	
million	 beneficiaries	 through	 the	 fiscus	 has	 substantially	 improved	 conditions	 in	 poor	
households.245	 However,	 the	 developmental	 impact	 of	 grants	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	
much	 debate	 in	 South	 Africa,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 desired	 shift	 from	 a	
welfare	 state	 to	 a	 developmental	 state.	 The	 debate	 revolves	 around	 the	 financial	
sustainability	 and	 developmental	 outcomes	 of	 social	 grants.	 The	 evidence	
overwhelmingly	shows	that	social	grants	do	indeed	have	developmental	attributes.246		
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
experienced negative growth for two consecutive quarters. See www.statssa.gov.za for more detail and current 
figures (accessed 14-06-2017). 
243 StatsSA Census 2011 51, 55. 
244 StatsSA Census 2011 51, 55. 
245 SASSA A statistical summary of social grants in South Africa Fact Sheet: Issue no 4 of 2017 
<http://www.sassa.gov.za> (accessed 14-06-2017). 
246 See K Siebrits & S Van der Berg Social Assistance Reform during a Period of Fiscal Stress (2010) 21-22, a 
report prepared for the Financial and Fiscal Commission, which provides a summary of the fiscal implications 
as well as the developmental outcomes debate. Several studies have found that: a.) grant receipts boost the 
food spending of beneficiaries (Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) Review of the Child Support Grant: 
Uses, Implementation and Obstacles (2008) Report compiled for the Department of Social Development, the 
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 31); b.) 
households who receive grants spent relatively more on basic necessities (food, fuel, housing, and household 
operations) and relatively less on medical care, debt service and tobacco than households who did not receive 
grants (M Samson, U Lee, A Ndlebe, K MacQuene, I van Niekerk, V Gandhi, T Harigaya & C Abrahams The 
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3	4	4	Housing	and	basic	services	
Having	 clean	 water,	 adequate	 sanitation,	 light	 and	 heat	 as	 well	 as	 decent	 housing	 is	
critical	 for	overcoming	poverty.	Considerable	progress	has	been	made	 in	 this	area	since	
democracy.		
The	 average	 household	 size	 for	 South	Africa	 decreased	 from	 4,5	 in	 1996	 to	 3,6	 in	 2011.	
Over	 that	 period	 there	was	 a	 steady	 increase	 in	 the	 percentage	 of	 households	 living	 in	
formal	dwellings;	the	percentage	of	households	living	in	traditional	dwellings	has	almost	
halved	 while	 the	 percentage	 of	 households	 living	 in	 informal	 dwellings	 has	 decreased	
from	16,2%	in	1996	to	13,6%	in	2011.247	
The	number	of	households	expanded	from	10.8	million	to	15.6	million	between	2002	and	
2014.	Over	 the	 same	period,	 the	 share	 of	 households	 accessing	 basic	 services	 increased	
from	77%	to	86%	in	the	case	of	electricity,	from	80%	to	86%	for	water	infrastructure	and	
the	share	of	households	accessing	sanitation	went	up	from	62%	to	80%.248 Between	2001	
and	2011	access	to	piped	water	on	site	increased	from	60%	to	73,4%.249	The	proportion	of	
households	that	have	flush	toilets	connected	to	the	sewage	system	increased	from	49,1%	
in	Census	2001	 to	57%	 in	Census	2011.	The	percentage	of	households	 that	were	without	
toilets	 declined	 significantly	 from	 13,6%	 and	 in	 Census	 2001	 to	 5,2%	 in	 Census	 2011.250	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Social and Economic Impact of South Africa’s Social Security System (2004) Report commissioned by the 
Economics and Finance Directorate of the Department of Social Development, 75-77); c.) nutritional benefits 
to children increased with increases in food expenditure associated with receipt of child support grants and 
social pensions (J Aguero, M Carter & I Woolard “The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Nutrition: the 
South African Child Support Grant” IPC Working Paper No 39 (2007); F Yamauchi Early Childhood Nutrition, 
Schooling and within-sibling Inequality in a Dynamic Context: Evidence from South Africa (2005); M Williams 
The Social and Economic Impacts of South Africa’s Child Support Grant EPRI Working Paper No 39 (2007) 55-
59); and d.) receipt of child support grants and old-age pensions encouraged school attendance among child 
support grant recipients and children living with pensioners (A Case, V Hosegood & F Lund “The Reach and 
Impact of Child Support Grants: Evidence from KwaZulu-Natal” in Development Southern Africa 22(4) (2005) 
467-482; D Budlender & I Woolard The Impact of the South African Child Support and Old Age Grants on 
Children’s Schooling and Work TECL Paper No 43 (2006); M Leibbrandt, I Woolard, A Finn & J Argent Trends in 
South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers No 101 (2010) 62-63). 
247 StatsSA Census 2011 57. 
248 Presidency Development Indicators 4. 
249 StatsSA Census 2011 59. 
250 StatsSA Census 2011 60. 
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Households	using	electricity	for	lighting	increased	from	58,2%	in	1996	to	84,7%	in	2011.251		
Despite	improvements	in	government	services	for	the	poor,	there	are	still	many	delays	in	
obtaining	services,	lower	levels	of	service,	difficulties	in	paying	for	services	and	relatively	
high	 levels	 of	 disconnection	 of	 services	 in	 poor	 communities.252	 Many	 of	 the	 poorest	
municipal	 districts	 as	 well	 as	 informal	 settlements	 and	 farm	 workers,	 have	 proven	
difficult	 to	 reach	 adequately.	 As	 a	 result,	 poor	 households	 continue	 to	 lag	 in	 access	 to	
government	services.253	These	shortfalls	place	a	further	burden	on	women	and	girls,	who	
continue	 to	 undertake	 most	 household	 labour.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 persistent	
inequality	 and	 minimal	 changes	 in	 the	 spatial	 geography	 of	 apartheid,	 African	
communities	overall	continue	to	lag	behind	historically	white	areas.	The	quality	of	service	
in	historically	black	areas	is	often	worse	than	in	historically	white	communities.		
3	4	5	Health	
Adequate	 healthcare	 is	 also	 critical	 in	 the	 struggle	 against	 poverty	 to	maintain	 a	 good	
quality	of	life,	ensure	adults	are	able	to	work	and	care	for	their	families,	and	that	children	
grow	up	healthy.	Largely	due	 to	 the	 roll-out	of	 anti-retroviral	 treatment,	 South	Africa’s	
life	expectancy	increased	by	9	years	from	52	years	in	2004	to	61	years	in	2014.254	The	infant	
mortality	rate	also	dropped	from	58	to	34	deaths	per	 1000	 live	births	between	2002	and	
2014.	Over	the	same	period,	the	under	5-mortality	rate	dropped	from	85	to	44	deaths	per	
1000	live	births.255	
Trends	in	the	Maternal	Mortality	Ratio	measuring	the	well-being	of	mothers	(a	key	SDG	
indicator),	 show	some	progress	 from	281	per	 100,000	 in	2008	 to	 197	per	 100,000	 in	2011,	
																																								 																				
251 StatsSA Census 2011 61. Bhorat, Naidoo & Van der Westhuizen Shifts in Non-Income Welfare in South 
Africa in analysing welfare shifts in the post-apartheid period, show that access to formal housing grew by 42% 
and 34% for the poorest deciles 1 and 2 respectively between 1993 and 2004, and 21% and 16% for deciles 
3 and 4. Access to piped water increased by 187% in the poorest decile over this period, while the growth was 
31% in the 4th decile.  Access to electricity for lighting for the poorest households grew by an extraordinary 
578%. It is clear from their study that the delivery of basic services has been strongly pro-poor. Bhorat et al 
also show that while in 1993 40% of all South African households were asset- (and service-) poor; by 2004 this 
figure had been almost halved to 22%. 
252 Presidency Towards a Poverty Strategy 41. 
253 Presidency Towards a Poverty Strategy 42. 
254 Presidency Development Indicators 4. 
255 Presidency Development Indicators 4. 
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however	 are	 still	 unacceptably	 high.256	 Furthermore,	 HIV	 prevalence	 in	 the	 total	
population	 showed	 a	 slight	 increase	 from	 8.8%	 to	 9.9%	 during	 the2001-2010	 decade.	
However,	it	subsequently	stabilised	at	around	10%	from	2011	in	2014.257	Amongst	pregnant	
women	 attending	 antenatal	 care	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 HIV	 prevalence	 increased	 from	
24.8%	in	2001	to	29.1%	in	2006.	HIV	prevalence	rates	subsequently	stabilised	at	29%	from	
2007	 to	 2012,	 except	 for	 2010	 where	 prevalence	 reached	 30%.	 These	 trends	 reflect	 the	
dividends	of	a	massive	and	largely	successful	ARV	therapy	(ART)	programme,	which	has	
seen	 the	number	of	patients	on	 treatment	 rapidly	 scaled	up	 from	 113	 375	 in	2005	 to	2.8	
million	 in	 2014.	 Another	 important	 positive	 trend	 is	 the	 decline	 in	 HIV	 prevalence	
amongst	youth	15-24	years,	from	15%	in	2001	to	8.7%	in	2014.258	
In	terms	of	access	to	healthcare,	many	challenges	thus	remain.	The	public	health	system	
continues	to	face	underfunding	and	understaffing,	particularly	in	hospitals	and	clinics	in	
poor	 communities.	 People	 in	 poor	 households	 are	more	 likely	 to	 use	 public	 healthcare	
and	 there	 is	 generally	 a	 huge	 public	 /private	 divide	 in	 health	 care	 due	 to	 a	 degraded	
public	 health	 system	 and	 lack	 of	 social	 health	 insurance.259	 Poor	 people	 are	 therefore	
much	more	 likely	 to	 face	 long	waiting	 times,	 lack	of	medicines,	 rude	or	uncaring	 staff,	
inadequate	opening	times	and	long	distances	to	facilities.260		
3	4	6	Social	exclusion	and	participation	
South	Africa	is	thus	still	a	deeply	divided	and	highly	inequitable	society	despite	notable	
advances	made	 to	date.	As	 seen	 from	 the	data	 above,	 the	 country	 is	 divided	 largely	 by	
race,	 gender,	 age	 and	where	one	 lives.	High	 levels	of	unemployment	amongst	Africans,	
																																								 																				
256 Presidency Development Indicators 44. 
257 Presidency Development Indicators 45-47. 
258 Presidency Development Indicators 45. 
259 See M Pieterse A Benefit-Focused Analysis of Constitutional Health Rights (2005) Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of the Witwatersrand, 150–174; M Pieterse “Indirect Horizontal Application of the Right to have 
Access to Health Care Services” (2007) 23 SAJHR 157–179. The National Government introduced a National 
Health Insurance in 2012 to address the deficiencies in the health system for poor people, which is 
understood as mostly skewed due to the health care financing scheme. The NHI was piloted in 10 districts in 
2012 but at the time of writing had not yet been fully resourced or implemented. See Department of Health 
Policy on National Health Insurance <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/nationalhealthinsurance.pdf> 
(accessed 29-09-2016). 
260 See Presidency Towards a Poverty Strategy 44-45.  
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the	youth	and	women,	and	poverty	in	general	also	serve	to	perpetuate	the	social	exclusion	
experienced	by	many.	This	social	fragmentation	manifests	itself	in	various	ways,	including	
high	 levels	 of	 domestic	 violence,	 substance	 abuse,	 high	 levels	 of	 criminality,	 hostility	
towards	people	of	foreign	origin,	low	levels	of	mutual	respect,	social	solidarity	and	other	
behaviours.261	
The	 achievement	 of	 developmental	 objectives	 to	 reduce	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 will	
largely	be	determined	by	the	effectiveness	of	the	rights-based	and	institutional	framework	
created	by	the	Constitution	and	associated	policies	and	laws.	Over	the	past	two	decades,	
the	government	has	made	considerable	progress	 in	 transforming	 the	 institutions	of	 the	
state,	 in	cultivating	equitable	policies	across	spheres,	and	 in	creating	a	representative262	
democratic	 culture.	 However,	 participatory	 democratic	 institutions,	 culture	 and	
environment	 where	 citizens,	 in	 particular	 the	 poor	 and	 marginalised,	 articulate	 and	
pursue	their	views	and	ideals,	need	strengthening.	Avenues	for	participation	exist	within	
the	 institutional	processes	of	 the	 legislature	and	the	executive,	however	again	 these	are	
limited	 for	 marginalised	 communities	 largely	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 access	 and	 information.	
Access	to	the	courts	is	also	limited	because	of	a	dearth	of	resources	and	knowledge	of	the	
processes	for	the	enforcement	of	rights.	This	leads	to	increased	marginalisation,	exclusion	
and	disempowerment	of	poor	 communities,	 as	 frustration	grows	with	 their	 situation	of	
poverty	 and	 the	 slow	 progress	 in	 the	 realisation	 of	 rights.263	 The	 design	 and	
implementation	of	poverty	reduction	initiatives	should	therefore	ensure	greater	and	more	
effective	 participatory	 governance	 towards	 empowerment	 and	 social	 inclusion.	 These	
aspects	of	participatory	democracy	are	discussed	further	below,	as	essential	elements	of	
the	transformative	potential	of	the	Constitution	to	support	the	reduction	of	poverty	and	
inequality.	
																																								 																				
261 See Presidency Towards a Poverty Strategy 54-55. 
262 See Presidency Development Indicators 60-61. Voter turnout on average per province has tended to be 
very high in every election since the advent of democracy in 1994, however it is steadily decreasing overall. 
The turnout in 2014 was 73.48%, a decrease from the 77.3% turnout in 2009, and from the turnout of 76.7% 
in 2004. Voter turnout in 1999 was 89.3% and in 1994 it was 86.87%. 
263 See Presidency Development Indicators 90, in relation to the general decline since 2004 in public trust and 
confidence about government's performance in delivering services. 
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3	5	An	interdependent	human	rights-based	approach	to	poverty	
In	this	section,	I	elaborate	on	the	interdependence	of	socio-economic	rights	and	civil	and	
political	 rights,	 including	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice,	 in	 international	 treaty	 law	
and	 soft	 international	 law.	 Historically	 these	 categories	 of	 rights	 have	 been	 separately	
defined	in	international	law,	but	seen	as	interdependent,	especially	more	recently	in	the	
context	 of	 global	 poverty	 eradication.	 The	 purpose	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 potential	
complementarity	of	 socio-economic	rights	and	the	right	 to	administrative	 justice	 in	 the	
South	 African	 Constitution	 and	 jurisprudence,	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	
seeking	to	address	poverty	and	inequality.	
	During	 the	 last	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 international	 human	 rights	 became	 a	
worldwide	and	increasingly	important	political	and	legal	project.264	At	the	second	session	
of	 the	Commission	on	Human	Rights	 (1947),	 it	was	decided	 that	 three	working	 groups	
would	 simultaneously	 draft	 a	 declaration,	 a	 single	 treaty,	 and	 measures	 of	
implementation	 of	 that	 treaty,	 all	 of	 which	 would	 constitute	 an	 International	 Bill	 of	
Rights.	The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(‘UDHR’)	was	drafted	and	adopted	by	
1948,	and	contained	essentially	 the	entire	 range	of	human	rights	being	discussed	at	 the	
time.	 After	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 UDHR,	 the	 ensuing	 period	 (1949-1966)	 was	 largely	
devoted	to	drafting	a	convention	on	human	rights	and	producing	a	mechanism	for	their	
implementation.	After	nearly	 twenty	 years,	 this	work	 led	 eventually	 to	 the	 adoption	by	
the	 UN	 General	 Assembly	 on	 16	 December	 1966	 of	 three	 separate	 instruments:	 the	
International	 Covenant	 on	Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (‘ICCPR’),	 the	Optional	 Protocol	 to	
that	Covenant,	 and	 the	 International	Covenant	 on	Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights	
(‘ICESCR’).265		
The	 UN	 debates	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 General	 Assembly	 to	 divide	 human	
rights	 into	two	 instruments,	 reveal	 three	broad	categories	of	reasons	 for	 the	separation:	
																																								 																				
264 See generally H Steiner, P Alston & R Goodman International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals 4 ed (2012). 
265 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) were formulated out of the UDHR and together constitute the 
International Bill of Rights. 
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implementation-based	reasons,	ideological	or	political	reasons	and	pragmatic	reasons.266	
The	implementation-based	reasons	involved	a	view	of	socio-economic	rights	as	different	
in	 nature	 from	 civil-political	 rights	 due	 to	 the	 former’s	 non-justiciability	 and	 therefore	
susceptibility	to	different	procedures	of	 implementation.	Ideological	reasons	were	based	
on	the	Cold	War	division	between	East	and	West	and	communism	and	capitalism,	with	
socio-economic	 rights	 being	 associated	with	 communism.	 Finally,	 the	 practical	 reasons	
included	 the	 need	 to	 rework	 the	 wording	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 a	 lack	 of	
acceptance	from	all	states	for	the	socio-economic	rights.267	
3	5	1	The	interdependence	of	human	rights	
Despite	the	separation	of	civil	and	political	and	socio-economic	rights	into	two	separate	
international	 treaties,	 the	 interrelationship	 among	 the	 various	 human	 rights	 has	 since	
been	established	in	international	law.	Following	the	simultaneous	consideration,	approval	
and	 opening	 for	 signature	 of	 the	 two	 Covenants,	 the	 1968	 Proclamation	 of	 Tehran	
emerged.	Article	13	of	the	Proclamation	states:	
“Since	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	are	indivisible,	the	full	realization	of	civil	
and	 political	 rights	 without	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 rights,	 is	
impossible.	The	achievement	of	lasting	progress	in	the	implementation	of	human	rights	is	
dependent	upon	sound	and	effective	national	and	international	policies	of	economic	and	
social	development.”268	
																																								 																				
266 See C Scott “The interdependence and permeability of human rights norms: Towards a partial fusion of the 
international covenants on human rights” Osgoode Hall Law Journal Vol 27(4) 1989 770-878, 791-813 for a 
detailed historical discussion of the reasons for the separation of the two instruments. 
267 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 794-798. 
268 The Proclamation of Tehran, 1968, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, UN 
Doc A/CONF.32/41, available at <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/ l2ptichr.htm> (accessed 24-07-2016). 
See also the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, 
25 June 1993, UN doc A/CONF. 157/24 Part I, para 5 <http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx> (accessed 24-07-2016). This was reiterated in 1969 in the 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, adopted 11 Dec. 1969, GA Res 2542 (XXIV), UN GAOR 24th 
Sess, Supp NO 30, at 49 UN Doc A/7630 (1969) and again in Article 1(a) of UN General Assembly Resolution 
32/130, ‘Alternative approaches and ways and means within the UN system for improving the effective 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (16 December 1977) as follows: “[A]ll human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent.” See also Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 779-86. Furthermore, the ICCPR’s preamble confirms the notion that civil and political freedom can 
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Craig	Scott	explains	two	ways	in	which	interdependence	can	be	understood:	“organic	and	
related	interdependence”.269	“Organic	interdependence”	refers	to	one	right	forming	a	part	
of	 another	 right	 and	may	 therefore	 be	 incorporated	 into	 that	 latter	 right.	He	 gives	 the	
example	of	the	relationship	between	ICCPR	6(1)	“the	right	to	 life”	and	ICESCR	11(1)	“the	
right	to	an	adequate	standard	of	living”.	Such	an	approach	implies	an	overlap	between	the	
two	 articles.	 “Related	 interdependence”	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 rights	 are	mutually	
reinforcing	 or	 mutually	 dependent,	 but	 distinct.	 Scott	 explains	 that	 with	 “related	
interdependence”,	 rights	 are	 equally	 important	 as	 well	 as	 complementary,	 but	 they	
remain	distinct.270		
The	interdependence	of	human	rights	can	also	be	understood	conceptually,	as	grounded	
in	 the	 social	 experience	 of	 human	 beings.	 As	 described	 in	 the	 section	 on	 the	
multidimensional	 perspective	 of	 poverty,	 the	 interdependence	 of	 rights	 attempts	 to	
capture	the	idea	“that	values	and	norms	directly	related	to	the	full	development	of	human	
potential	cannot	be	protected	in	isolation	from	one	another”.271	
Scott	suggests	“upwards”	and	“downwards”	relationships	between	human	rights	and	the	
social	 realities	 of	 the	 poor.272	 The	 “upwards”	 relationship	 equates	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	
human	 rights	 and	 the	 interpretation	 of	 legal	 norms	 being	 grounded	 in	 social	
experience.273	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 “downwards”	 relationship	 provides	 information	
about	 human	 rights	 and	 their	 interpretations	 that	 lead	 to	 an	 empowerment	 process	
whereby	 recipients	 of	 human	 rights	 guarantees	 are	 able	 to	 relate	 the	 law	 to	 their	
individual	life	experience.274	
The	interdependent	approach	thus	rests	on	the	realities	of	people’s	 lives	as	a	whole	and	
the	 consequent	 need	 for	 the	 promotion,	 in	 tandem,	 of	 rights	 from	 both	 traditional	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
only be achieved if conditions exist whereby everyone can enjoy their civil and political rights as well as their 
economic, social and cultural rights. The ICESCR has a very similar paragraph in its preamble.  
269 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 794-798. 
270 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 794-798. 
271 P Alston “Out of the Abyss: The challenges confronting the new UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332, 352. 
272 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 788. 
273 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 788. 
274 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 788. 
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categories.	 For	 example,	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 hearing	 in	 administrative	 cases	 concerning	
socio-economic	 rights	 points	 to	 the	 key	 role	 of	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 poor	 in	 the	
improvement	of	 their	 own	quality	 of	 life.275	A	 South	African	democratic	developmental	
state	should	view	the	interdependence	of	rights	as	a	reflection	of	a	holistic	understanding	
of	the	reality	of	enduring	poverty.	Participatory	democracy	and	autonomy	must	underpin	
the	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 and	 its	 transformative	 poverty	 reduction	 project.	
Civil	 and	political	 rights,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 in	 particular,	 form	 the	
participatory	elements	alongside	the	delivery	of	socio-economic	rights.	I	argue	that	their	
interdependence	is	relational,	as	per	Scott’s	approach,	because	of	the	way	in	which	these	
rights	 are	 separate,	 but	 equally	 important	 and	 complementary	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state	working	towards	the	elimination	of	poverty	and	inequality.		
The	 principle	 of	 interdependence	 has	 continued	 to	 appear	 in	 UN	 resolutions,	 views,	
general	 comments,	 and	 individual	 complaints	 as	 well	 as	 in	 broader	 UN	 human	 rights	
programmes.276	This	principle	has	been	foundational	to	the	international	human	rights-
based	 approach	 to	 poverty,	 which	 further	 reinforces	 how	 we	 conceptualise	 and	
understand	the	interaction	between	socio-economic	and	administrative	justice	rights	in	a	
South	African	democratic	developmental	state.		
3	5	2	A	human	rights-based	approach	to	poverty	
The	Vienna	Declaration	of	 the	 1993	World	Conference	on	Human	Rights	observed	 that	
the	“existence	of	wide-spread	extreme	poverty	inhibits	the	full	and	effective	enjoyment	of	
human	 rights”	 and	 that	 “extreme	 poverty	 and	 social	 exclusion	 constitute	 a	 violation	 of	
human	dignity”.277	Building	on	this,	Mary	Robinson,	the	former	UN	High	Commissioner	
																																								 																				
275 See, for example, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1987/21, “Popular participation in its various 
forms as an important factor in development and in the full realization of all human rights” (10 March 1987) in 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/L.11/Add.5. 
276 See Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4) 815. 
277 Vienna Declaration para 14. 
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for	Human	Rights,	stated	that	lawyers	should	use	human	rights	principles	to	pursue	the	
central	development	objective,	which	is	the	eradication	of	poverty.278	
The	 question	 for	 human	 rights	 lawyers	 then	 becomes	what	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 poverty	 in	
international	human	rights	terms?	Is	poverty	a	violation	of	human	rights?	If	poverty	is	a	
violation	 of	 human	 rights,	 of	 what	 precisely	 does	 the	 violation	 consist?279	 This	 can	 be	
answered	in	various	ways:	(1)	that	the	violation	of	human	rights	causes	poverty;	or	(2)	that	
as	 a	 result	 of	 being	 poor,	 people’s	 rights	 are	 violated;	 or	 (3)	 that	 many	 human	 rights	
violations	can	be	classified	as	poverty	violations;	or	(4)	that	the	condition	of	poverty	is	to	
be	viewed	as	a	distinct	violation	of	specific	human	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	subsistence	
or	the	right	to	health.	
The	conceptual	connection	between	poverty	and	human	rights	asserts	that	human	rights	
are	strong	tools	for	fighting	poverty,	even	if	poverty	is	often	conceptually	seen	as	distinct	
from	 human	 rights.	 Andreassen	 argues	 that	 the	 two	 concepts	 have	 a	 vital	 relationship	
with	one	another,	reflecting	a	profound,	intrinsic	causality.280	He	states	that	human	rights	
violations	cause	poverty,	and	poverty	reflects	violations	of	human	rights.281	Therefore,	the	
reduction	 of	 poverty	 will	 entail	 recognition,	 protection	 and	 implementation	 of	 various	
human	rights.	
Osmani	distinguishes	three	ways	in	which	human	rights	can	be	identified	as	relevant	to	
poverty:	 “constitutive	 relevance”,	 “instrumental	 relevance”	 and	 “constraint-based	
relevance”.282	 The	 concept	 of	 constitutive	 relevance	 of	 human	 rights	 is	 based	 on	 an	
understanding	of	what	 it	means	to	be	poor.	Sen’s	capabilities	approach	says	that	a	poor	
person	 is	 someone	 who	 is	 deprived	 of	 basic	 capabilities,	 for	 example	 to	 be	 free	 from	
																																								 																				
278 M Robinson “Bridging the gap between human rights and development: From normative principles to 
operational relevance” United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Bank (3 December 2001). 
279 Steiner, Alston & Goodman International Human Rights in Context 308-313. T Campbell Poverty as a 
Violation of Human Rights: Inhumanity or Injustice? (2003). 
280 B Andreassen & D Banik “Human rights and extreme poverty: African dimensions” (2010) 14(1) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 4, 9.  
281 Andreassen & Banik (2010) 14(1) International Journal of Human Rights 4, 9.  
282 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 21-22. 
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hunger,	 to	 be	 in	 good	 health,	 and	 to	 be	 educated.283	 In	 terms	 of	 rights,	 a	 poor	 person	
could	be	said	to	 lack	fulfilment	of	certain	human	rights	 for	example,	 the	rights	to	food,	
health,	and	education.	These	rights	have	constitutive	relevance	for	poverty.		
Instrumental	 relevance	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 certain	 rights	 to	 promote	 poverty	
reduction.	Osmani	refers	to	evaluative	and	causative	relevance.284	The	idea	of	evaluative	
relevance	 stems	 from	 the	observation	 that	 analyses	of	poverty	 require	 social	 evaluation	
through	 participation	 of	 the	 poor.	 The	 fulfilment	 of	 civil-political	 rights	 may	 be	 a	
necessary	precondition	for	such	an	evaluation.		Civil	and	political	rights	can	also	play	an	
important	causative	role,	for	example	in	preventing	the	occurrence	of	famines	through	a	
relatively	free	media.285		
Finally,	rights	can	be	relevant	to	poverty	by	acting	as	a	constraint	on	the	types	of	action	
that	are	permissible	 in	order	to	address	poverty.	For	example,	the	forced	sterilisation	of	
the	poor	population	in	order	to	control	and	diminish	the	effects	of	poverty,	as	violating	
people’s	 personal	 liberty	 and	 right	 to	 choose.	 These	 rights	 may	 not	 in	 themselves	 be	
constitutive	of	poverty	or	 instrumental	 to	reducing	poverty,	but	will	 still	be	relevant	by	
ruling	out	certain	types	of	action	as	not	permissible.286	
A	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 poverty	 reduction	 provides	 the	 norms	 and	 values	
upon	 which	 to	 devise	 policies	 and	 strategies	 for	 poverty	 reduction,	 as	 set	 out	 in	 the	
international	 law	of	human	rights.	The	rights-based	approach	to	poverty	 is	a	normative	
framework	 based	 on	 international	 human	 rights	 law.	 In	 order	 to	 satisfy	 all	 the	
requirements	of	a	rights-based	approach	to	poverty,	the	process	of	policy	formulation	will	
also	need	 to	ensure	 the	participation	of	 stakeholders,	 and	 the	progressive	 realisation	of	
rights	 over	 time.	 Based	 on	 this	 international	 framing,	 in	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
																																								 																				
283 Sen Development as Freedom 36-43. See also S Osmani “Poverty and Human Rights: Building on the 
Capability Approach” Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal for People-
Centered Development, Vol 6(2) (2005) 205–219; and S Van Der Berg A capabilities approach to the judicial 
review of resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights LLD thesis University of 
Stellenbosch (2015). 
284 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 22. 
285 See A Sen Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981). 
286 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 22. 
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developmental	state,	a	rights-based	approach	to	poverty	reduction	must	thus	also	include	
the	participation	of	those	affected	by	poverty.	
However,	 participation	 can	 only	 be	 genuine	 or	 meaningful	 if	 ordinary	 people	 are	
empowered	 to	 claim	 their	 rights	 and	 to	 participate	 effectively	 in	 the	 decision-making	
processes,	 either	 directly	 or	 through	 agents	 such	 as	 civil	 society	 organisations.	 This	
requires	the	expansion	of	civil	and	political	rights	to	create	an	enabling	environment	for	
the	 advancement	 of	 the	 cause	 of	 poverty	 reduction.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 poor	 are	 to	
genuinely	 enjoy	 the	 right	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 development	 of	 poverty	 reduction	
measures,	they	must	be	empowered	through	the	fulfilment	of	the	right	of	association,287	
the	right	of	assembly,288	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression,289	the	right	to	information290	
																																								 																				
287 See UDHR Article 20; ICCPR Article 22; and ICESCR Article 8. 
288 See UDHR Article 20; and ICCPR Article 21. 
289 See UDHR Article 19; ICCPR Article 19; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 10 “Freedom of 
opinion” (Art 19) (1983). 
290 In its very first session in 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I), stating, “Freedom of 
information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United 
Nations is consecrated.” Abid Hussain, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
elaborated on this in his 1995 Report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, stating: “Freedom will be bereft 
of all effectiveness if the people have no access to information. Access to information is basic to the 
democratic way of life.” These quotations highlight the importance of freedom of information at a number of 
different levels: in itself, for the fulfilment of all other rights and as underpinning democracy. The right to 
information is not recognised in the international bill of rights as a stand-alone right. The UDHR and the ICCPR 
enveloped freedom of information within the broader right to freedom of expression (Article 19). The 
“Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information” U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996), were adopted on 1 October 1995 by a group of international law experts convened 
by ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg, and elaborated upon the imperative that if 
people are to be able to monitor the conduct of their government and to participate fully in a democratic 
society, that they must have access to government-held information. See also the “Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters” June 25, 
1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999), entered into force Oct. 30, 2001. Over the past decade, freedom of information 
has also begun to be recognised in regional human rights instruments. See “Resolution on the Adoption of the 
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa” adopted at the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, meeting at its 32nd Ordinary Session, in Banjul, The Gambia, from 17th to 23rd October 
2002, which affirms the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and information as an individual 
human right based on Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
<http://www.achpr.org/sessions/32nd/resolutions/62/> (accessed 26-07-2016).  See also the “Council of 
Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents”, the first treaty on the right to know, adopted by the 
Council of Europe on 27 November 2008. This treaty was opened for signature on 18 June 2009 and 14 
countries have signed thus far <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/205> 
(accessed 26-07-2016). The right to freedom of information is also enshrined in a number of national 
constitutions. <http://www.Right2INFO.org> (accessed 26-07-2016) brings together information on the legal 
frameworks for the right to information from more than 80 countries. See further M Dimba “Access to 
information as a tool for socio-economic justice” A presentation on behalf of the Open Democracy Advice 
Centre (ODAC) for the conference Towards Greater Transparency: Access to Information, 21 & 22 August 2012, 
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and	 the	 right	 of	 equal	 access	 to	 justice.291	 Empowerment	 is	 only	 possible	 through	 the	
fulfilment	 of	 these	 rights,	 and	 effective	 participation	 is	 then	 also	 achievable.292	 In	 a	
democratic	developmental	state,	participation-enabling	rights	must	be	strongly	protected	
and	 promoted	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 progress	 in	 socio-economic	 transformation.	 In	 turn,	
one	 also	 requires	 social	 and	 economic	 rights	 in	 order	 to	 participate	 effectively	 –	 the	
familiar	circularity	problem	with	participation	and	socio-economic	rights.	
The	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	(‘OHCHR’)	has	
produced	a	number	of	documents	over	the	past	decade,	detailing	a	normative	approach,	
instead	of	a	development	economist’s	approach,	 to	 the	concept	and	content	of	poverty.		
OHCHR	 produced	 Principles	 and	 Guidelines	 for	 a	 Human	 Rights	 Approach	 to	 Poverty	
Reduction	 Strategies293	 (‘OHCHR	Guidelines’)	 to	 guide	 countries,	 international	 agencies	
and	development	specialists	in	translating	human	rights	norms,	standards	and	principles	
into	poverty	 reduction	policies	and	strategies.	The	OHCHR	Guidelines	are	based	on	 the	
conceptual	 work	 of	 Professors	 Paul	 Hunt,	 Manfred	 Nowak	 and	 Siddiq	 Osmani,294	
discussed	above,	the	literature	on	human	rights,	poverty	and	development	in	general,	and	
consultations	 with	 UN	 member	 states,	 intergovernmental	 and	 nongovernmental	
organisations.295	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Windhoek, Namibia <http://www.ippr.org.na/sites/ default/files/ATI%20Socio-Economic%20Briefing%20 
Paper.pdf> (accessed 03-07-2016). 
291 UDHR Article 7: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection 
of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such discrimination.” See also ICCPR Article 22; and Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007). 
292 Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty 23-24. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 25 
“The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service” (Art 25) 
(1996). 
293 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Human Rights and Poverty Reduction: A 
Conceptual Framework (2004); and Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (2006), <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ PovertyReductionen.pdf>  
(accessed 10-07-2016). 
294 See Osmani Evolving Views on Poverty; S Osmani “Human rights to food, health and education” (2000) 1(2) 
Journal of Human Development 273-98; The Concept of Poverty in the Rights-based Approach (2002); S 
Osmani, O Chowdhury, M Mujeri & Q Shahabuddin Proposal for the Bangladesh Country Study: The Right to 
Development Project (2002); P Hunt, M Novak & S Osmani Human Rights and Poverty Reduction Strategies 
UN OHCHR Discussion Paper (2002). 
295 For a sample of the literature on a human rights-based approach to poverty reduction, see R Kapindu 
“Poverty reduction strategies and the rights to health and housing: The Malawian and Ugandan experiences” 
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The	 OHCHR	 Guidelines	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	 participatory	 rights	 in	 the	 four	
stages	 of	 participation	 in	poverty	 reduction	policy	development:	 “preference	 revelation;	
policy	 choice;	 implementation;	 and	 monitoring,	 assessment	 and	 accountability”.296	
“Preference	 revelation”	 is	 the	 initial	 stage	 before	 policies	 are	 formulated,	where	 people	
must	 be	 enabled	 to	 state	 what	 their	 preferences	 are,	 and	 the	 objectives	 they	 want	 to	
achieve.	“Policy	 choice”	 refers	 to	 when	 policies	 are	 developed	 and	 decisions	 are	 taken	
regarding	the	allocation	of	resources.		Opportunities	must	also	be	created	to	empower	the	
poor	to	participate	in	the	implementation	stage	as	well,	primarily	the	responsibility	of	the	
executive	arm	of	the	State.	Such	opportunities	mostly	arise	in	community-level	activities,	
within	 an	 institutional	 framework	 of	 representative	 local	 government.	 The	 final	 stage	
involves	monitoring	and	assessment	of	the	impact	of	policies	and	holding	to	account	the	
State	and	other	duty-bearers,	for	their	obligations.		
In	 a	democratic	developmental	 state	 these	 stages	of	participation	 in	policy	 formulation	
would	enable	people	to	participate	meaningfully	in	co-creating	policies,	programmes	and	
laws	of	 the	 country	 to	 ensure	 its	 socio-economic	 transformation,	 as	well	 as	monitoring	
and	assessing	their	efficacy	through	participatory	rights	such	as	the	right	to	information	
and	 freedom	 of	 expression.	 The	OHCHR	 Guidelines’	 description	 of	 the	 four	 stages	 of	
participation	 required,	 clearly	 lay	 out	 the	 opportunities	 for	 population	 groups	 that	 are	
affected	directly	and	indirectly,	to	inform	our	understanding	of	the	nature	and	genesis	of	
poverty	 and	 then	 to	 adopt	more	 appropriate	 and	 effective	 strategies	 to	 reduce	poverty.	
Furthermore,	 the	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 poverty	 supports	 the	 interaction	 between	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
African Human Rights Law Journal Vol 6 Issue 2 (2006) 493; C Nyamu-Musembi & A Cornwall What is the 
‘rights-based approach’ all about? Perspectives from international development agencies Institute of 
Development Studies Working Paper (2004) 234; B Fortman Persistent Poverty and Inequality in an Era of 
Globalization: Opportunities and Limitations of a Rights Approach Tilburg University Lustrum Conference 
(2003); J Mubangizi “Know your rights: Exploring the connections between human rights and poverty reduction 
with specific reference to South Africa” (2005) 21(1) SAJHR 32; T Pogge “Recognised and violated by 
international law: The human rights of the global poor” Leiden Journal of International Law 18 (2005) 717; Q 
Wodon Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Background Paper for the World Development Report 2000/2001 
World Bank; P Vizard Conceptualising Poverty in a Human Rights Framework: Foundational Issues in Ethics, 
Economics and International Law PhD Thesis, London School of Economics (2000); UNDP Human 
Development and Human Rights (1998); UNDP Human Development Report (2000); DFID The UK White Paper 
on International Development (1997); and Human Rights Watch Indivisible Human Rights: The Relationship 
between Political and Civil Rights to Survival, Subsistence and Poverty (1992). 
296 OHCHR Guidelines 14-15. 
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socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 by	 highlighting	 the	 need	 to	 ensure	
meaningful	participation	of	the	poor	in	policy	and	decision-making	processes,	as	well	as	
holding	the	State	and	other	duty-bearers	accountable.	
The	obligations	deriving	from	these	poverty-related	rights	may	be	analysed	by	reference	
to	the	duties	to	respect,	protect	and	fulfil.297	The	duty	to	respect	entails	the	duty-bearer	
not	 breaching	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 any	 human	 right,	 directly	 or	 indirectly.	 The	 duty	 to	
protect	entails	the	duty-bearer	preventing	third	parties	from	abusing	the	right.	The	duty	
to	fulfil	entails	the	duty-bearer	adopting	appropriate	legislative,	administrative	and	other	
measures	to	ensure	the	full	realisation	of	rights.298	A	rights-based	approach	also	calls	for	
the	 creation	 and	 strengthening	 of	 the	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 holding	 duty-bearers	
accountable	 for	 their	 actions.299	 Accordingly,	 the	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 poverty	
reduction,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state,	emphasises	obligations	and	requires	that	
all	 duty-holders,	 including	 the	 legislature,	 the	 executive,	 the	 judiciary,	 administrations	
and	organs	of	state,	be	held	to	account	for	their	conduct	in	realising	human	rights.		
All	 mechanisms	 of	 accountability	 must	 be	 accessible,	 transparent	 and	 effective.300	 An	
accountability	 procedure	 compels	 duty-bearers	 to	 answer	 for	 their	 acts	 or	 omissions	 in	
relation	 to	 their	duties.	 It	provides	an	opportunity	 for	 right-holders	 to	understand	how	
duty-bearers	 have	 discharged,	 or	 failed	 to	 discharge,	 their	 obligations.	 It	 then	 also	
provides	 duty-bearers	 with	 an	 opportunity	 to	 clarify	 or	 justify	 their	 conduct.	
Accountability	includes	some	form	of	remedy	and	reparation	for	human	rights	violations.		
																																								 																				
297 OHCHR Conceptual Framework 30; OHCHR Guidelines 11. 
298 These types of duties are derived from the work of Henry Shue in Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and 
US Foreign Policy (1980); and Basic Rights 2ed (1996). See Committee on Economic, Social and Culture 
Rights General Comment 3, Article 2 Implementation at the national level (Thirteenth session, 1981), 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 4 para 1; and the "The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights" (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691-701 para 6 (the ‘Maastricht Guidelines’). These 
guidelines elaborate upon the understanding of violations of economic, social and cultural rights and remedies 
thereto. They built on “The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122–135. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted this typology of obligations in The Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, communication no. 155/96 (2001) 
AHRLR 51 (ACHPR 2001) paras 44–48. For a critique of this typology, see Steiner, Alston & Goodman 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 185-192; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
82-87. 
299 OHCHR Guidelines 4. 
300 OHCHR Guidelines 4. 
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Individuals’	whose	rights	have	been	violated	also	have	a	procedural	right	to	an	effective	
remedy	 before	 a	 domestic	 body.	This	 does	 not	 necessarily	 require	 a	 judicial	 procedure.	
There	 are	 four	 broad	 types	 of	 accountability	 mechanisms:	 judicial;	 quasi-judicial	 (e.g.	
ombuds	institutions,	international	human	rights	treaty-bodies);	administrative	tribunals;	
and	 political	 (e.g.	 parliamentary	 processes).	 States	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 safeguard	 the	
rights	of	any	person	claiming	a	remedy,	by	having	their	rights	determined	by	a	competent	
judicial,	 administrative	 or	 legislative	 authority.	 Furthermore,	 States	 must	 ensure	 that	
relevant	 authorities	 enforce	 these	 remedies.301	 The	 interdependence	 between	 socio-
economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	
highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 accountability	 in	 the	 context	 of	 addressing	 poverty	 and	
inequality.	 Progress	 cannot	 be	 made	 if	 there	 are	 no	 mechanisms	 for	 transparency	 of	
decision-making	and	reparation	 for	 failure	 to	realise	socio-economic	rights	 for	 the	poor	
and	marginalised.	
The	 international	 human	 rights	 normative	 framework	 is	 particularly	 concerned	 with	
protecting	individuals	and	groups	who	are	vulnerable,	marginal,	disadvantaged	or	socially	
excluded	 and	 ensuring	 they	 have	 opportunities	 to	 participate	 in	 decisions	 affecting	
them.302	 The	 principles	 of	 equality	 and	 non-discrimination303	 require	 that	 laws	 and	
																																								 																				
301 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 9 (Nineteenth sess, 
1998) “The domestic application of the Covenant” UN doc E/C.12/1998/24; and UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3. See also the jurisprudence of the European Convention on 
Human Rights pertaining to article 6 of the Convention. Article 6 protects the right to a fair criminal and civil 
trial and the procedural protections in article 6 have been applied to social security benefits. See for example 
Feldbrugge v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 425 (contributory sickness benefit claim); Schuler-Zgraggen v 
Switzerland (1993) 16 EHRR 405; Salesi v Italy (1993) 26 EHRR 187 (state-funded non-contributory disability 
pension); Kerojavi v Finland (1996) EHRLR 66; Mennitto v Italy (2000) 34 EHRR 1122; and the discussion by 
M Scheinin ‘Economic and social rights as legal rights’ in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 29, 34–38. 
302 See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969) and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981). There are also numerous international 
instruments protecting the status of refugees, protecting minorities, children, persons with disabilities, older 
persons etc. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 28 “Equality of rights between men and 
women” (2000); UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 16 “The equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights” (Article 3) (Thirty- fourth 
session, 2005), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/3 (2005).; and UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No 20. 
303 The principle of non-discrimination and equality are well established in international human rights law. See 
the UDHR Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood;” and Article 2 “Everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
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institutions	that	cultivate	discrimination	against	specific	individuals	and	groups	must	be	
eliminated.304	
The	obligation	on	duty-holders	to	work	towards	poverty	reduction,	does	not	require	that	
all	human	rights	must	be	realised	immediately.	In	recognition	of	resource	constraints,	it	
allows,	 if	necessary,	 for	progressive	 realisation	of	 rights	over	 a	period	of	 time.305	At	 the	
same	time,	however,	the	approach	demands	that	minimum	essential	levels	of	all	rights	–	
or	 core	 obligations	 –	 should	 always	 be	 respected.306	 Progressive	 realisation	 of	 socio-
economic	rights	is	a	key	feature	of	the	South	African	Bill	of	Rights,	however,	our	judiciary	
has	largely	rejected	the	international	minimum	core	approach.	This	jurisprudence	will	be	
discussed	in	detail	in	chapter	four	in	the	context	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	that	
seeks	 socio-economic	 transformation,	 in	 particular	 for	 people	 living	 in	 poverty	 and	
suffering	extreme	poverty.	
In	conclusion,	the	international	human	rights	and	development	discourse	has	highlighted	
the	conceptual	 and	operational	 linkages	 that	 exist	between	human	 rights,	development	
and	 poverty.	 There	 is	 increasing	 global	 support	 for	 attempts	 to	 redefine	 development	
issues,	 including	 poverty,	 as	 a	 normative	 conception	 grounded	 in	 the	 human	 rights	
doctrine.	 The	 normative	 framework	 of	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 poverty	
reduction	 is	 extremely	 valuable	 to	 the	 development	 discourse	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state.	 The	 case	 for	 a	 human	 rights-based	 approach	 to	 poverty	 focuses	
precisely	 on	 the	 transformative	 quality	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 their	 legal	 obligations.	
Human	 rights	 also	 mobilise	 communities	 and	 groups,	 as	 an	 essential	 mechanism	 for	
social	movements,	 popular	 involvement	 and	 social	 change.	Human	 rights	 standards,	 in	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status...” Similarly ICESCR, Articles 3, 7; and ICCPR, Article 26. See also UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 20 “Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (Art 
2, para. 2) (2009). 
304 OHCHR Guidelines 17. 
305 OHCHR Guidelines 22-26. See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the interpretation 
of “progressive realisation” in General Comment No 3. See also Maastricht Guidelines on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights para 8. 
306 OHCHR Guidelines 26-27. For purposes of interpreting States Parties’ obligations under the ICESCR, see 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 3 para 10. See also General 
Comments No 12 (right to adequate food), No 13 (right to education) and No 14 (right to health) as examples 
of minimum core obligations. 
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this	 way,	 provide	 evaluative	 norms	 and	 potentially	 empowering	 tools	 to	 address	 the	
neglect	of	weak	or	vulnerable	groups	in	development	processes.307	This	is	even	more	so	in	
a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state,	where	there	is	a	thriving	media	and	civil	
society	holding	up	the	values	of	participation	and	accountability.	
3	6	Conclusion	
This	chapter	serves	as	the	contextual	background	to	the	analysis	of	socio-economic	rights	
and	administrative	justice	jurisprudence	in	the	chapters	that	follow.	I	described	the	dire	
situation	of	poverty	and	inequality	in	South	Africa	inherited	from	the	apartheid	era,	and	
which	in	many	respects	still	exists,	albeit	substantially	improved	upon,	in	the	twenty	two-
years	since	the	advent	of	constitutional	democracy.		
The	understanding	of	poverty	globally	has	evolved	from	a	narrowly	defined	income-based	
notion	 of	 what	 it	means	 to	 be	 poor,	 to	 a	 holistic	 interpretation	 of	 what	 is	 required	 in	
order	 to	 lift	 people	 from	 poverty	 and	 free	 human	 potential.	 This	 evolved	
conceptualisation	 incorporates	elements	of	material	deprivation	 that	must	be	overcome	
through	 the	 provision	 of	 basic	 needs,	 and,	 significantly	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 study,	
incorporates	 the	 less	 tangible	 elements	 of	 agency,	 empowerment	 and	 capabilities	
required	to	surmount	the	impact	of	deprivation	on	the	socio-political	dimensions	of	life.		
I	have	provided	an	overview	of	the	multi-dimensionality	of	poverty	from	a	development	
economics	perspective,	and	have	 linked	 it	 to	a	holistic	human	rights-based	approach	to	
poverty.	This	multi-layered	description	of	poverty	and	related	rights	 further	depicts	 the	
needs	 of	 individuals	 and	 communities	 as	 encompassing	 the	 tangible	 and	 material	
domains	on	the	one	hand	as	well	as	the	intangible	sense	of	having	control	over	one’s	life	
described	by	Sen	as	“capability	functionings”.		
																																								 																				
307 See discussions of the use of rights discourse in advocating for policy and law changes by non-
governmental organisations in: S Wilson “Taming the Constitution: Rights and reform in the South African 
education system” 20 (2004) SAJHR 418; M Heywood “Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South 
Africa: Background, strategies and outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign Case against the Minister of 
Health” (2003) 19 SAJHR 278; M Heywood “Shaping, making and breaking the law in the campaign for a 
National HIV/AIDS Treatment Plan” in P Jones & K Stokke (eds) Democratising Development: The Politics of 
Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 181. 
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The	 international	 human	 rights	 legal	 framework	 supports	 a	multi-dimensional	 view	 of	
poverty.	A	rights-based	approach	to	poverty	sees	socio-economic	rights	such	as	the	right	
to	 health,	 education,	 housing,	 water	 and	 social	 security	 as	 related	 to	 the	 material	
deprivations	 that	 people	 experience.	 Civil	 and	 political	 rights	 facilitate	 poor	 people’s	
empowerment	 and	 participation	 in	 the	 decisions	 that	 affect	 them.	 Both	 categories	 of	
rights	are	critical	and	mutually	supportive	in	the	context	of	poverty.	These	rights	are	then	
translated	 into	 obligations	 on	 state	 actors	 to	 ensure	 the	 reduction	 of	 poverty.	 Those	
actors	 responsible	 for	 designing	 and	 implementing	 the	 measures	 required	 to	 reduce	
poverty	in	all	its	dimensions,	must	do	so	cooperatively,	in	terms	of	the	Constitution,	and	
based	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 participatory	 democracy.	 These	 principles	 require	 the	
participation	of	the	poor	in	the	policy,	legislative	and	administrative	decisions	that	affect	
them.	
The	 South	 African	 Constitution,	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 obliges	 the	
provision	 of	 material	 benefits	 as	 well	 as	 participatory	 empowerment,	 for	 true	
emancipation	from	poverty	for	the	poor.	In	chapters	four,	five	and	six,	I	will	analyse	the	
shortcomings	 and	 successes	 of	 the	 interwoven	 jurisprudence	 on	 socio-economic	 rights	
and	 administrative	 justice,	 in	 relation	 to	 poverty	 reduction	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 South	
African	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 I	 will	 identify	 key	 interdependent	 features	 of	
each	 set	 of	 rights,	 which	 can	 potentially	 enhance	 the	 future	 jurisprudence	 on	 poverty	
reduction.	I	will	focus	on	the	rights	to	education,	social	security,	water,	and	housing	and	
basic	services,	where	the	interconnectedness	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	
justice	 in	 the	 context	 of	 poverty	 is	 most	 vivid.	 I	 will	 examine	 the	 interaction	 and	
complementarity	between	the	right	to	administrative	justice	and	socio-economic	rights	in	
addressing	 poverty	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 based	 on	 the	 conceptual	 foundations	 in	
chapters	two	and	three.	
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CHAPTER 4: Socio-Economic Rights to Address Poverty 
	
4	1	Introduction	
The	 incorporation	 of	 justiciable	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 the	 1996	Constitution	was	 an	
acknowledgement	of	the	need	to	transform	the	situation	in	South	African	society,	where	
many	people	 live	 in	desperate	poverty.	Poverty	has	been	 recognised	 in	 terms	of	 lack	of	
access	to	quality	education,	income,	food,	health	care,	housing,	water	and	land.	Although	
it	only	ratified	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	on	the	
12th	of	January	2015,	South	Africa	is	a	model	in	the	international	community,	for	including	
enforceable	socio-economic	rights	in	the	Bill	of	Rights.	308	The	South	African	Courts	have	
developed	an	influential	body	of	jurisprudence	on	socio-economic	rights	in	the	context	of	
addressing	poverty	and	inequality.	Since	1996,	over	a	period	of	21	years,	the	Constitutional	
Court	 has	 handed	 down	 52	 judgements	 related	 to	 a	 number	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	
namely	 the	 rights	 to	 property	 (6),	 housing/shelter	 (28),	 water	 (1),	 social	 security	 (5),	
health	(3),	education	(8)	and	access	to	medical	treatment	for	prisoners	(1).309	
Sen’s	 capability	 definition	 of	 poverty	 and	 the	 international,	 multi-dimensional	 human	
rights	 approach	 to	 poverty	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 has	 located	 the	 elements	 of	
empowerment	and	participation	of	the	poor,	alongside	their	socio-economic	needs.	The	
																																								 																				
308 The South African government initially signed the ICESCR in 1994. It took twenty years for the government 
to ratify the covenant and it finally entered into force on 12 April 2015. Section 27, the Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC) and other organisations welcomed the ratification but raised concerns about the qualification made in 
respect of the right to education. The qualification states: “The Government of the Republic of South will give 
progressive effect to the right to education, as provided for in Article 13 (2)(a) and Article 14, within the 
framework of its National Education Policy and available resources.” The South African Constitution and 
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court state that the right to education is immediately 
realisable, unlike the other socio-economic rights in the SA Constitution that are “progressively realisable”. The 
Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) in a press statement after the ratification, expressed hope that the SA 
government would now also ratify or accede to the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (OP-ICESCR), which 
provides an individual complaint mechanism (such as exists for the other major international human rights 
treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). This mechanism allows poor and 
marginalised people to lodge individual complaints regarding socio-economic rights violations at the 
international level, thereby promoting a culture of accountability for implementing the ICESCR. 
<http://www.seri-sa.org/images/ ICESR_CN_23_2015-Eng.pdf> (accessed 01-09-2016).  
309 See the Appendix to this dissertation for the full list of socio-economic rights cases. 
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interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	in	the	South	African	jurisprudence	has	evolved	to	
incorporate	 participatory	 elements	 in	 the	 procedural	 dimensions	 of	 socio-economic	
rights,	as	well	as	in	the	remedies	directed	by	the	courts,	such	as	meaningful	engagement.	
There	 is	 a	 burgeoning	 literature	 and	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 significance	 of	 participation	
and	 active	 agency	 in	 transforming	 South	 African	 society	 to	 an	 empowered	 nation	 of	
people	 that	 are	 able	 to	 take	 up	 opportunities	 provided	 by	 the	 state,	 society	 and	 the	
markets.	 This	 is	 explicit	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 where	
participatory	democracy	flourishes.	
Much	of	 the	 debate	 around	 the	 justiciability	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 has	 involved	 the	
appropriate	 role	 of	 the	 judiciary	 in	 a	 constitutional	 democracy.310	 The	 Constitutional	
Court’s	approach	has	been	one	of	deference	 to	democratic	prerogatives	and	 the	 limited	
nature	of	public	resources,	while	also	paying	special	deliberative	attention	to	those	whose	
basic	 needs	 are	 not	 being	met.	 The	 Court’s	 transformative	 role	 and	 jurisprudence	 has	
large	 implications	 for	 how	 we	 think	 about	 participation,	 empowerment	 and	 meeting	
social	and	economic	needs	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
The	Court’s	approach	has	been	likened	to	an	administrative	law	model	of	socio-economic	
rights.	What	 the	 Court	 has	 implicitly	 required	 is	 for	 government	 to	 develop	 and	 fund	
social	programmes	through	which	a	significant	number	of	poor	people	are	progressively	
given	 access	 to	 socio-economic	 rights.	 What	 the	 Court	 calls	 for	 is	 a	 reasonable	 plan,	
designed	to	ensure	that	relief	will	be	forthcoming.	The	Court	has	-	tentatively	at	first	but	
more	 boldly	 of	 late	 -	 sought	 to	 include	 elements	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 by	
increasingly	 requiring	 government	 to	 define	 programmes	 and	 plans	 together	 with	
																																								 																				
310 See D Davis “Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards ‘Deference 
Light’” 22 SAJHR 301 (2006); K Young “A typology of economic and social rights adjudication: Exploring the 
catalytic function of judicial review” ICON (2010) Vol 8 No 3 385-420; D Brand “Judicial Deference and 
Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa” (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 614; B Ray 
“Evictions, Aspirations and Avoidance” V (2014) CCR 173; K Young “The Avoidance of Substance in 
Constitutional Rights” V (2014) CCR 233; D Landau “Aggressive Weak-Form Remedies” V (2014) CCR 244; J 
Dugard “Beyond Blue Moonlight: The Implications of Judicial Avoidance in Relation to the Provision of 
Alternative Housing” V (2014) CCR 265; B Ray Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, Participation, and 
Democracy in South Africa's Second Wave (2016). 
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affected	 individuals	and	communities.311	This	has	almost	exclusively	been	applied	 in	 the	
context	 of	 evictions	 law	 and	 education	 cases,	 which	 are	 not	 limited	 by	 “progressive	
realisation”	 and	 “available	 resources”,	 and	 is	 not	 yet	 a	 generalised	 requirement	 for	 all	
socio-economic	rights.	However,	the	potential	for	extrapolation	to	other	socio-economic	
rights	 exists.	 The	 Court,	 in	 conjunction	 with	 technical	 experts,	 lawyers	 and	 affected	
communities,	can	determine	the	substantive	content	of	socio-economic	rights	and	what	
is	 required	 to	alleviate	 the	plight	of	 those	 living	 in	poverty.	This	can	be	done	 in	such	a	
way	 as	 to	 alleviate	 poverty	 for	 individual	 litigants	 as	 well	 as	 address	 wider	 systemic	
developmental	issues.	
This	 chapter	 explores	 the	 socio-economic	 rights	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 South	 African	
Courts	 and	 its	 pursuance	 of	 poverty	 alleviation,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state.	 I	 first	 examine	 the	 substantive,	proactive	and	participatory	 role	of	
judicial	interpretation	and	enforcement	of	socio-economic	rights.	I	then	analyse	elements	
of	 the	 South	 African	 socio-economic	 rights	 jurisprudence	 that	 support	 a	 participatory,	
experimental,	 managerial	 and	 developmental	 approach:	 reasonableness	 review;	
substantive	interpretation;	and	meaningful	engagement	remedies	and	their	enforcement.	
These	 themes	 will	 be	 further	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 five	 and	 six	 in	 relation	 to	 their	
interface	 with	 the	 right	 to	 just	 administrative	 action,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.	
Although	 development	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 a	 strategic	 priority	 for	 all	 governments,	 the	
developmental	role	of	governments	 in	 lesser-developed	or	transitional	states,	 like	South	
Africa,	is	different	from	that	of	governments	in	more	developed	states.312	In	chapter	two	I	
traced	 the	 origins	 of	 so-called	 developmental	 states,	 summarising	 the	 various	
manifestations	of	 the	developmental	 state	on	different	 continents.	 I	 then	 identified	 the	
characteristics	 of	 the	 contemporary	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 In	
adopting	the	philosophy	of	a	democratic	developmental	state,	the	promotion	of	economic	
																																								 																				
311 See the typology of socio-economic rights adjudication described in Young (2010) ICON 385-420, in 
particular the experimentalist review and managerial review. 
312 See D Landau “Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law” (2010) Harvard 
International Law Journal Vol 51(2). 
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development	is	closely	aligned	to	the	goals	of	achieving	substantial	reduction	in	poverty	
and	 inequality.	As	distinct	 from	a	 traditional	developmental	 state,	 this	 requires	a	 social	
safety	 net	 implemented	 by	 an	 efficient	 and	 effective	 bureaucracy,	 autonomous	
institutions	and	a	participatory,	deliberative	and	representative	democracy.313	
This	chapter	evaluates	the	Court’s	performance	in	reviewing	socio-economic	rights	in	the	
context	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 and	 reconsiders	 the	 Courts’	 role	 in	 the	
transformative	 project.	 Based	 on	 a	 contemporary	 understanding	 of	 the	 multi-
dimensionality	 of	 poverty,	 giving	 socio-economic	 rights	 substantive	 content	 and	
stimulating	participation	 is	 critical	 to	achieving	 real	 and	 lasting	poverty	 reduction	on	a	
systemic	 scale.	 Robust	 review	 by	 the	 courts	 in	 socio-economic	 rights	 cases	 is	 far	
preferable	to	deferential	review	since	the	courts	have	an	equally	substantive	role	to	play	
as	 the	 legislature	 and	 executive,	 in	 advancing	 the	 democratic	 developmental	 state.314	 A	
stronger	 form	 of	 review	 allows	 scope	 for	 government,	 community	 and	 civil	 society	
participation	in	the	translation	of	rights	into	effective	policies	and	programmes,	both	as	a	
means	and	an	end	to	achieving	long-term	socio-economic	transformation.		
4	2	International	law	on	social	and	economic	rights	
Socio-economic	rights	are	recognised	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(1948)	
as	 well	 as	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 international,	 regional	 and	 specialised	 human	 rights	
conventions.315	The	key	 international	treaty	protecting	economic	and	social	rights	 is	 the	
International	 Covenant	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	 (1966)	 (‘ICESCR’).316	 In	
addition,	regionally	social	and	economic	rights	are	also	protected	in	the	African	Charter	
on	 Human	 and	 People’s	 Rights	 (1981).317	 Under	 international	 law,	 it	 is	 now	 widely	
recognised	 that	 the	 realisation	 of	 all	 human	 rights	 generally	 entails	 the	 following	
																																								 																				
313 F Cloete & M Auriacombe Measuring Empowerment in Democratic Developmental States Centre for 
International Policy Exchanges, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland 1 <http://umdcipe.org/ 
conferences/Moscow/papers/Measuring_Empowerment_in_Democratic_Developmental_States.pdf> 
(accessed 30-09-2016). 
314 See discussion below in 4 3, 4 4 and 4 5. 
315 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Gen Ass Res 217A (III), 10 December 1948 . 
316 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 3 was adopted on 16 
December 1966, and entered into force on 3 January 1976. 
317 African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) 21 ILM 59 (entered into force on 21 October 1986). 
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elements:	respect,	protection	and	fulfilment.318	This	was	reiterated	with	respect	to	socio-
economic	 rights	 in	 the	 Maastricht	 Guidelines	 on	 Violations	 of	 Economic,	 Social	 and	
Cultural	Rights	(‘Maastricht	Guidelines’)	319	and	in	the	comments	of	the	UN	Committee	on	
Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights.320	
The	duty	 to	 respect	 includes	primarily	negative	duties	 and	means	 that	 the	 state	has	 to	
consider	in	all	its	actions	the	effect	on	human	rights	and	must	not	engage	in	acts	whose	
outcome	would	be	the	deprivation	or	restriction	of	access	to	socio-economic	rights.	It	is	
generally	 accepted	 that	 duties	 to	 respect	 are	 immediate	 obligations	 irrespective	 of	
whether	 socio-economic	 rights	 or	 civil	 and	 political	 rights	 are	 involved.	 This	 can	 be	
explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 obligations	 only	 require	 abstention	 and	 limited	 or	 no	
resources.	 The	 duty	 to	 protect	 requires	 states	 to	 take	 steps,	 in	 particular	 legislative	
measures,	 to	prevent	third	parties	 from	infringing	human	rights.	With	respect	 to	socio-
economic	 rights,	 this	 obligation	 means	 above	 all	 the	 protection	 of	 people	 from	 third	
parties	depriving	them	of	resources,	which	would	otherwise	enable	them	to	satisfy	their	
basic	 needs.	 The	 growing	 relevance	 of	 private	 role-players,	 especially	 multi-national	
corporations,	 renders	 this	 duty	 increasingly	 important.321	 Finally,	 the	 duty	 to	 fulfil	
																																								 																				
318 H Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (1980). 
319 See "The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1998) 20 Human 
Rights Quarterly 691-701 para 6 (the ‘Maastricht Guidelines’). The Maastricht Guidelines are considered to be 
‘soft law’ under international law and hence are non-binding. They were developed on the occasion of the 10th 
anniversary of The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights UN doc E/CN4/1987/17Annex (1987), reprinted in (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 122 (the ‘Limburg Principles’), by a group of more than thirty experts. The experts met in Maastricht, 
the Netherlands, from 22-26 January 1997 at the invitation of the International Commission of Jurists 
(Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, Ohio, USA) and the Centre for 
Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University (the Netherlands). The meeting was convened to 
elaborate on the Limburg Principles as regards the nature and scope of violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights and appropriate responses and remedies. The participants unanimously agreed on the 
Maastricht Guidelines as a reflection of the evolution of international law since 1986. These guidelines are 
designed to be of use to all who are concerned with understanding and determining violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights and in providing remedies thereto, in particular monitoring and adjudicating bodies at 
the national, regional and international levels.  
320 See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature of States parties' 
obligations (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1990), reprinted in Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003). 
321 For example, see the discussion on the role of multinational corporations and their accountability for 
actions in domestic and international economies that impact negatively on the human rights of the poor and 
the environment, in P Alston & R Goodman International Human Rights (2013) 1462-1496; and T Pogge 
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requires	states	to	take	appropriate	positive	steps	towards	the	full	realisation	of	the	right.	
This	duty	is	of	crucial	importance	for	the	realisation	of	socio-economic	rights.	This	duty,	
involving	questions	of	 resource	restrictions	and	wealth	redistribution,	 is	also	one	of	 the	
main	elements	of	the	ongoing	debate	around	socio-economic	rights.	The	duties	to	protect	
and	 fulfil	 socio-economic	 rights	 take	 on	 greater	 significance	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state	 like	 South	 Africa,	 as	 it	 seeks	 to	 address	 widespread	
poverty	and	inequality	in	a	transformative	and	systemic	manner.	
Another	 classification	 of	 obligations	 distinguishes	 between	 obligations	 of	 conduct	 and	
obligations	 of	 result.322	 Whereas	 the	 former	 only	 require	 a	 certain	 policy	 or	 specific	
measures,	 the	 latter	 require	 the	 achievement	 of	 specified	 targets.	 There	 is	 a	 close	
relationship	 between	 obligations	 of	 conduct	 and	 result	 and	 the	 obligations	 to	 respect,	
protect	and	fulfil	since	the	 latter	can	all	 include,	and	be	expressed	by	duties	of	conduct	
and	of	result.	The	duty	to	fulfil	the	right	to	health	could	therefore	either	be	articulated	in	
the	form	of	a	required	conduct,	for	example	establishing	a	comprehensive	programme	for	
the	 supply	of	basic	health	 care	 to	all	 children;	or	 it	 could	be	 set	up	as	 an	obligation	of	
result	 such	 as	 the	 reduction	 of	 infant	 mortality	 by	 a	 certain	 percentage.323	 Both	
obligations	of	conduct	and	of	result	have	a	role	to	play	for	different	purposes.	
Modern	constitutions	are	increasingly	recognising	that	human	rights	and	the	basic	social	
conditions	 in	 which	 people	 live,	 are	 fundamentally	 interconnected,	 by	 incorporating	
socio-economic	rights.324	These	are	seen	to	impose	“positive	rights”	or	obligations	on	the	
state	as	well	as	“negative	rights”	(which	impose	a	duty	on	the	government	not	to	act	 in	
certain	 ways,	 such	 as	 freedom	 from	 torture	 or	 discrimination).	 Apart	 from	 simply	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
“Recognized and violated by international law: The human rights of the global poor” (2005) 18 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 717. 
322 The Maastricht Guidelines para 7. 
323 See chapter three. 
324 See generally M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) for a critical analysis of social rights in twenty-nine national and international 
jurisdictions. Constitutions with explicit socio-economic rights provisions that may be judicially enforced are 
mainly found in Central and Eastern Europe, and South America. See for example the Colombian Constitution, 
the Lithuanian Constitution, the Hungarian Constitution, the Sri Lankan Constitution and the Constitution of the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor 2002. For the incorporation specifically of children’s socio-economic rights 
in modern constitutions, see generally J Tobin “Increasingly seen and heard: The constitutional recognition of 
children's rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 86.   
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protecting	members	of	society	from	the	heavy	hand	of	state	power,	socio-economic	rights	
oblige	the	state	to	do	as	much	as	it	can	to	secure	for	all	members	of	society	a	basic	set	of	
social	goods	–	education,	social	security,	health	care,	food,	water,	shelter,	access	to	land	
and	housing.	
Article	2(1)	of	the	ICESCR	describes	the	kind	of	measures	a	state	has	to	take	in	fulfilment	
of	its	obligations	in	regard	to	socio-economic	rights.	Article	2	consists	of	five	elements:	a)	
a	state	has	to		“undertake	steps”;	b)	“individually	and	through	international	assistance	and	
cooperation”;	c)	“to	the	maximum	of	its	available	resources”;	d)	“with	a	view	to	achieving	
the	 full	 realisation	 of	 the	 right”;	 and	 e)	 “by	 all	 appropriate	 means”.	 With	 regard	 to	
appropriate	 means,	 the	 ICESCR	 mentions	 “particularly	 the	 adoption	 of	 legislative	
measures”.	The	Committee	on	Economic	Social	 and	Cultural	Rights	 (‘CESCR’)	 stated	 in	
General	 Comment	 3	 that	 “appropriate	means”	 should	 be	 interpreted	widely	 and	would	
include,	 but	 not	 be	 limited	 to	 judicial	 remedies	 as	 well	 as	 administrative,	 financial,	
educational	and	social	measures.325	Relating	to	judicial	remedies,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	
CESCR	expressly	emphasised	the	justiciability	of	the	rights	in	the	Covenant	and	considers	
judicial	remedies	to	be	a	highly	appropriate	measure.326	
Section	 39(1)(b)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 states	 that,	 when	 interpreting	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights,	 a	
court	“must	consider	international	law”.	This	means	that	when	interpreting	human	rights	
norms,	 the	 courts	 must	 take	 cognisance	 of	 international	 and	 comparative	 law	 in	
furthering	 its	 transformative	 ideals.327	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 held	 that	 both	
binding	 and	 non-binding	 international	 law	 may	 be	 relevant.328	 Non-binding	 law	 may	
include	treaties,	which	South	Africa	has	not	ratified,	those	that	it	may	not	ratify,329	as	well	
																																								 																				
325 CESCR General Comment 3 paras 5 and 7.  
326 CESCR General Comment 3 paras 5 and 7. See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 9, The domestic application of the Covenant (Nineteenth session, 1998), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 54 (2003), stressing domestic 
incorporation and judicial enforcement in giving effect to the obligations in the ICESCR. 
327 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 101-105. See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
328 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para 35 (‘Makwanyane’). 
329 For example the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950). 
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as	 soft	 international	 law.330	 Binding	 international	 law	 includes	 primarily	 treaties	 that	
South	 Africa	 has	 ratified,	 as	 well	 as	 norms	 of	 customary	 international	 law.331	 As	
Liebenberg	 states,	 the	 Court	 has	 “adopted	 a	 flexible	 approach”	 to	 the	 application	 of	
international	 law	when	 interpreting	the	Bill	of	Rights,	 in	relation	to	non-binding	 law.332	
However,	the	Court	is	obliged	to	follow	binding	international	law	that	has	been	enacted	
into	 domestic	 law	 through	 the	 provisions	 of	 sections	 231	 and	 232	 of	 the	 Constitution.	
Section	 231(4)	 provides	 that	 a	 self-executing	 provision	 of	 an	 agreement	 that	 has	 been	
approved	by	Parliament	is	 law	in	South	Africa	unless	inconsistent	with	the	Constitution	
or	any	piece	of	legislation.333	
Finally,	section	233	of	the	Constitution	requires	the	courts	when	interpreting	any	piece	of	
legislation	 to	 “prefer	 any	 reasonable	 interpretation	 of	 the	 legislation	 that	 is	 consistent	
with	 international	 law	 over	 any	 alternative	 interpretation	 that	 is	 inconsistent	 with	
international	 law”.	 This	 would	 apply	 equally	 to	 legislation	 affecting	 people’s	 socio-
economic	 rights.	 As	 will	 be	 evident	 from	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 rights	
jurisprudence	in	the	South	African	Courts,	the	interpretive	imperative	in	section	233	has	
not	been	fully	appreciated.	However,	now	that	the	South	African	Government	has	ratified	
the	 ICESCR,	 we	 will	 hopefully	 see	more	 infusion	 of	 international	 interpretation	 in	 the	
substance	of	socio-economic	rights.334	
																																								 																				
330 “Soft” international law refers to interpretive material, for example the General Comments to the ICESCR, 
resolutions of international conferences, reports and guidelines issued by international bodies. See S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para 35. 
331 Customary international law refers to sources of law that are as ‘a general practice accepted as law’ as per 
art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. A rule of customary international law generally 
binds all states. See further discussion on human rights as customary international law in Alston & Goodman 
International Human Rights 61-89. 
332 See for example the discussion on the rejection by the Court of the concept of the minimum core of socio-
economic rights in section 4 5 6 below. 
333 See discussion of self-executing treaty provisions in CESCR General Comment 9 para 11; J Dugard “South 
Africa” in D Sloss (ed) The role of domestic courts in treaty enforcement (2009) 455; and Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 103-104. 
334 The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR opened for signature in September 2009. It provides a mechanism for 
complaints to be brought to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, against states that have 
ratified the Option Protocol. Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ 
OPCESCR.aspx> (accessed 02-09-2016). South Africa has ratified the ICESCR but not the Optional Protocol. 
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4	3	Adjudicating	socio-economic	rights	in	a	democratic	developmental	state	
The	socio-economic	rights	cases	decided	by	the	Constitutional	Court	to	date	have	largely	
involved	poor	litigants	attempting	to	access	the	various	socio-economic	rights	protected	
in	the	Constitution.335	Jackie	Dugard	and	Stuart	Wilson	divide	the	cases	into	two	phases,	
which	 is	 useful	 for	 purposes	 of	 analysis:	 the	 first	 wave	 of	 cases	 appearing	 before	 the	
Constitutional	Court	between	1995	and	2005	(8	 in	 10	years),	and	after	a	 lull,	 the	second	
wave	 from	 2008	 onwards.336	 The	more	 recent	 cases	 between	 2011	 and	 2017	 have	 largely	
comprised	of	participatory	judgments	in	evictions337	and	education338	cases.		
																																								 																				
335 See D Brand and C Heyns “Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution” in Law, 
Democracy and Development 1998(2) 153-167. See also K Maclean Constitutional Deference, Courts and 
Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009) 17-21 for an analysis of what is included in the categorisation of 
socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution. Socio-economic rights provisions are contained in 
sections 25(5), 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Constitution. Section 25(5) provides that “the State must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable 
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.” Sections 26(1) entrenches the right of “everyone” “to 
have access to adequate housing”, and section 27(1) the right of everyone “to have access to (a) health care 
services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if 
they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social assistance”. “Everyone” 
includes non-citizens such as permanent residents, as decided in Khosa & Mahlaule paras 46-47. The rights in 
sections 26 and 27 are qualified by a second subsection, which requires the state to “take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights”. In addition, these rights are subject to the general limitations clause in section 36. A second 
category of socio-economic rights, referred to as “basic” rights, entrenches children’s socio-economic rights, 
namely basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services (s 28(1)(c)); the right of everyone 
to basic education, including adult basic education and the right to receive education in the language of one’s 
choice (s 29(1)(a) and (b)); and detainee’s rights to adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and 
medical treatment (s 35(2)(e)). This category of rights is not qualified by reference to reasonable measures, 
progressive realisation or resource constraints. However, these rights are still subject to the limitations clause 
section 36. All of these rights are enforceable by the Courts, and the Courts have a wide discretion to grant 
“just and equitable” remedies (s 172). See I Currie & J De Waal “Socio-Economic Rights” in Bill of Rights 
Handbook 6 ed (2013) 563; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights. 
336 M Langford, B Cousins, J Dugard, and T Madlingozi (eds) Strategies for Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa: Symbols or Substance (2013). See also generally Ray Engaging with Social Rights. 
337 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) BCLR 
150 (CC); Maphango and Others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) BCLR 449 (CC); Pheko and 
Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 (4) BCLR 388 (CC); Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm 
Mooiplaats 355JR v Golden Thread Limited 2012 (4) BCLR 372 (CC); Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC 
Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) BCLR 382 (CC); The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue v City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 2012 (9) BCLR 951 (CC); Schubart Park Residents’ Association and 
Others v City of Tshwane 2013 (1) BCLR 68 (CC); Motswagae and Others v Rustenburg Local Municipality 
2013 (3) BCLR 271 (CC); Hattingh v Juta 2013 (5) BCLR 509 (CC); Zulu v eThekwini Municipality 2014 (8) 
BCLR 971 (CC); Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 (11) BCLR 1265 (C); MC Denneboom Service Station CC v 
Phayane 2014 (12) BCLR 1421 (CC); Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson, North West 
Provincial Executive Committee 2015 (1) BCLR 72 (CC); Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2015 
(6) BCLR 711 (CC); Pitje v Shibambo 2016 (4) BCLR 460 (CC); Molusi v Voges N.O. 2016 (7) BCLR 839 (CC); 
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The	 first	wave	was	 gradual	 and	 though	 somewhat	 deferential,	 it	 provided	 considerable	
potential	to	further	develop	the	jurisprudence	in	allowing	access	to	material	benefits	for	
those	living	in	poor	and	deprived	circumstances.339	It	can	be	characterised	by	the	Court’s	
“reasonableness”	 approach	 to	 the	 review	 of	 the	 positive	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 socio-
economic	rights	and	largely	by	a	lack	of	development	of	the	substance	of	rights.340		
The	 second	 wave	 of	 cases	 hit	 the	 Court	 in	 rapid	 succession	 between	 2008	 and	 2010,	
followed	by	a	spate	of	eviction	cases	in	2011	and	2012.	This	second	wave	of	cases	displays	
the	Court’s	continued	non-engagement	with	the	substantive	content	of	socio-	economic	
rights	 and	 what	 Danie	 Brand	 described	 as	 “the	 proceduralisation	 of	 socio-economic	
rights”	in	relation	to	the	first	wave,341	whilst	at	the	same	time	enhancing	the	participatory	
elements	of	socio-economic	rights	through	“meaningful	engagement”.342		
Brian	Ray’s	analysis	of	the	second	wave	cases	perceives	the	largely	procedural	approach	of	
the	courts	and	avoidance	of	substantive	interpretation	as	a	way	of	reframing	social	rights	
as	 “tools	 for	 democratic	 accountability	 in	 policy	 development	 rather	 than	 substantive	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 (10) BCLR 1308 (CC); Occupiers of Erven 87 and 
88 Berea v De Wet (CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017). 
338 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 761; 
KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Education, 
KwaZulu-Natal 2013 (6) BCLR 615 (CC); Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v 
Welkom High School; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High 
School 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC); MEC for Education in Gauteng Province and Other v Governing Body of 
Rivonia Primary School and Others 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC); Federation of Governing Bodies for South 
African Schools v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Gauteng 2016 (8) BCLR 1050 (CC). 
339 Langford et al Strategies for Socio-Economic Rights in SA.  See also D Brand “Judicial Deference and 
Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa” (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 614; and Young 
(2010) ICON 392-95. 
340 See for example: C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A 
comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206; D Brand “The 
proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence or ‘What are socio-economic rights 
for?’” in H Botha, A J van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative 
Constitution (2004) 33; Pieterse (2004) SAJHR; C Steinberg “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review 
of South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264; D Bilchitz Poverty and 
Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007); L Williams “Issues 
and challenges in addressing poverty and legal rights: A comparative United States/South African analysis” 
(2005) 21 SAJHR 436; J Dugard “Courts and the poor in South Africa: A critique of systemic judicial failures to 
advance transformative justice” (2008) 24 SAJHR 214; Currie & De Waal “Socio-Economic Rights” in Bill of 
Rights Handbook 563; and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
341 Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” Rights and Democracy. 
342 See section 4 6 below. 
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guarantees”.343	He	supports	this	approach,	which	he	describes	as	the	eviction	model	and	
democratic	engagement	models,	as	being	a	way	for	the	courts	to	exert	stronger	authority	
to	 enforce	 social	 rights	 whilst	 working	 within	 the	 constraints	 of	 the	 separation	 of	
powers.344	
Katharine	Young	describes	the	role	of	the	Court	over	the	past	two	decades	as	“catalysing”	
government	 and	 other	 civil	 society	 role	 players	 to	 develop	 the	 substance	 of	 socio-
economic	rights.345		She	puts	forward	a	typology	of	socio-economic	rights	adjudication	as	
a	differentiated	analysis	of	the	“catalytic	court’s”	interpretation	of	rights,	its	evaluation	of	
government	 action	 and	 the	 design	 of	 remedies.	 The	 typology	 comprises	 a	 “deferential	
review”	observed	 in	the	early	cases;346	a	“conversational	review”	between	courts	and	the	
legislature;347	 an	 “experimentalist	 review”	 involving	 numerous	 stakeholders	 engaging	 in	
contextual	investigation	and	systemic	change;348	a	“managerial	review”	where	the	court	is	
directly	responsible	for	prescribing	the	content	of	socio-economic	rights	and	supervising	
relief;349	 and	 a	 “peremptory	 review”	 with	 the	 courts	 providing	 a	 superior	 response.350	
These	various	characterisations	are	helpful	 for	devising	a	more	nuanced	and	contextual	
understanding	of	 the	court’s	evolving	and	vital	 transformative	 role.	For	 the	purposes	of	
this	 dissertation	 I	 will	 primarily	 explore	 the	 experimentalist	 and	 managerial	 styles	 of	
review.	These	styles	of	review	have	the	most	potential	to	enhance	and	strengthen	the	role	
																																								 																				
343 Ray Social Rights 187. 
344 Ray Social Rights 233-328. 
345 See the typology of socio-economic rights adjudication and the notion of the “catalytic function” of the court 
described in Young (2010) ICON 385-420. 
346 Young (2010) ICON 392-395. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 
1696 (CC); Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 
2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). 
347 Young (2010) ICON 395-398. See Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 2002 (5). 
348 Young (2010) ICON 398-401. See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 
1033 (CC) 2002 (5); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Occupiers of 
51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 
475 (CC). 
349 Young (2010) ICON 402-407. See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C); Minister 
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 2002 (5); Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg and 
Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) (2008) 4 All SA 471 (W). 
350 Young (2010) ICON 407-409. See Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
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of	the	courts	in	the	socio-economic	rights	jurisprudence	and	systemically	address	multi-
dimensional	poverty	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
In	an	assessment	of	the	extent	to	which	the	Constitutional	Court	of	South	Africa	can	be	
said	to	have	provided	an	“institutional	voice	for	the	poor”	during	the	first	wave	of	socio-
economic	rights	cases	from	1995	to	2005,	Jackie	Dugard	and	Theunis	Roux351	argued	that	
although	the	Court	found	in	favour	of	the	applicants	in	four	of	the	socio-economic	rights	
cases	that	came	before	the	Court	during	this	period,	the	jurisprudence	is	lacking	from	a	
pro-poor	 perspective.	 The	 authors	 argue	 that	 firstly,	 none	 of	 the	 judgments	 provided	
direct,	substantive	relief	to	the	applicants:	“an	outcome	that	gives	little	incentive	to	poor	
litigants	to	seek	relief	through	constitutional	 litigation”.352	Furthermore,	the	standard	of	
review	 adopted	 by	 the	 Court	 –	 that	 the	 overall	 policy,	 legislation	 and	 practices	 of	
government	in	the	sector	concerned	should	be	reasonable	–	“requires	litigants	to	have	a	
sophisticated	 understanding	 of	 often	 complex	 policy	 and	 budgetary	 issues,	 thereby	
disincentivising	the	poor	 from	bringing	cases	 to	 the	Court,	unless	 they	have	substantial	
legal	and	other	expert	support”.353		
The	second	wave	of	socio-economic	rights	cases	that	have	come	before	the	Constitutional	
Court	since	2008	have	been	brought	by	poor	litigants	seeking	to	enforce	their	rights.	In	
the	majority	of	these	cases,	the	poor	litigants	succeeded	in	getting	a	favourable	outcome	
in	the	Constitutional	Court,	but	through	procedural	and	participatory	orders	primarily	for	
the	benefit	of	litigants,	rather	than	the	substantive	interpretation	and	realisation	of	rights	
towards	long-term,	systemic	change.	It	is	this	trend	that	began	with	judicial	deference	in	
Soobramoney	 v	 Minister	 of	 Health	 (KwaZulu-Natal)354	 (“Soobramoney”)	 and	
																																								 																				
351 J Dugard & T Roux “The record of the South African Constitutional Court in providing an institutional voice 
for the poor: 1995-2004” in R Gargarella (ed) Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An 
Institutional Voice for the Poor? (2006) 107. 
352 Dugard & Roux “The South African Constitutional Court” in Courts and Social Transformation 113. 
353 Dugard & Roux “The South African Constitutional Court” in Courts and Social Transformation 113. 
354 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
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reasonableness	 review	 in	 Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa	 v	 Grootboom355	
(“Grootboom”)	and	has	evolved	throughout	the	jurisprudence.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 I	 propose	 a	 conception	 of	 judicial	
review	where	the	courts	play	a	more	robust	role	in	developing	the	substantive	contours	of	
rights	 and	 promoting	 participation	 in	 socio-economic	 rights	 decision-making.	 There	 is	
considerable	potential	 in	 the	 jurisprudence,	 as	well	 as	 a	democratic	 imperative,	 for	 the	
courts	to	further	develop	this	approach,	which	I	explore	in	greater	depth	below.	But	there	
is	 an	 existing	 tension	 in	 the	 courts’	 understanding	 and	 application	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	
separation	 of	 powers	 and	 their	 judicial	 role.356	 A	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 can	
provide	 a	 differentiated	 understanding	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 and	 judicial	 role	
conception.357	
4	4	From	judicial	deference	to	judicial	prowess	
In	its	original	form,	the	doctrine	of	separation	of	powers	was	intended	to	guard	against	an	
over-concentration	 of	 state	 power	 by	 dividing	 government	 up	 into	 three	 spheres	 –	
legislative,	executive	and	judicial.358	Simply	put,	it	thereby	aimed	to	enhance	democracy	
by	 intensifying	 accountability	 and	 efficiency,	 and	 protecting	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 of	
citizens	 against	 state	 tyranny.359	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 its	 boundaries	 are	 flexible	 and	 the	
doctrine	has	advanced	since	the	early	days	into	a	system	of	“checks	and	balances”	which	
																																								 																				
355 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
356 See Young (2010) ICON 418-420 where she suggests different role conceptions for courts’ responses to 
socio-economic rights infringements. These include: a catalytic court, a detached court, an engaged court and 
a supremacist court. She describes the South African Constitutional Court as a “catalytic court”. 
357 See Ray Engaging with Social Rights 8; R Hirschl “From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative 
Constitutional Studies” 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2013); J De Ville “Deference as 
respect and deference as sacrifice: A reading of Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism” (2004) 20 SAJHR 577; T Allan “Common Law Reason and the limits of Judicial Deference” in D 
Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2004); H Corder “Administrative justice: A cornerstone of South 
Africa's democracy” (1998) 14 SAJHR 38; D Dyzenhaus “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and 
Democracy” in M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (1997); C Hoexter “The future of judicial 
review in South African administrative law” (2000) 17 SALJ 484; K O'Regan “Breaking Ground: Some thoughts 
on the seismic shift in our administrative law” (2004) 121 SALJ 424; H Corder “Towards Administrative Justice 
in a Future South Africa” in Empowerment and Accountability (1991); E Mureinik “Reconsidering review: 
Participation and accountability” (1993) Acta Juridica 35. 
358 See I Currie & J De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume 1 - Constitutional Law 
(2001); P Kurland "The rise and fall of the "doctrine" of separation of powers" (1986) 85 Michigan LR 592; J 
Van der Vyver "The separation of powers" (1993) 8 SA Public Law 177.  
359 See Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 383. 
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augments	overall	accountability	by	the	different	branches	of	government,	monitoring	and	
counterbalancing	 their	 respective	 exercise	of	 power.360	 Judicial	 review	of	 legislative	 and	
executive	action	is	probably	the	most	familiar	and	most	striking	instance	of	such	checks	
and	balances.361	
Various	 commentators	 have	 reconceptualised	 the	 discourse	 on	 judicial	 involvement	 in	
the	realisation	of	socio-economic	rights	in	order	to	fashion	an	appropriate	judicial	role	in	
a	“socially	just	constitutional	dispensation”.362	The	debate	reflects	the	underlying	tension	
between	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 and	 judicial	 review	 as	 facilitating	 transformative	
constitutionalism	 under	 certain	 circumstances.	 There	 is	 a	 view	 that	 social	 justice	 is	
hampered	 through	 an	 overly	 deferential	 judicial	 approach	 when	 the	 executive	 and	
administration	 neglects	 the	 needs	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 poor.363	 Typical	 fears	 raised	
regarding	 the	 role	 of	 the	 judiciary	 revolve	 around	 the	 ideological	 legitimacy	 of	 socio-
economic	 rights	 claims,	 and	 the	 institutional	 legitimacy	 and	 competence	 of	 courts	 in	
socio-economic	matters.		
South	African	courts	are	nonetheless	constitutionally	obliged	to	 interpret	 the	substance	
of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 to	 evaluate	 government	 compliance	 with	 the	 duties	 they	
impose,	 to	 pronounce	 on	 the	 validity	 of	 legislation	 and	 policy	 in	 the	 socio-economic	
																																								 																				
360 J Cassels "Judicial activism and public interest litigation in India: Attempting the impossible?" (1989) 37 
American J of Comparative L 495 ; Van der Vyer (1993) 8 SA Public Law 185-85, 190-91; Currie & De Waal 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 92,95; Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 385-89. 
361 See the main judgement in Electronic Media Network Limited v e.tv (Pty) Limited 2017 (9) BCLR 1108 (CC) 
paras 1-5 and the dissenting judgement paras 95-96. See also Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 23 (also quoted in Land Access Movement of South Africa 
v Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces 2016 (10) BCLR 1277 (CC) para 6) regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in a matter where NCOP public participation processes on the 
Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act 15 of 2014 were allegedly unreasonable). 
362 E Mureinik “Beyond a charter of luxuries: Economic rights in the Constitution” (1992) 8 SAJHR 464-74; S 
Liebenberg “Socio-Economic Rights” in M Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2004); 
Davis SAJHR (2006) 301; Young (2010) ICON 385; Brand (2011) Stel Law Rev 614-638; K Young Constituting 
Economic and Social Rights 143 (2012); Ray (2013) CCR 173-232; Young (2013) CCR 233-243; D Landau 
“Aggressive Weak-Form Remedies” V (2014) CCR 244; J Dugard “Beyond Blue Moonlight: The Implications of 
Judicial Avoidance in Relation to the Provision of Alternative Housing” V (2014) CCR 265; Ray Engaging with 
Social Rights 8. 
363 See for example Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the RSA and Others (No 2) 2007 (1) BCLR 
47 (CC). 
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sphere	 and	 to	 remedy	 state	 non-compliance	 with	 socio-economic	 obligations.364	 In	 a	
democratic	developmental	 state,	 the	courts	 can	play	a	more	actively	democratic	 role	 in	
order	 to	 fulfil	 their	 constitutional	 mandate	 and	 enhance	 accountability.	 I	 extrapolate	
below	what	it	means	for	the	courts	to	be	an	“active	democratic	structure”	and	what	form	
of	judicial	review	it	requires	in	terms	of	interpretive	and	remedial	techniques.365	
Mark	Tushnet	examines	two	forms	of	judicial	enforcement	–	weak	and	strong.366	Applying	
that	 to	 social	 welfare	 rights,	 he	 explains	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 “state	 action”	
doctrine	 and	 the	 enforcement	 of	 social	 welfare	 rights.	 He	 describes	 weak	 substantive	
rights	 in	 constitutions	 as	 those	 that	 give	 legislatures	 an	 extremely	 broad	 range	 of	
discretion	about	providing	 those	 rights	and	direct	 that	courts	defer	 substantially	 to	 the	
legislature.	That,	formally,	is	the	position	in	the	US	constitutional	law.	He	argues	that	the	
weak	form	of	enforcement	may	be	particularly	attractive.	He	cites	the	case	of	Grootboom	
as	“a	good	example	of	a	weak	judicially	enforceable	social	welfare	right”.367	He	notes	that	
in	 both	 Grootboom	 and	 the	 subsequent	 case	 Minister	 of	 Health	 v	 Treatment	 Action	
Campaign	 (No	 2)368	 (“TAC”),	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 rejected	 a	 version	 of	 strong	
substantive	 rights.369	 In	 that	 version,	 the	 Constitution	 requires	 the	 provision	 to	 all	 of	
some	minimum	amount	of	health	care	or	shelter.	In	the	TAC	case,	the	Court	asserted	that	
it	was	not	“institutionally	equipped”	to	make	the	multiple	factual	and	political	enquiries	
required	for	determining	what	minimum	core	standards	should	be,	nor	for	deciding	how	
public	finances	should	most	appropriately	be	spent.370	It	continued,	“Courts	are	ill-suited	
to	adjudicate	upon	 issues	where	Court	orders	 could	have	multiple	 social	 and	economic	
																																								 																				
364 Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 383. Section 165(4) of the Constitution provides: “Organs of state, through 
legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, 
dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of courts.” Also quoted in Zulu v eThekwini Municipality 2014 (8) BCLR 
971 (CC) para 70 in the judgement of Van der Westhuizen J. 
365 See discussion on “judicial prowess” in section 6 5. 
366 M Tushnet “Social welfare rights and the forms of judicial review” 82 Texas Law Review (2004) 1895, 
1897. 
367 M Tushnet Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (2009) 242-243. 
368 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
369 David Landau suggests a reconceptualisation of “weak-form” remedies into aggressive weak form remedies 
in Landau (2014) CCR 244. 
370 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 37. 
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consequences	 for	 the	 community”.371	 This	 is	 the	 language	 of	 non-justiciability,	 Tushnet	
argues.	Yet,	the	Court	went	on	in	both	cases	to	enforce	the	relevant	socio-economic	right.	
In	 TAC	 the	 Court	 held	 although	 there	 are	 no	 clear	 lines	 separating	 the	 roles	 of	 the	
legislature,	the	executive	and	the	courts,	there	are	matters	that	are	primarily	the	domain	
of	one	of	the	arms	of	government,	but	this	does	not	mean	that	“courts	cannot	or	should	
not	make	orders	that	have	an	impact	on	policy.”372	
Tushnet	argues	 that	 the	Constitutional	Court’s	orders	 in	Grootboom	 and	TAC	 requiring	
the	government	 to	 include	a	provision	 for	 “people	 in	desperate	need”	 in	 its	plans,	does	
shift	the	government’s	priorities	to	some	extent.	Yet	the	Court’s	order	was	quite	limited	in	
its	effects.	In	particular,	under	the	Court’s	order	the	individual	plaintiffs	need	not	receive	
any	relief	at	all.	The	government’s	program	would	have	been	acceptable	had	it	promised	
to	provide	some	housing	for	people	in	desperate	need	within	a	reasonably	short	period	of	
time.	He	argues	that	treating	the	rights	as	weak	ones	is	consistent	with	the	Constitution’s	
language,	 and	 particularly	 its	 requirement	 of	 reasonableness.	 Constitutional	 provisions	
allowing	 government	 to	 adopt	 reasonable	 programs	 to	 achieve	 social	 welfare	 rights,	 a	
willingness	 to	 find	 some	 programs	 unreasonable,	 and	 a	 remedial	 system	 that	 does	 not	
guarantee	that	any	particular	plaintiff	will	receive	individualised	relief,	are	characteristics	
of	weak	substantive	social	welfare	rights.	This	weak	form	of	rights	adjudication	does	not	
accord	with	the	concept	of	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state	and	the	goals	
of	 transformative	 constitutionalism.	 A	 stronger	 form	 of	 participatory	 and	 substantive	
judicial	review	to	ensure	progress	in	the	reduction	of	poverty	and	inequality	is	required.	
The	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	Mazibuko	 v	 City	 of	 Johannesburg373	 (“Mazibuko”)	 took	 a	
highly	 deferential	 stance	 based	 on	 the	 separation	 of	 powers,	 and	 did	 not	 follow	 the	
potential	opened	up	in	the	TAC	case	for	the	courts	to	intervene	further	in	policy	design	
and	 implementation.374	 The	 approach	 in	Mazibuko	 does	 not	 square	with	 the	 notion	 of	
constitutional	supremacy	and	the	Constitutional	mandate	that	courts	interpret	rights	and	
																																								 																				
371 Para 38. 
372 Para 98. 
373 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). 
374 Para 61. 
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assess	 where	 they	 have	 been	 infringed.375	 Nor	 does	 it	 equate	 with	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 where	 the	 judiciary	 can	 be	 a	 legitimate	 institutional	 platform	 for	
resolving	 the	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 ensuring	
accountability	in	the	provision	of	public	goods	to	the	poor.	The	Courts	can	enhance	their	
role	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	developmental	 state,	 by	 actively	 listening	 to	 all	 the	
role-players,	including	poor	communities,	and	facilitating	engagement	on	the	resolution	
of	socio-economic	rights	cases	that	come	before	the	court.	This	does	not	require	them	to	
replace	 the	 policy	 and	 law	domains	 of	 the	 executive	 and	 the	 legislature	 respectively.	 It	
instead	promotes	the	role	of	the	courts	in	assisting	all	relevant	parties	to	come	to	sensible	
solutions	that	uphold	the	transformative	intent	of	the	Constitution,	through	engagement	
in	the	substance	of	socio-economic	rights	and	the	active	participation	of	those	affected.		
Brian	 Ray	 describes	 the	 South	 African	 Constitutional	 Court’s	 avoidance	 techniques	 as	
signalling	 limited	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 constitutional	 rights,	 ceding	 to	 current	
legislation	and	policy	and	deliberately	marginalising	judicial	authority.376		The	avoidance	
techniques	 include:	 the	 use	 of	 reasonableness	 review;	 new	 procedural	 remedies;	 highly	
abstract	 constitutional	 deliberation	 or	 fact-specific	 deliberation;	 and	 findings	 of	
unconstitutional	 conduct	 only	 in	 “easy”	 cases.	 It	 weakens	 the	 courts	 institutional	 and	
interpretative	 authority	 and	 “severely	 constrains	 its	 capacity	 to	 act	 as	 an	 independent	
partner	in	developing	and	implementing	the	social	rights	provisions”.377	He	recommends	
“thick	 subsidiarity”	which	 favours	 statutory	 interpretation	 that	allows	 for	elaboration	of	
constitutional	 substance	 through	 iterative	 cooperative	development	with	 the	 legislature	
and	 the	 executive.	He	wants	 the	 courts	 to	 give	 an	 “independent,	 normative	 account	 of	
what	the	socio-economic	rights	require.”378	
Katharine	Young	takes	 issue	with	Ray’s	categorisation	of	 the	court	and	 instead	presents	
an	alternative	picture	of	the	Constitutional	Court’s	socio-economic	rights	jurisprudence,	
																																								 																				
375 See the Court’s extensive discussion of the power of the courts to grant appropriate and effective remedies, 
and their interpretation of their role within the “separation of powers” in Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) paras 96-114. 
376 Ray (2013) CCR 173-232.  
377 Ray (2013) CCR 182. 
378 Ray (2013) CCR 192. 
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by	rendering	a	typology	that	embodies	the	Court’s	capacity	“to	catalyse	the	resolution	of	
the	problems	obstructing	the	right	in	question”.379	She	contrasts	this	catalytic	model	with	
other	comparative	 judicial	 role	conceptions	that	she	depicts	as	supremacist,	engaged	or	
detached	 roles.	 The	 types	 of	 judicial	 review	 that	 she	 puts	 forward	 under	 the	 catalytic	
conception,	 which	 resonate	 most	 with	 the	 judicial	 role	 conception	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state,	 is	 that	 of	 the	 “experimentalist”	 and	 “managerial	 review”.380	 These	
forms	of	 judicial	 review	allow	 for	a	participatory,	deliberative	and	 iterative	engagement	
between	the	courts	and	other	stakeholders	such	as	government,	parties,	communities	and	
experts	 in	 order	 to	 craft	 policy	 solutions	within	 a	 substantive	 description	 of	 the	 socio-
economic	 right	 in	 question.	 They	 also	 confront	 systemic	 and	 structural	 features	 of	
poverty	and	inequality	and	require	the	courts	to	ensure	that	there	is	no	recalcitrance	on	
the	part	of	the	government	or	the	parties	by	supervising	mandatory	relief	orders.		
Young	observes	that	the	Constitutional	Court	has	 in	many	instances	“acted	dynamically	
rather	than	statically,	and	actively	rather	than	obstructively.”381	The	remedy	of	meaningful	
engagement	 first	 devised	 in	 Port	 Elizabeth	 Municipality	 v	 Various	 Occupiers382	 (“PE	
Municipality”)	is	an	example	of	“experimentalist	review”.	The	“managerial	review”	has	the	
court	 assuming	 direct	 responsibility	 for	 interpreting	 the	 substantive	 contours	 of	 the	
socio-economic	 right	 in	 question	 and	 supervising	 protection	 of	 the	 right	 via	 strict	
timelines	and	detailed	plans,	 for	example	in	Grootboom383	and	Mazibuko384	 in	the	lower	
courts,	 and	 in	Residents	 of	 Joe	 Slovo	 Community,	Western	 Cape	 v	 Thubelisha	Homes385	
(“Joe	 Slovo”)	 and	 AllPay	 Consolidated	 Investment	 Holdings	 (Pty)	 Ltd	 v	 Chief	 Executive	
Officer	 of	 the	 South	 African	 Social	 Security	 Agency386	 (“AllPay”)	 judgments	 in	 the	
Constitutional	Court.	
																																								 																				
379 Young (2013) CCR 235. See Young (2010) ICON 385 for a full description of the typology. 
380 Young (2013) CCR 233-243. 
381 Young (2013) CCR 238. 
382 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
383 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 
384 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) (2008) 4 All 
SA 471 (W). 
385 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC). 
386 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC). 
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In	the	next	section	I	undertake	an	analysis	of	the	South	African	Constitutional	Court’s	key	
socio-economic	 rights	 adjudication,	 within	 the	 framework	 and	 goals	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state.	 I	 examine	 the	 first	 and	 second	 wave	 of	 cases	 for	 the	 following	
results:	 direct,	 substantive	 relief	 to	 poor	 litigants;	 lasting	 systemic	 developmental	
outcomes;	and	opportunities	for	participation	of	the	poor	in	the	decisions	affecting	them.	
The	 transformative	 role	 of	 the	 courts	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 necessitates	
recognition	 that	 the	 empowerment	 of	 the	 poor	 includes	 actual	 material	 and	 psycho-
socio-political	elements,	as	 illustrated	by	 the	multi-dimensional	human	rights	approach	
to	 poverty.	 The	 judiciary	 can	 “democratise”	 itself	 by	 facilitating	 the	 substantive	
interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	and	ensuring	direct	relief	to	the	poor,	through	the	
participation	of	poor	litigants,	legal	and	technical	experts,	in	the	tradition	of	deliberative	
and	 participatory	 democracy,	 and	 democratic	 experimentalism.	 In	 this	 way	 the	
adjudication	of	socio-economic	rights	can	truly	achieve	the	over-arching	goals	to	reduce	
poverty	and	inequality,	of	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
4	5	The	essence	of	substance	
This	 section	 examines	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 model	 of	 review	 in	 socio-economic	 rights	
cases,	 and	 distinguishes	 between	 cases	 that	 involve	 negative	 duties	 on	 the	 State,	 and	
those	that	involve	positive	duties.	The	jurisprudence	of	the	South	African	Constitutional	
Court	 applies	 different	 models	 of	 review	 to	 negative	 and	 positive	 duties,	 based	 on	
differing	obligations,	as	discussed	above	under	international	law	on	social	and	economic	
rights.	 The	 application	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 these	 models	 will	 be	 explored	 in	 this	 section.	
Then,	 building	 upon	 these	models,	 I	 will	 discuss	 the	 limitations	 and	 potential	 for	 the	
Court	 to	 be	 an	 “active	 democratic	 structure”	 that	 substantively	 and	 collaboratively	
interprets	 the	 content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 to	 further	 transformative	
constitutionalism	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
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4	5	1	Nature	of	obligations	under	socio-economic	rights	
The	 Constitution	 places	 an	 overarching	 obligation	 on	 the	 state	 to	 “respect,	 protect,	
promote	and	fulfil	the	rights	in	the	Bill	of	Rights”.387	Similar	to	international	law	on	social	
and	economic	rights,	this	clearly	establishes	that	all	the	rights	in	the	Bill	of	Rights	impose	
a	combination	of	negative	and	positive	duties	on	the	state.	In	relation	to	socio-economic	
rights	provisions	in	the	Constitution,	the	jurisprudence	has	been	formulated	around	these	
positive	and	negative	duties.388		
The	Court	established	the	foundations	of	its	jurisprudence	on	the	positive	duties	imposed	
upon	 the	 State	 by	 the	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 sections	 26	 and	 27,	 in	 the	 earlier	well-
known	 cases	 Soobramoney,389	 Grootboom,390	 TAC391	 and	 Khosa	 v	 Minister	 of	 Social	
Development392	 (“Khosa”),	through	its	construction	of	the	“reasonableness	test”.393	These	
duties	are	subject	to	the	qualifications	of	“reasonable	measures”,	“progressive	realisation”,	
and	the	availability	of	resources	in	section	26(2)	and	27(2).	The	Court	has	not	clearly	laid	
out	 its	 understanding	 of	 what	 positive	 duties	 these	 socio-economic	 rights	 impose,	
however,	 it	has	 said	 that	 it	does	not	 entail	 the	delineation	by	 the	courts	of	a	minimum	
core	content	of	rights	that	must	be	provided	by	the	state.394	Furthermore,	as	Liebenberg	
observes,	 the	 cases	 have	 generally	 elaborated	 two	 kinds	 of	 situations	 where	 the	
“reasonableness	test”	applies.	Firstly,	there	are	cases	where	the	State	has	failed	to	develop	
or	 implement	a	programme	 to	give	effect	 to	 socio-economic	 rights.	 Secondly,	 there	are	
cases	 where	 there	 is	 an	 allegation	 of	 unreasonable	 exclusion	 from	 legislation	 or	
programmes	meant	to	give	effect	to	socio-economic	rights.395		
																																								 																				
387 Section 7(2). 
388 See discussion of negative and positive obligations in relation to public and private actors in Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC) paras 37-58.  
389 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
390 Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
391 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
392 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
393 See section 4 5 3 and 4 5 4 below. 
394 See section 4 5 6 below. 
395 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 133. 
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The	Constitutional	Court	has	also	asserted	that	sections	26(1)	and	27(1)	entail	a	negative	
duty	 on	 the	 state	 to	 “desist	 from	 preventing	 or	 impairing”	 access	 to	 the	 rights.396	 The	
Court	 in	 Jaftha	 v	 Schoeman397	 (“Jaftha”)	 held	 that	 the	deprivation	of	 a	person’s	 existing	
access	to	housing	amounted	to	a	negative	violation	of	the	right	to	housing.	Furthermore,	
it	 held	 that	 this	 negative	 violation	was	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 qualifications	 of	 “reasonable	
measures”,	 “progressive	 realisation”,	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 resources	 in	 section	 26(2).	
Once	 the	 violation	 has	 been	 shown,	 the	 burden	 then	 shifts	 to	 the	 State	 to	 justify	 the	
deprivation	under	the	general	limitations	clause	(section	36).398	
The	Court	 has	 been	 bolder	when	 called	 on	 to	 protect	 an	 unqualified	 right	 such	 as	 the	
section	26(3)	right	not	to	be	arbitrarily	evicted	from	one’s	home,	as	it	did	in	Port	Elizabeth	
Municipality,399	Joe	Slovo400	and	Occupiers	of	51	Olivia	Road,	Berea	Township	and	197	Main	
Street,	Johannesburg	v	City	of	Johannesburg401	(“Olivia	Road”).	In	addition	to	clarifying	the	
state’s	 negative	 obligation	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 right,	 the	 Court	 has	 also	 read	 particular	
positive	 obligations	 into	 section	 26(3).	 It	 places	 an	 obligation	 on	 the	 state	 in	 eviction	
cases	to	provide	alternative	accommodation	or	land	when	evictions	are	being	undertaken.	
In	 Joe	Slovo,	 the	Court	held	that	 in	determining	 in	each	case	whether	an	eviction	order	
was	just	and	equitable	(and	consequently	reasonable),	the	court	would	have	to	take	into	
account	 “the	 reasonableness	 of	 offers	 made	 in	 connection	 with	 suitable	 alternative	
accommodation”,402	with	 particular	 reference	 to	 vulnerable	 occupiers	 (for	 example,	 the	
elderly,	 children,	 disabled	 persons	 and	 female-headed	 households),	 and	 suitability	 of	
																																								 																				
396 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 34; Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 46.  
397 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC). The case concerned the constitutionality 
of provisions permitting the sale in execution of people’s homes in order to satisfy debts. 
398 Paras 31-34. 
399 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
400 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC). 
401 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). See the numerous recent cases: South African Informal Traders Forum v City of 
Johannesburg; South African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg 2014 (6) BCLR 726 
(CC); Zulu v eThekwini Municipality 2014 (8) BCLR 971 (CC); MC Denneboom Service Station CC v Phayane 
2014 (12) BCLR 1421 (CC); Pitje v Shibambo 2016 (4) BCLR 460 (CC); Molusi v Voges N.O. 2016 (7) BCLR 
839 (CC); Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet (CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017). 
402 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 30-1. 
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alternative	 accommodation	 in	 terms	 of	 proximity	 to	 employment,	 schools,	 clinics,	
transport	and	other	social	amenities.403	
In	 the	 most	 recent	 case	 addressing	 the	 right	 to	 property	 (section	 25(6)),	 Daniels	 v	
Scribante404	(“Daniels”),	the	court	distinguished	between	positive	and	negative	obligations	
in	relation	to	private	land-owners,	building	on	the	judgements	in	Governing	Body	of	the	
Juma	Musjid	 Primary	 School	 and	Another	 v	Ahmed	Asruff	 Essay405	 (“Juma	Musjid”),	 and	
City	of	Johannesburg	Metropolitan	Municipality	v	Blue	Moonlight	Properties	39	(Pty)	Ltd406	
(“Blue	Moonlight”).	 The	 court,	 in	 five	 separate	 but	 concurring	 judgements,	 held	 that	 a	
private	 landowner	 has	 both	 negative	 and	 positive	 obligations	 with	 respect	 to	 socio-
economic	rights	for	poor	and	vulnerable	people.	
In	 the	 education	 cases	Head	 of	 Department:	 Mpumalanga	 Department	 of	 Education	 v	
Hoërskool	 Ermelo407	 (“Hoërskool	 Ermelo”),	 KwaZulu-Natal	 Joint	 Liaison	 Committee	 v	
Member	of	the	Executive	Council,	Department	of	Education,	KwaZulu-Natal408	(“KZN	Joint	
Liaison	Committee”),	Head	of	Department,	Department	of	Education,	Free	State	Province	v	
Welkom	High	School409	(“Welkom	High	School”),	MEC	for	Education	in	Gauteng	Province	v	
Governing	Body	of	Rivonia	Primary	School410	(“Rivonia	Primary	School”)	and	Federation	of	
Governing	 Bodies	 for	 South	 African	 Schools	 v	 Member	 of	 the	 Executive	 Council	 for	
Education,	 Gauteng411	 (“FEDSAS”),	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 provided	 a	 substantive	
interpretation	of	the	unqualified	right	to	education	in	section	29	and	required	the	state	to	
respect,	protect,	promote	and	fulfil	such	rights.412	It	has	underlined	the	historic	injustices	
																																								 																				
403 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) 165, 322. 
404 (CCT50/16) [2017] ZACC 13 (11 May 2017) paras 37-58. 
405 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) paras 57-8. 
406 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) para 36. 
407 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC). 
408 2013 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
409 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC). 
410 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC). 
411 2016 (8) BCLR 1050 (CC). 
412 See in particular Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) 
BCLR 177 (CC) paras 1, 2, 42, 43; MEC for Education in Gauteng Province v Governing Body of Rivonia 
Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC) paras 1-3; Federation of Governing Bodies for South African 
Schools v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Gauteng 2016 (8) BCLR 1050 (CC) paras 1-3. 
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of	apartheid	education,	the	transformational	role	of	access	to	quality	education,	and	the	
democratic	nature	of	the	current	public	schooling	system	in	South	Africa.  
4	 5	 2	Models	 of	 review	 applied	 to	 negative	 and	 positive	 obligations	 in	 socio-economic	
rights	jurisprudence	
In	 cases	 where	 State	 action	 is	 held	 to	 deprive	 people	 of	 pre-existing	 access	 to	 socio-
economic	 rights,	 the	 Court	 has	 identified	 this	 as	 being	 a	 prima	 facie	 breach	 of	 the	
negative	 duty	 “to	 respect”	 the	 relevant	 rights	 located	 in	 subsections	 26(1),	 27(1)	 and	
section	29.413	In	Juma	Musjid,	Nkabinda	J	described	this	duty	thus:		
“Breach	 of	 this	 obligation	 occurs	 directly	when	 there	 is	 a	 failure	 to	 respect	 the	 right	 or	
indirectly,	 when	 there	 is	 a	 failure	 to	 prevent	 the	 direct	 infringement	 of	 the	 right	 by	
another	or	a	failure	to	respect	the	existing	protection	of	the	right	by	taking	measures	that	
diminish	that	protection.”414			
The	State’s	justifications	for	the	breach	are	then	evaluated	against	the	strict	“purpose	and	
proportionality	requirements”	under	the	general	limitations	clause	(section	36),415	 in	the	
manner	of	the	traditional	two-stage	approach	to	constitutional	review	of	other	rights	 in	
the	Bill	of	Rights.	The	negative	duties	under	socio-economic	rights	have	also	been	held	to	
be	horizontally	applicable	to	other	action	besides	State	action.416	
A	 different	 model	 of	 review	 has	 emerged	 from	 cases	 dealing	 with	 the	 positive	 duties	
imposed	 by	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 sections	 26	 and	 27	 through	 the	 earlier	 cases	 of	
Soobramoney,	Grootboom,	TAC	 and	Khosa,	 and	 then	haphazardly	 applied	 in	Mazibuko.	
																																								 																				
413 G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 (3) Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663. 
414 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 
761 (CC) para 58. See also Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 653. 
415 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 653. 
416 Based on section 8(2) and (3). See for example: Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 34; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 
1033 (CC) para 46; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) paras 33-34; Governing 
Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) para 
58; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) BCLR 
150 (CC); Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355JR v Golden Thread Limited 2012 (4) BCLR 
372 (CC); MC Denneboom Service Station CC v Phayane 2014 (12) BCLR 1421 (CC); Pitje v Shibambo 2016 
(4) BCLR 460 (CC); Molusi v Voges N.O. 2016 (7) BCLR 839 (CC); Daniels v Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC) 
paras 37-58. 
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The	Court	has	held	that	the	positive	duties	to	achieve	the	realisation	of	socio-economic	
rights	 for	 those	 who	 lack	 access	 to	 socio-economic	 rights,	 or	 whose	 current	 access	 is	
inadequate,	 “is	 both	 defined	 and	 limited	 by	 the	 criteria	 of	 reasonableness,	 progressive	
realisation	and	the	State’s	available	resources”.417	
Finally,	 the	 Court	 has	 also	 applied	 the	 reasonableness	 model	 of	 review	 in	 relation	 to	
unqualified	 socio-economic	 rights,	 such	 as	 children’s	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 section	
28(1)(c).	 For	 example	 in	Grootboom,	 the	Court	 rejected	 the	 claim	based	on	 the	 right	of	
children	 to	 shelter	 in	 section	28(1)(c)	of	 the	Constitution	on	 the	basis	 that	 the	primary	
obligation	to	provide	shelter	for	the	children	lay	on	the	parents	and	families,	and	only	if	
they	 could	 not	 provide	 such,	 the	 obligation	 fell	 on	 the	 State.418	 In	 TAC,	 the	 Court	
concluded	 that	 the	 impact	on	children’s	health	 rights	under	 section	28(1)(c)	was	only	a	
factor	in	the	overall	assessment	as	to	whether	the	government’s	PMTCT	programme	was	
unreasonable	in	terms	of	section	27(2).419		
The	case	of	Juma	Musjid,	dealing	with	the	right	to	education	in	section	29(1)(a),	was	the	
first	 time	that	 the	Court	read	an	unqualified	socio-economic	right,	without	 inclusion	of	
the	reasonableness	test.	 In	this	case,	the	Court	held	that	the	right	to	basic	education	in	
section	29(1)(a)	is	“immediately	realisable”,	subject	only	to	the	limitations	clause	(section	
36).420	Right	to	education	cases	since	then,	namely	Hoërskool	Ermelo,	KZN	Joint	Liaison	
Committee,	 Welkom,	 Rivonia	 and	 FEDSAS	 have	 reiterated	 the	 unqualified	 right	 to	
education.	 However,	 the	 South	 African	 government’s	 qualification	 of	 the	 right	 to	
education	as	being	subject	to	“progressive	realisation”,	upon	ratification	of	the	ICESCR,	is	
cause	for	concern.421	
	
																																								 																				
417 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 11. Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) paras 30-39. 
418 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 15, 70, 75-78. 
419 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) paras 74-79. 
420 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 
761 (CC) para 37.  
421 ESCR-Net <https://www.escr-net.org/news/2015/government-south-africa-ratifies-icescr> (accessed 01-
05-2017). 
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4	5	3	Evolution	of	reasonableness	review	
In	Soobramoney,	the	first	socio-economic	rights	case	that	came	before	the	Constitutional	
Court,	 the	 Court	 assessed	 whether	 the	 justifications	 of	 the	 State	 for	 rejecting	 kidney	
dialysis	 treatment	 for	 the	applicant	at	 a	 state	 institution,	were	 fair	 and	 reasonable.	The	
Court	applied	a	cost-benefit	analysis	in	evaluating	the	criteria	for	access	to	kidney	dialysis	
treatment.422	It	held	that	due	to	the	high	cost	of	the	kidney	dialysis	programme,	providing	
such	 treatment	 to	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 patients	 in	 need,	 would	 jeopardise	 other	 health	
priorities	of	the	State,	in	particular	primary	health	care.423	The	Court	did	not	focus	on	the	
normative	goals	and	purposes	of	the	right	of	access	to	health	services	in	sections	27(1)(a)	
and	(2),	but	 instead	paid	greater	attention	 to	 the	State’s	 justifications	 for	not	providing	
access	 to	 the	 right	 to	 emergency	medical	 treatment	 in	 section	 27(3).424	 They	 failed	 to	
ascertain	 the	nature	of	 the	decision	or	of	 the	 right	 affected.	On	 the	other	hand,	 in	 the	
delictual	case	of	Oppelt	v	Head:	Health,	Department	of	Health	Provincial	Administration:	
Western	 Cape425	 (“Oppelt”),	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 determined	 that	 the	 conduct	 of	
health	care	workers	at	a	provincial	hospital	was	negligent	and	violated	the	constitutional	
right	to	emergency	medical	treatment.	The	court	went	into	some	detail	on	what	the	right	
itself	means.426	
In	 the	 Grootboom	 case,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 elaborated	 upon	 the	 content	 of	 the	
qualifications	on	socio-economic	rights	set	out	in	sections	26(2)	and	27(2).	It	developed	a	
model	of	 “reasonableness	review”	 for	adjudicating	positive	claims	under	 these	rights.	 In	
particular,	 it	 focused	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 incumbent	 on	 the	 State	 to	 institute	 a	
“reasonable	 programme”	 in	 order	 to	 “progressively	 realise”	 the	 socio-economic	 rights	
enumerated	in	sections	26	and	27	of	the	Constitution.	The	central	question	for	the	Court	
																																								 																				
422 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 654. 
423 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) para 28. 
424 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 654.  
425 2015 (12) BCLR 1471 (CC) paras 54-56.  
426 Paras 55-57. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 129	
 
is	whether	the	means	chosen	are	reasonably	capable	of	facilitating	the	realisation	of	the	
socio-economic	rights	in	question.427	This	is	referred	to	as	a	means-ends	enquiry.428		
Quinot	and	Liebenberg	suggest	that	the	Grootboom	 judgment	applies	a	“proportionality	
approach”	 in	 that	 the	 government	was	 granted	 a	 “margin	 of	 discretion”	 relating	 to	 the	
policy	choices	for	their	public	housing	programme,	but	the	Court	could	inquire	whether	
such	measures	 constituted	 a	 reasonable	 solution	 to	 the	 socio-economic	 deprivation	 at	
issue.429	Reasonableness	must	also	be	assessed	in	light	of	the	broader	normative	goals	that	
the	 socio-economic	 rights	 sought	 to	 achieve,	 such	 as	 human	 dignity,	 freedom	 and	
equality.430	The	Court	did	spend	some	time	developing	a	substantive	interpretation	of	the	
right	to	housing.	It	discussed	the	content	of	housing	as	a	human	right,	as	well	as	how	it	
contributes	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 foundational	 constitutional	 values	 such	 as	 human	
dignity,	 and	 other	 rights	 in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights.	 Yacoob	 J	 described	 housing	 as	 entailing	
more	than	a	physical	structure	of	“bricks	and	mortar”,431	and	refers	in	this	context	to	land	
and	various	services	 such	as	water,	 sewage	and	refuse	 removal.432	Human	dignity	 is	 the	
underlying	 value	 upon	 which	 the	 Court	 based	 its	 key	 finding	 in	 Grootboom,	 that	
reasonableness	requires	as	a	minimum,	short-term	relief	for	those	whose	needs	are	urgent	
and	 “who	 are	 living	 in	 intolerable	 conditions	 or	 crisis	 situations”.433	 A	 statistical	
improvement	was	thus	not	 found	to	necessarily	pass	the	reasonableness	test,	 if	 it	 is	not	
appropriately	 responsive	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 those	 in	 desperate	need.434	 The	Court	
also	referred	to	international	law	in	its	judgment,	in	particular	the	International	Covenant	
on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	 and	 its	 General	 Comment	 No.3.435	 It	 did	 not	
																																								 																				
427 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 46. 
428 Para 78. See also Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” Rights and Democracy 40. 
429 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 655. 
430 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 23, 44. 
431 Para 81. 
432 Para 35. 
433 Paras 63-64, 99. See also the more recent judgement in Daniels v Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC) on 
the importance of security of tenure to human dignity. 
434 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 44. 
435 Para 45. 
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endorse	 the	 Committee’s	minimum	 core	 approach,	 but	 did	 assimilate	 the	 Committee’s	
interpretation	of	the	concept	of	“progressive	realisation”.436	
In	Grootboom	the	Court	laid	down	criteria	against	which	to	measure	the	reasonableness	
of	 a	 government	 programme	 to	 realise	 socio-economic	 rights.437	 	 	 The	 content	 of	 the	
programme	 must	 be	 coordinated,	 comprehensive	 and	 “capable	 of	 facilitating	 the	
realisation	of	the	right”;438	it	must	be	balanced	and	flexible439	and	pay	attention	to	short,	
medium	 and	 long-term	 needs.440	 Appropriate	 financial	 and	 human	 resources	 must	 be	
made	available	for	the	programme.441	It	must	also	be	inclusive	and	ensure	that	it	does	not	
“exclude	those	 in	desperate	need	and	 living	 in	 intolerable	conditions”.442	The	court	also	
asserted	 that	 the	policies	and	programmes	must	be	reasonable	both	 in	 their	conception	
and	 their	 implementation443	 and	 must	 be	 transparent	 and	 its	 contents	 must	 be	 made	
known	to	the	public.444	
In	 the	Khosa	 case,	 involving	 the	 rights	of	non-citizens	 to	 access	 socio-economic	 rights,	
the	 Court	 found	 that	 a	 number	 of	 rights	 were	 at	 stake	 and	 emphasised	 the	
interconnectedness	 of	 the	 rights	 in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 as	 a	 factor	 in	 ascertaining	 the	
reasonableness	of	a	measure.445	Apart	from	the	socio-economic	right	to	social	assistance,	
the	case	also	affected	the	right	to	life,	dignity,	and	equality.	The	Court	expanded	upon	the	
reasonableness	test	previously	used.	The	court	stated	that:	
“[W]hen	 the	 rights	 to	 life,	 dignity	 and	 equality	 are	 implicated	 in	 dealing	 with	 socio-
economic	rights,	they	have	to	be	taken	into	account	along	with	the	availability	of	human	
and	 financial	 resources	 in	 determining	 whether	 the	 state	 has	 complied	 with	 the	
																																								 																				
436 Paras 26-33, 45. 
437 Paras 39-44. 
438 Paras 39-41. 
439 Para 43. 
440 Para 43. 
441 Para 39. 
442 Paras 43-44. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed these principles in Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 68. 
443 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 40-43. 
444 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 123. 
445 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 
(CC) paras 40-44. 
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constitutional	 standard	 of	 reasonableness.	 This	 is,	 however,	 not	 a	 closed	 list	 and	 all	
relevant	factors	have	to	be	taken	into	account	in	this	exercise.	What	is	relevant	may	vary	
from	case	to	case	depending	on	the	particular	facts	and	circumstances.”446	
An	 ever-increasing	 list	 of	 factors	 has	 evolved	 through	Grootboom,	TAC,	Khosa	 and	 the	
eviction	 cases	 –	Olivia	 Road,	 Joe	 Slovo	 –	 that	 must	 be	 considered	 as	 indicators	 of	 the	
reasonableness	 of	 the	 measures	 adopted	 by	 the	 State.	 These	 now	 include:	 reasonable	
conceptualisation	 and	 implementation	 of	 programmes;447	 non-discrimination	 against	
groups	in	their	access	to	specific	programmes;448	the	impact	of	the	deprivation	on	other	
rights	 such	 as	 life,	 dignity	 and	 equality;449	 and	 “meaningful	 engagement”	with	 affected	
groups.450		
The	critical	elements	of	this	test	-	in	the	context	of	poverty	-	is	that	the	State	is	obliged	to	
ensure	 that	 a	 programme	 aimed	 at	 realising	 socio-economic	 rights	 must	 consider	 the	
needs	of	the	most	vulnerable,	as	well	as	the	majority	of	those	in	need.	If	the	development	
of	the	programme	does	not	articulate	a	component	for	addressing	the	needs	of	the	most	
vulnerable,	 it	will	not	pass	muster.	 If	 it	does	 so	on	paper	but	 it	does	not	 translate	 into	
implementation	on	the	ground,	it	will	also	fail	the	reasonableness	test.	The	transparency	
requirement	 could	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 process	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 policy	 or	
programme,	as	well	as	the	informational	aspect	thereafter.451	This	would	ensure	that	the	
constitutional	values	of	human	dignity,	non-discrimination,	accountability,	transparency	
and	 participatory	 democracy	 are	 promoted.452	 These	 values	 are	 core	 to	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.		
																																								 																				
446 Para 44. 
447 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 40-43. 
448 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 
(CC). 
449 Para 44. 
450 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Governing 
Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). See 
full discussion of “meaningful engagement” as a remedy in 4 6 2 below. 
451 See chapter two on participatory processes required for policy development in the Constitution. 
452 See Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review; and D Brand Courts, Socio-economic Rights 
and Transformative politics LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2009). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 132	
 
4	5	4	Shortcomings	of	reasonableness	review	since	Mazibuko	
Mazibuko	 dealt	 with	 the	 right	 to	 sufficient	 water	 under	 section	 27(1)(b)	 of	 the	
Constitution.	The	applicants	in	the	case	were	five	poor	residents	of	Phiri	in	Soweto,	one	
of	the	poorest	urban	township	areas	of	Johannesburg.	The	respondents	were	the	City	of	
Johannesburg,	 Johannesburg	 Water	 (a	 company	 wholly	 owned	 by	 the	 City),	 and	 the	
national	Minister	 for	Water	 Affairs	 and	 Forestry.		 Appearing	 as	amicus	 curiae	 was	 the	
international	NGO,	Centre	on	Housing	Rights	 and	Evictions	 (‘COHRE’).	The	 case	 arose	
initially	 out	 of	 the	 organising	 efforts	 of	 the	 Anti-Privatisation	 Forum	 (APF),	 a	 South	
African	 social	 movement,	 and	 supported	 in	 its	 advocacy	 and	 litigation	 efforts	 by	 the	
Centre	for	Applied	Legal	Studies	(“CALS”)	at	the	University	of	Witwatersrand,	along	with	
other	human	rights	organisations.			
In	 this	 case,	 the	 Courts	 considered	 the	 lawfulness	 of	 Operation	 Gcin’amanzi,	 a	 pilot	
project	of	the	City	of	Johannesburg	in	Phiri	in	early	2004	to	attend	to	the	high	volume	of	
water	 loss	 and	 non-payment	 of	 water	 services	 in	 Soweto.	 The	 project	 entailed	 laying	
water	pipes	to	increase	water	supply	and	minimise	water	loss,	as	well	as	the	installation	of	
pre-paid	meters.	The	meters	would	charge	consumers	for	use	of	water	in	excess	of	the	6	
kilolitre	per	household	monthly	free	basic	water	allowance	and	disconnect	them	for	non-
payment.	 	The	applicants	challenged	the	City	of	Johannesburg’s	Free	Basic	Water	policy	
(‘FBW’)	 in	 terms	 of	 which	 6	 kilolitres	 of	 water	 are	 provided	 monthly	 for	 free	 to	 all	
households	 in	 Johannesburg	 and	 the	 lawfulness	 of	 the	 installation	 of	 pre-paid	 water	
meters	 in	 Phiri.	 The	 City’s	 FBW	 policy	 was	 based	 on	 the	 national	 government’s	
regulations	which	stipulate	that	a	basic	water	supply	constitutes	25	litres	per	person	daily,	
or	6	kilolitres	per	household	with	average	of	3,2	persons	monthly.	
The	 South	Gauteng	High	Court	 found	 that	 the	 installation	of	 pre-paid	water	meters	 in	
Phiri	was	unlawful	and	unfair.453	It	also	held	that	the	City’s	FBW	policy	was	unreasonable	
																																								 																				
453 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg and Others (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions as amicus curiae) 
[2008] 4 All SA 471 (W).  
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and	 therefore	 unlawful.	 	 It	 ordered	 that	 the	 City	 should	 provide	 50	 litres	 of	 free	 basic	
water	daily	to	the	applicants	and	“similarly	placed”	residents	of	Phiri.		
On	 appeal,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 (“SCA”)	 held	 that	 42	 litres	 of	 water	 per	 day	
amounted	to	“sufficient	water”	within	the	meaning	of	section	27(1)(b)	of	the	Constitution,	
and	 ordered	 the	 City	 to	 adjust	 its	 policy	 accordingly.454	 	 The	 SCA	 also	 held	 that	 the	
installation	of	the	pre-paid	water	meters	was	unlawful	due	to	the	fact	that	the	City’s	By-
laws	did	not	make	provision	 for	 them	 in	 these	 circumstances.	The	Court	 gave	 the	City	
two	years	to	amend	the	By-laws.		The	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal	did	not	consider	whether	
the	manner	in	which	the	meters	were	installed	was	fair.		
The	case	then	went	on	appeal	to	the	Constitutional	Court.	All	the	parties	before	the	Court	
agreed	 that	 the	 old	 system	 of	 water	 supply	 to	 Soweto	 was	 problematic	 and	
unsustainable.455		The	applicants	however	asserted	that	the	City’s	FBW	policy	and	the	way	
in	which	 it	was	 implemented	was	unlawful,	unreasonable,	unfair	and	 in	breach	of	 their	
constitutional	right	to	sufficient	water.	The	City	presented	that	there	had	been	extensive	
consultation	with	communities	about	the	content	of	the	project	and	the	implementation	
of	Operation	Gcina’manzi.456	 The	 City	 alleged	 that	 by	 the	 time	 the	 applicants	 brought	
their	 challenge	 in	 the	High	Court	 eighteen	months	 later,	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 residents	
had	accepted	pre-paid	water	meters	and	according	to	a	survey	the	City	undertook,	they	
were	satisfied	with	the	new	system.	In	addition,	the	wastage	of	water	had	been	effectively	
minimised.	 The	 City	 also	 argued	 further	 that	 its	 FBW	policy	 had	 been	 under	 constant	
review	since	it	was	adopted	in	order	to	ensure	that	it	was	meeting	its	obligation	to	take	
measures	to	progressively	realise	the	right	of	access	to	sufficient	water.457	
The	 Constitutional	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 obligation	 placed	 on	 government	 by	 section	
27(1)(b)	 is	 an	 obligation	 to	 take	 reasonable	 legislative	 and	 other	measures	 to	 seek	 the	
progressive	realisation	of	the	right.	In	relation	to	the	FBW	policy,	therefore,	the	question	
																																								 																				
454 City of Johannesburg v Mazibuko 2009 (8) BCLR 791 (SCA). 
455 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 166. 
456 Para 167. 
457 Para 168. 
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they	had	to	consider	was	whether	it	was	a	reasonable	policy.	Unlike	the	High	Court	and	
the	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal,	the	Constitutional	Court	did	not	find	it	appropriate	to	give	
a	quantified	content	to	what	constitutes	“sufficient	water”	as	they	stated	that	is	a	matter	
of	policy	that	should	be	left	to	the	executive	to	decide	upon.458	The	Court	concluded	that	
the	FBW	policy	 cannot	be	 said	 to	be	unreasonable	 since	80%	of	 the	households	 in	 the	
City	 receive	 adequate	 water	 under	 the	 policy.459	 The	 Court	 also	 noted	 that	 100	 000	
households	within	Johannesburg	still	lack	access	to	the	most	basic	water	supply,	that	is	a	
tap	within	200m	of	their	household.460	
In	 its	 judgement,	 the	 Court	 gave	 a	 very	 narrow	 construction	 of	 the	 standard	 of	
reasonableness	 review	 for	 assessing	 positive	 duties.461	 The	 Court	 took	 an	 extreme	
deferential	 stance,	 justified	 by	 its	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 “proper	 role”	 of	 the	 courts	 in	
relation	 to	 other	 branches	 of	 government.	 O’Regan	 J	 stated	 that	 it	 is	 “institutionally	
inappropriate”	 for	 courts	 to	precisely	delineate	what	 it	will	 take	 to	 achieve	 a	 particular	
socio-economic	 right.	 She	 asserted	 that	 this	 is	 a	 clear	 mandate	 of	 the	 executive	 and	
legislative	arms	of	government,	which	are	 institutionally	bound,	democratically	selected	
and	well	positioned	to	examine	such	social	needs,	conditions	and	resources	required.462	
The	Court	went	on	to	hold	that	the	Court’s	role	in	enforcing	positive	duties	under	socio-
economic	rights	is	two-fold.	First,	in	the	absence	of	the	government	taking	steps	to	realise	
socio-economic	rights,	“the	courts	will	require	the	government	to	take	steps”.463	Second,	
the	 courts	 will	 intervene	 if	 the	 steps	 taken	 by	 the	 government	 “fail	 to	 meet	 the	
constitutional	standard	of	reasonableness”.464	The	Court	identified	three	situations	where	
unreasonableness	would	be	evident:	a.)	where	no	provision	is	made	for	those	desperately	
																																								 																				
458 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 62-68. See substantive content of the right 
to water not considered by the Court, in Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-ninth 
session Geneva, 11-29 November 2002 General Comment No. 15 (2002) The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) E/C.12/2002/11.  
459 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 89. 
460 Para 14. 
461 See Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 657; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 468-
472. 
462 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 61. 
463 Para 67. 
464 Para 67. 
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in	need;465	b.)	socio-economic	policies	contain	unreasonable	exclusions	or	restrictions;466	
and	 c.)	 a	 failure	 by	 government	 “continually	 to	 review	 its	 policies	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
achievement	of	the	right	is	progressively	realised”.467	
In	applying	these	criteria,	the	Court	found	that	the	provision	of	25	 litres	per	person	per	
day,	as	prescribed	by	national	legislation	and	regulations,	was	not	unreasonable.	Despite	
the	 Court’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 facts	 surrounding	 the	 provision	 of	 basic	 water	 to	 the	 Phiri	
community,	it	was	swayed	by	the	justifications	of	the	State	and	chose	not	to	engage	with	
the	arguments	regarding	the	sufficiency	of	the	allocation	of	25	litres	per	person	per	day.	
The	Court	had	substantial	evidence	before	 it,	 from	the	State,	 the	community	and	other	
relevant	 experts	 to	 make	 such	 a	 determination,	 but	 it	 refrained	 from	 doing	 so.	 It	
acknowledged	 the	 normative	 content	 of	 the	 right	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 judgement:	
“Water	is	life”	and	“Human	beings	need	water	to	drink,	to	cook,	to	wash	and	to	grow	our	
food.	Without	it,	we	will	die.”468	However	no	further	analysis	of	the	nature	of	the	right	or	
the	impact	of	the	basic	water	allowance	on	households	in	the	Phiri	community,	such	as	
Ms	Mazibuko,	was	done.	
On	 the	 issue	of	pre-paid	water	meters,	 the	Court	held	 that	national	 legislation	and	 the	
City’s	 own	 by-laws	 authorised	 the	 latter	 to	 introduce	 pre-paid	 water	meters	 as	 part	 of	
Operation	 Gcin’amanzi.	 The	 Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 installation	 of	 the	 meters	 was	
neither	 unfair	 nor	 discriminatory.469	 The	 Court	 commended	 the	 City	 for	 constantly	
reviewing	and	revising	its	policies	in	order	to	promote	the	progressive	achievement	of	the	
right	of	access	to	sufficient	water	and	thus	found	them	to	be	reasonable	on	that	basis.	The	
Court	thus	upheld	the	appeal	by	the	City	and	Johannesburg	Water	and	the	Minister	and	
set	aside	the	orders	of	the	High	Court	and	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal.470			
	
																																								 																				
465 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
466 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 67. 
467 Para 67. See Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 658. 
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469 Para 154-157. 
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4	5	5	Critique	of	reasonableness	review:	The	absence	of	substance	
One	of	 the	key	critiques	of	 the	Court’s	 reasonableness	 review	model	 for	positive	duties	
imposed	by	socio-economic	rights,	is	the	Court’s	lack	of	engagement	with	the	substantive	
content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights.471	 The	 Court’s	 main	 inquiry	 is	 instead	 focused	 on	
whether	a	government	programme	meets	the	various	criteria	for	reasonableness	as	set	out	
above.		
Cass	 Sunstein	 and	 others	 have	 described	 this	 model	 of	 review	 as	 derivative	 of	
administrative	 law.472	 Danie	 Brand	 depicts	 the	 Constitutional	 Court’s	 early	 socio-
economic	rights	jurisprudence	as	“proceduralising	its	adjudication”.473	Brand	describes	the	
Court’s	jurisprudence	as	focusing	on	“structural	rather	than	concrete	guiding	values	and	
ends:	 structural	 good	 governance	 standards	 such	 as	 legality	 (rationality	 and	 non-
arbitrariness),	coherence,	coordination	and	inclusivity	in	government	policy	formulation	
and	 decision-making”.474	 He	 critiques	 the	 Court	 for	 setting	 itself	 up	 as	 an	 “impartial	
referee”	 and	 not	 delving	 into	 the	 content	 of	 rights,	 but	 rather	 enquiring	 whether	 the	
policy	structurally,	met	with	the	requirements	of	reasonableness.	He	argues	further	that	
the	Court	in	Soobramoney,	Grootboom	and	TAC	omitted	entirely	a	necessary	exploration	
of	 the	 “ends”	 (the	content	of	 the	rights)	 the	reasonable	measures	are	meant	 to	achieve,	
thus	ignoring	the	first	part	of	the	section	26	and	27	enquiry.	Similarly,	the	Constitutional	
Court	 in	Mazibuko	 refused	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 actual	 content	 of	 the	 right	 to	 “sufficient”	
water	but	chose	instead	to	focus	on	the	broad	ambit	of	the	reasonableness	of	the	policies	
and	procedural	elements.	
																																								 																				
471 See Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” Rights and Democracy 33-56; S Liebenberg The Judicial 
Enforcement of Social Security Rights in South Africa: Enhancing Accountability for the Basic Needs of the 
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473 Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” Rights and Democracy 36. 
474 Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” Rights and Democracy 36. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 137	
 
I	 argue	 that	 the	 Courts	 can	marry	 this	 procedural/structural	 approach	with	 a	 content-
focused	approach,	along	the	lines	of	the	experimentalist	review	approach,	as	a	means	to	
determining	 a	 solution	 to	 problems	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 This	 would	 be	 way	 of	
“democratising	 the	 courts”	 and	 holding	 the	 legislature	 and	 executive	 accountable	 for	
socio-economic	transformation	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		Mazibuko	provided	
a	 perfect	 opportunity	 for	 the	 Court	 through	 collaborative	 engagement,	 to	 define	 how	
much	water	 is	 “sufficient”	 for	 purposes	 of	 a	 dignified	 and	 healthy	 existence	 for	 people	
living	 in	 poverty.	 The	 Court	 would	 not	 have	 to	 assume	 a	 supremacist	 stance	 and	
unilaterally	declare	the	content,	but	could	instead	have	moved	the	parties	to	agree	on	a	
reasonable	amount.	This	would	have	been	a	different	approach	to	the	High	Court	(‘HC’)	
and	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal	(‘SCA’)	laying	down	the	substance	of	the	right	as	either	50	
or	 42	 litres,	 but	 rather	 the	 court	 facilitating	 deliberation	 and	 an	 agreement	 based	 on	
balancing	 needs	 and	 resources.	 The	 Court	 could	 thus	 proactively	 determine	 the	
parameters	 of	 the	 content	 of	 rights,	 together	 with	 the	 technical	 and	 legal	 experts,	
litigants,	affected	communities	and	the	state,	as	an	“active	democratic	structure”.	Instead	
of	 only	 inquiring	 into	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 decision-making	 with	 respect	 to	 policy,	
programming	 and	 planning	 in	 socio-economic	 rights	 cases,	 the	 Courts	 should	 also	 be	
delving	into	the	substance	of	socio-economic	rights.		
Furthermore,	the	Court’s	very	own	reasonableness	criteria	requires	a	substantive	content	
analysis,	with	respect	to	the	following:	the	programme	must	be	“capable	of	facilitating	the	
realisation	 of	 the	 right”;475	 it	 must	 pay	 attention	 to	 “short,	 medium	 and	 long-term	
needs”;476	measures	cannot	 leave	out	of	account	the	“degree	and	extent	of	 the	denial	of	
the	 right	 they	 endeavour	 to	 realise”;477	 “those	whose	needs	 are	most	urgent	 and	whose	
ability	to	enjoy	all	rights	is	therefore	most	in	peril,	must	not	be	ignored	by	the	measures	
aimed	 at	 achieving	 realisation	 of	 the	 right”;	 “if	 the	 measures,	 though	 statistically	
successful,	 fail	 to	 respond	 to	 the	needs	of	 those	most	desperate,	 they	may	not	pass	 the	
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test”.478	It	is	not	possible	to	circumvent	an	exploration	of	the	substance	of	socio-economic	
rights,	if	the	Court	requires	itself	to	understand	the	needs	of	the	poor,	the	realisation	of	
the	right	in	question,	the	denial	of	the	right	and	the	enjoyment	of	the	right.	The	so-called	
ends	of	 the	 right,	 in	 the	means-end	analysis,	 can	only	be	determined	by	examining	 the	
content	 of	 the	 right.	 This	 is	 the	 legitimate	 role	 of	 the	 courts	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state	and	can	be	accomplished	through	engagement	with	experts,	affected	
communities	and	their	representatives,	and	the	state	at	the	review	and	remedial	stages	of	
adjudication.	
The	 reluctance	 of	 the	Court	 to	 elaborate	 the	 content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 state’s	 positive	 obligations	 vis-à-vis	 each	 right,	 has	 held	 back	 the	
transformative	 potential	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 socio-economic	 rights	 jurisprudence.	 The	
Court’s	 relatively	 weak	 standard	 of	 review	 has	 diminished	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Court	 to	
systemically	 support	 the	 upliftment	 of	 the	 poor.479	 The	 Constitutional	 Court’s	
unfortunate	 interpretation	 of	 “progressive	 realisation”	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 an	
analysis	 of	 whether	 policies	 improve	 conditions	 for	 “a	 larger	 number	 of	 people”	 or	 “a	
wider	 range	 of	 people”.480	 Systemic	 change	 and	 developmental	 progress	 is	 key	 to	
achieving	long-term,	sustainable,	poverty	alleviation,	as	the	primary	aim	of	a	democratic	
developmental	state.		
It	 is	only	in	relation	to	more	recent	cases	on	the	unqualified	right	to	education	and	the	
right	 not	 to	 be	 evicted	 from	 one’s	 home	 where	 the	 Court	 has	 been	 proactive	 in	 its	
substantive	 interpretation	of	what	 the	 rights	 entail.	 In	 the	 recent	 case	 of	Daniels481	 the	
court,	 in	 five	 separate	 but	 concurring	 judgements,	 described	 in	 elaborate	 detail	 the	
historical	dispossession	of	land	in	South	Africa	and	the	conditions	under	which	poor	and	
vulnerable	 African,	 Indian	 and	 Coloured	 people	 had	 to	 live,	 and	 still	 live.	 The	 court	
discussed	 the	 obligations	 of	 a	 landowner	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 substandard	 living	
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conditions	of	a	domestic	worker	 living	on	his	 land,	under	the	right	to	property	(section	
25(6)),	 and	 held	 that	 the	 occupier	 was	 entitled	 to	 make	 improvements	 to	 bring	 the	
dwelling	 to	 a	 standard	 that	 is	 constitutionally	 compliant.	 The	 court	 placed	 a	 positive	
obligation	on	the	landowner	to	ensure	the	occupier’s	enjoyment	of	the	section	25(6)	right	
to	 secure	 tenure.	 The	 parties	 were	 ordered	 to	 engage	 meaningfully	 with	 one	 another	
regarding	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 improvements,	 in	 particular	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
building	plans	and	their	approval,	and	the	movement	of	builders	on	site.	
A	 requirement	 for	participation	of	affected	people	and	communities	 in	 fleshing	out	 the	
most	 appropriate	 way	 to	 realise	 the	 right	 in	 question,	 albeit	 another	 procedural	
(structural)	 requirement,	 would	 also	 foster	 the	 empowerment	 of	 poor	 people	 in	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 a	 possible	 interpretation	 of	 the	
reasonableness	requirement	of	transparency	and	openness	stipulated	in	Grootboom,482	as	
well	 as	 the	 appropriate	 role	 for	 government	 and	 affected	 communities	 established	 in	
Olivia	Road	and	Joe	Slovo	through	“meaningful	engagement”.483 
4	5	6	“Minimum	core”	content	
The	Court’s	explicit	rejection	of	a	minimum	core	content	of	socio-economic	rights,	in	my	
opinion,	also	left	a	vacuum	for	a	more	substantive	interpretation	of	the	various	rights.	In	
the	 context	 of	 considering	 the	 concept	 of	 directly	 enforceable	 “minimum	 core”	
obligations	 on	 the	 State,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 rejected	 an	 interpretation	 of	 socio-
economic	 rights	 that	 would	 allow	 “a	 self-standing	 and	 independent	 positive	 right	
enforceable	 irrespective	 of	 the	 considerations	 mentioned	 in	 section	 27(2)”.484	 This	 is	
however	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 interpretation	 of	 a	 minimum	 core	 content	 of	 a	 socio-
economic	 right.485	 I	 suggest	an	approach	 to	 the	minimum	core	content	debate	 -	within	
																																								 																				
482 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
483 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) 
BCLR 847 (CC). 
484 Para 39. 
485 See K Young “The minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search of content” (2008) 33 
The Yale Journal of International Law 113, for a very useful analytical discussion of the various possible 
meanings of the “minimum core”.  
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the	 reasonableness	 review	analysis	 -	 that	would	 facilitate	 the	alleviation	of	poverty	 in	a	
democratic	 developmental	 state	 through	 a	 collaborative,	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	
rights.	 The	 notion	 of	 a	 “minimum	 core”	 can	 emerge	 from	 the	 jurisprudence	 under	 the	
Court’s	reasonableness	review	requirement	that	a	reasonable	government	programme,	at	
a	minimum,	 cater	 for	 the	 urgent	 needs	 of	 vulnerable	 groups.	 This	would	 be	 a	 starting	
point	for	the	incremental	substantive	interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights.	
The	South	African	Constitution	does	not	 specifically	 include	 a	minimum	core	of	 socio-
economic	 rights.	 However,	 based	 on	 South	 Africa’s	 international	 law	 commitments,	
commentators	 have	 argued	 that	 everyone	 should	 have	 the	 right	 to	 a	minimum	 core	 of	
basic	entitlements.486	General	Comment	3	of	the	CESCR,	first	laid	out	the	minimum	core	
obligation,	and	South	Africa	has	now	finally	ratified	the	ICESCR.487	General	Comment	5	of	
the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child	 (‘CRC’),	which	has	also	been	ratified	by	South	
Africa,	 states	 that	 General	 Comment	 3	 of	 the	 CESCR	 is	 complementary	 to	 the	 CRC.488	
Finally,	 the	socio-economic	rights	provisions	 in	 the	South	African	Constitution	are	very	
similar	to	the	rights	in	the	ICESCR	and	the	CRC.	
The	 Courts,	 however,	 have	 not	 been	 amenable	 to	 enforcing	minimum	 core	 content	 of	
socio-economic	 rights.	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 Grootboom489	 considered	 General	
Comment	3	of	 the	CESCR,	which	 the	amici	used	 to	argue	 for	 the	minimum	core	of	 the	
right	 to	 access	 to	 adequate	 housing,	 but	 was	 lukewarm	 towards	 the	 minimum	 core	
																																								 																				
486 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The justification and enforcement of social and economic rights 
(2007); S Rosa & M Dutschke “Child Rights at the Core: The use of international law in South African cases on 
children’s socio-economic rights” 22 (2006) SAJHR 224-260; K Creamer The impact of South Africa's evolving 
jurisprudence on children's socio-economic rights on budget analysis, IDASA (2002) 27; K Creamer “The 
implication of socio-economic rights jurisprudence for government planning and budgeting: The case of 
children's socio-economic rights” (2004) 8 Law Democracy and Development 208-21, 218; Comments on the 
Social and Economic Rights in the Working Draft of the New Constitution (22 November 1995) 4; M Olivier 
“Constitutional perspectives on the enforcement of socio-economic rights: Recent South African experiences” 
(2002) 33 VUWLR 140; DA Horsten & L Jansen van Rensburg “The extent of justiciability of the socio-economic 
rights of children and the courts' application of these rights” (2004) Speculum Juris 121-136. 
487 General Comment 3 of the CESCR para 10. 
488 Committee on the Rights of the Child Thirty-fourth session 19 September–3 October 2003 General 
Comment No. 5 (2003) “General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
(arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6) para 5. 
489 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 29, 32-33. It 
was argued in this case, that s 28 socio-economic rights are the minimum core of the more general, full blown 
socio-economic rights. The minimum core rights of children are constitutionally protected in s 28 while the 
minimum core rights of everyone have to be read in from international law. 
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approach.	 It	 said	 only	 that	 it	 could	 play	 a	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	
programmes	 or	 policies,	 if	 the	 Court	 was	 able	 to	 obtain	 sufficient	 information.	 It	
explained	 that	 the	 practical	 difficulties	 and	 lack	 of	 information	 regarding	 the	 varying	
degree	of	needs	in	the	country	hampered	its	ability	to	determine	the	minimum	core,	nor	
did	it	possess	the	institutional	competency	to	do	so.490	The	Court	also	voiced	its	concern	
about	 the	 resources	 that	would	be	 required	 to	provide	everyone	with	access	 to	a	 “core”	
service	immediately.491		
Similarly	 in	 TAC,492	 the	 Court	 overruled	 the	 conception	 that	 section	 27(1)	 bestowed	 a	
distinctive	 positive	 right,	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 limitations	 in	 section	 27(2).	 The	 Court	
reiterated	 that	 failure	 to	 fulfil	 minimum	 core	 needs	 would	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	
determining	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	 government	 programme.493	 In	 Mazibuko,	 the	
Court	 believed	 the	 litigants	 to	 be	 pursuing	 the	minimum	core	 argument	 yet	 again	 and	
became	extremely	defensive	and	irate	despite	the	fact	that	the	CALS	lawyers	stated	firmly	
that	 they	carefully	constructed	the	 litigants’	case	around	the	Grootboom	 reasonableness	
test	and	were	not	seeking	to	argue	for	a	minimum	core	for	water.494	
The	 cases	 that	have	 ensued	 since	 the	Court	 rejected	 the	 concept	of	 the	minimum	core	
have	 followed	 the	 same	 course.	 Even	 though	 the	 Court	 has	 chosen	 not	 to	 adopt	 a	
minimum	core	 approach	under	 international	 law,	 it	 should	 still	 construct	 and	define	 a	
core	content	of	socio-economic	rights	or	at	least	a	substantive	interpretation	of	what	each	
right	means	and	what	it	seeks	to	achieve.495	That	way,	the	State	can	progressively	realise	
the	qualified	socio-economic	rights	over	time.	The	net	effect	of	the	above	cases	is	that	the	
																																								 																				
490 Paras 32-33, 38. It is however, practically possible to ascertain needs amongst the poor in the country, at a 
very detailed, local level. 
491 Para 35.  
492 Submission of the Community Law Centre and Idasa Amicus Heads of Argument TAC case (April 2003) 
paras 14 and 23, p 181 (copy on file with author). 
493 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 33; Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 34, 68. 
494 See J Dugard’s comment on P Danchin “A Human Right to Water? The South African Constitutional Court’s 
decision in the Mazibuko case” European Journal of international Law <http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-
to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-court’s-decision-in-the-mazibuko-case/> (accessed 28-11-2016). 
COHRE’s amicus curiae intervention argued that a minimum core should be used in determining 
reasonableness rather than in place of the reasonableness standard. 
495 Liebenberg suggests an approach that is sufficiently flexible and yet defines the substance of socio-
economic rights. See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 163-203. 
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Court	 requires	 a	 reasonable	 government	 programme,	 at	 a	 minimum,	 to	 cater	 for	 the	
urgent	needs	of	vulnerable	groups.	However,	there	are	critical	 limitations	to	the	Court’s	
approach.		
Firstly,	under	the	reasonableness	test	there	is	no	direct	entitlement	to	a	minimum	core	of	
the	socio-economic	right,	except	perhaps	to	emergency,	temporary	accommodation	when	
faced	 with	 an	 eviction	 on	 public	 or	 private	 land.	 Either	 way,	 they	 must	 sit	 tight	 and	
wait.496	Secondly,	the	Court	did	not	elevate	the	issues	of	the	claimants	to	be	addressed	as	
a	matter	of	priority.	The	general	comments	of	the	CESCR	suggest	that	the	minimum	core	
confers	a	higher	standard	of	review	for	the	non-fulfilment	of	minimum	core	rights.497	In	a	
democratic	 developmental	 state,	 this	 would	 accord	 with	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
accountability	for	redress	and	progress	on	poverty	reduction	measures.	Take	for	example	
the	right	to	food,	which	is	the	only	socio-economic	right	that	has	not	yet	been	tested	in	
the	courts.	If	people	are	facing	severe	hunger	and	food	shortages,	should	they	wait	for	a	
reasonable	policy	or	programme	to	be	developed,	or	would	they	get	priority	in	the	form	of	
emergency	food	parcels,	similar	to	emergency	housing?	
Thirdly,	 the	 claimant	 bears	 the	 burden	 of	 having	 to	 prove	 that	 the	 government’s	
programme	 is	 unreasonable.	 Litigants	 must	 review	 government’s	 social	 policies,	
programmes	 and	 legislation	 within	 the	 national,	 provincial	 or	 local	 spheres	 of	
government,	 and	 assess	 the	 resources	 available	 to	 meet	 the	 relevant	 socio-economic	
needs.	They	must	make	the	argument	that	that	the	State’s	failure	to	meet	their	needs	is	
unreasonable.498	 This	 is	 a	 very	 complex	 undertaking.	 If	 the	 courts	 were	 to	 adopt	 a	
minimum	 core	 inquiry,	 a	 prima	 facie	 violation	 could	 be	 established	 based	 on	 a	 lack	 of	
access	to	basic	needs.	The	burden	would	then	fall	on	the	State	to	justify	itself.499		
From	the	perspective	of	a	developmental	state	and	participatory	democracy,	elucidating	
the	 normative	 content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 delineating	 a	 minimum	 core	 is	
																																								 																				
496 S Liebenberg “South Africa's evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: an effective tool in 
challenging poverty?” (2002) Law, Democracy and Development 159, 176. 
497 UN CESCR General Comment 3 para 10. 
498 Liebenberg Law, Democracy and Development 177.  
499 Liebenberg Law, Democracy and Development 177. 
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desirable.	The	questions	are:	Who	should	do	it	and	how	should	it	be	done?	What	is	useful	
about	 reasonableness	 review	 is	 that	 it	 enables	 a	 Court	 to	 elaborate	 on	 the	 expansive	
meaning	of	socio-economic	rights,	but	then	to	adopt	a	very	context-sensitive	assessment	
of	what	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	require	of	particular	organs	of	state,	given	the	constitutional	
commitment	to	the	full	realisation	of	the	rights	and	taking	into	account	current	resource	
and	 institutional	 constraints,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 qualified	 rights.	 In	 the	Mazibuko	 case,	 for	
example,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 had	 all	 the	 necessary	 evidence	 before	 it	 and	 the	
participation	of	all	the	relevant	people,	to	warrant	a	conclusion	that	25	litres	of	water	per	
person	a	day	was	unreasonable,	and	remedy	the	situation	as	the	High	Court	and	Supreme	
Court	 had	 done,	 by	 facilitating	 an	 agreement	 on	 a	 higher	 minimum	 requirement	 per	
person.			
A	 version	 of	 the	 minimum	 core	 that	 facilitates	 or	 enables	 participation	 in	 the	
determination	of	substantive	content	is	possible,	and	would	advance	the	objectives	of	the	
democratic	developmental	 state	and	transformative	constitutionalism.	The	Court	would	
still	have	to	respond	to	the	critique	of	separation	of	powers,	but	could	justify	its	position	
by	re-conceptualising	the	role	of	the	courts	as	facilitating	the	inclusive	participation	of	all	
relevant	 role-players	 through	 judicial	 forums	 and	 remedies.	 The	 actual	 minimum	 core	
content,	 in	 the	 immediate	 context	 of	 the	 case	 before	 the	 court,	 would	 be	 mediated	
through	 a	 collaborative	 engagement	 between	 policy-makers,	 non-government	
organisations	 and	 affected	 communities	 and	 supervised	 by	 the	 courts.	 The	 court	 could	
request	 reports	 on	 the	 research	 and	 views	 of	 the	 various	 parties	 to	 the	 litigation,	
including	amicus	and	other	state	organs	it	might	want	to	join	the	case,	during	the	review	
stage.500	 It	 would	 then	 facilitate	 agreement	 amongst	 the	 parties	 on	 the	 substantive	
content	of	the	minimum	core	of	the	right,	in	the	circumstances	of	the	particular	case	and	
taking	 into	 account	 the	 historical	 situation	 and	 the	 means	 to	 achieve	 socio-economic	
																																								 																				
500 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC); Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet 
(CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive 
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC); Black Sash Trust v Minister of 
Social Development [2017] ZACC 8; 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and ZACC 20; 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC). 
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developmental	 outcomes.	 At	 the	 remedial	 stage,	 the	 court	 would	 monitor	 the	
implementation	of	the	agreement.501		
It	is	envisaged	that	the	delineation	of	the	minimum	core	content	would	then	also	provide	
a	 basis	 for	 systemic	 improvement	 of	 conditions	 of	 other	 disadvantaged	 and	 vulnerable	
people	in	similar	situations.	This	“democratisation”	of	the	courts	would	not	seek	to	usurp	
the	 role	of	 the	executive	or	 the	 legislature,	but	 facilitate	collaborative	and	participatory	
forums	 for	 the	 various	 relevant	 parties	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 constituent	 elements	 of	 the	
minimum	core	content	of	a	socio-economic	right.	
4	6	Participatory	dimensions	of	socio-economic	rights	jurisprudence		
The	purpose	 of	 constitutional	 remedies	 is	 to	 provide	 effective	 relief	 to	 those	who	have	
experienced	 a	 violation	 of	 their	 rights,	 and	 also	 to	 deter	 future	 violations.502	 If	 the	
transformative	 intent	 of	 the	 Constitution	 is	 to	 have	 a	 broader	 impact	 on	 our	 society	
beyond	 redress	 for	 actual	 litigants,	 strategies	 to	 systemically	 address	 the	 underlying	
causes	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 are	 required.	 Such	 strategies	 must	 challenge	 the	
structural	rules	that	serve	to	entrench	socio-economic	disempowerment	of	the	poor	and	
disadvantaged	in	our	society.503	The	Courts	have	also	highlighted	this	broader	purpose	in	
needing	to	develop	effective,	far-reaching	and	creative	remedies	and	to	“forge	new	tools”,	
where	necessary,	in	constitutional	rights	cases,	principally	socio-economic	rights	cases.504	
In	a	country	where	few	people	have	the	resources	to	enforce	their	socio-economic	rights	
through	 the	 legal	 process,	 the	 courts	 have	 a	 specific	 responsibility	 to	 ensure	 that	
infringement	 of	 rights	 is	 effectively	 asserted	 and	 remedial	 action	 taken	 swiftly	 and	
systemically.	
The	courts	in	responding	to	socio-economic	rights	violations,	should	promote	the	notions	
of	participatory	and	deliberative	democracy	through	the	wide	range	of	remedial	options	
																																								 																				
501 See discussion below on structural remedies in 4 6 6. 
502 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 378-461, 378. 
503 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 379. 
504 Cameron JA in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v 
Ngxuza 2001 (10) BCLR 1039 (SCA) paras 11-12. Quoted in Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 379. 
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available	 under	 the	 Constitution.	 This	 would	 result	 in	 not	 only	 effectively	 altering	 the	
material	 causes	 of	 poverty,	 but	 also	 catalysing	 an	opportunity	 for	 empowerment	of	 the	
poor	 by	 changing	 the	 underlying	 power	 dynamics	 between	 the	 state	 and	 citizens,	 as	
envisaged	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 The	 courts’	 use	 of	 participatory	 and	
transformative	remedies,	such	as	“meaningful	engagement”	and	structural	remedies,	will	
contribute	 to	 achieving	 this	 ultimate	 purpose.	 This	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	
jurisprudence	on	evictions,	social	security	and	education,	upon	which	I	will	focus	in	this	
section.	
4	6	1	Constitutional	remedies	in	socio-economic	rights	cases	
Section	 172(1)	 of	 the	 1996	Constitution	 provides	 that,	 “[w]hen	deciding	 a	 constitutional	
matter	within	its	power,	a	court	…	(b)	may	make	any	order	that	is	just	and	equitable”.	In	
addition,	 section	38	of	 the	Constitution	provides	 that	anyone	with	standing	 in	 terms	of	
this	section	“has	the	right	to	approach	a	competent	court,	alleging	that	a	right	in	the	Bill	
of	 Rights	 has	 been	 infringed	 or	 threatened”,	 and	 confers	 on	 courts	 the	 power	 to	 grant	
“appropriate	relief,	including	a	declaration	of	rights”.	In	theory,	these	provisions	give	the	
Constitutional	 Court	 scope	 to	 develop	 innovative	 remedies	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	
constitutional	 rights,	 especially	 pro-poor	 rights.505	 In	 an	 obiter	 judgment	 in	 Zulu	 v	
eThekwini	Municipality506	 (“Zulu”),	 Van	 der	Westhuizen	 J	 declared	 the	 interim	 eviction	
order	against	 the	applicants	 invalid.	He	emphasised	 the	power	of	 the	Court	granted	by	
the	Constitution	to	make	any	order	that	is	“just	and	equitable”	in	order	to	achieve	“justice	
and	 equity”	 for	 litigants.507	 This	 is	more	 important	 than	 “strict	 adherence	 to	 technical	
procedures”	 because	 a	 flexible	 remedial	 jurisdiction	 allows	 the	 Court	 to	 “scratch	 the	
surface	to	get	to	the	real	substance	below”.508		
In	 the	 very	 recent	 case	 of	Occupiers	 of	 Erven	 87	 and	 88	 Berea	 v	 De	 Wet	 (“Occupiers	
Berea”),	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 High	 Court	 had	 been	 remiss	 in	 not	
																																								 																				
505 T Bollyky “R if C > P + B: A paradigm for judicial remedies in socio-economic rights violations” (2002) 18 
SAJHR 161-200. 
506 2014 (8) BCLR 971 (CC). 
507 Para 62. 
508 Para 62. 
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conducting	a	proper	enquiry	into	all	the	relevant	facts	of	the	case.	It	stated	that	the	High	
Court	had	“failed	to	appreciate	that	the	duty	to	conduct	the	enquiry	is	that	of	the	court,	
which	 is	 obliged	 to	 be	 proactive	 in	 gathering	 information	 about	 all	 the	 relevant	
circumstances,	considering	that	information	and	arriving	at	a	just	and	equitable	order	in	
the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case.”	 [own	 italics]509	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 went	 on	 to	
make	an	order	to	rescind	the	eviction	and	remit	the	matter	to	the	High	Court	of	South	
Africa,	Gauteng	Local	Division,	with	the	direction	that	the	matter	be	case-managed	and	
dealt	with	expeditiously.	It	joined	the	City	of	Johannesburg	as	a	respondent	to	the	matter	
and	gave	clear	directions	 for	reporting	to	the	High	Court	within	30	days	on	the	steps	 it	
had	taken	and	steps	it	intended	to	take	in	order	to	provide	alternative	land	or	emergency	
accommodation	to	the	applicants	in	the	event	of	their	being	evicted,	as	well	as	when	the	
alternative	land	or	accommodation	would	be	provided.		
What	this	and	other	eviction	cases	have	failed	to	address,	is	what	happens	to	the	litigants	
after	the	provision	of	emergency	accommodation.	Without	a	substantive	interpretation	of	
the	content	of	the	right	to	housing	and	what	that	means	in	the	context	of	evictions,	the	
litigants	remain	in	a	state	of	limbo	and	no	systemic,	sustainable	solution	to	the	problem	is	
ever	debated	or	implemented.	In	the	presence	of	these	powers,	the	Courts	have	over	the	
years	fashioned	some	creative	and	participatory	remedies	for	poor	communities	to	realise	
their	socio-economic	rights.	However,	at	the	same	time,	I	have	argued	above	that	socio-
economic	 rights	 litigation	 aimed	 at	 advancing	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 poor	 has	 resulted	 in	
somewhat	 limited	 relief	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades510	 and	 requires	 an	 augmented,	
proactive	and	participatory	approach	by	the	courts	in	a	democratic	developmental	state,	
to	bring	about	the	systemic	socio-economic	transformation	required.	
In	 Soobramoney,	 where	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 right	 not	 to	 be	 refused	 emergency	
medical	treatment	did	not	extend	to	renal	dialysis,	no	relief	was	granted	to	the	applicant,	
																																								 																				
509 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC) paras 52-57. 
510 See generally Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Chapter 8. See also K Pillay Addressing Poverty through 
the Courts: How have we Fared in the First Decade of Democracy? Unpublished paper presented at a 
Conference on Celebrating a Decade of Democracy in Durban, 23-25 January 2004 (on file with author) 
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who	died	of	kidney	failure	shortly	after	the	judgment.511	In	Grootboom,	a	declaratory	order	
was	 granted	 requiring	 the	 state	 to	meet	 its	 obligations	 under	 section	 26(2)	 of	 the	 1996	
Constitution	 to	 “devise	 and	 implement	 within	 its	 available	 resources	 a	 comprehensive	
and	 coordinated	 [housing]	 program”.	 Such	 a	 programme,	 the	 Court	 continued,	 should	
“include	reasonable	measures	such	as	…	[the	provision	of]	relief	for	people	who	have	no	
access	 to	 land,	no	roof	over	 their	heads,	and	who	are	 living	 in	 intolerable	conditions	of	
crisis	 situations”.	Although	 remarking	 in	 passing	 that	 the	 South	African	Human	Rights	
Commission	(one	of	the	amici	curiae	in	the	case)	would	monitor	and	report	on	the	state’s	
progress	 in	 complying	with	 the	 judgment,	 the	Court	did	not	 incorporate	 this	 oversight	
function	in	its	order.512	
In	 TAC,	 the	 Pretoria	 High	 Court	 had	 granted	 a	 structural	 interdict	 requiring	 the	
government	to	revise	its	policy	regarding	the	prevention	of	mother-to-child	transmission	
of	HIV/AIDS	and	to	submit	the	revised	policy	to	the	court.513	Whilst	deciding	in	favour	of	
the	 claimant,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 considered	 a	 structural	 interdict	 to	 be	
inappropriate,	 and	 instead	 granted	 an	 order	 declaring	 government	 policy	 to	 be	
unreasonable,	coupled	with	a	mandatory	order	directing	that	the	restrictions	on	the	use	
of	a	particular	antiretroviral	drug	outside	of	selected	research	sites	be	removed,	and	that	
the	 drug	 be	 made	 available	 at	 all	 public	 hospitals	 and	 clinics.	 Since	 then	 the	
Constitutional	Court	has	used	structural	 interdicts	more	often	 in	 socio-economic	 rights	
cases,	as	in	Occupiers	Berea,	but	it	has	not	been	without	its	challenges.514	
In	 Khosa,	 the	 remedy	 chosen	 by	 the	 Court	 was	 to	 provide	 a	 “reading	 in”	 remedy	 for	
sections	of	the	Social	Assistance	Act	and	other	legislation	and	regulations,	so	as	to	allow	
permanent	 residents	 the	 same	 social	 assistance	 benefits	 as	 South	 African	 citizens.515	
Permanent	residents	were	thus	immediately	entitled	to	social	assistance	benefits.	In	spite	
of	the	power	given	to	the	Court	to	fashion	appropriate	relief,	in	four	out	of	the	five	earlier	
																																								 																				
511 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
512 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 97. 
513 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 129. 
514 Discussed further in 4 6 6 below. 
515 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 
(CC) para 98. 
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cases	where	the	Court	considered	the	state’s	positive	obligations	vis-à-vis	particular	socio-
economic	rights,	it	refused	relief	in	the	one	case	where	a	person	sought	a	direct	remedy	
(Soobramoney)	and,	 in	 the	other	 three	cases,	mandated	that	 the	applicable	government	
policy	be	changed,	without,	however,	granting	direct	relief	to	the	affected	individuals.	
On	the	other	hand,	in	a	number	of	the	later	cases,	the	relief	granted	by	the	Constitutional	
Court	 directly	 to	 the	 affected	 individual	 litigants	 has	 been	more	 favourable	 (albeit	 not	
systemic)	 and	 procedurally	 based.516	 In	 Joseph	 v	 City	 of	 Johannesburg517 (“Joseph”)	 the	
termination	 of	 electricity	 to	 the	 occupants	 of	 a	 building	was	 declared	 unlawful	 due	 to	
procedural	lapses	and	the	court	ordered	the	electricity	to	be	reconnected	immediately.	In	
Hoërskool	 Ermelo	 the	 learners	 were	 allowed	 to	 remain	 at	 the	 school	 and	 the	 Court	
ordered	the	School	Governing	Body	(‘SGB’)	to	review	the	language	policy	in	line	with	the	
Constitution,	 also	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 procedural	 lapses.518	 For	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 broader	
disadvantaged	community,	the	Constitutional	Court	ordered	the	Head	of	the	Department	
of	Education	(‘HOD’)	to	review	the	numbers	of	students	that	would	need	places	in	Grade	
8	and	make	provision	for	them	in	the	2010	school	year.519	The	SGB	and	the	HOD	were	also	
ordered	to	report	back	to	the	Court	by	a	particular	date	on	their	policy	decisions.520	This	
was	 the	 first	 supervisory	 order	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 a	 socio-economic	 rights	
matter.	
The	Court	activated	a	constructive	remedy	in	a	wave	of	socio-economic	rights	cases	from	
2008	onwards,	in	particular	in	relation	to	eviction,	basic	services	and	education	cases,521	in	
																																								 																				
516 In Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC) the Court merely ordered the 
Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing to make a final decision on the Ekurhuleni 
Municipality’s application to upgrade the status of the Harry Gwala Informal Settlement, within 14 months of 
the date of the order. 
517 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) para 87. 
518 Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) 
para 106. 
519 Para 106. 
520 Para 106. 
521 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Joseph v City 
of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) para 64; Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of 
Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC); Head of Department, Department of Education, Free 
State Province v Welkom High School; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v 
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the	 form	of	 a	mandatory	 order	 requiring	 the	parties	 involved	 to	 “engage	meaningfully”	
with	the	purpose	of	reaching	a	“mutually	satisfactory	and	specific	resolution	to	the	issues	
in	 dispute”.522	 These	 types	 of	 remedies	 can	 facilitate	 the	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	
values	 of	 the	 Constitution	 as	 envisaged	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 But	 they	
must	 do	 so	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 rights	 themselves	 are	 capable	 of	 being	 realised	 by	
giving	content	as	well	as	form	to	them	so	as	to	ensure	that	other	persons	living	in	similar	
conditions	 of	 poverty	 may	 also	 benefit.	 This	 systemic	 impact	 on	 socio-economic	
transformation	can	be	achieved	through	empowering	affected	litigants	and	communities	
by	their	participation	in	solving	social	policy	challenges.	 	The	following	section	analyses	
the	 potential	 of	 this	 remedy	 in	more	 depth,	 to	 further	 strengthen	 democratic	 court	 to	
proactively	engage	in	experimentalist	and	managerial	review.	
4	6	2	“Meaningful	engagement”:	Purpose	and	requirements	
Neither	section	26(2)	of	the	Constitution	nor	the	Prevention	of	Illegal	Eviction	from	and	
Unlawful	Occupation	of	Land	Act	 19	of	 1998	(‘PIE	Act’)523	expressly	require	“meaningful	
engagement”.	 	 The	 requirement	 is	 an	 innovation	 made	 applicable	 initially	 in	 eviction	
cases	by	the	judgments	of	the	Constitutional	Court	in	Olivia	Road	and	Joe	Slovo,	to	assess	
the	reasonableness	of	measures	taken	by	the	State	when	implementing	housing	policy	and	
law.	The	Court	in	these	cases	held	that	“meaningful	engagement”	is	not	only	required	by	
section	 26(2)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 but	 is	 also	 mandated	 in	 all	 evictions	 sought	 in	 the	
context	 of	 housing	 development	 under	 the	 PIE	 Act.524	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 owners	 and	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Harmony High School 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC) and MEC for Education in Gauteng Province v Governing Body 
of Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 (CC); Federation of Governing Bodies for South African 
Schools v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Gauteng 2016 (8) BCLR 1050 (CC); Daniels v 
Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC). 
522 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 423. 
523 The Act is intended to provide for the prohibition of unlawful eviction; to provide for procedures for the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers; and is intended to give effect to s 26(3) of the Constitution. 
524 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 84 and 87; 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 39-45; Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) 
paras 15-7; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) 
paras 115-7; and Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (2) 
BCLR 99 (CC) para 69. See also recent cases: South African Informal Traders Forum v City of Johannesburg; 
South African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg 2014 (6) BCLR 726 (CC); Zulu v 
eThekwini Municipality 2014 (8) BCLR 971 (CC); MC Denneboom Service Station CC v Phayane 2014 (12) 
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municipalities	can	evict	only	in	terms	of	the	PIE	Act.		This	means	that	all	applicants	for	
eviction	must	comply	with	the	requirements	expressly	stipulated	in	the	PIE	Act	and	the	
Constitution	as	well	as	with	all	other	judicially	specified	requirements.	
Sachs	J	in	Port	Elizabeth	Municipality	v	Various	Occupiers525	(“PE	Municipality”)	remarked	
that	PIE	allows	for	the	interaction	between	the	foundational	values	of	the	rule	of	law	and	
the	 attainment	 of	 equality.	 The	 Court	 is	 required	 then	 to	 “engage	 in	 active	 judicial	
management	according	to	equitable	principles	of	an	ongoing,	stressful	and	law-governed	
social	 process”.526	 This	 was	 reiterated	 recently	 in	Molusi	 v	 Voges	 NO527	 (“Molusi”)	 in	
relation	to	the	Extension	of	Security	of	Tenure	Act	62	of	1997	(‘ESTA’).	In	PE	Municipality	
the	 municipality	 sought	 a	 ruling	 that	 it	 was	 not	 constitutionally	 obliged	 to	 find	
alternative	accommodation	or	land	when	seeking	to	evict	unlawful	occupiers.	The	Court	
rejected	 this	 argument,	 finding	 that	 in	 most	 circumstances	 a	 municipality	 would	 be	
obliged	 to	procure	a	mediated	solution	and	provide	alternative	accommodation	or	 land	
before	an	eviction	could	be	executed.528	This	decision	provided	concrete	benefits	to	poor	
people	 in	 this	 case	 and	 future	 cases,	 in	 as	much	 as	municipal	 evictions	may	 no	 longer	
proceed	without	a	proper	plan	for	relocation	to	alternative,	emergency	accommodation.	 
As	per	 the	Court’s	 judgments	 in	 Joe	Slovo529	and	Abahlali	Basemjondolo	Movement	SA	v	
Premier	of	the	Province	of	KwaZulu-Natal530	(“Abahlali”),	 it	 is	clear	that	all	applicants	for	
eviction	must	engage	reasonably	before	instituting	eviction	proceedings	as	well	as	during	
the	 process.531	 	 Commentators	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 orders	 in	Olivia	Road	 and	 Joe	
Slovo	differ	in	relation	to	the	timing	and	issues	of	engagement.	In	Olivia	Road,	the	Court	
ordered	the	parties	to	engage	before	an	eviction	order	could	be	granted,	and	in	Joe	Slovo,	
engagement	 was	 required	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 alternative	 accommodation	 and	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
BCLR 1421 (CC); and Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality v Chairperson, North West Provincial 
Executive Committee 2015 (1) BCLR 72 (CC). 
525 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
526 Paras 35-6. 
527 2016 (7) BCLR 839 (CC) para 31. 
528 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 39-45. 
529 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC). 
530 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC). 
531 See Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) Meaningful Engagement Workshop Report (December 2009) 
35-36. Unpublished. On file with the author.  
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relocation,	 rather	 than	 the	 decision	 to	 evict	 itself.532	 Wilson	 warns	 that	 “meaningful	
engagement	 could	 remain	 a	 procedural	 condition	 to	 be	 satisfied	 before	 an	 inevitable	
eviction	order	 is	 sought	and	obtained”.533	As	a	 result	of	 the	process	of	engagement,	 the	
property	could	possibly	be	upgraded	without	the	eviction	of	the	unlawful	occupiers.	This	
is	 because	 it	would	 not	 be	 acting	 reasonably	 in	 the	 engagement	 process.	 The	Court	 in	
Abahlali	 asserted	 that	proper	engagement	 in	circumstances	of	potential	eviction	should	
be	undertaken	with	people	who	are	to	be	evicted,	in	order	to	ascertain:	whether	the	areas	
where	 they	 live	 could	 be	 upgraded	 in	 situ;	 the	 provision	 and	 location	 of	 alternative	
accommodation;	 and	 the	 manner	 of	 and	 timeframes	 for	 eviction.534	 In	 ideal	
circumstances,	the	engagement	would	be	meaningful	when	used	as	a	negotiation	method	
between	the	parties	both	to	determine	whether	or	not	eviction	is	“just	and	equitable”	in	
order	to	implement	the	policy	of	the	government,	as	well	as	to	iron	out	the	consequences	
if	 eviction	 is	unavoidable	 in	order	 to	 “progressively	 realise”	 the	 right	 to	housing.535	The	
former	and	the	latter	could	then	be	made	an	order	of	court	and	implemented.	
Where	 they	 work	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 all	 parties	 concerned,	 litigants,	 civil	 society	
organisations,	 lawyers	 and	 government	 have	welcomed	 engagement	 orders	 alike.	 Their	
value	 in	 facilitating	 participatory	 and	 deliberative	 democratic	 processes	 and	
empowerment	of	 those	affected	by	poverty	 is	widely	acknowledged.536	As	Wilson	notes,	
“meaningful	 engagement”	 provides	 a	 space	 for	 negotiation	 for	 poor	 people,	 social	
movements	 and	 public	 interest	 lawyers.	 It	 can	 be	 a	 process	 through	which	 substantive	
claims	to	land	and	housing	can	be	defined	and	implemented	for	specific	groups	of	people,	
together	with	the	state.	In	Olivia	Road	(and	all	those	similarly	situated),	the	Court	did	not	
																																								 																				
532 CALS Meaningful Engagement. 
533 CALS Meaningful Engagement 36. See also S Wilson “Breaking the Tie: Evictions, homelessness and the 
new normality” (2009) 126(2) South African Law Journal 270-290. 
534 Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) 
para 114. 
535 See G Muller “Conceptualising ‘meaningful engagement’ as a deliberative democratic partnership” (2011) 
22 Stellenbosch Law Review 742-758 on different forms of citizens’ engagement; See a critique of the way in 
which “meaningful engagement” was applied in different cases in S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes” 
African Human Rights Law Journal 12(1) (2012) 1-29. 
536 CALS Meaningful Engagement. 
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provide	 a	 specific	 set	 of	 benefits,	 but	 a	 space	 for	 discussion	 and	 negotiation	 towards	
protecting	and	achieving	such	benefits.537		
The	Court	 has	 also	 interestingly	 encouraged	 engagement	 in	 non-eviction	 related	 cases,	
for	 example	 in	 Joseph	 where	 the	 City	 committed	 to	 “engaging	 with	 the	 applicants”	
regarding	the	termination	of	electricity	supply	and	the	Court	welcomed	this.538	Similarly	
the	 Court	 has	 held	 in	 the	 various	 education	 cases	 that	 a	 language	 policy,539	 learner	
pregnancy	policy540	and	admissions	policy541	adopted	by	individual	schools	infringed	the	
constitutional	rights	of	learners	to	human	dignity,	to	freedom	from	unfair	discrimination	
and	to	receive	a	basic	education.	The	schools	were	ordered	to	review	their	policies	in	light	
of	the	requirements	of	the	Constitution,	the	Schools	Act	and	to	engage	meaningfully	with	
the	HOD	in	the	process	of	reviewing	the	policies.		
The	education	cases	have	also	served	to	highlight	the	important	particpatory	democratic	
role	of	school	governing	bodies,	as	elected	representatives	of	schools,	in	determining	the	
content	of	school	policies	and	ensuring	that	they	comply	with	the	constitutional	right	to	
access	 education,	 including	 quality	 education.	 In	 the	 recent	FEDSAS	 case,542	 the	 Court	
upheld	Gauteng	regulations	related	to	admissions	of	learners	and	held	that	they	did	not	
contradict	 the	 power	 of	 school	 governing	 bodies	 to	 determine	 admissions	 policies	 for	
schools.	 The	 gist	 of	 the	 judgment	 supported	 the	 attempts	 by	 the	 Gauteng	 Education	
Department	to	make	quality	education	equitably	accessible.		
																																								 																				
537 Wilson SALJ.  
538 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) para 64. See also Mamba v Minister of Social 
Development Case No 36573/08 (T) (unreported judgment of 12 August 2008 and Order dated 21 August 
2008). The case concerned refugees who opposed the closure of refugee camps by the Gauteng government 
during the xenophobic violence in 2008. The Constitutional Court issued an engagement order directing the 
parties to meaningfully engage with one another and with other stakeholders and to come up with a plan for 
reintegration and alternative accommodation before closure of the camps on 30 September 2008, however 
the order was not complied with. See discussion of this case in Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 422; and B 
Ray Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits as a Socio-economic Rights Remedy 9 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 
399 (2010) <http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/2> (accessed 07-09-2016). 
539 Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC). 
540 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School; Head of 
Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School 2013 (9) BCLR 989 (CC). 
541 MEC for Education in Gauteng Province v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School 2013 (12) BCLR 1365 
(CC). 
542 Federation of Governing Bodies for South African Schools v Member of the Executive Council for Education, 
Gauteng 2016 (8) BCLR 1050 (CC). 
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When	the	Court	orders	engagement	between	the	executive	arm	of	government	and	the	
affected	 litigant	 communities,	 it	 plays	 a	 facilitatory,	 collaborative	 role	 amongst	 the	
various	competing	interests,	whilst	ensuring	that	the	outcomes	of	such	engagement	serve	
to	further	socio-economic	rights.	This	is	the	kind	of	“aggressive	weak-form”	remedy	that	
David	 Landau	 says	 is	 required	 to	 spur	 political	 action	 towards	 the	 co-design	 of	 socio-
economic	policy.543	This	balancing,	participatory	and	proactive	role	for	the	courts	fits	well	
with	 the	notion	of	 the	democratic	developmental	 state	where	all	public	 institutions	are	
responsible	 for	 socio-economic	 transformation.	 “Meaningful	 engagement”	 as	 a	 remedy	
requires	interaction	between	all	the	parties	to	a	case,	especially	where	there	are	opposing	
interests	 as	 in	 the	 case	 between	 landowner	 and	 resident	 or	 learner	 and	 school.	 It	 is	 a	
participatory	 tool	 that	 the	 courts	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 can	 utilise	 to	
determine,	 in	 a	 cooperative	 manner	 between	 state	 and	 citizens,	 or	 citizens	 amongst	
themselves,	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 a	 socio-economic	 right	 and	 the	 process	 for	 the	
practical	realisation	thereof.544	
4	6	3	Substantive	rights	and	systemic	solutions	
Tissington	and	Liebenberg	raise	concerns	about	the	limited	impact	these	orders	can	have	
when	 they	 resolve	 only	 the	 practical	 issues	 in	 the	 case	 before	 the	 court,	 and	 not	 the	
broader	 systemic	 issues,	 which	 may	 equally	 affect	 other	 similarly	 situated	 groups	 and	
usually	 fall	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 policy.545	 This	 is	 also	 the	 challenge	 for	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state,	 which	 has	 to	 transform	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 experienced	 by	
millions	of	people,	as	described	in	chapter	3,	 in	a	sustainable	and	long-term	manner.	In	
the	absence	of	substantive	analysis	of	the	constitutional	rights	and	duties	of	the	parties,	
“context-specific	 negotiated	 orders”	 may	 not	 benefit	 others	 who	 are	 not	 party	 to	 the	
litigation.546	 Liebenberg	 suggests	 that	 one	 way	 to	 resolve	 this	 is	 through	 judgments	
																																								 																				
543 D Landau “Aggressive weak-form remedies” CCR 244. 
544 Section 38 Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 allows the courts to appoint a fact-finding commission or referee 
to address the factual disputes and report back to the Court. 
545 K Tissington “Challenging Inner City Evictions before the Constitutional Court of South Africa: The Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road case in Johannesburg, South Africa” (2008) 5(2) Housing and ESC Rights Law Quarterly 1, 
3–6. Quoted in Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 421-422. 
546 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 423. 
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“which	 illuminate	 the	 relevant	 legal	 principles	 and	 their	 application	 to	 similar	 cases”	
through	 “a	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 relevant	 rights	 and	 their	 implications”.547	
This	way,	public	authorities	and	the	broader	public	then	know	what	the	rights	mean	in	
similar	situations	in	order	that	they	can	act	accordingly.	It	should	also	nullify	the	need	for	
any	 further	 litigation	 on	 similar	 issues,	 by	 other	 disadvantaged	 groups.	 It	 is	 a	 form	 of	
judicial	“policy-making”,	with	which	some	commentators	are	uncomfortable,	but	which	I	
argue	is	a	form	of	necessary	judicial	“precedent-setting”.	
Liebenberg	 argues	 that	 in	 order	 for	 engagement	 orders	 to	 “constitute	 appropriate	 and	
effective	 relief	 for	 violations	 of	 constitutional	 rights”548	 for	 disadvantaged	 groups,	 the	
rights	 involved	must	be	given	substance	and	content.	Devoid	of	content,	 rights	become	
somewhat	meaningless	as	guiding	norms	for	state	action,	and	instead	the	focus	is	placed	
on	the	process	of	“meaningful	engagement”	alone.	In	this	way,	the	negotiating	power	of	
disadvantaged	groups	in	relation	to	their	constitutional	rights	may	be	diminished	in	the	
face	 of	 more	 powerful	 state-players	 and	 require	 ongoing	 court	 challenges	 on	 similar	
issues.	This	would	obviously	be	a	waste	of	time	and	resources	on	the	part	of	litigants	and	
courts.	In	PE	Municipality	the	Court	emphasised	the	necessity	for	the	courts	to	“balance	
competing	 interests	 in	 a	 principled	 way	 and	 to	 promote	 the	 constitutional	 vision	 of	 a	
caring	society	based	on	good	neighbourliness	and	shared	concern.”549	The	Court	went	on	
to	state	that	it	is	not	for	the	judiciary	to	correct	all	the	systemic	unfairness	that	exists	in	
society	but	that	it	can	“soften	and	minimise	the	degree	of	injustice	and	inequity	which	the	
eviction	of	the	weaker	parties	in	conditions	of	inequality	of	necessity	entails.”550	
More	 recent	 Constitutional	 Court	 judgments	 have	 increasingly	 begun	 to	 show	 signs	 of	
substantive	interpretation	of	rights	that	can	serve	to	guide	and	ameliorate	the	conditions	
of	poor	people	in	similar	situations.	In	FEDSAS,	the	right	to	education	and	the	right	not	
																																								 																				
547 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 423-424. 
548 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424. 
549 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 37. 
550 Para 38. 
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to	be	unfairly	discriminated	against,	was	vividly	elucidated	by	Moseneke	 J.551	 In	Molusi,	
the	issue	related	to	the	application	of	ESTA	to	a	tenant	who	was	being	evicted,	in	giving	
effect	 to	 section	 26(3)	 of	 the	 Constitution.552	 The	 Court	 said	 that	 although	 the	 correct	
procedures	were	 followed,	 the	applicant’s	 situation	was	not	 taken	 into	account	and	 the	
application	for	eviction	in	the	Land	Claims	Court	was	dismissed.	The	Court	demonstrated	
an	appreciation	of	 the	plight	of	 the	 applicants	 in	 the	 context	of	 apartheid-era	 land	 law	
and	 common-law	 that	 that	 entrenched	 “unfair	 patterns	 of	 social	 domination	 and	
marginalisation	of	vulnerable	occupiers	in	eviction	cases”.553	The	Court	held	that	the	land	
reform	 legislation	 –	 ESTA	 –	 now	 requires	 a	 balancing	 of	 opposing	 interests	 between	
landowner	rights	and	people	desperate	without	land	or	accommodation.	“A	court	making	
an	 order	 for	 eviction	 must	 ensure	 that	 justice	 and	 equity	 prevail	 in	 relation	 to	 all	
concerned...”554		
In	 the	 recent	 case	 of	Daniels,	 the	 five	 separate	 judgements	 of	 the	 court	 also	went	 into	
much	detail	about	the	plight	of	people	dispossessed	of	land	during	colonial	and	apartheid	
times	and	the	need	to	remedy	the	situation	over	time,	with	careful	consideration	of	the	
rights	 to	 property	 and	 security	 of	 tenure.555	 These	 examples	 of	 a	 more	 substantive	
interpretation	of	rights	in	socio-economic	cases,	along	with	a	structural	and	longer-term	
perspective,	provide	promise	towards	guiding	norms	for	state	and	private	action	beyond	
the	 immediate	 case	 before	 the	 courts.	 The	need	 for	municipalities	 to	 plan,	 budget	 and	
provide	alternative	accommodation	for	people	about	to	be	evicted	from	private	or	public	
land;	the	principled	guidance	given	to	SGBs	with	respect	to	the	content	of	school	policies	
towards	quality	education	 for	all;	 and	 the	broader	entitlement	 to	basic	 services	 such	as	
electricity,	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 right	 to	 housing,	 are	 all	 significant	 steps	 in	 this	
direction.	 The	 participatory	 methods	 by	 which	 the	 substance	 of	 rights	 is	 derived,	
delineated	and	delivered,	is	also	characteristic	of	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
																																								 																				
551 Federation of Governing Bodies for South African Schools v Member of the Executive Council for Education, 
Gauteng 2016 (8) BCLR 1050 (CC) paras 1-3. 
552 Molusi v Voges NO 2016 (7) BCLR 839 (CC). 
553 Para 39. 
554 Para 39. 
555 Daniels v Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC). 
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4	6	4	Obligation	of	the	state	to	negotiate	solutions	in	private	evictions	
A	number	of	cases	that	have	become	before	the	High	Court,	the	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal	
and	subsequently	the	Constitutional	Court,	have	established	an	obligation	on	the	State	to	
address	 the	 situation	 of	 poor	 people	 facing	 homelessness	 in	 private	 eviction	
applications.556	 It	 is	 important	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 for	 the	 courts	 to	
ensure,	 through	 participation	 and	 deliberation,	 that	 the	 State	 takes	 responsibility	 for	
redistributive	 justice	 and	 balancing	 competing	 constitutional	 rights	 in	 the	 context	 of	
widespread	poverty,	vulnerability	and	private	interests.		
In	Lingwood,	the	Judge	held	that	the	obligation	to	provide	access	to	adequate	housing	or	
suitable	 alternative	 accommodation	 for	 homeless	 people	 or	 unlawful	 occupiers	
threatened	with	eviction,	 fell	on	 the	State	and	municipalities.557	 Furthermore,	 the	 judge	
highlighted	the	comments	of	Sachs	J	 in	the	PE	Municipality	case	where	he	“stressed	the	
necessity	 and	 importance	 of	 parties	 involved	 in	 litigation	 under	 PIE	 to	 engage	 in	
mediation	in	an	endeavour	to	achieve	mutually	acceptable	solutions”.558	In	this	case,	the	
judge	found	that	the	parties	never	engaged	in	any	negotiations,	 including	mediation,	 in	
an	attempt	to	finding	mutually	acceptable	solutions.	All	the	parties	(including	the	City	of	
Johannesburg	 who	 was	 joined	 in	 the	 proceedings)	 were	 thus	 ordered	 to	 take	 all	
reasonable	steps	to	achieve	a	mediated	solution.559		
In	City	 of	 Johannesburg	Metropolitan	Municipality	 v	 Blue	Moonlight	 Properties	 39	 (Pty)	
Ltd560	(“Blue	Moonlight”),	the	leading	case	on	private	evictions,	a	group	of	81	adults	and	
five	children	faced	eviction	by	a	private	landowner	that	sought	to	redevelop	the	property	
																																								 																				
556 See Lingwood and Another v Unlawful Occupiers of R/E ERF 9 Highlands 2008 (3) BCLR 325 (W); Blue 
Moonlight Properties v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and Others 2009 (1) SA 470 (W); Occupiers of Erf 
101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (4) BCLR 
354 (SCA) (‘Shorts Retreat’); The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville v Mark Lewis Steele 
2010 (9) BCLR 911 (SCA). See also the recent cases Molusi v Voges NO 2016 (7) BCLR 839 (CC); Pitje v 
Shibambo 2016 (4) BCLR 460 (CC); Daniels v Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC); Occupiers of Erven 87 and 
88 Berea v De Wet (CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017). See also S Liebenberg “Socio-economic 
rights beyond the public/private divide” in M Langford et al Symbols and Substance (2013). 
557 Lingwood and Another v Unlawful Occupiers of R/E ERF 9 Highlands 2008 (3) BCLR 325 (W) para 20. 
558 Para 33. 
559 Paras 37-38. 
560 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
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where	 they	 lived.	The	 issues	 presented	 in	Blue	Moonlight	 involved	 the	 extent	 to	which	
section	26	of	the	Constitution	obligates	a	private	landowner	to	allow	people	to	continue	
to	 occupy	 land	 where	 evicting	 them	 would	 result	 in	 homelessness;	 the	 interaction	
between	 the	 right	 to	 housing	 in	 section	 26	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 private	 property	 in	
section	25;	 the	 rights	of	 the	occupiers	and	 the	 landowner	against	 the	municipality;	 and	
the	 obligation	 on	 the	 government	 to	 provide	 emergency	 housing	 to	 citizens	 facing	
eviction	from	private	land.	
The	Court	established	the	principle	that	private	landowners	have	a	limited	obligation	to	
allow	occupiers	to	remain	on	land	where	evicting	them	would	cause	homelessness.	It	also	
articulated	that	the	municipality	couldn’t	rely	on	a	lack	of	resources	as	a	defence	where	
that	 lack	 was	 the	 result	 of	 an	 incorrect	 interpretation	 of	 its	 statutory	 obligations	 to	
provide	 housing.	 The	 court	 held	 that	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 the	 City	 of	 Johannesburg	 was	
required	 to	 provide	 emergency	 accommodation	 to	 people	 who	 would	 be	 rendered	
homeless	 by	 the	 eviction	 –	 “[t]he	 City	 has	 a	 duty	 to	 plan	 and	 budget	 proactively	 for	
situations	 like	 that	of	 the	occupiers”.561	The	Court	quoted	Grootboom	 in	 support	of	 the	
finding	that	the	proactive	“duty	regarding	housing	in	section	26	of	the	Constitution	falls	
on	all	three	spheres	of	government	–	local,	provincial	and	national	–	which	are	obliged	to	
co-operate”.562	
This	principle	has	also	been	applied	to	another	private	eviction	case	related	to	the	right	to	
education.563	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Juma	Musjid,	 an	 application	 for	 leave	 to	 appeal	 was	made	
against	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 KwaZulu-Natal	 High	 Court.	 	 The	 order	 of	 the	 High	 Court	
authorised	 the	 eviction	of	 a	 public	 school	 conducted	on	private	property.	 	 The	dispute	
was	between	the	 Juma	Musjid	Trust	 (Trust),	 the	owner	of	 the	private	property,	and	the	
Member	of	the	Executive	Council	for	Education	for	KwaZulu-Natal	(MEC)	as	well	as	the	
School	Governing	Body	(SGB).	 	The	 impasse	arose	when	the	MEC	failed	to	conclude	an	
agreement	as	required	by	certain	provisions	of	the	South	African	Schools	Act	(Act)	setting	
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562 Para 57. 
563 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 
761 (CC). 
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out	the	tenancy	terms	and	conditions.	 	The	standoff	culminated	in	a	successful	eviction	
claim	by	the	Trust	 in	the	High	Court.	 	This	was	followed	by	an	unsuccessful	attempt	to	
appeal	to	the	Supreme	Court	of	Appeal.564			
In	this	case,	the	Constitutional	Court	found	that	the	High	Court	should	not	have	made	an	
order	 for	 eviction,	 because	 the	 order	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 learners’	 right	 to	 a	 basic	
education	 under	 section	 29(1)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 and	 on	 the	 learners’	 best	 interests	
under	 section	 28	 of	 the	Constitution.	 	Nkabinde	 J	 stated	 that	 the	High	Court	 ought	 to	
have	required	the	MEC	to	provide	it	with	information	regarding	the	steps	she	had	taken	
to	ensure	that	 the	 learners	would	have	schools	at	which	they	would	be	enrolled	 for	 the	
2011	academic	year.		As	this	had	not	happened,	the	order	of	the	High	Court	was	set	aside	
and	 the	 provisional	 order	 dated	 7	 September	 2010	 was	 made.	 	 The	 provisional	 order	
required	the	MEC	and	the	Trustees	to	endeavour	to	conclude	a	section	14	agreement	in	
terms	of	the	Act	which	might	have	rendered	the	application	for	eviction	unnecessary	and	
saved	the	school	from	closure.565		
Once	it	became	clear	to	the	Court	that	pursuant	to	the	provisional	order,	the	closure	of	
the	 school	 had	 become	 inevitable	 and	 the	 dispute	 remained	 unresolved,	 the	 Trustees	
applied	for	an	eviction	order.		On	25	November	2010	a	further	order	was	made,	which	was	
designed	to	ensure	that	the	MEC	complied	with	his	obligation	to	provide	information	on	
alternative	schooling	for	the	children.566	Finally,	upon	considering	the	reports	and	further	
information	 furnished	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 order	 of	 25	 November	 2010,	 the	 Court	 was	
satisfied	 that	 the	 Trustees	 had	 made	 out	 a	 case	 for	 eviction	 and	 that	 satisfactory	
arrangements	 had	 been	 made	 by	 the	 MEC	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 learners	 would	 be	
accommodated	 at	 other	 schools	 during	 the	 2011	 school-year.	 	 Accordingly,	 on	 10	
December	2010	the	Court	granted	an	eviction	order.567	
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Broadly,	this	case	involved	balancing	competing	rights:	the	right	to	a	basic	education	on	
the	one	hand	and	property	rights	on	the	other.568	What	is	 interesting	about	this	case	in	
relation	to	“meaningful	engagement”,	is	that	the	Court	required	the	parties	to	resolve	the	
issues	 between	 them	 as	 per	 two	 orders	 of	 the	 Court,	 firstly	 before	 the	 eviction	 was	
decided	 upon,	 and	 then	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 eviction,	 in	 order	
ultimately	 to	protect	 the	 right	of	 the	children	 to	basic	education.	Nkabinde	 J	explained	
that	the	Court	provisionally	set	aside	the	eviction	order	by	the	High	Court	in	order	for	the	
MEC,	the	Trustees	and	the	SGB	to	engage	meaningfully	on	the	matter	and	discuss	options	
for	 securing	 alternative	 placement	 for	 the	 learners,	 in	 line	 with	 their	 right	 to	 basic	
education.569	
The	Court	in	this	case	took	care	to	examine	the	nature,	content,	substance	and	purpose	of	
the	right	to	education,	 in	the	context	of	 international	 law,	as	well	as	 in	the	context	of	a	
South	Africa	where	the	right	to	education	was	prejudiced	under	apartheid.570	Nkabinde	J,	
in	quoting	the	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights,	General	Comment	13,	
stressed	the	importance	of	the	right	to	education	as	an	“empowerment	right…	by	which	
economically	 and	 socially	 marginalised	 adults	 and	 children	 can	 lift	 themselves	 out	 of	
poverty	and	obtain	the	means	to	participate	fully	in	their	communities.”571	
In	 the	 eviction	 and	 education	 cases	 discussed	 above,	 the	 courts	 have	 established	 an	
obligation	 on	 the	 State	 to	 address	 the	 situation	 of	 poor	 people	 facing	 homelessness	 in	
private	 evictions	 and	 learners	 whose	 public	 schools	 are	 located	 on	 private	 land	 facing	
closure.	 The	 requirement	 for	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 between	 vulnerable	 individual	
citizens	 and	 private	 interests,	 overseen	 by	 the	 State,	 is	 a	 fundamental	 tenet	 of	 our	
horizontally	applicable,	 transformative	constitution	and	a	participatory	democracy.	This	
is	particularly	 important	 in	 the	context	of	poverty	where	 there	 is	a	 severe	 imbalance	 in	
power	 between	 the	 wealthy	 and	 the	 poor.	 Vulnerable,	 poor	 people	 can	 thus	 be	
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empowered	to	negotiate	the	terms	of	their	own	survival	and	development,	with	support	
of	the	courts.	
4	6	5	Transformative	“meaningful	engagement”	in	a	democratic	developmental	state	
In	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 executive	 and	 administrative	 structures	 need	 to	
incorporate	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 training	 and	 actual	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 in	
their	 policy	 development	 processes	 and	 throughout	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	
programmes.	 The	 government	 is	 duly	 obligated	 and	 therefore	 needs	 to	 be	 equipped	 to	
engage	 well	 before	 litigation	 is	 a	 possibility,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 design	 and	 delivery	 of	
socio-economic	rights.572	
“Meaningful	 engagement”	processes	 also	 encourage	 transparency	 and	 accountability.	 In	
Olivia	 Road	 the	 Court	 ordered	 the	 government	 to	 keep	 a	 public	 record	 of	 each	
engagement	so	that	 the	courts	could	 later	review	the	outcome	as	well	as	 the	process	of	
engagement.	 Emphasising	 that	 “secrecy	 is	 counter-productive	 to	 the	 process	 of	
engagement”,	the	Court	stated	“the	provision	of	a	complete	and	accurate	account	of	the	
process	of	engagement	including	at	least	the	reasonable	efforts	of	the	municipality	within	
that	 process	 would	 ordinarily	 be	 essential”.573	 Courts	 are	 then	 empowered	 to	 review	
whether	in	fact	meaningful	engagement	has	taken	place	between	the	city	and	the	resident	
who	 may	 be	 rendered	 homeless.574	 This	 is	 essential	 for	 accountable,	 transparent	 and	
participatory	governance,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
Brian	Ray	discusses	the	engagement	remedies	in	three	cases	-	Olivia	Road,	Mamba	and	Joe	
Slovo	 -	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 engagement	 orders	 of	 the	 court	 differed	
considerably	 in	 the	 three	 instances	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons.	He	 noted	 that	 there	was	 a	
distinct	 lack	 of	 trust	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 citizens;	 there	 was	 a	 top-down	
approach	versus	a	partnership	in	finding	solutions;	there	were	differing	degrees	of	control	
																																								 																				
572 See Ray Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits.  
573 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 
2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) para 21. 
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exercised	 by	 the	 courts;	 and	 differing	 political	 will	 on	 the	 part	 of	 government.575	 He	
distinguishes	 between	 these	 cases	 as	 examples	 of	 “litigation	 engagement”	 (engagement	
which	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 behest	 of	 litigation	 as	 a	 “remedy-management”	 tool),	 and	
supports	 and	 promotes	 his	 preferred	 form	 of	 engagement,	 “political	 engagement”,	 as	 a	
more	 systematic	 form	 of	 public	 participation	 in	 government	 policy	 development	
processes.	This	 is	the	method	that	he	thinks	the	Courts	will	most	 likely	develop	further	
and	which	has	the	most	potential	for	“transforming	engagement	into	an	effective	tool	for	
socio-economic	 rights	 enforcement”.576	He	 compares	 it	 to	 the	 standard	 role	 that	 courts	
have	taken	for	decades	in	the	US,	in	large	structural-reform	cases,	and	argues	for	different	
and	 appropriate	 roles	 for	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 other	 arms	 of	 government.	He	 states	 that	
remedies	like	engagement	mostly	rely	on	the	political	branches	and	citizens	themselves,	
not	 the	 courts,	 to	 develop	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 remedy.	 This	 turns	 the	 constitutional	
enforcement	into	more	of	a	political	than	a	judicial	process,	whilst	still	retaining	a	role	for	
the	courts	to	ensure	that	constitutional	values	are	enforced.577		
In	 our	 constitutional	 democracy,	 it	 is	 incumbent	 on	 policy-makers	 and	 implementing	
agents	to	consult	with	poor	communities	and	individuals	about	the	needs	to	be	addressed	
and	the	most	effective	way	to	address	them.	This	is	consistent	with	constitutional	values	
of	accountability,	responsiveness	and	openness,	found	in	section	1	of	the	Constitution	and	
underpinning	 our	 democratic	 developmental	 state.578	 There	 are	 no	 doubt	 numerous	
examples	of	where	this	form	of	“political	engagement”	takes	place	already,	but	it	needs	to	
be	 strengthened	 and	 extended	 and	 the	 Courts	 can	 assist	 in	 making	 this	 happen.	 The	
Constitution	 expressly	 provides	 for	 public	 access	 to	 and	 participation	 in	 legislative	
																																								 																				
575 Ray Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits. 
576 Ray Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits 18. 
577 Ray Engagement’s Possibilities and Limits 23. See also Ray Engaging with Social Rights; Sabel & Simon 
(2003-2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 1016, which discusses their analysis of US structural interdicts and 
institutional governance reforms; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 378, 434-438; K G Young “A typology of 
economic and social rights adjudication: Exploring the catalytic function of judicial review” in International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Advance (2011); A Klein “Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for 
the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights” 39 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 351 
(2008). 
578 G Muller “Conceptualising “Meaningful Engagement” as a Deliberative Democratic Partnership” (2011) 
22(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 742-758. 
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processes,579	 as	 well	 as	 executive	 processes	 by	 providing	 that	 “people’s	 needs	 must	 be	
responded	to,	and	the	public	must	be	encouraged	to	participate	in	policy-making”.580	The	
Constitutional	 Court	 has	 in	 several	 cases	 underscored	 the	 centrality	 of	 participatory	
democracy	to	the	achievement	of	constitutional	goals	and	values,581	the	necessity	of	this	
participation	 for	 purposes	 of	 informed	decision-making582	 and	 affirmed	 the	duty	of	 the	
State	 to	 take	positive	measures	 to	ensure	 that	 the	public	has	 the	effective	 capacity	 and	
opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 processes.583	 In	 particular,	 it	 has	
highlighted	the	need	to	listen	to	the	voices	of	the	poor	and	marginalised	in	society.584	
Moreover,	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 appears	 to	 favour	 the	 meaningful	 engagement	
approach	as	one	way	of	accommodating	the	separation	of	powers	dilemma	with	which	it	
is	constantly	confronted.	In	Matatiele	Municipality	and	Others	v	President	of	the	RSA	and	
Others	 (No	 2),	 a	 case	 about	 inadequate	 public	 participation	 in	 the	 demarcation	 of	
municipal	boundaries	in	Matatiele	and	Maluti,	the	court	said	that	the	state	didn’t	have	to	
follow	the	views	of	the	people	in	order	for	the	participation	to	be	meaningful,	but	merely	
consider	them	and	be	open	to	them.585	One	of	the	main	concerns	of	the	poor	residents	of	
Matatiele	 and	 Maluti	 was	 their	 access	 to	 government	 services.	 The	 form	 of	 the	
participation	and	“political	engagement”	is	thus	of	vital	importance	in	order	not	to	get	to	
the	point	of	“litigation	engagement”,	where	parties	are	then	forced	by	the	courts	to	find	
an	 amiable	 solution	 and	 to	 implement	 such	 solution	 through	 structural	 remedies.	 To	
truly	 reach	 the	 point	 of	 transformative	 engagement,	 poor	 people	 must	 be	 heard	 and	
negotiated	with	in	good	faith	-	prior	to	litigation	being	on	the	cards	-	and	only	then	will	
																																								 																				
579 Sections 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160. See chapter two. 
580 Section 195(1)(e). Sections 50 and 51 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 affirm the application of 
the constitutional principles governing public administration to the provision of municipal services. 
581 In Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 (1) BCLR 1, para 181, the 
Constitutional Court elaborated upon the goals and values of the Constitution in relation to democracy and 
participation: “[I]t is apparent from the Constitution that the democratic government that is contemplated is a 
participatory democracy which is accountable, transparent and requires participation in decision-making.” 
582 Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) para 33. 
583 See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) paras 
108, 112–117.  
584 Para 115, where the Constitutional Court highlighted the importance and value of participation by 
marginalised groups in legislative processes in giving legitimacy to legislation and dignity to those who 
participate. See further the discussion in chapters five and six. 
585 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC). 
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empowerment	 and	 upliftment	 of	 the	 poor	 be	 truly	 possible	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.	
4	6	6	Enforcement	of	court	orders	through	structural	remedies	
Despite	the	successful	litigation	of	socio-economic	rights	cases	for	the	benefit	of	the	poor,	
all	 levels	 of	 government	 have	 been	 criticised	 for	 partially	 or	 completely	 ignoring	 their	
court-ordered	 obligations.586	 This	 refers	 to	 all	 forms	 of	 remedies	 including	 declaratory	
orders,	 interdicts	 against	 state	 action,	 orders	 for	 compensation	or	mandatory	 orders	 to	
revert	 to	 a	 “status	quo”.	 Jonathan	Berger	 argues	 that	 this	 is	 the	 case	 irrespective	of	 the	
strength	of	the	order	and	that	follow-up	litigation	is	a	regular	feature	of	almost	all	socio-
economic	rights	cases.587	 In	attempting	to	explain	these	unsatisfactory	results,	Langford	
and	Kahanovitz	 argue	 that	 “supply-side	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 level	 of	 support	within	 the	
bureaucracy	and	government	for	the	judgment,	the	complexity	and	cost	of	the	orders,	the	
extent	of	soft	and	hard	judicial	power	and	the	power	of	relevant	non-state	actors”	are	all	
significant.588		
It	 is	often	contended	that	a	key	factor	appears	to	be	the	degree	of	pressure	and	level	of	
organisation	of	the	applicants	or	civil	society.	In	assessing	the	impact	and	enforcement	of	
socio-economic	 rights	 litigation	 in	 South	 Africa,	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 strong	 social	
movement,	NGO,	campaign	or	organised	community	in	support	of	the	applicant,	is	seen	
as	 a	 decisive	 variable.589	 The	 limited	 and	 distant	 outcomes	 for	 the	 poor	 litigants	 in	
																																								 																				
586 See the SASSA social grants cases as a glaring example: AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 
(CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief 
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC); Black Sash Trust v 
Minister of Social Development [2017] ZACC 8; 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and ZACC 20; 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 
(CC). See also Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 (2) BCLR 237 (GNP).  
587 J Berger “Litigating for Social Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Focus on Health and Education” in V 
Gauri & D Brinks (eds) Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the 
Developing World (2008). 
588 M Langford & S Kahanovitz Just Tick The Boxes? Judicial Enforcement In South Africa May 2010 
unpublished paper (copy on file with author) https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/ 
Langford_and_Kahanovitz_-_South_Africa_0.pdf> (accessed 7-11-2016). 
589 See for example Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC); 
Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) and 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Black Sash 
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Grootboom	versus	TAC	and	Abahlali	is	often	cited	in	support	of	this	view.590	The	emphasis	
on	the	civil	 support	structure	also	accords	with	 international	 research,	although	 it	does	
not	 necessarily	 accord	 with	 all	 comparative	 experience.591	 Nevertheless,	 a	 strong,	
coordinated	 voice	 advocating	 for	 the	 rights	 of	 poor	 and	 dispossessed	 people	 is	 an	
important	accountability	mechanism	for	the	executive,	the	legislature	and	the	courts,	in	a	
democratic	developmental	state.	In	the	recent	judgement	of	the	Land	Access	Movement	of	
South	 Africa	 v	 Chairperson	 of	 the	 National	 Council	 of	 Provinces592	 (“Land	 Access	
Movement”),	 the	Constitutional	 Court	 declared	 that	 Parliament	 had	 failed	 to	 satisfy	 its	
obligation	to	facilitate	public	involvement	on	the	Restitution	of	Land	Rights	Amendment	
Act	15	of	2014,	in	accordance	with	section	72(1)(a)	of	the	Constitution	and	thus	declared	
the	Act	invalid.593	
Arguments	 for	 supervisory	 jurisdiction	by	 the	court	might	be	 stronger	 in	 cases	without	
strong	social	movement	backing.	Cases	like	Hoërskool	Ermelo	and	Juma	Musjid	where	the	
court	required	both	the	SGB	and	the	HOD	to	report	back	to	it	once	the	policies	had	been	
reviewed,	may	produce	better	 outcomes.	 In	 the	High	Court	 judgment	of	Western	Cape	
Forum	 for	 Intellectual	 Disability	 v	 Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa	 and	
Others594	Cleaver	J	granted	a	structural	interdict	in	terms	of	which	the	respondents	were	
ordered	to	submit	a	program	to	the	court	as	to	how	they	intended	to	remedy	the	breach	
of	the	rights	of	the	affected	children	and	to	report	on	a	periodic	basis	as	to	the	progress	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Trust v Minister of Social Development [2017] ZACC 8; 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and ZACC 20; 2017 (9) BCLR 
1089 (CC). See also F Veriava The Limpopo Textbook Crisis 2012 <http://www.section27.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/The-2012-Limpopo-Textbook-Crisis1.pdf> (accessed 30-09-2016). See also 
generally M Langford et al (eds) Symbols or Substance (2013); and specifically B Goldblatt & S Rosa “Social 
Security Rights” in M Langford et al (eds) Symbols or Substance (2013) on the role of the Alliance for 
Children’s Entitlement to Social Security as an organising campaign for the extension of the Child Support 
Grant to all poor children under the age of 18 and the threat of potential litigation in the ultimate success of 
the campaign. 
590 See Berger “Litigating for Social Justice” in Courting Social Justice, for his wider review of cases generally 
supporting the importance of civil society pressure. The Treatment Action Campaign attributes its temporary 
failure to enforce the Nevirapine order due to its attention being diverted by other issues. In addition, applicant 
communities often experience different levels of organisation and unanimity.  
591 See for example Langford & Kahanovitz Judicial Enforcement In South Africa 3-4. 
592 2016 (10) BCLR 1277 (CC). 
593 Para 93. 
594 2011 (5) SA 87 (WCC). See also C Ngwena and L Pretorius “Substantive equality for disabled learners in 
state provision of basic education: a commentary on Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa” (2012) 28(1) SAJHR 81-115. 
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made	 and	 what	 further	 progress	 was	 intended.	 As	 to	 the	 basis	 for	 granting	 such	 an	
interdict,	reference	was	made	to	the	judgment	in	City	of	Cape	Town	v	Rudolph	 in	which	
Selikowitz	 J	 held	 that	 “[a]ppropriate	 or	 just	 and	 equitable	 relief,	 is	 relief	 which	 is	
effective.”595	He	stated	that	the	relief	must	be	selected	in	terms	of	its	ability	to	protect	the	
constitutional	 right	 that	 has	 been	 infringed	 and	 its	 effectiveness	 will	 depend	 on	 the	
factual	context	of	the	case.		
In	Fose	v	Minister	of	Safety	and	Security596	(“Fose”)	Ackermann	J	stated	that	appropriate	
relief	is	required	to	“protect	and	enforce	the	Constitution”	and	for	this	purpose	could	take	
the	form	of	“a	declaration	of	rights,	an	 interdict,	a	mandamus	or	some	other	relief	as	 is	
necessary	under	the	circumstances”.597	He	held	that	the	circumstances	of	the	case,	such	
as	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 applicant	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 respondents,	 would	
make	a	structural	interdict	an	appropriate	order.	He	also	stressed	the	importance	of	the	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 remedy,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 infringement	 of	 an	 entrenched	
constitutional	right.598		
Such	relief	has	been	granted	on	numerous	occasions	and	 is	appropriate	when	the	court	
does	not	wish	to	prescribe	to	the	respondent	in	detail	what	steps	must	be	taken.	Relief	of	
this	 nature	 was	 also	 granted	 in	 Rail	 Commuters	 Action	 Group	 v	 Transnet	 Limited	 t/a	
Metro	Rail599	(“Rail	Commuters”).	In	N	v	Government	of	Republic	of	South	Africa	(No	1),600	
while	 recognising	 that	 the	 grant	 of	 a	 structural	 interdict	might	 amount	 to	 interference	
with	the	authority	and	discretion	of	the	executive	arm	of	the	government,	the	court	held	
structural	 relief	 was	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 circumstances	 in	 the	 case.	 The	 Court	
found	there	was	nothing	“rational”	or	“workable”	coming	from	the	respondents	and	there	
																																								 																				
595  2004 (5) SA 39 (C) 74. 
596 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
597  Para 19. 
598 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) paras 19, 69.  
599 2003 (5) SA 518 (C). See also Kiliko and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2006 (4) SA 114 (C) 
para 32. 
600 2006 (6) SA 543 (D) para 32. 
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were	 many	 “delays,	 obstacles	 and	 restrictions”,	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 applicants’	
constitutional	rights.601	
In	 the	various	Pheko	 judgments	No	 1,	 2	and	3,602	 the	court	granted	a	 structural	 remedy	
that	required	regular	reporting	back	to	the	Court.	The	 judge	 in	Pheko	(No	3)603	gave	an	
order	 whereby	 the	 High	 Court	 must	 deal	 with	 the	 disputed	 facts	 related	 to	 the	
identification	of	suitable	alternative	land	for	the	Bapsfontein	community.	In	Pheko	(No	3)	
the	judge	stated:	“supervisory	orders	arising	from	structural	interdicts	ensure	that	courts	
play	an	active	monitoring	role	in	the	enforcement	of	orders”.604		The	court	held	that	this	
was	an	appropriate	case	for	supervisory	relief,	in	order	to	guarantee	a	commitment	to	the	
constitutional	values	of	accountability,	responsiveness	and	openness	by	all	concerned,	in	
a	system	of	democratic	governance.		The	granting	of	a	structural	interdict	is	intended	to	
secure	a	response	in	the	form	of	reports	in	order	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	positive	
obligations	 imposed	 by	 its	 order.	 	 The	 court’s	 role	 is	 thus	 to	 continue	 to	monitor	 the	
implementation	of	the	remedy	it	has	ordered	until	it	has	been	fulfilled.	
The	design	of	court	orders	can	also	be	more	influential	and	provide	direct	or	supervisory	
access	 to	 the	 lower	courts.605	These	are	designed	 in	 such	a	way	 that	allows	parties	easy	
access	 to	 lower	 courts	 where	 their	 constitutional	 rights	 have	 allegedly	 been	 infringed	
upon	and	judges	are	required	to	resolve	the	matter	within	a	certain	time	period.	Judges	
may	 make	 any	 order	 they	 deem	 appropriate	 and	 the	 decision	 must	 be	 carried	 out	
																																								 																				
601 Para 32. 
602 Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 (4) BCLR 388 (CC); Pheko v Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality 2015 (6) BCLR 711 (CC) (‘Pheko No 2’); Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (No 3) 2016 (10) BCLR 1308 (CC) (‘Pheko No 3’). 
603 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 (10) BCLR 1308 (CC). 
604 Para 1. 
605 For example the immediate, individualised and minimum tutela orders in jurisdictions like Costa Rica and 
Colombia seem to produce relatively high levels of compliance. See Langford Social Rights Jurisprudence 146. 
This writ of protection may be filed by any person whose constitutional rights have been violated or threatened 
and will receive protection. The trial judge has a period of ten days between the filing of the writ and the 
resolution. The tutela decisions have no specific remedy. The protection consists of an order made by the 
judge for parties to act or refrain from acting. The judges may choose the measures they see fit in the 
circumstances of the case to protect constitutional rights and the decision must be complied with immediately. 
It may be challenged before a superior court. 
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immediately.	In	the	case	of	Pheko	(No	3),	the	court	gave	the	High	Court	jurisdiction	over	
the	reporting	and	monitoring	of	the	case.606	
In	the	most	startlingly	 ineffective	example	of	the	application	of	structural	remedies,	the	
AllPay	 judgments,	 the	 court	 put	 in	 place	 supervisory	 orders	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 social	
grants	 system	 would	 not	 be	 jeopardised	 by	 the	 declaration	 of	 invalidity	 of	 the	 social	
grants	 payment	 contract.607	 The	 court	 intended	 to	 supervise	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	
Department	of	Social	Development	(‘DSD’)	and	the	South	African	Social	Security	Agency	
(‘SASSA’)	 would	 engage	 in	 a	 new	 tender	 process	 for	 the	 proper	 administration	 of	 17	
million	social	grants.	The	Department	and	SASSA	were	required	to	report	to	the	Court	on	
progress	 with	 the	 tender	 award	 process.	 When	 the	 Court	 was	 satisfied	 that	 proper	
procedures	 were	 in	 place	 and	 underway,	 it	 withdrew	 its	 supervisory	 order,	 only	 to	 be	
drawn	back	into	a	crisis	situation	in	March	2017	after	the	tender	was	not	awarded	and	the	
DSD	could	not	meet	its	deadline	to	have	a	new	contract	in	place	by	end	March	2017.		
The	non-governmental	organisation,	Black	Sash,	concerned	that	social	grants	would	not	
be	paid	to	17	million	beneficiaries	in	need	in	April	2017,	took	the	Minister	and	the	DSD	to	
the	Constitutional	Court	 to	compel	an	urgent	solution	 to	 the	grants	crisis.608	The	court	
ordered	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 invalid	 contract	 for	 a	 further	 year	 in	 order	 to	 avert	 the	
collapse	of	the	social	grants	payment	system.	It	was	harsh	in	its	critique	of	the	Minister	
and	Department’s	lack	of	progress	and	any	apparent	urgency	on	the	matter	over	the	two	
years	since	the	AllPay	 judgement.	Without	the	intervention	of	the	Black	Sash,	the	court	
and	 the	 issuing	 of	 yet	 another	 ongoing	 supervisory	 order,	millions	 of	 people	 and	 their	
families,	who	are	also	dependent	on	their	social	grants,	would	have	been	left	destitute.	
																																								 																				
606 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 (10) BCLR 1308 (CC) (‘Pheko No 3’) para 46. 
See also Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet (CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017). 
607 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC). 
608 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development [2017] ZACC 8; 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and ZACC 20; 
2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 168	
 
There	 is	 vast	 potential	 for	 structural	 interdict	 remedies	 to	 promote	 both	 far-reaching	
institutional	reforms	and	participatory	democracy.	In	a	democratic	developmental	state,	
it	 is	 crucial	 that	 the	 administration,	 the	 executive	 or	 the	 legislature	 is	 effective	 in	 its	
capacity	 to	 deliver	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 litigation	 and	 that	 these	 institutions	 are	 held	
accountable	 and	 demonstrate	 respect	 for	 the	 legitimate	 role	 of	 the	 courts	 under	 a	
constitutional	democracy.	Structural	remedies	allow	the	courts	to	play	a	monitoring	role	
over	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	 other	 spheres	 and	 organs	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 ensure	
accountability	and	responsiveness	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
4	7	Conclusion	
Justiciable	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 a	 transformative	 Constitution,	 assist	 in	monitoring	
the	 State’s	 progressive	 realisation	 of	 its	 constitutional	 obligations	 to	 the	 poor	 and	
ultimately	holding	the	State	accountable	for	these	obligations.	However	there	are	 limits	
to	the	extent	to	which	these	rights	have	been	able	to	support	wide-scale	socio-economic	
transformation	 in	 South	Africa	 over	 the	past	 21	 years,	 since	 the	 enactment	of	 the	Final	
Constitution.	This	is	due,	in	particular,	to	the	reluctance	of	the	courts	to	engage	with	the	
substance	of	the	rights,	the	deference	the	courts	have	shown	to	the	mandates	of	the	other	
arms	of	government	and	the	difficulties	experienced	with	the	enforcement	of	remedies.		
I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 Constitutional	 Court’s	 socio-economic	 rights	 jurisprudence	 can	
significantly	 contribute	 to	 this	 long-term	developmental	 enterprise.	The	 courts	need	 to	
engage	 with	 the	 substance	 of	 rights,	 in	 a	 collaborative	 way	 that	 not	 only	 solves	 the	
immediate	 problems	 faced	 by	 litigants	 in	 the	 cases	 before	 them,	 but	 that	 also	 creates	
certainty	 via	 systemic	 solutions	 to	 poor	 people	 in	 similar	 circumstances.	 The	 South	
African	 Constitutional	 Court	 ruled	 in	 Grootboom	 and	 in	 subsequent	 cases	 discussed	
above,	 that	 reasonableness	 is	 the	benchmark	set	 for	government	action	and	 inaction	 in	
the	context	of	 socio-economic	rights	 for	people	 living	 in	poverty.	This	 situation	has	 led	
many	to	view	the	socio-economic	rights	jurisprudence	through	a	procedural	lens	and	to	
characterise	 the	Court’s	approach	as	deferential.	Young’s	 typology	of	 the	Court’s	 review	
provides	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 the	 court’s	 approach	 over	 the	 past	 two	
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decades	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 rights	 jurisprudence.	 I	 argue	 similarly	 that	 by	 playing	 a	
proactive	 role,	via	managerial	and	experimentalist	 review	methods,	 the	Court	can	delve	
deeper	into	the	substantive	interpretation	of	rights,	including	their	intent,	their	contours	
and	their	potential	policy	implications,	without	assuming	a	supremacist	position.	
In	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 the	 courts	 as	 an	 institution	 can	 also	 be	
“democratised”	 by	 holding	 the	 state	 accountable	 and	 facilitating	 the	 meaningful	
participation	 of	 poor	 people	 and	 other	 critical	 role-players	 in	 the	 realisation	 of	 socio-
economic	rights.	The	courts	have	the	power	to	bring	the	various	parties	together	to	solve	
socio-economic	 issues,	 including	 affected	 communities,	 experts	 and	 state	 officials.	 The	
jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 relation	 to	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 in	
particular,	 has	 provided	 fertile	 ground	 in	 eviction	 and	 education	 rights	 cases	 for	
participatory	 democracy	 to	 flourish.	 The	 integrated,	 multi-dimensional	 human	 rights	
approach	and	the	capabilities	approach	to	poverty	alleviation	acknowledges	the	critical,	
transformational	 importance	 of	 participatory	 rights	 for	 poor	 people.	 The	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 espouses	participation	 as	 foundational	 to	bringing	 about	deep	 and	
sustained	 socio-economic	 transformation,	 as	 the	 main	 aim	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state.	 The	 next	 chapter	 will	 look	 at	 how	 administrative	 justice,	 as	 a	
participatory	 right,	 can	 further	 contribute	 to	 the	 redress	 of	 poverty	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	South	African	state.	
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 170	
 
CHAPTER 5: Administrative Justice to Address Poverty 
	
5	1	Introduction	
This	 chapter	 will	 discuss	 the	 realm	 of	 administrative	 law	 and	 delve	 into	 the	 role	 that	
administrative	 justice	 can	 play	 to	 advance	 socio-economic	 transformation	 in	 a	 South	
African	democratic	developmental	state.	South	African	administrative	 law	has	advanced	
significantly	from	a	procedurally	focused	area	of	law,	since	the	advent	of	democracy.	The	
inclusion	 of	 “justifiability”	 in	 section	 24(d)	 of	 the	 1993	 Constitution	 and	 thereafter	
“reasonableness”	 in	 section	 33(1)	 of	 the	 Final	 Constitution	 as	 a	 ground	 for	 review	 of	
“administrative	 action”	 is	 one	demonstrable	way	 in	which	South	African	 administrative	
law	has	shifted	towards	a	more	substantive	conception	of	review.	I	will	consider	the	scope	
and	the	substantive	content	of	 the	 requirements	under	 the	right	 to	 “just	administrative	
action”	 in	 section	33(1),	 in	particular	 the	elements	of	 “lawfulness”,	 “reasonableness”	and	
“procedural	 fairness”,	 in	 furthering	 the	 aims	 of	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 in	 a	
South	African	democratic	developmental	state.		
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 analysis	 is	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 and	 substantive	 content	 of	
administrative	 justice	 in	 advancing	 good	 governance	 and	 addressing	 poverty,	 alongside	
socio-economic	 rights	 provisions,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	
Following	 on	 from	 the	 discussion	 in	 chapter	 four	 above,	 I	 examine	 the	 promise	 of	 a	
substantive	right	to	just	administrative	action	to	be	a	platform	for	the	voices	of	poor	and	
vulnerable	 people	 in	 South	 Africa,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 public	 goods.	 Giving	
people	 a	 say	 in	decision-making	where	 administrative	 action	 is	 concerned,	 can	 shape	 a	
sense	 of	 empowerment	 and	 agency	 as	 a	 necessary	 dimension	 of	 poverty	 alleviation,	
discussed	in	chapters	two	and	three.	Participation	of	the	poor	in	the	determination	and	
provision	of	public	goods,	furthers	participatory	democracy,	and	enhances	accountability	
and	good	governance	 in	a	democratic	developmental	 state.	 It	 is	also	a	critical	aspect	of	
the	multi-dimensional	human	rights	approach	to	poverty,	described	in	chapter	three.	
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I	 begin	with	 a	 contextual	 overview	of	 the	 evolution	of	 administrative	 law	globally.	 The	
changing	 situation	 of	 global	 governance	 and	 the	 global	 economy	 has	 resulted	 in	
administrative	 law	 assuming	 a	 more	 prominent	 role.	 I	 discuss	 the	 growing	 body	 of	
international	 law	 and	 jurisprudence	 in	 the	 area	 of	 administrative	 law	 with	 a	 view	 to	
locating	its	modern	purpose	and,	in	particular,	the	pivotal	role	of	administrative	justice	in	
fostering	socio-economic	transformation	within	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
I	 then	briefly	outline	 the	history	of	South	African	administrative	 law,	up	 to	 the	present	
day.	Thereafter,	I	explain	the	current	interaction	between	section	33	of	the	Constitution,	
the	Promotion	of	Administrative	Justice	Act	3	of	2000	(‘PAJA’)	(meant	to	give	effect	to	the	
Constitution)	 and	 the	 common	 law,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 transformative	 constitution.	 I	
focus	my	discussion	 in	relation	to	the	requirements	under	section	33(1),	of	 “lawfulness”,	
“reasonableness”	and	“procedural	fairness”,	on	the	conceptions	of	these	elements	that	are	
significant	 in	 cases	 relating	 to	 the	 adjudication	 of	 socio-economic	 rights.	 In	 the	 first	
instance,	the	aim	is	to	highlight	the	extent	to	which	substantive	considerations	can	enter	
the	 essential	 elements	 of	 section	 33	 in	 order	 for	 administrative	 law	 to	 be	 capable	 of	
bringing	about	“justice”	not	purely	in	a	procedural	or	“means”	sense,	but	also	in	an	“ends”	
sense.	As	Quinot	and	Liebenberg	explain,	administrative	 law	review	since	the	advent	of	
the	 Constitution	 must	 now	 be	 understood	 “as	 part	 of	 administrative	 justice	 within	 a	
justiciable	 bill	 of	 rights.”609	 In	 the	 second	 instance,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 support	my	 argument	
that	 true	 socio-economic	 transformation	 can	 only	 take	 place	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	 state,	 where	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 accountability	 thrive.	 The	
safeguards	 of	 administrative	 justice,	 I	 argue,	 are	 essential	 elements	 of	 this	 project	 and	
“ends”	in	themselves,	in	an	integrated	view	of	a	human	rights	approach	to	poverty.	
The	courts	post	democracy	in	South	Africa,	have	interpreted	and	expanded	the	notions	of	
lawfulness	and	 legality	 in	 interesting	and	 innovative	ways.	These	could	be	employed	 to	
further	 socio-economic	 transformation	 under	 a	 constitutional	 dispensation	 in	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state.	 Legality	 is	 now	 much	 closer	 to	 the	 notion	 of	
																																								 																				
609 G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-
economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 (3) Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663, 641. 
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administrative	justice	as	it	includes	both	rationality	and	procedure.610	I	then	examine	the	
evolution	of	“reasonableness”	as	a	standard	of	review	in	administrative	law	and	the	shift	
towards	 a	 more	 substantive	 conception	 of	 review.	 I	 examine	 the	 implications	 of	 that	
change	in	cases	involving	review	of	administrative	action	where	socio-economic	rights	are	
impacted.	 Quinot	 and	 Liebenberg	 refer	 to	 these	 as	 “overlap	 cases”.611	 These	 cases	
demonstrate	 overlapping,	 and	 potentially	 complementary	 standards,	 of	 reasonableness	
review	 under	 the	 different	 constitutional	 provisions.	 The	 reasonableness	 standard	 of	
review	 under	 administrative	 justice	 includes	 a	 procedural	 as	 well	 as	 a	 substantive	
element.	 Both	 are	 necessary	 to	 fulfil	 the	 ideals	 of	 our	 transformative	 constitution	 in	 a	
democratic	developmental	state,	from	the	perspective	of	a	multi-dimensional	approach	to	
poverty.	Finally,	I	discuss	the	requirement	of	procedural	fairness	in	the	“overlap”	cases,	as	
a	 participatory	 element	 of	 administrative	 justice	 that	 is	 complementary	 to	 socio-
economic	rights	and	critical	to	participatory	democracy.	
It	is	within	this	context	that	this	chapter	investigates	the	role	of	administrative	law	in	the	
socio-economic	 transformation	 of	 South	 Africa,	 as	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	
Administrative	law	has	a	vital	role	to	play	in	maintaining	transparency	and	accountability	
of	 public	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 institutions	 performing	 public	 roles,	 promoting	
participatory	and	deliberative	democracy	and	ensuring	good	governance.	This	 is	critical	
to	addressing	multi-dimensional	poverty	and	inequality	in	the	long-term,	in	a	democratic	
developmental	state.	
																																								 																				
610 H Corder “The development of administrative law in South Africa” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in 
South Africa (2015) 2-26; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 253. 
611 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 641. These cases are: Minister of Public Works v 
Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association (Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC); Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 
(1) BCLR 78 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA, Amici 
Curiae) 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); 
Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC); Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the 
Province of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of 
Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC); Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC); Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff 
Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC); South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others; South African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg and 
Others 2014 (6) BCLR 726 (CC). 
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5	2	The	evolution	of	administrative	law	in	a	modern,	developing	world	
The	basic	format	and	the	principles	of	administrative	law	have	developed	over	centuries,	
but	its	recognition	as	a	separate	branch	of	law	has	only	transpired	over	the	last	century.612	
The	earliest	establishment	of	administrative	law	as	a	field	of	study	began	in	France	in	the	
late	19th	century	–	inspired	by	the	professionalisation	of	their	public	administration,	their	
history	of	extensive	executive	powers	and	the	application	of	the	doctrine	of	separation	of	
powers.613	Since	then	it	has	grown	into	a	vast	field.	
Administrative	law	can	now	be	divided	into	general	and	particular	categories:	(a)	General	
administrative	 law	 comprises	 “the	 general	 principles	 of	 law,	 which	 regulate	 the	
organisation	 of	 administrative	 institutions	 and	 the	 fairness	 and	 efficacy	 of	 the	
administrative	process,	which	govern	the	validity	of	and	liability	for	administrative	action	
and	inaction,	and	which	govern	the	administrative	and	judicial	remedies	relating	to	such	
action	 or	 inaction”;	 and	 (b)	 Particular	 administrative	 law	 encompasses	 the	 legislation,	
legal	 principles	 and	policies	 developed	 in	 relation	 to	 specific	 areas	 of	 administration.614	
This	dissertation	is	primarily	concerned	with	general	administrative	law.615	
Due	to	the	rapid	transformations	in	the	nature	and	structure	of	modern	society	and	the	
rise	in	prominence	of	human	rights,	the	realm	of	administrative	law	has	begun	to	widen	
and	 deepen	 into	 socio-economic	 spheres.616	 Baxter	 discusses	 a	 number	 of	 changes	 that	
have	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 direction	 of	 contemporary	 administrative	 law.617	
First,	and	most	importantly	for	purposes	of	this	dissertation,	the	rise	of	the	welfare	state	
and	 the	developmental	 state	as	a	 result	of	changing	political	attitudes,	growing	poverty	
and	 inequality	 and	 technological	 advancement,	 has	 elevated	 administrative	 law	 in	
																																								 																				
612 Baxter Administrative Law 46-56; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012). 
613 Baxter Administrative Law. See discussion on the separation of powers in chapter four. 
614 Baxter Administrative Law 54-55. 
615 Certain areas of particular administrative law such as social security law or education law may also have 
significant implications for the realisation of socio-economic rights, but a consideration of those particular 
areas fall beyond the scope of this study. 
616 Baxter Administrative Law 35, 63. See also Corder “The development of administrative law in SA” in 
Administrative Justice in SA 2-26, 24. 
617 Baxter Administrative Law 64-70. 
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relation	 to	 the	 delivery	 of	 social	 services	 to	 people	 and	 to	 their	 participatory	 rights.618	
Second,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 national	 or	 state	 security,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 heightened	
preoccupation	 with	 terrorism	 and	 consequently	 far-reaching	 powers	 of	 administrative	
agencies	 are	 also	 having	 an	 immense	 impact	 on	 individual	 liberties.619	 Third,	 there	 has	
been	 a	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 the	 contracting	 power	 of	 public	 authorities	 as	 a	method	 of	
policy	implementation.620	Baxter	refers	to	this	as	part	of	the	emergence	of	“administrative	
corporatism”,	 which	 blurs	 the	 public-private	 divide	 in	 delivering	 public	 functions.	 He	
describes	this	trend	as	manifesting	in	three	ways:	in	the	“increased	collaboration	between	
government	 and	 private	 organisations	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 conducting	 public	 ventures,	
such	as	economic	development”;	in	the	“publication	of	trades	and	professions”;	and	in	the	
creation	 of	 copious	 policy	 councils	 and	 advisory	 committees	 in	 Parliament	 “covering	
almost	 every	 facet	 of	 public	 administration”.621	 Fourth,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 need	 for	
regulation	 of	 inter-governmental	 relations,	 in	 particular	 central/local	 government	
relations.	Finally,	there	is	the	role	of	administrative	law	in	economic	regulation.	
																																								 																				
618 Only in rare cases do entitlements to natural justice and judicial review hold the status of human rights, 
such as in the South African Bill of Rights, the Constitutions of Namibia Article 18 
http://www.orusovo.com/namcon/ (accessed 18-09-2016); Ghana Article 2 
http://www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/chapter/chap_1.htm (accessed 18-09-2016); and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act No 109 1990, Article 27, Right to justice. 
619 In the Australian context, for example, in the absence of a Bill of Rights, administrative law has become a 
highly advanced tool for the protection and promotion of human rights, and as a constraint on public power. 
Australia has no statutory or constitutional Bill of Rights. Human rights claims have thus permeated 
administrative law because, like human rights law, it primarily constrains the exercise of public power, often in 
critical areas of public policy. As a consequence, Australian administrative law is more advanced than most 
jurisdictions and certainly more than international human rights law, since it provides both merits review and 
essential judicial guarantees of procedural fairness in administrative decision-making. In particular, 
administrative law has been used to challenge decisions about refugee status, where aggrieved applicants 
have sought judicial review regarding what are essentially human rights claims. These migration cases have 
seen the expansion of the scope of natural justice and other grounds of review, as well as a blurring of the 
legality/merits distinction. At the same time, without a bill of rights to bring human rights and administrative 
law together, Groves and Lee argue that Australian administrative law grounds for review have remained 
immune from consideration of human rights in administrative decision-making. McMillan and Williams argue 
that Australian law does secure a right to administrative justice, which is expressed as a right of individuals to 
seek judicial review of government decisions adversely affecting them; a right of appeal on the merits to a 
tribunal or a court (which may incorporate a human rights perspective in substituting the “correct or preferable 
decision”); and a right of judicial review on the law and merits on matters of special importance. See generally 
M Groves & H Lee (eds) Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (2007); J 
McMillan “Judicial Restraint and Activism in Administrative Law” (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 335 at 336; C 
Beaton-Wells “Australian Administrative Law: The Asylum Seeker Legacy” (2005) Public Law 267; N McMillan 
and N Williams “Administrative Law and Human Rights” in D Kinley (ed) Human Rights in Australian Law 
(1998) 63 at 82. 
620 See generally G Quinot State Commercial Activity: A Legal Framework (2009). 
621 Baxter Administrative Law 15. 
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These	 global	 trends,	 transpiring	 equally	 in	 the	 South	African	 context,	 have	 all	 led	 to	 a	
growing	 debate	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 judiciary,	 the	 executive	 and	 the	
legislature	and	the	degree	to	which	administrative	disputes	are	justiciable	in	the	courts.622	
As	such,	there	is	an	emergence	of	new	attempts	to	analyse	administrative	law	and	apply	
new	theories	to	it,	at	an	international,	regional	and	national	level.	These	efforts	highlight	
the	substantial	socio-economic	challenges	the	world	faces,	the	endeavours	to	regulate	the	
global	economic	order	and	together	address	the	challenges	of	widespread	poverty	and	the	
ongoing	infringement	of	human	rights,	by	the	public	and	private	spheres.	Such	patterns	
are	 also	 clearly	 discernible	 in	 the	 present	 South	 African	 political,	 economic	 and	 legal	
dispensation,	especially	vivid	in	the	mounting	corruption	of	the	state	and	its	capture	by	
private	 interests.623	 They	 have	 direct	 and	 indirect	 impact	 on	 the	 role	 of	 administrative	
justice	 to	 address	 the	 ongoing	 situation	 of	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 and	 enhance	
transparency,	accountability	and	participatory	democracy	in	a	democratic	developmental	
state.		
The	 next	 section	 looks	 at	 the	 current	 status	 and	 rising	 importance	 of	 administrative	
justice	 in	 international	 human	 rights	 law,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 trends	 featured	 in	 this	
section.	Although	South	African	administrative	law	is	arguably	substantially	ahead	of	the	
international	 trends,	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 international	 law	 context	 provides	 a	 legal-
political	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	 role	 of	 administrative	 justice	 and	 the	
intersection	with	socio-economic	rights,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
5	3	Administrative	justice	in	international	law	
Administrative	 justice	 under	 international	 law	 is	 sorely	 underdeveloped.	 The	 right	 to	
administrative	justice	is	not	explicitly	recognised	in	any	of	the	international	human	rights	
covenants	or	regional	conventions.	The	right	has	only	been	 inferred	 from	the	European	
human	 rights	 jurisprudence,	 namely	 from	 the	 fair	 hearing	 provision	 article	 6(1)	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
622 See discussion of separation of powers in chapter four. See also the latest case of Electronic Media 
Network Limited v e.tv (Pty) Limited 2017 (9) BCLR 1108 (CC). 
623 See Public Protector “State of Capture Report No.2 of 2016/17” (14-10-2016) Public Protector South 
Africa <http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-17/State_Capture_14October2016.pdf> 
(accessed 29-05-2017). 
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European	 Convention	 and	 the	 “right	 to	 good	 administration”	 in	 the	 Charter	 of	
Fundamental	 Rights	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 2000	 (“CFREU”).	 Few	 of	 the	 older	
international	human	rights	 instruments	 treat	access	 to	a	court	 to	challenge	detrimental	
administrative	 decisions	 as	 a	 human	 right.	 Article	 14	 of	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	
Civil	and	Political	Rights	(“ICCPR”),	and	Articles	6	and	13	of	the	European	Convention	on	
Human	Rights	 (“ECHR”)	are	 the	 rare	examples,	although	heavily	circumscribed	 in	 their	
application.624	These	international	treaties	arose	in	a	post-war	period	and	have	since	been	
interpreted	 in	 accordance	 with	 more	 modern	 notions	 in	 recent	 times.	 Contemporary	
charters,	 like	 the	CFREU,	 reflect	 an	 evolution	of	 administrative	 law	 that	 recognises	 the	
increasing	power	of	 administrative	decision-making	over	people’s	 lives	 and	 the	need	 to	
protect	 individual	 social	and	economic	 interests	 from	both	public	and	private	power.625	
The	potential	therefore	exists	to	extend	the	realm	of	international	administrative	justice	
rights	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 realisation	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 an	
integrated	human	rights	approach	to	poverty	discussed	in	chapter	three.		
5	3	1	International	human	rights	law	
There	 is	 no	 explicit	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 in	 international	 human	 rights	 law.	
Article	14(1)	of	the	ICCPR	establishes	only	that	in	the	determination	of	a	“criminal	charge”	
or	“rights	and	obligations	in	a	suit	at	law”,	a	person	is	“entitled	to	a	fair	and	public	hearing	
by	a	competent,	independent	and	impartial	tribunal	established	by	law”.626	A	“suit	at	law”	
																																								 																				
624 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Art 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966); European 
Convention on Human Rights, Arts 6, 13, opened for signature 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955). See 
further discussion below. In several cases, the European human rights bodies have confirmed the importance 
of this right in relation to administrative decisions by intergovernmental bodies. 
625 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 (2000/C 364/01). The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000 contains Article 41 “Right to good administration”, which 
protects the right of every person: “to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable 
time by the institutions and bodies of the Union”; “to be heard, before any individual measure which would 
affect him or her adversely is taken”; and “the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions” 
[emphasis added]. 
626 ICCPR, Article 14 states: 
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press 
and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre 
public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the 
parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
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was	 historically	 understood	 as	 meaning	 a	 civil	 action	 in	 court,	 and	 did	 not	 extend	 to	
encompass	 administrative	 decisions	 or	 actions.	 This	 limitation	 reflects	 the	 historical	
circumstances	 during	 the	 period	 1945-1966,	 in	 which	 the	 human	 rights	 treaties	 were	
drafted,	 when	 the	 full	 effects	 on	 individuals	 of	 the	 explosive	 growth	 of	 the	 modern	
regulatory	state	were	not	yet	felt.	Civil	or	criminal	proceedings	were	still	considered	the	
primary	means	by	which	legal	rights	and	interests	were	affected,	and	the	 importance	of	
safeguarding	the	individual	from	bureaucratic	oppression	and	maladministration	was	not	
fully	recognised.	
However,	more	recently,	the	Human	Rights	Committee,	in	General	Comment	32,	“Article	
14:	Right	 to	 equality	 before	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 and	 to	 a	 fair	 trial”,627	 has	 extended	 its	
application	and	declared	that:		
“The	concept	of	determination	of	rights	and	obligations	 ‘in	a	suit	at	 law’	…	encompasses	
(a)	judicial	procedures	aimed	at	determining	rights	and	obligations	pertaining	to	the	areas	
of	contract,	property	and	torts	in	the	area	of	private	law,	as	well	as	(b)	equivalent	notions	
in	the	area	of	administrative	law	such	as	the	termination	of	employment	of	civil	servants	
for	 other	 than	 disciplinary	 reasons,	 the	 determination	 of	 social	 security	 benefits	 or	 the	
pension	 rights	 of	 soldiers,	 or	 procedures	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	 public	 land	 or	 the	 taking	 of	
private	property.	 In	addition,	 it	may	 (c)	 cover	other	procedures	which,	however,	must	be	
assessed	on	a	case	by	case	basis	in	the	light	of	the	nature	of	the	right	in	question.”628		
This	 provides	 an	 opening	 up	 of	 international	 “administrative	 justice”	 rights	 to	 socio-
economic	areas	such	as	social	security	and	property	and	acknowledges	the	important	role	
it	can	play	 in	determining	rights	and	obligations	under	 international	human	rights	 law.	
This	 is	 potentially	 useful	 jurisprudence	 for	 the	 South	African	 courts	when	determining	
cases	where	administrative	justice	rights	affect	socio-economic	rights.		
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in 
a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons 
otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. 
627 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and 
tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007). 
628 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32, para 16 [emphasis added]. 
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Article	 14	 is	 said	 to	 be	 limited	 though,	 in	 that	 it	 guarantees	 procedural	 equality	 and	
fairness	only	and	cannot	be	interpreted	as	ensuring	the	absence	of	error	on	the	part	of	the	
competent	 tribunal.	 It	 is	 generally	 for	 the	 courts	 of	 States	 parties	 to	 the	 Covenant	 to	
review	facts	and	evidence,	or	the	application	of	domestic	legislation,	in	a	particular	case,	
unless	 it	 can	 be	 shown	 that	 such	 evaluation	 or	 application	 was	 clearly	 arbitrary	 or	
amounted	to	a	manifest	error	or	denial	of	justice,	or	that	the	court	otherwise	violated	its	
obligation	 of	 independence	 and	 impartiality.	 The	 same	 standard	 applies	 to	 specific	
instructions	to	the	jury	by	the	judge	in	a	trial	by	jury.	
5	3	2	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	
The	ECHR	does	not	make	explicit	mention	of	 any	 right	 to	administrative	 justice	 in	 the	
making	of	decisions,	however	protection	for	such	rights,	have	been	derived	from	Article	
6(1)	through	interpretation.	Article	6(1)	provides	that	in	the	determination	of	their	“civil	
rights	 and	 obligations	 …	 everyone	 is	 entitled	 to	 a	 fair	 and	 public	 hearing	 within	 a	
reasonable	 time	 by	 an	 independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal	 established	 by	 law”.	 Under	
Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR,	 state	 parties	must	 ensure	 that	 the	 procedural	 standards	 of	 the	
international	organisations	of	which	they	are	members	are	equivalent	 to	 their	domestic	
standards.		
Christopher	 Forsyth	 explains	 that	 article	 6(1)	 was	 originally	 intended	 to	 apply	 to	 the	
determination	 of	 private	 law	 rights	 only	 and	not	 to	 public	 law	matters,	 and	 to	 judicial	
proceedings	 rather	 than	administrative	proceedings.629	However,	 given	 the	modern	 far-
reaching	 duty	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 applicable	 to	 administrative	 decision-makers,	 the	
European	 jurisprudence	 has	 accepted	 that	 Article	 6(1)	 applies	 in	 administrative	
matters.630	The	jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(“European	Court”)	
has	also	accepted	that	the	failure	of	an	initial	decision	to	comply	with	Article	6(1)	may	be	
																																								 																				
629 C Forsyth “Article 6(1) of the European Convention and the curative powers of judicial review” The 
Cambridge Law Journal Vol 60(3) (2001) 449-452, 449. 
630 See Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455; and Fredin v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 784. 
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cured	 if	 the	person	 aggrieved	 can	bring	 the	 case	 on	 review	before	 an	 independent	 and	
impartial	tribunal	of	“full	jurisdiction”.631		
Applying	 the	 jurisprudence	 under	 Article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 in	 R.	
(Alconbury	Developments	Ltd.)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Environment,	Transport	and	the	
Regions	 (‘Alconbury’),632	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 held	 that	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	
State	in	a	planning	matter	could	be	questioned	before	the	High	Court	by	a	special	form	of	
judicial	review	–	an	application	under	section	288	of	the	Town	and	Country	Planning	Act	
1990.	However	 the	merits	 of	 the	decision	 could	not	be	questioned	 in	 such	proceedings	
and	was	unnecessary	to	cure	the	lack	of	impartiality	and	independence	of	the	Secretary	of	
State	 in	 the	 case	 in	 question.	 Forsyth	 critiques	 the	 decision	 in	 Alconbury	 for	 being	
“incoherent”	 because	 “the	 supposed	 flaw	 in	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 decision	 was	 his	
reliance	 upon	 his	 own	 policy	 and	 understanding	 of	 the	 public	 interest”.	 That	 “flaw”	
cannot	be	cured	by	judicial	review	proceedings	that	do	not	reconsider	his	reliance	upon	
that	 policy,	 and	 therefore	 that	 do	 not	 touch	 the	 merits.633	 However,	 extension	 of	 the	
grounds	 of	 judicial	 review	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 reviewing	 court	 is	
sufficiently	full	were	laid	in	Alconbury,	where	Lord	Slynn	remarked	further	that	“the	court	
has	 jurisdiction	 to	 quash	 for	 a	 misunderstanding	 or	 ignorance	 of	 an	 established	 and	
relevant	fact”,634	thus	forming	the	foundation	for	the	judicial	review	for	error	of	fact	in	the	
English	system.	
Forsyth	 identifies	 two	 particular	 instances	 in	 which	 the	 applicability	 of	 Article	 6(1)	 to	
administrative	decision-making	is	“somewhat	vexed”.635	First,	it	is	often	unclear	when	an	
administrative	 decision	 determines	 “civil	 rights”.	 Second,	 whilst	 non-compliance	 with	
Article	 6(1)	 may	 be	 “cured”	 where	 the	 person	 aggrieved	 has	 access	 to	 a	 court	 of	 “full	
																																								 																				
631 Bryan v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 116. 
632 [2001] 2 WLR 1389. 
633 Forsyth (2001) Cambridge Law Journal 451. 
634 [2001] 2 WLR 1389, 1407. 
635 C Forsyth “Procedural justice in administrative proceedings and Article 6(1) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” The Cambridge Law Journal Vol 26(2) (2003) 244-247. 
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jurisdiction”,	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 “full	 jurisdiction”	 is	 in	 the	 circumstances.636	 Forsyth	
discusses	 the	 case	 of	 Runa	 Begum	 v	 Tower	 Hamlets	 London	 Borough	 Council	 (“Runa	
Begum”)637	 where	 the	 issue	 of	 provision	 of	 accommodation	 by	 a	 local	 council	 to	 a	
homeless	 person	 arose.	 The	 decision	 taken	 by	 the	 council’s	 rehousing	manager	 in	 this	
case,	 was	 held	 not	 to	 have	 been	 taken	 by	 an	 “independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal”.	 In	
relation	to	the	merits	of	the	decision	and	in	reliance	upon	Alconbury,	the	court	held	that	
access	to	a	court	of	“full	jurisdiction”	meant	“full	jurisdiction	to	deal	with	the	case	as	the	
nature	of	 the	decision	requires”.638	The	 facts	of	 the	case	were	at	 issue	and	so	 the	Court	
hearing	 a	 section	 204	 appeal	 under	 the	 Housing	 Act	 1996,	 had	 the	 power	 to	 quash	
findings	of	fact	that	were	perverse	or	irrational	or	when	there	was	no	evidence	to	support	
them,	 but	 the	 court	 could	 not	 substitute	 its	 own	 findings	 of	 fact	 for	 those	 of	 the	 final	
instance	decision-maker.639	
Finally,	 in	 determining	 what	 is	meant	 by	 “civil	 rights”,	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	
Rights	has	held	that	social	security	benefits	engage	Article	6(1).640	In	these	cases,	the	right	
in	question	was	an	individual,	economic	right	that	flowed	from	specific	statutory	rules.	In	
Runa	 Begum,	 the	 issue	 of	 “civil	 rights”	 engagement	 did	 not	 need	 to	 be	 determined,	
however	 Lord	 Hoffman	 discussed	 the	 issue	 at	 length	 and	 concluded	 that	 the	 right	 to	
accommodation	was	“akin	to	a	claim	for	social	security	benefits”.641	As	Lord	Hoffman	said:	
“An	 English	 lawyer	 can	 view	 with	 equanimity	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 article	 6	
because	 the	 English	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 requires	 the	 legality	 of	 virtually	 all	
government	decisions	affecting	the	individual	to	be	subject	to	the	scrutiny	of	the	ordinary	
courts	….	[T]his	breadth	of	scope	is	accompanied	by	an	approach	to	the	ground	of	review	
																																								 																				
636 Forsyth (2003) Cambridge Law Journal 244. See also R Wade & C Forsyth Administrative Law 11 Ed 
(2014). 
637 [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 WLR 388 (HL). 
638 Para 5, 85. 
639 Para 99. 
640 Feldbrugge v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 425 (contributory sickness benefit claim); Salesi v Italy (1993) 
26 EHRR 187 (state-funded non-contributory disability pension); Mennitto v Italy (2000) 34 EHRR 1122. 
641 [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 WLR 388 (HL) para 55. 
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which	 requires	 that	 regard	be	had	 to	democratic	 accountability,	 efficient	 administration	
and	the	sovereignty	of	Parliament.”642	
This	 quote	 highlights	 the	 purpose	 of	 administrative	 justice	 and	 justifies	 its	 widened	
scope.	The	right	to	administrative	justice	is	a	critical	tool,	in	a	democratic	developmental	
South	 African	 state	 requiring	 greater	 democratic	 accountability	 and	 administrative	
efficiency,	 particularly	 in	 cases	 where	 social	 benefits	 are	 determined.	 The	 evolving	
international	 law	 and	 jurisprudence	 related	 to	 global	 administrative	 law	 indicates	
growing	support	for	a	broadened	scope	and	role	for	administrative	justice,	in	the	pursuit	
of	democratic	accountability	and	administrative	efficiency	in	a	modern	state.	
5	4	Global	administrative	law	
The	concept	of	“global	administrative	 law”	is	still	nascent	but	 is	taking	shape	through	a	
growing	body	of	research	and	practice.643	It	is	relevant	to	briefly	mention	this	concept	for	
the	purposes	of	this	dissertation,	due	to	the	expanding	significance	of	accountability	and	
participatory	 approaches	 in	 tackling	 poverty	 and	 development	 challenges.	 The	 main	
writers	 in	 this	 area	 have	 identified	 certain	 emerging	 characteristics	 of	 global	
administrative	 law	 that	 elucidate	 the	 broader	 purpose	 and	 substantive	 content	 of	
administrative	law	in	a	complex,	contemporary	world	and	in	a	democratic,	developmental	
state.	 Kingsbury	 explains	 the	 basis	 of	 global	 administrative	 law	 as	 being	 the	 increased	
																																								 																				
642 [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 WLR 388 (HL) para 35. 
643 See for example B Kingsbury, N Krisch & R B Stewart The Emergence of Global Administrative Law (2005) 
New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 17 New York University School of Law 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/17> (accessed 30-09-2016); C Harlow “Global Administrative Law: The Quest 
for Principles and Value” (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 197; N Krisch “The Pluralism of 
Global Administrative Law” (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 247; N Krisch and B Kingsbury 
“Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order” (2006) 17 European 
Journal of International Law 1; M Barr & G Miller “Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel” (2006) 17 
Journal of International Law 15; B Morgan, “Turning Off the Tap: Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social 
Construction of Global Administrative Law” European Journal of International Law (2006) 17(1) 215–46; 
Quinot Administrative Justice in South Africa, chap 4; S Chesterman Global Administrative Law (2009) New 
York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 17 New York University School of Law 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/152> (accessed 30-09-2016); B Kingsbury “The concept of ‘law’ in global 
administrative law” The European Journal of International Law (2009) 20(1) 23-57; and H Corder Global 
Administrative Law: Innovation and Development (2009). 
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application	of	trans-governmental	regulation	and	administration	in	many	areas	including	
security,	 development	 finance,	 environmental	 protection,	 banking,	 law	 enforcement,	
telecommunications,	 international	 trade,	 intellectual	 property,	 and	 cross-border	
movements	 of	 populations,	 including	 refugees.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 global	 interdependence,	
various	 transnational	 regulatory	 systems	 have	 been	 established	 through	 international	
treaties	and	cooperation	in	order	to	deal	with	regulatory	decisions	at	a	global	level.644		
Kingsbury	 posits	 that	 this	 global	 shift	 “has	 created	 an	 accountability	 deficit	 in	 the	
growing	exercise	of	transnational	regulatory	power”.645	The	response	to	this	has	been	an	
attempt	to	extend	domestic	administrative	law	to	intergovernmental	regulatory	decisions	
that	 affect	 a	 nation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 development	 of	 new	 global	 administrative	 law	
mechanisms	to	address	decisions	made	within	the	intergovernmental	systems.646		
The	 focus	 of	 the	 field	 of	 global	 administrative	 law	 is	 on	 the	 operation	 of	 principles,	
procedural	 rules,	 review	 mechanisms	 and	 other	 mechanisms	 to	 ensure	 transparency,	
participation,	reasoned	decision-making	and	legality	in	global	governance.647	 	The	scope	
reaches	even	further	to	propose	the	inclusion	of	“substantive	law	that	defines	the	powers	
and	limits	of	regulators	under	human	rights	treaties	and	case	law	defining	the	conditions	
under	which	state	organs	can	interfere	with	individual	liberties”.648	The	normative	bases	
of	 global	 administrative	 law	 resonate	 with	 evolving	 South	 African	 administrative	 law	
under	 a	 transformative	 constitution	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 Kingsbury	
describes	these	normative	conceptions	as	follows:	
																																								 																				
644 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 16. 
645 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 16. 
646 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 16-17. Global administrative bodies can include: 
formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies, informal intergovernmental regulatory networks and coordination 
arrangements, national regulatory bodies operating with reference to an international intergovernmental 
regime, hybrid public–private regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory bodies exercising transnational 
governance functions of particular public significance. 
647 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law. The definition of global administrative law would 
cover most of global governance as “administrative action”, namely “rulemaking, administrative adjudication 
between competing interests, and other forms of regulatory and administrative decision and management”. 
Kingsbury describes what constitutes “administrative action” under domestic law as defined primarily in the 
negative — “state acts that are not legislative or judicial — and even though the boundaries between these 
categories are blurred at the margins”. 
648 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 28-29.  
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“Three	different	normative	 conceptions	of	 the	 role	of	 global	 administrative	 law:	 internal	
administrative	 accountability;	 protection	 of	 private	 rights	 or	 the	 rights	 of	 states;	 and	
promotion	of	democracy.”649	
The	descriptions	of	global	administrative	law	comprise	some	broad	basic	legal	principles	
and	requirements	of	both	a	procedural	and	a	substantive	nature,	although	the	system	is	
still	 fragmented	and	developing.	The	 first	 foundational	principle	 is	 a	 classic	and	 largely	
uncontroversial	 feature	 of	 domestic	 administrative	 law.	 Procedural	 participation	 and	
transparency	represents	the	right	of	affected	individuals	to	have	their	views	and	relevant	
information	considered	before	a	decision	 is	 taken.	Various	versions	of	 this	principle	are	
increasingly	 applied	 in	 global	 administrative	 governance.	 In	 the	WTO	 Appellate	 Body	
decision	in	the	Shrimp–Turtle	case,	it	required	the	United	States	to	provide	mechanisms	
for	procedural	participation.650	The	United	States	had	provided	none	of	the	states	whose	
exports	 of	 shrimp	 products	 to	 the	 United	 States	 had	 been	 curtailed	 by	 domestic	 U.S.	
administrative	regulations	with	a	“formal	opportunity	to	be	heard,	or	to	respond	to	any	
arguments	that	may	be	made	against	it”.651		
Participation	in	global	administrative	proceedings	has	not	been	restricted	to	 individuals	
or	states	affected	by	decisions.	It	is	common	practice	for	international	bodies	to	include	
NGOs	 representing	 affected	 social	 and	 economic	 interests,	 in	 their	 work	 of	 standard-
setting	and	rule-making.652	Many	of	these	NGOs	apply	pressure	for	access	to	information	
and	 “decisional	 transparency”,	 which	 is	 important	 in	 order	 for	 participation	 rights	 and	
rights	of	review	to	be	exercised	effectively.	They	also	promote	accountability	by	exposing	
administrative	decision-making	to	public	and	peer	scrutiny.653	
																																								 																				
649 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 43 [emphasis added]. 
650 WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R Doc. No. 98-3899 (Oct. 12, 1998) (Shrimp–Turtle). 
651 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 38. See also N Woods & A Narlikar “Governance 
and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank” 53 International Social Science 
Journal (2001) 569. 
652 For example the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making, and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (entered in force Oct. 30, 2001). 
653 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 38. 
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The	 second	 requirement	 is	 that	 of	 providing	 reasons	 for	 administrative	 decisions.	 This	
fundamental	principle	has	also	been	extended	 from	domestic	 law	 into	 some	global	and	
regional	institutions.	An	entitlement	to	have	a	decision	of	a	domestic	administrative	body	
affecting	 one’s	 rights	 reviewed	 by	 a	 court	 or	 other	 independent	 tribunal	 is	 among	 the	
most	widely	accepted	features	of	domestic	administrative	law,	and	this	is	to	some	extent	
reflected	in	global	administration.	This	entitlement	to	review	by	national	authorities	was	
referred	 to	 in	 the	Shrimp–Turtle	 decision.654	Acceptance	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 review	 is	
reflected	in	the	establishment	of	the	World	Bank	Inspection	Panel,	and	also	in	the	right	of	
appeal	to	the	Court	of	Arbitration	for	Sport	from	doping	decisions.655	
Finally,	 the	 substantive	 standards	 that	 apply	 across	 domestic	 law	 and	 global	
administrative	law	are	variable.	Kingsbury	argues:		
“Especially	 when	 individual	 rights	 are	 placed	 at	 the	 forefront,	 global	 administrative	 law	
might	 be	 expected	 to	 embody	 substantive	 standards	 for	 administrative	 action,	 like	 those	
applied	in	a	domestic	context—such	as	proportionality,	rational	relation	between	means	and	
ends,	use	of	less	restrictive	means,	or	legitimate	expectations”.656		
Proportionality	is	a	central	issue	in	the	jurisprudence	of	some	international	human	rights	
regimes,	as	discussed	above:	in	the	ECHR,	for	example,	interference	with	many	individual	
rights	 can	 be	 justified,	 but	 only	 if	 (inter	 alia)	 the	 interference	 is	 proportionate	 to	 the	
legitimate	 public	 objective	 pursued.657	 The	 proportionality	 principle	 is	 reflected	 also	 in	
some	 national	 court	 decisions	 on	 global	 governance,	 such	 as	 a	 German	 court	 decision	
critical	 of	 a	 ruling	 by	 an	 international	 sports	 federation	 in	 a	 doping	 case	 because	 it	
imposed	disproportionate	sanctions.658	Similarly,	restrictions	conflicting	with	the	general	
rules	 of	 free	 trade	under	 the	GATT	 are	 allowed	only	 if	 they	meet	 certain	 requirements	
designed	to	ensure	a	rational	fit	between	means	and	ends,	and	employ	means	that	are	not	
more	 trade-restrictive	 than	 reasonably	 necessary	 to	 accomplish	 the	 relevant	 regulatory	
																																								 																				
654 Shrimp-Turtle para 180. 
655 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 39. 
656 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law [emphasis added]. 
657 See above 5 3 2. 
658 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 39. 
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objective.	 Yet	 in	 many	 other	 areas	 of	 global	 administration,	 the	 application	 of	 such	
requirements	has	so	far	been	minimal.659	
With	 the	 changing	 role	 of	 the	 nation	 state	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 administrative	 state,	
responsibility	 for	 the	 welfare	 and	 development	 of	 its	 people	 is	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 pro-
active,	ever-expanding	state.	The	inclusion	of	administrative	 justice	and	socio-economic	
rights	in	the	South	African	Constitution	entrenches	the	role	of	the	state	to	provide	access	
to	housing,	education,	health	care	and	so	on,	which	mandates	fall	predominantly	on	the	
administration.	 The	 next	 section	 examines	 the	 role	 of	 administrative	 justice	 in	 socio-
economic	transformation,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
5	5	Socio-economic	transformation	and	administrative	justice	
Administrative	 law	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “regulating	 the	 activities	 of	 bodies	 that	 exercise	
public	 powers	 or	 perform	 public	 functions,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 those	 bodies	 are	
public	authorities	in	a	strict	sense”.660	As	the	definition	states,	the	focus	of	administrative	
law	takes	a	functional	as	opposed	to	an	institutional	approach,	where	it	is	the	function	of	
public	 administration	 rather	 than	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 public	 administration	 that	 is	
determinative	of	 “administrative	 action”.661	 Branches	of	 the	 state	 capable	 of	 performing	
“administrative	 action”	 are	 the	 “policy	 branch”	 of	 the	 executive,	 the	 “public	
administration”,	the	legislature	and	the	judiciary.662		
The	 “policy	 branch”	 of	 the	 executive	 refers	 to	 that	 part	 of	 the	 government	 concerned	
primarily	with	the	formulation	of	policy	and	legislation;663	those	institutions	responsible	
for	implementation	of	legislation	and	policy	are	classified	under	the	administration.	The	
																																								 																				
659 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 41. 
660 C Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed (2012) 2. Different definitions of administrative law abound. Some 
definitions attempt to distinguish between constitutional law and administrative law. See Corder 
“Administrative law in SA” in Administrative Justice in SA 2. See also Baxter Administrative Law 50-52. Baxter 
distinguishes the two subjects in terms of their emphasis: “while constitutional law is primarily concerned with 
the structure and distribution of governmental power, administrative law is primarily concerned with its mode 
of exercise.” 
661 G Quinot & P Maree “Administrative action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa (2015) 
66-94, 72. See President of RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
662 Quinot & Maree “Administrative action” in Administrative Justice in SA 67-70. 
663 See M Vile (1998) Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 400, quoted in P Maree “Administrative 
authorities in legal context” in G Quinot Administrative Justice in South Africa (2015) 38. 
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“public	administration”	generally	 includes	the	organs	and	functionaries	of	 the	executive	
branch	 of	 the	 state	 responsible	 for	 the	 day-to-day	 implementation	 of	 law	 and	 the	
administration	 of	 policy	 –	 this	 includes	 all	 the	 government	 departments	 at	 national	 or	
provincial	level.	It	also	includes	local	government	administrations,	the	security	forces	and	
“parastatal”	 organisations.664	 According	 to	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 public	 administration	
comprises	the	public	service,	or	the	employees	of	government	departments.665		
“Administrative	action”	refers	broadly	 to	 the	conduct	of	a	public	administration	nature,	
and	 includes	 actions	 by	 natural	 or	 juristic	 persons	 “when	 exercising	 a	 public	 power	 or	
performing	 a	 public	 function	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 empowering	 provision,	 which	 adversely	
affects	 the	 rights	 of	 any	person	 and	which	has	 a	direct,	 external	 legal	 effect	 ...”.666	 It	 is	
important	to	note	that	the	actions	of	some	private	institutions	and	bodies	–	such	as	clubs	
and	churches	–	may	also	qualify	as	administrative	action,	notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	
these	bodies	are	not	part	of	the	public	administration.667	In	the	words	of	Nelson	Mandela:	
“Even	the	most	benevolent	of	government	are	made	up	of	people	with	all	the	propensities	for	
human	 failings.	 The	 rule	 of	 law	 as	we	 understand	 it	 consists	 in	 the	 set	 of	 conventions	 and	
arrangements	that	ensure	that	it	is	not	left	to	the	whims	of	individual	rulers	to	decide	on	what	
is	good	for	the	populace.	The	administrative	conduct	of	government	authorities	are	subject	to	
the	scrutiny	of	independent	organs.	This	is	an	essential	element	of	good	governance	that	we	
have	sought	to	have	built	into	our	new	constitutional	order”.668	
																																								 																				
664 Hoexter Administrative Law 3: “These consist of public enterprises, regulatory boards, cultural bodies and 
other organisations wholly or partly controlled by government”, for example Telkom, Eskom, South African 
Broadcasting Corporation, the South African Law Commission and the Human Sciences Research Council. See 
also Baxter Administrative Law chapter eight. 
665 Section 197(1) of the Constitution. 
666 Section 1 of PAJA. 
667 Hoexter Administrative Law 3. See further discussion below. 
668 Address by President Nelson Mandela at the International Ombudsman Institute VIIth International 
Conference on Balancing the Exercise of Governmental Power and its Accountability, delivered at Durban 
2000. Quoted in South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others; South 
African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg and Others 2014 (6) BCLR 726 (CC) para 3. 
In this case, informal traders in the inner City of Johannesburg applied for urgent interim relief from the High 
Court and then the Constitutional Court when their right to dignity and right to trade was severely curtailed by 
the City officials and metro police. The court granted the relief sought on the basis that their conduct had 
“spawned immediate and acute hardship that left the applicant traders destitute” (para 36); and affected the 
rights of their children to basic nutrition, shelter and basic health care services (para 31). 
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The	 institutional	accountability,	of	which	Mandela	speaks,	 is	of	critical	 importance	 in	a	
democratic	 developmental	 state	 built	 on	 a	 transformative	 Constitution.	 The	
administrators	and	decision-makers	that	distribute	public	goods	must	be	accountable	in	a	
constitutional	 democracy.	 This	 is	 also	 distinctive	 of	 a	 participatory	 democracy	 where	
people	 are	 entitled	 to	 have	 a	 say	 in	 the	 decisions	 that	 directly	 affect	 them.	With	 the	
inclusion	of	the	right	to	administrative	justice	in	the	Constitution,	administrative	law	has	
evolved	 into	 a	 set	 of	 legal	 rules	 aimed	 at	 realising	 administrative	 justice.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	 it	 must	 be	 understood	 that	 unlike	 administrative	 law	 under	 the	 common	 law,	
administrative	 law	 in	 the	 service	 of	 administrative	 justice	 is	 about	 more	 than	 judicial	
review.	Although	 judicial	 review	 is	 a	 critical	 process	 for	 accountability,	 there	 are	many	
other	 routes	 and	mechanisms	 just	 as	 important	 to	 realising	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	
justice.669	 This	 expansive	 role	 for	 administrative	 justice	 is	 imperative	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state	that	requires	good	governance	and	efficient	public	administration,	in	
order	to	bring	about	socio-economic	transformation.		
The	 challenge	 for	 lawyers,	 practitioners	 and	 proponents	 of	 administrative	 justice,	 is	 to	
inculcate	 principles	 and	 guidelines	 for	 the	 behaviour	 of	 public	 servants	 engaged	 in	 the	
exercise	of	public	power	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.670	The	courts	can	assist	by	
promoting	administrative	 justice	principles	in	their	 judgements	and	remedies;	academic	
and	 training	 institutions	 can	 educate	 lawyers	 and	 public	 officials.	 	 Other	 avenues	 for	
achieving	 administrative	 justice	 besides	 the	 courts	 include	 specialised	 ombuds	 offices,	
appeals	tribunals	and	so	on.		
Due	 to	 the	 applicability	 of	 administrative	 justice	 to	 a	 wide	 spectrum	 of	 topics,	 as	
discussed	above,	the	South	African	courts	have	considered	a	significantly	large	number	of	
cases	under	the	administrative	 justice	rubric	 in	the	South	African	Constitution,	and	the	
Promotion	 of	 Administrative	 Justice	 Act	 3	 of	 2000	 (“PAJA”),	 since	 1994.	Notably,	 these	
cases	have	included,	in	a	range	of	selected	areas,	the	use	of	the	right	to	just	administrative	
action	 to	 both	 advance	 the	 interests	 of	 and	 protect	 the	 poor.	 The	 history,	 scope	 of	
																																								 																				
669 See G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa (2015) xv. 
670 Corder “Administrative law in SA” in Administrative Justice in SA 25. 
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application,	and	content	of	the	requirements	under	this	right	are	outlined	below	and	the	
interpretation	of	the	right	in	cases	related	to	realisation	of	socio-economic	rights	for	the	
poor	and	vulnerable,	is	discussed	further	in	chapter	six.		
5	5	1	The	Constitution,	PAJA	and	the	common	law	
South	Africa	has	a	long	history	of	abuse	of	government	power,	characterised	by	“executive	
authority”	and	a	wide	range	of	discretionary	powers	granted	 to	government	officials.	 In	
addition,	the	authority	of	the	courts	under	the	common	law	to	review	the	exercise	of	this	
discretion	 was	 extremely	 limited	 by	 the	 constitutional	 system	 of	 “parliamentary	
sovereignty”.671		
The	 Constitution	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 South	 Africa	 Act	 200	 of	 1993	 (“the	 Interim	
Constitution”)	 established	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 (section	 24),672	 within	 a	
system	of	constitutional	supremacy.	Section	24	of	the	Interim	Constitution	changed	the	
position	of	common	law.	In	Pharmaceutical	Manufacturers	Association	of	South	Africa:	In	
Re	Ex	Parte	President	of	the	Republic	of	South	Africa673	(“Pharmaceutical	Manufacturers”)	
the	Constitutional	Court	held	that	there	is	only	one	system	of	administrative	law,	which	is	
shaped	 by	 and	 subject	 to	 the	Constitution	 and	 rejected	 the	 notion	 that	 judicial	 review	
under	the	Constitution	and	the	common	law	are	different	concepts.674	The	Constitution	
requires	 the	administration	to	act	 in	accordance	with	 fundamental	principles	of	 justice,	
fairness	 and	 reasonableness.	The	 court	 further	 clarified	 that	 the	power	of	 the	 courts	 to	
review	administrative	action	is	also	now	derived	from	the	Constitution.675	
																																								 																				
671 C Hoexter “Just Administrative Action” in I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 643; 
O’Regan (2004) SALJ 424. 
672 Section 24 stated:  
Every person shall have the right to- 
(a) lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests is affected or threatened; 
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or her rights or legitimate expectations is 
affected or threatened; 
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of his or her rights 
or interests unless the reasons for such action have been made public; and 
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where any of his or 
her rights is affected or threatened. 
673 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC).  
674 Para 33. 
675 Para 45. 
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Administrative	law	is	now	firmly	grounded	as	a	constitutional	concept	in	South	Africa	in	
section	 33	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 right	 to	 “just	 administrative	 action”.	 	 The	
constitutional	 right	 requires	 administrative	 action	 to	 be	 lawful,	 reasonable	 and	
procedurally	 fair	 (s	 33(1)),	 and	 includes	 the	 right	 to	be	given	 reasons	 for	 administrative	
action	(s	33(2)).	Section	33(3)	places	a	further	obligation	on	the	State	to	enact	legislation	
to	 give	 effect	 to	 these	 rights	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 for	 judicial	 review	 of	 administrative	
action	 and	 to	 promote	 an	 efficient	 administration.	 This	 is	 also	 a	 critical	 element	 of	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state	where	 efficient	 institutional	 capacity	 of	 the	 courts,	 the	
executive	 and	 the	 administration,	 is	 required	 to	 ensure	 delivery	 of	 public	 goods	 and	
accountability	over	such	delivery.	
Following	 the	 decision	 in	 the	 Pharmaceutical	 Manufacturers	 case,	 the	 Promotion	 of	
Administrative	Justice	Act	was	enacted	to	“give	effect	to”	the	constitutional	right	to	just 
administrative action.676	 It	 is	 the	 legislative	basis	 for	 the	review	of	administrative	action	
and	sets	out	procedures	to	be	followed	by	administrators	before	taking	certain	decisions	
or	making	certain	rules.	The	purpose	of	administrative	justice	and	PAJA	is	to	ensure	the	
government	 is	 democratic,	 accountable,	 open	 and	 transparent.	 As	 Skweyiya	 J	 stated	 in	
Joseph	v	City	of	Johannesburg677	(“Joseph”):	
“The	preamble	of	PAJA	gives	expression	to	the	role	of	administrative	justice	and	provides	that	
the	 objectives	 of	 PAJA	 are	 inter	 alia	 to	 “promote	 an	 efficient	 administration	 and	 good	
governance”	 and	 to	 “create	 a	 culture	 of	 accountability,	 openness	 and	 transparency	 in	 the	
public	 administration	 or	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 public	 power	 or	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 public	
function”.	 	 These	 objectives	 give	 expression	 to	 the	 founding	 values	 in	 section	 1	 of	 the	
Constitution,	 namely	 that	 South	Africa	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 on	 principles	 of	
democratic	government	to	ensure	accountability,	responsiveness	and	openness.”678	
																																								 																				
676 The Act came into operation on 30 November 2000 (Proclamation R73 of 29 November 2000), with the 
exceptions of ss 4 and 10. These sections came into effect on 31 July 2002 (Proclamation R63 of 24 July 
2003). 
677 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC). 
678 Para 43 (footnote omitted). 
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This	 resonates	 with	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 striving	 to	 address	 poverty	 and	
inequality	 in	 a	 structural	 and	 substantive	 manner	 through	 the	 participation	 and	
empowerment	of	poor	and	vulnerable	people.	A	democratic	developmental	state	requires	
“active	 democratic	 structures”	 such	 as	 the	 courts,	 to	 provide	 an	 avenue	 to	 hold	 the	
administration	and	the	executive	accountable	for	the	efficient	delivery	of	public	goods	to	
people	 in	 need	 of	 them.	 Both	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 public	 administration	 require	 the	
relevant	institutional	legitimacy	and	capacity	in	order	to	fulfil	these	objectives,	values	and	
principles	of	our	democratic	constitutional	order.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 PAJA	 is	 general	 administrative	 law,	 which	
supplements	all	other	legislation	empowering	particular	administrative	action.	Since	the	
enactment	of	PAJA,	 the	 rights	 to	 just	 administrative	action	 in	 the	Constitution,	 though	
foundational,	 largely	 play	 an	 indirect	 role	 in	 judicial	 review	 to	 interpret	 the	 PAJA	 in	 a	
manner	 that	 conforms	 to	 section	 33.679	 In	 addition,	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 constitutional	
supremacy,	 if	 any	 aspect	 of	 PAJA	 unjustifiably	 limits	 the	 constitutional	 right	 to	
administrative	justice,	it	can	be	contested	as	an	infringement	of	section	33.680 
5	5	2	The	scope	of	administrative	law	
The	scope	of	administrative	law,	in	particular	the	meaning	of	“administrative	action”	and	
the	question	of	 the	 relationship	between	 the	PAJA	definition	of	 “administrative	 action”	
and	the	meaning	of	“administrative	action”	in	section	33	of	the	Constitution,	is	the	subject	
of	much	contention.681		
According	to	the	body	of	jurisprudence	interpreting	the	right	to	lawful,	procedurally	fair	
and	 justifiable	 administrative	 action	 under	 section	 24	 of	 the	 interim	 Constitution	 (in	
																																								 																				
679 Hoexter “Just Administrative Action” in Bill of Rights Handbook 643. 
680 O’Regan laid this out in Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) 490 
(CC) para 25: “The Courts’ power to review administrative action no longer flows directly from the common law 
but from PAJA and the Constitution itself. The groundnorm of administrative law is now to be found in the first 
place not in the doctrine of ultra vires, nor in the doctrine neither of parliamentary sovereignty, nor in the 
common law itself, but in the principles of our Constitution. The common law informs the provision of PAJA and 
the Constitution, and derives its force from the latter. The extent to which the common law remains relevant to 
administrative law review will have to be developed on a case-by-case basis as the Courts interpret and apply 
the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution.” 
681 See C Hoexter “’Administrative action’ in the courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303.  
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operation	 between	 1994	 and	 2000),	 “administrative	 action”	 is	 “the	 exercise	 of	 public	
power	 by	 all	 organs	 of	 state	 except	 the	 following:	 the	 legislatures	 (national,	 provincial,	
local)	 when	 exercising	 their	 legislative	 functions”;682	 “the	 judiciary,	 when	 exercising	
judicial	 functions”;683	 “the	 President	 when	 exercising	 the	 constitutional	 powers	 of	 the	
head	 of	 state”684	 (and	 similarly,	 “the	 Premiers	 of	 Provinces	 exercising	 their	
constitutionally	 enumerated	 powers”685);686	 and	 “the	 cabinet	 and	 provincial	 cabinets	
(when	making	political	decisions)”.687	The	 jurisprudence	of	 the	Constitutional	Court	on	
the	meaning	of	“administrative	action”	is	based	primarily	on	a	distinction	between	policy	
development	 and	 legislative	 activity	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 legislation,	 the	 latter	
being	 administrative	 action.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 at	 this	 point	 that	 socio-economic	
rights	 jurisprudence	 has	 challenged	 both	 policy	 formulation	 and	 legislative	 activity,	 to	
greater	 and	 lesser	 extents,	 and	 this	 is	 complementary	 to	 the	 role	 that	 administrative	
justice	can	play	in	challenging	policy	and	legislation	implementation	in	relation	to	socio-
economic	transformation,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
The	definition	of	“administrative	action”	in	the	PAJA	is	markedly	more	complex	than	the	
right	 to	administrative	 justice	provided	 for	 in	 the	Constitution.688	Firstly,	 the	definition	
delineates	whose	decisions	may	be	the	subject	of	judicial	review	of	administrative	action:	
“organs	of	state”	including	departments	at	national,	provincial	or	local	government	level;	
																																								 																				
682 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC). 
683 Nel v Roux NO 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC); Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd v Diversified Health Systems 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 661 (SCA) . 
684 Sections 84 and 85 of the Constitution set out the powers, functions and executive authority of the 
President. 
685 Sections 125 and 127 of the Constitution set out the powers, functions and executive authority of Premiers. 
686  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC); President of the RSA and Others v SARFU and Others 1999 (10) BCLR 
1059 (CC). 
687 The Head of State and Cabinet are excluded because they are endowed under the Constitution with political 
(policy) and not administrative authority. Permanent Secretary, Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern 
Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 (2) BCLR 118 (CC) para 21. 
688“‘[A]dministrative action’ means any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by – 
(a) an organ of state, when –  
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect…” 
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and	natural	or	juristic	persons	exercising	public	power	or	performing	a	public	function.689	
The	PAJA	also	specifically	excludes	some	of	the	actions	of	particular	organs	of	state	from	
the	definition	of	administrative	action	-	and	these	are	therefore	not	governed	by	the	Act.	
Most	of	these	excluded	actions	are	governed	directly	by	the	Constitution	and	have	their	
own	specific	rights,	procedures	and	remedies.	The	actions	which	are	excluded	are:	policy	
decisions	of	the	executive;	the	making	of	legislation	by	Parliament,	a	provincial	legislature	
or	 a	municipal	 council;	 the	 exercise	 of	 judicial	 functions	 by	 the	 officers	 of	 courts	 and	
some	other	 bodies;	 and	decisions	 taken	under	 the	Promotion	of	Access	 to	 Information	
Act	(Act	No.	2	of	2000)	to	either	allow	or	deny	access	to	information.		
Secondly,	 the	 Act	 confines	 administrative	 action	 to	 “decisions”	 or	 “failure	 to	 take	
decisions”,	 instead	 of	 “conduct”	 of	 the	 administration.	 The	 Act	 contains	 a	 complicated	
definition	 of	 “decision”.690	One	 of	 the	 grey	 areas	 in	 the	Act	 relates	 to	whether	 the	Act	
applies	to	the	making	of	delegated	legislation.	In	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	v	Eisenberg	and	
Associates	 (“Eisenberg”)	 it	was	 stated:	 “The	definition	of	 ‘decision’	does	not	 refer	 to	 the	
making	of	regulations	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	this	constitutes	administrative	action	for	
the	purposes	of	PAJA.”691	Further	on,	however,	the	Court	asks	whether	“a	construction	of	
PAJA	 that	 excludes	 the	making	 of	 regulations	 from	 the	 ambit	 of	 administrative	 action	
would	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 Constitution.”692	 In	 the	 case	 of	Minister	 of	 Health	 and	
Another	v	New	Clicks	South	Africa	(Pty)	Ltd	and	Others693	(“New	Clicks”),	 the	validity	of	
regulations	 made	 by	 the	 Minister	 of	 Health,	 on	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Pricing	
																																								 																				
689 In Section 239 of the Constitution, organs of state also include “functionaries or institutions exercising a 
power or performing a function in terms of any legislation”, such as universities. 
690 “‘[D]ecision’ means any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or required to be 
made, as the case may be, under an empowering provision, including a decision relating to – 
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or determination; 
(b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or 
permission; 
(c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a license, authority or other instrument; 
(d) imposing a condition or restriction; 
(e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; 
(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or 
(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an administrative nature, and a reference to a failure 
to take a decision must be construed accordingly.” 
691 2003 (5) SA 281 (CC) para 52. 
692 Para 53 fn 30. 
693 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC). 
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Committee,	to	give	effect	to	the	pricing	system	for	the	sale	of	medicines,	were	challenged.		
The	court	split	on	the	question	of	whether	PAJA	applied	to	the	recommendations	of	the	
Pricing	 Committee	 and	 to	 the	 subsequent	 making	 of	 regulations	 by	 the	 Minister.694	
Chaskalson	CJ,	Langa	DCJ,	Ngcobo,	O’Regan	and	Van	der	Westhuizen	JJ	held	that	PAJA	is	
applicable.	 The	 reasoning	 of	Chaskalson	CJ	 and	Ngcobo	 J	 differs	 in	 that	Chaskalson	CJ	
decided	 that	PAJA	applies	 to	 the	making	of	all	 regulations,	while	Ngcobo	 J	decided	 the	
matter	 narrowly	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 powers	 in	 issue	 in	 this	 case,	 and	 leaves	 the	 question	
whether	 PAJA	 applies	 to	 all	 regulation-making	 open.695	 	 Sachs	 J	 held	 that	 the	 Act	 is	
applicable	to	the	issue	of	the	dispensing	fee	only	and	that	the	general	regulatory	scheme	
is	 governed	by	 the	 principles	 of	 legality.696	Moseneke,	Madala,	Mokgoro,	 Skweyiya	 and	
Yacoob	JJ	held	that	it	was	not	necessary	to	decide	the	issue	of	the	applicability	of	PAJA,	
since	they	found	the	procedure	followed	to	be	fair.697	
Thirdly,	the	decision	must	be	made	under	an	“empowering	provision”.698	This	establishes	
clearly	 that	 administrative	 action	 includes	 the	 implementation	 of	 other	 forms	 of	 law	
besides	legislation.		
Then	the	decision	taken	must	“adversely	affect	rights”.	This	is	one	of	the	most	significant	
limitations	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 PAJA	 and	 circumscribes	 where	 it	 intersects	 with	 socio-
economic	 rights.	 This	 includes	 decisions	 that:	 require	 someone	 to	 do	 something,	 to	
tolerate	 something	 or	 not	 to	 do	 something;	 limit	 or	 remove	 someone's	 rights;	 or	 say	
someone	does	not	have	a	right	to	something.	This	is	called	an	“adverse	determination	of	a	
person's	 rights”.699	 A	 decision	 can	 “affect”	 a	 person’s	 rights	 in	 one	 of	 two	 ways:	 the	
decision	 could	 deprive	 a	 person	 of	 their	 existing	 rights;700	 or	 it	 could	 affect	 a	 person's	
																																								 																				
694 Para 13 – provides a summary of the issues raised and the conclusions reached by the Court.  
695 Para 13. 
696 Para 13. 
697 Para 13. City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Cable City (Pty) Ltd 2010 (3) SA 589 (SCA) where the 
SCA held rule-making to be subject to PAJA. See also G Quinot “Administrative law” (2010) Annual Survey of 
South African Law 41 – 76. 
698 Section 1: “‘empowering provision’ means a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or an agreement, 
instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken.” 
699 I Currie The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act: A Commentary 2 ed (2007) 74-81. 
700 For example Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxusa 
2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) . 
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right	by	determining	what	 those	rights	are.	An	example	 is	where	someone	applies	 for	a	
Child	Support	Grant	and	the	administrator	decides	not	to	grant	approval	for	it.	The	PAJA	
uses	the	term	in	both	of	these	senses.	In	other	words,	decisions	that	deprive	someone	of	
rights,	and	those	that	determine	that	person's	rights	are	both	“administrative	action”.701		
Finally,	 a	 decision	 must	 have	 legal	 effect,	 the	 effect	 must	 be	 direct,	 and	 it	 must	 be	
external.	This	means	that	to	meet	the	requirements	of	“administrative	action”,	a	decision	
must	have	a	real	impact	on	a	person's	rights.	It	must	be	a	legally	binding	determination	of	
someone's	 rights	 or	 obligations.	 Put	 another	 way,	 a	 decision	 must	 establish	 what	
someone's	rights	or	obligations	are,	or	must	change	or	withdraw	them;	and	the	decision	
must	be	a	 final	one.702	 In	Head	of	Department:	Mpumalanga	Department	of	Education	v	
Hoërskool	 Ermelo703	 (“Hoërskool	 Ermelo”),	 the	Court	 characterised	 the	dispute	 as	 being	
about	the	issues	of	 legality	and	administrative	 justice	 in	relation	to	“the	right	to	receive	
education	 and	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	 state	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 right	 is	 given	 effect	 to	 in	
public	schools”.704	
Hoexter	has	critiqued	PAJA	for	severely	circumscribing	the	realm	of	administrative	action	
via	 its	 elaborate	 statutory	 definition	 in	 section	 1.	 She	 is	 pessimistic	 about	 the	 overly	
complex	 and	 narrow	 definition	 of	 “administrative	 action”	 in	 PAJA	 and	 the	 consequent	
struggle	 of	 the	 courts	 in	 applying	 this	 definition.	 Her	 analysis	 shows	 that	most	 of	 the	
courts	dealing	with	administrative	law	post-PAJA	have	spent	a	disproportionate	amount	
of	 interpretive	 energy	 considering	 whether	 the	 statutory	 definition	 is	 satisfied	 or	 not,	
before	 they	 can	proceed	with	 the	 substantive	 considerations	of	 the	merits	of	 the	 cases.	
Hoexter	 argues	 further	 that	 far	 too	much	of	 the	 action	has	not	 fallen	within	 this	 strict	
definition.	 This	 definition	 has	 thus	 unduly	 limited	 the	 potential	 impact	 of	 the	
administrative	 justice	provision	 in	 section	33	of	 the	Constitution,	 as	 the	Act	 is	now	 the	
primary	pathway	to	judicial	review	in	administrative	law.	It	has	also	distracted	the	courts	
																																								 																				
701 See Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC); and Grey’s Marine Hout Bay and Others v 
Minister of Public Works and Others 2005(6) SA 313 (SCA). 
702 PAJA s 1(b). 
703 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) para 32. 
704 Para 39-40, 43. 
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from	 dealing	with	 the	 substance	 of	 administrative	 law	 and	 the	 content	 of	 the	 right	 to	
administrative	justice.	She	states	that	“substance	can	become	form;	cases	that	ought	to	be	
and	 really	 are	 about	 fairness	 or	 reasonableness	 can	 become	 cases	 about	 administrative	
action.”705		
The	substantive	and	participatory	elements	of	the	right	to	just	administrative	action	play	
an	 important	 role	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 and	 are	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	
section.	 The	 courts’	 interpretation	 of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 right	 is	 thus	 critical.	 The	
intersection	between	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice,	in	cases	that	have	
come	before	the	courts	and	which	Quinot	and	Liebenberg	refer	to	as	“overlap”	cases,	will	
also	 be	 discussed	 further	 below,	 and	 in	 chapter	 six.	 These	 cases	 demonstrate	 the	
substantive	 complementarity	 between	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights	
towards	 achieving	 socio-economic	 transformation	 in	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	state.	
5	5	3	The	content	of	the	right	to	administrative	justice:	Substance	and	participation	
Section	 33(1)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 establishes	 a	 right	 to	 administrative	 action	 that	 is	
“lawful,	 reasonable	 and	 procedurally	 fair”.	 The	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	 right	 to	 just	
administrative	action	has	helped	to	flesh	out	the	substantive	content	of	the	right,	and	in	
cases	where	the	duties	overlap	with	socio-economic	rights,	has	lent	itself	to	a	compatible,	
substantive	 interpretation	 of	 both	 sets	 of	 rights.	 The	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 the	
elements	 of	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 -	 lawfulness,	 the	 principle	 of	 legality,	
reasonableness,	and	procedural	fairness	-	reinforces	the	participatory	and	accountability	
aspects	 of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 aimed	 at	 achieving	 socio-economic	
transformation.	
5	5	3	1	Lawfulness	and	the	principle	of	legality	
Hoexter	defines	the	requirement	of	“lawfulness”	as:	
																																								 																				
705 Hoexter (2006) Acta Juridica 312. 
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“’Lawful’	administrative	action	means	 in	essence	that	administrative	actions	and	decisions	
must	be	duly	 authorised	 by	 law	 and	 that	 any	 statutory	 requirements	 or	 preconditions	 that	
attach	to	the	exercise	of	the	power	must	be	complied	with.”706		
Hoexter	explains	that	there	are	many	grounds	of	review	that	give	content	to	the	idea	of	
lawfulness,	 arising	 from	 the	 common	 law,	 the	 constitutional	 right	 to	 administrative	
justice,	 and	 PAJA	 itself.707	 These	 grounds	 are	 overlapping	 and	 have	 been	 variously	
classified.	She	classifies	them	according	to	three	main	themes	of	legality:	the	requirement	
of	 authority,	 the	 concept	 of	 jurisdiction	 and	 abuse	 of	 discretion.708	 A	 discussion	 of	 all	
these	grounds	 is	unnecessary	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	dissertation,	however,	 the	area	of	
interest	 and	 relevance	 for	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
courts	have	used	the	broader,	encompassing	concept	of	legality	itself,	in	cases	relating	to	
administrative	justice	and	socio-economic	rights.709		
In	the	pre-democratic	era	the	principle	of	legality	was	the	idea	that	administrators	had	to	
act	 lawfully,	 or	 as	 described	 by	 Baxter,	 it	 was	 simply	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 ultra	 vires	
doctrine.710	 In	 the	 post-democratic	 period,	 the	 common	 law	 notion	 of	 legality	 is	 still	
found	 in	our	 law	 today,	but	 in	a	different	 format	captured	 in	 the	administrative	 justice	
clause	 of	 the	 Constitution	 and	 in	 PAJA.	 The	main	 difference	 is	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	
administrative	 law,	 the	 content	 of	 legality	 has	 been	made	 explicit	 in	 section	 33	 of	 the	
Constitution	 which	 specifically	 requires	 administrative	 action	 to	 be	 lawful,	 reasonable	
and	 procedurally	 fair,	 and	 to	 give	 reasons	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 and	 it	 has	 been	
concretised	in	the	list	of	grounds	of	review	in	section	6	of	PAJA.	
																																								 																				
706 Hoexter (2006) Acta Juridica 314 [emphasis added]. 
707 Hoexter (2006) Acta Juridica 253-255. 
708 Hoexter (2006) Acta Juridica 254. 
709 See for example, in Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 
(3) BCLR 177 (CC) para 43, the Court raised the issues of legality and administrative justice in relation to the 
right to education. See discussion further below. 
710 Hoexter Administrative Law 122. Baxter Administrative Law 301. 
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But	legality	also	has	a	broader	meaning.	It	refers	to	the	constitutional	principle	of	legality	
that	 applies	 to	 the	 use	 of	 all	 public	 power,	 beyond	 administrative	 action.711	 Hoexter	
describes	it	thus:	
“This	principle	of	 legality	(or	 ‘legality	and	rationality’)712	 is	an	aspect	of	the	rule	of	 law,	a	
concept	 implicit	 in	 the	 interim	Constitution	 and	 a	 founding	 value	 of	 our	 constitutional	
order	in	terms	of	section	1(c)	of	the	1996	Constitution.	The	fundamental	idea	it	expresses	
is	 that	 ‘the	exercise	of	public	power	 is	only	 legitimate	where	 lawful’.	 Its	detailed	content	
has	to	be	worked	out	 from	the	Constitution	as	a	whole,	and	this	 is	a	continuing	process	
that	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 embarked	 on	 in	 a	 series	 of	 cases	 involving	 non-
administrative	action.”713	
In	 Fedsure	 Life	 Assurance	 Ltd	 v	 Greater	 Johannesburg	 Transitional	 Metro	 Council	 714	
(“Fedsure”)	the	Court	described	the	principle	of	legality	as	an	aspect	of	the	rule	of	law.	It	
held	 that	 the	 principle	 implied	 that	 a	 body	 exercising	 public	 power,	 such	 as	 a	
municipality	making	original	legislation,	“had	to	act	within	the	powers	lawfully	conferred	
to	it”.715	In	Pharmaceutical	Manufacturers	and	President	of	the	RSA	v	SARFU716	(“SARFU”),	
near-legislative	action	was	 the	 issue	and	 the	Court	 said	 that	 the	principle	 required	 that	
the	exercise	of	public	power	should	not	be	arbitrary	or	irrational.	Chaskalson	P	said:	
“It	 is	a	requirement	of	the	rule	of	 law	that	the	exercise	of	public	power	by	the	Executive	
and	 other	 functionaries	 should	not	 be	 arbitrary.	Decisions	must	 be	 rationally	 related	 to	
the	 purpose	 for	 which	 the	 power	 was	 given;	 otherwise	 they	 are	 in	 effect	 arbitrary	 and	
inconsistent	with	this	requirement.	It	follows	that	in	order	to	pass	constitutional	scrutiny	
the	 exercise	 of	 public	 power	 by	 the	 Executive	 and	 other	 functionaries	 must,	 at	 least,	
																																								 																				
711 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) 
para 49; Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association (Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 
(7) BCLR 652 (CC) para 54; Electronic Media Network Limited v e.tv (Pty) Limited 2017 (9) BCLR 1108 (CC) 
paras 22, 25, 26. The rule of law also applies to judicial authority, see S v Mabena 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA). 
712 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 78. 
713 Hoexter Administrative Law 122. See also C Hoexter “The rule of law and the principle of legality in South 
African adminstrative law today” in M Carnelley & S Hoctor (eds) Law, Order and Liberty: Essays in Honour of 
Tony Mathews (2011) 55. 
714 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) paras 56 and 58. 
715 Hoexter Administrative Law 123. 
716 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC). 
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comply	with	this	requirement.	If	 it	does	not,	 it	 falls	short	of	the	standards	demanded	by	
our	Constitution	for	such	action.”717	
In	 Albutt	 v	 Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Violence	 and	 Reconciliation718	 (“Albutt”)	 the	
Constitutional	 Court	 also	 discussed	 procedural	 fairness	 as	 a	 requirement	 of	 rationality,	
under	the	principle	of	legality.	The	Court	in	this	case,	held	that	it	would	be	irrational	for	
the	 President	 to	 grant	 pardons	 for	 politically	motivated	 offenders,	without	 hearing	 the	
victims	of	 the	offences.	 Similarly	 in	Electronic	Media	Network	Limited	 v	 e.tv	 (Pty)	Ltd719	
(“Electronic	Media	 Network”),	 e.tv	 challenged	 the	Minister	 of	 Communications	 for	 not	
consulting	appropriately	on	a	policy	amendment.	The	majority	judgement	acknowledged	
that	 the	policy	domain	 is	 the	exclusive	 jurisdiction	of	 the	executive	arm	of	government	
but	 held	 that	 the	 Minster’s	 policy	 amendment	 could	 properly	 be	 reviewed	 under	 the	
constitutional	principle	of	legality.720	Mogoeng	CJ	stated:	
“Consultation	 is	 not	 an	 inconsequential	 process	 or	 a	 sheer	 formality,	 particularly	 in	
relation	to	national	policy	development.	It	exists	to	facilitate	a	festival	of	ideas	that	would	
hopefully	 provide	 some	 enlightenment	 on	 the	 stakeholders’	 major	 perspectives	 so	 that	
policy-formulation	is	as	informed	as	possible	for	the	good	of	all,	not	some.”721		
	
There	is	also	evidence	of	judicial	support	for	the	principle	of	legality	requiring	the	giving	
of	 reasons.722	 The	 principle	 of	 legality	 thus	 incorporates	 elements	 of	 participatory	
democracy	and	justification	of	public	power.		
However,	 although	Albutt	 invited	 this	 via	 rationality,	 the	 court	was	 explicit	 that	 it	was	
only	 doing	 so	 based	 on	 the	 facts	 in	 the	 particular	 case.	 There	 have	 been	 a	 number	 of	
recent	 decisions	 where	 the	 courts	 have	 had	 to	 decide	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 impose	
procedural	 fairness	 standards	 upon	 exercises	 of	 public	 power	 that	 do	 not	 amount	 to	
																																								 																				
717 Para 85. 
718 2010 (5) BCLR 391 (CC). 
719 [2017] ZACC 17 paras 22, 26. 
720 Paras 22, 26.  
721 Para 38. 
722 Wessels v Minster of Justice and Constitutional Development 2010 (1) SA 128 (GNP). 
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administrative	action.723	Masetlha	v	President	of	the	RSA	(“Masetlha”)	suggested	that	it	is	
not	 always	 appropriate	 to	 subject	 public	 power	 that	 is	 not	 administrative	 action	 to	 the	
rigours	 of	 notice	 and	 provide	 opportunity	 to	 make	 representations.724	 For	 example	
judicial	and	legislative	conduct	already	make	provision	for	procedural	fairness,	such	that	
it	 already	 ensures	 transparency	 and	 accountability.	 However	 it	 is	 more	 complex	 in	
relation	to	executive	conduct.725	 It	may	sometimes	be	undesirable	to	 impose	procedural	
fairness	requirements	on	the	political	discretion	of	a	decision-maker,	for	example	where	
issues	of	national	security	are	concerned.		
Although	 there	 is	 still	 uncertainty	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 legality,	 and	
whether	 or	not	 and	 to	what	 extent	 legality	 requires	procedural	 fairness,	 it	 is	 now	 clear	
that	 there	 are	 times	when	exercises	of	public	power	 that	 are	not	 administrative	 action,	
must	 follow	 a	 fair	 process	 in	 order	 to	 be	 rational	 or	 lawful.	 The	 exact	 parameters	 of	
procedural	 fairness	 in	 these	circumstances,	has	not	yet	been	clearly	articulated.726	With	
respect	to	executive	conduct,	the	Constitution	also	requires	policy-making	to	incorporate	
procedural	and	participatory	opportunities,	where	policy-making	in	the	narrow	sense	of	
implementation	 is	 concerned,	 there	 may	 be	 overlap	 in	 such	 circumstances	 with	 the	
requirements	of	“meaningful	engagement”	as	devised	by	the	courts	in	the	socio-economic	
rights	 jurisprudence.	 Whether	 under	 the	 principle	 of	 legality	 or	 “meaningful	
engagement”,	 the	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 created	 through	 procedural	 and	
participatory	 requirements,	 is	 to	 be	 welcomed	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.		
There	should	be	minimal	and	exceptional	instances	where	this	is	not	the	case.	
Hoexter	characterises	the	requirements	of	lawfulness	in	relation	to	administrative	action	
under	section	33(1)	of	the	Constitution	and	the	PAJA,	as	coinciding	completely	with	the	
content	 of	 the	 constitutional	 principle	 of	 legality.	 She	 states	 that	 “[t]his	 principle	 is	 an	
																																								 																				
723 See for example Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC); Minister of 
Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Freedom 
Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA); and Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 (5) SA 69 
(CC); Electronic Media Network Limited v e.tv (Pty) Limited 2017 (9) BCLR 1108 (CC). 
724 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) paras 42, 77-78. 
725 See M Murcott “Procedural Fairness as a Component of Legality: Is a Reconciliation between Albutt and 
Masetlha Possible?” (2013) 130(2) SALJ 260, 271-272. 
726 Murcott (2013) SALJ 269-270. 
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aspect	of	the	rule	of	law”,	and	“is	one	of	the	founding	values	of	our	constitutional	order	
and	the	‘mainspring’	of	administrative	law”.727	The	principle	of	legality	is	also	implicit	in	
the	South	African	Constitution728	 and	 “provides	a	general	 justification	 for	 the	 review	of	
exercises	 of	 public	 power”.729	 She	 states	 that	 it	 is	 a	 “fourth	 pathway	 to	 review”,	 thus	
providing	an	additional	avenue	of	review	when	action	does	not	qualify	as	administrative	
action	for	the	purposes	of	the	PAJA	or	the	Constitution.730	Hoexter	argues	that,	due	to	the	
unwieldy	definition	of	“administrative	action”	in	PAJA,	courts	have	used	the	principle	of	
legality	 “as	 a	 residual	 pathway	 to	 review”.731	 This	 avoidance	 of	 PAJA,	 she	 says,	 is	made	
easier	by	 the	growing	overlap	between	“regular”	administrative	 law	and	the	principle	of	
legality.732	 For	 example,	 the	 principle	 of	 legality	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 both	 the	
majority	and	the	dissenting	 judgments	 in	New	Clicks733	where	there	was	a	reluctance	to	
engage	with	the	statutory	definition	of	administrative	action.734	
At	the	same	time,	Hoexter	goes	on	to	explain	that	the	principle	has	evolved	in	a	number	
of	 cases	 decided	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court,	 and	 has	 great	 potential	 to	 evolve	
considerably	 further,	 to	 perhaps	 even	 cover	 all	 grounds	 of	 review	under	 administrative	
law.735	 It	 has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 covering	 all	 the	 grounds	 ordinarily	 associated	 with	
authority,	jurisdiction	and	abuse	of	discretion.	In	Affordable	Medicines	and	New	Clicks,	it	
assisted	the	court	in	applying	administrative	law	principles	to	non-administrative	action,	
which	makes	the	principle	of	legality	very	attractive	in	its	potential.736	Sachs	J	described	
legality	 in	 a	 minority	 judgment	 in	 New	 Clicks	 as	 “an	 evolving	 concept	 in	 our	
																																								 																				
727 Hoexter Administrative Law 121, 254. 
728 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) 
paras 58-59. 
729 Hoexter Administrative Law 121. 
730 Hoexter Administrative Law 254. Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (8) BCLR 872 
(CC) paras 97, 144. See also Hoexter “Just Administrative Action” in Bill of Rights Handbook 643. 
731 Hoexter Administrative Law 314. 
732 Hoexter Administrative Law 134. 
733 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC). 
734 In the High Court judgment, Yekiso J points out that the reference to “lawfulness” in section 33(1) “is an all 
embracing and an umbrella concept that encapsulates all the requirements for administrative ‘legality’, 
including all those requirements and grounds for invalidity set out in section 6 of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act”. New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tshabalala-Msimang & Another NNO 2005 (2) 
SA 530 (C) para 61. 
735 Hoexter Administrative Law 254. 
736 Hoexter Administrative Law 255. 
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jurisprudence,	 whose	 full	 creative	 potential	 will	 be	 developed	 in	 a	 context-driven	 and	
incremental	manner”.737		
The	Court	in	Hoërskool	Ermelo	raised	the	issues	of	administrative	justice	and	legality,	and	
PAJA	did	not	feature.	The	court	held	in	this	case	that	under	the	South	African	Schools	Act	
84	 of	 1996,	 the	 administrator	was	 not	 empowered	 to	 appoint	 a	 committee	 to	 decide	 a	
school	language	policy,	except	when	the	school	governing	body	no	longer	performed	this	
function.	Though	the	Head	of	Department	(‘HOD’)	certainly	had	the	power	to	withdraw	
this	policy-deciding	function	from	the	school	governing	body	in	particular	circumstances,	
and	 though	 he	 was	 also	 empowered	 to	 appoint	 others	 to	 perform	 functions	 that	 the	
governing	body	had	failed	to	perform,	the	two	powers	were	unrelated	and	could	not	be	
“selectively	 or	 collectively	 applied	 to	 achieve	 a	 purpose	 not	 authorised	 by	 the	 statute”.	
The	 case	 was	 thus	 decided	 upon	 the	 basis	 that	 the	 administrator	 went	 beyond	 the	
authority	expressly	or	impliedly	conferred	on	them,	and	contravened	those	powers.	This	
was	decided	under	the	rubric	of	legality,	rather	than	administrative	action.	
However,	Hoexter	cautions	that	it	is	constitutionally	sounder	to	refer	to	PAJA	and	section	
33	before	relying	on	the	broad	constitutional	principle	of	legality.738	The	danger	is	that	it	
could	easily	develop	into	what	Hoexter	describes	as	a	“parallel	universe	of	administrative	
law”.739		In	the	recent	SCA	case	of	State	Information	Technology	Agency	Soc	Ltd	v	Gijima	
Holdings	(Pty)	Ltd740	(“Gijima”),	the	court	ruled	that	legality	review	is	not	available	when	
PAJA	 applies.	 	 There	 will	 no	 doubt	 be	 further	 development	 and	 application	 of	 the	
principle	 of	 legality	 and	 incorporation	 of	 the	 regular	 rules	 of	 administrative	 law	 in	 the	
realm	 of	 non-administrative	 action,	 in	 cases	 where	 PAJA	 does	 not	 apply	 due	 to	 the	
narrowness	of	the	definition	of	administrative	action	in	PAJA.		
																																								 																				
737 Para 614, with reference to the unanimous judgment of O’Regan J in Rail Commuters Action Group v 
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC) paras 85-6. 
738 Hoexter Administrative Law 255. 
739 Hoexter Administrative Law 133, 119. This runs counter to the principle of subsidiarity and threatens the 
unity of administrative law. 
740 2017 (2) SA 63 (SCA). 
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The	 principle	 of	 legality	 can	 bring	 about	 positive	 development	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	
including	 in	 cases	 involving	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights,	 due	 to	 it	
being	simple,	general	and	inclusive.	The	principle	of	legality	can	be	a	safeguard	for	action	
that	does	not	fit	the	complex	definition	of	administrative	action	under	section	33	or	PAJA,	
and	thereby	enable	the	courts	to	still	hold	those	who	wield	public	power	accountable	for	
their	actions	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
5	5	3	2	Reasonableness	
In	 South	 African	 administrative	 law,	 the	 requirement	 of	 “reasonable”	 administrative	
action	 has	 had	 a	 complex	 history.	 Two	 related	 doctrines	 assuaged	 review	 for	
unreasonableness	at	common	law.	Firstly,	the	doctrine	of	symptomatic	unreasonableness	
meant	that	unreasonableness	was	only	a	reviewable	defect	in	so	far	as	it	points	to	some	
other	reviewable	defect	 in	a	decision,	such	as	abuse	of	discretion.	This	 initial	prevailing	
standard	 of	 reasonableness	 was	 captured	 in	Union	 Government	 (Minister	 of	Mines	 and	
Industries)	 v	Union	Steel	Corporation	 (South	Africa)	Ltd741	 (“Union	Steel”).	 Secondly,	 the	
degree	 of	 unreasonableness	must	 be	 egregious.	 This	 standard	 originates	 in	 the	 English	
case	of	Associated	Provincial	Picture	Houses	Ltd	v	Wednesbury742	 (“Wednesbury”)	where	
Lord	 Greene	 distinguished	 between	 two	 senses	 of	 “unreasonableness”:	 illegality	 and	
irrationality.	He	emphasised	that	 it	 is	not	the	place	of	the	courts	however,	to	substitute	
their	view	for	that	of	the	administrative	body	and	instead	designed	a	standard	that	courts	
may	only	intervene	where	the	challenged	decision	is	“so	unreasonable	that	no	reasonable	
body	could	have	made	it”.743	
Over	 time,	 this	 test	 came	under	 increasing	criticism	and	 the	European	Court	of	 Justice	
(ECJ)	developed	the	“proportionality	test”	instead.	Basically,	proportionality	requires	that	
																																								 																				
741 Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South Africa) Ltd 1928 AD 
220. “[U]nreasonableness [must be]… so gross that something else can be inferred from it, either that is 
‘inexplicable except on the assumption of mala fides or ulterior motive’… or that it amounts to proof that the 
person on whom the discretion is conferred, has not applied his mind to the matter.” 
742 1947 (2) All ER 680. 
743 At 302. 
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a	proper	balance	be	struck	between	 the	objective	 that	 the	public	body	 is	pursuing,	and	
the	measures	it	adopts.744	In	general,	the	ECJ	formulates	this	stringent	test	as	follows:		
“[T]he	 measures	 adopted	 must	 be	 appropriate	 and	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	
objectives	 legitimately	pursued	and,	where	there	 is	a	choice	between	several	appropriate	
measures,	recourse	must	be	had	to	the	least	onerous,	and	the	disadvantages	caused	must	
not	be	disproportionate	to	the	aims	pursued.”745	
Finally,	 in	 R	 v	 Chief	 Constable	 of	 Sussex,	 ex	 parte	 International	 Traders	 Ferry	 Ltd746	
(“Traders	 Ferry”), English	 judges	 held	 that	 the	Wednesbury	 test	 is	 too	 deferential	 and	
suggested	 a	 more	 appropriate	 test	 would	 be	 whether	 the	 decision	 was	 one	 that	 a	
reasonable	authority	could	have	reached.		
The	entrenchment	of	the	constitutional	right	to	just	administrative	action	has	overridden	
these	two	doctrines.	The	1993	Constitution	introduced	the	right	to	administrative	action	
that	 is	 justifiable	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 reasons	 given	 for	 it,	 in	 section	 24(d).	 Despite	 the	
apparently	 deliberate	 exclusion	 of	 the	 word	 “reasonableness”	 in	 section	 24,747	
commentators	 interpreted	 the	 standard	 under	 section	 24(d)	 as	 being	 one	 of	
“reasonableness”.748	 Case	 law	 that	 appeared	 at	 this	 stage	 specifically	 recognised	 the	
substantive	dimension	of	 review.749	The	 judgment	of	Froneman	DJP	 in	Carephone	 (Pty)	
Ltd	v	Marcus	NO750	(“Carephone”)	described	section	24(d)	as	introducing	“a	requirement	
of	rationality	in	the	merit	or	outcome	of	the	administrative	decision”	which	“goes	beyond	
mere	procedural	 impropriety	as	a	ground	for	review,	or	 irrationality	only	as	evidence	of	
procedural	impropriety”.751	Quinot	and	Liebenberg	explain	that	Froneman	DJP	clearly	had	
a	 substantive	 standard	 in	 mind,	 when	 he	 formulated	 the	 judicial	 enquiry	 under	 the	
																																								 																				
744 M Wesson "Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court" (2004) 20 SAJHR 284-307, 290. 
745 R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa 1990 ECR 4023 para 14. 
746 R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Traders Ferry Ltd 1999 (1) All ER 129 (HL) 157. 
747 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31, 40 note 34. 
748 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 642; J Klaaren “Administrative Justice” in M 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1999) 25-20; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
643-690. 
749 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 642. 
750 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC). 
751 Para 31. 
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standard	of	rationality	as	the	judge	will	have	to	evaluate	the	merits	of	the	matter,	“not	in	
order	to	substitute	his	or	her	own	opinion	on	the	correctness	thereof,	but	to	determine	
whether	the	outcome	is	rationally	justifiable.”752	
Quinot	 and	Liebenberg	 explain	 further	 that	 in	 this	 judgment,	 Froneman	DJP	 applied	 a	
standard	of	review	that	went	beyond	a	purely	procedural	one,	to	involve	a	consideration	
of	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 case,	 what	 Froneman	 DJP	 referred	 to	 as	 “substantive	
rationality”.753	This	means	that	the	substantive	merits	of	the	decision	must	be	evaluated	
against	 the	 information	 -	 the	 facts	 and	 the	 law	 –	 that	 was	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 specific	
outcome.	This	standard,	 they	argue,	 implies	a	variability	 that	 ranges	 from	rationality	 to	
proportionality,	 depending	 on	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case.754	Roman	 v	Williams	 NO	
(“Roman”)	expanded	the	section	24(d)	standard	further	by	including	the	requirements	of	
“suitability,	 necessity	 and	 proportionality”	 which	 therefore	 entailed	 “proportionality	
between	the	means	and	the	end”.755	
However,	the	majority	 judgment	in	Bel	Porto	School	Governing	Body	v	Premier,	Western	
Cape756	(“Bel	Porto”)	held	that	section	24	had	not	bestowed	“substantive	fairness”	into	our	
law	as	a	criterion	upon	which	to	base	a	judgment	as	to	whether	administrative	action	is	
valid	or	not.757	The	Court	further	noted	with	concern,	that	such	a	standard	would	require	
judges	to	delve	into	policy	matters	that	according	to	the	separation	of	powers,	should	best	
be	 left	 to	 the	 political	 and	 administrative	 decision-makers.758	 The	majority	 Court	 held	
that	the	appropriate	standard	was	whether	there	was	“a	rational	decision	taken	lawfully	
and	directed	 to	 a	proper	purpose”.759	Currie	 and	de	Waal	nevertheless	 suggest	 that	 the	
majority	of	 the	court	 in	this	case	could	be	said	to	have	supported	what	appears	 to	be	a	
flexible	 standard	 of	 reasonableness	 review.760	 Chaskalson	 P	 appears	 to	 approve	 the	
																																								 																				
752 Para 36. 
753 Para 37. Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 643. 
754 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 643. 
755 1998 1 SA 270 (C) 284H-285A. Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 643. 
756 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC). 
757 Para 88. 
758 Para 88. 
759 Para 89. 
760 Hoexter “Just Administrative Action” in Bill of Rights Handbook 643. 
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approach	of	the	English	courts	enunciated	by	Lord	Cooke	in	Trader’s	Ferry,	namely	that	
“the	 intensity	 of	 review	…	will	 depend	 upon	 the	 subject	matter	 in	 hand”.761	 This	 could	
mean,	 continued	 Chaskalson	 P,	 that	 the	 “intensity	 of	 review	 in	 cases	 involving	 the	
infringement	of	particular	rights	may	require	a	stricter	standard	than	rationality.”762	The	
minority	on	the	other	hand,	adopted	a	much	more	substantive	test,	which	later	provided	
a	legal	basis	for	a	substantive	contextual	conception	of	reasonableness	under	section	33	of	
the	 Constitution	 and	 PAJA	 in	 Bato	 Star	 Fishing	 (Pty)	 Ltd	 v	 Minister	 of	 Environmental	
Affairs763	(“Bato	Star”).	
Section	 33	 of	 the	 Constitution	 requires	 that	 all	 administrative	 action	 must	 be	
reasonable.764	However,	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 statutory	 entrenchment	 in	 the	PAJA	of	 the	
right	to	reasonable	administrative	action.	The	SA	Law	Commission’s	draft	Bill	proposed	
that	 unreasonableness	 review	 should	 consist	 of	 two	 grounds	 of	 review:	 firstly	 that	 of	
rationality	 review,	 and	 secondly	 that	 of	 proportionality	 review	 similar	 to	 the	 general	
limitations	analysis	in	section	36	of	the	Constitution.765	However,	the	PAJA	was	left	with	
only	a	 rationality	 review	and	a	Wednesbury	 type	 formulation	prohibiting	administrative	
action	that	is	“so	unreasonable	that	no	reasonable	person”	could	have	taken	it.766	Section	
6(2)(f)(ii)	contains	the	rationality	review:	
“(2)	A	court	or	tribunal	has	the	power	to	judicially	review	an	administrative	action	if	–	…	
(f)	the	action	itself	–	…	
(ii)	is	not	rationally	connected	to	–	
(aa)	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	taken;	
(bb)	the	purpose	of	the	empowering	provision;	
(cc)	the	information	before	the	administrator;	or	
(dd)	the	reasons	given	for	it	by	the	administrator;	…”	
																																								 																				
761  Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) para 127. 
762  Para 127. 
763 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 644. 
764 Unreasonableness was a common-law ground of review only for delegated legislation. See Currie Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 169. Kruse v Johnson 1898 (2) QB 91. 
765 See Currie Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 171. 
766 See J De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 209, where he quotes the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee’s Chairperson as stating that the review ground proposed by the SALC would 
potentially permit courts “to go too far into the merits and make political decisions.” 
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This	 is	 simply	 a	minimum	 standard	 that	 administrative	 action	 should	 easily	meet.	 The	
rational	connection	test	merely	requires	that	there	be	some	rational	association	between	
the	action	and	the	rationale.	Section	6(2)(h)	on	the	other	hand,	is	extremely	similar	to	the	
Wednesbury	 test,	 involving	 a	 very	 narrow	 standard	 of	 reasonableness	 review	 somewhat	
like	the	“gross	unreasonableness”	test	of	the	common	law.	Section	6(2)(h)	states:	
“(h)		 [T]he	exercise	of	the	power	or	the	performance	of	the	function	authorised	by	the	
empowering	 provision,	 in	 pursuance	 of	 which	 the	 administrative	 action	 was	
purportedly	 taken,	 is	 so	 unreasonable	 that	 no	 reasonable	 person	 could	 have	 so	
exercised	the	power	or	performed	the	function;	…”	
Currie	 &	 Klaaren	 argued	 however,	 that	 it	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 different	 to	 the	
Wednesbury	 standard	 (by	 not	 just	 focusing	 on	 the	 egregiousness	 of	 the	 action)	 and	 as	
going	beyond	 rationality	 thereby	providing	 for	 review	of	 the	 substance	of	 a	decision.767	
They	suggested	that	the	provision	should	be	interpreted	purposively	to	give	effect	to	the	
constitutional	 right	 to	 reasonable	 administrative	 action	 by	 permitting	 a	 test	 of	
“substantive	proportionality”.768	Craig	explains	this	concept	as:	
“[A]t	 a	 general	 level	 proportionality	 involves	 some	 idea	 of	 balance	 between	 competing	
interests	and	objectives	and	that	it	embodies	some	sense	of	appropriate	relationship	between	
means	and	ends.”769	
In	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 case	 of	 Bato	 Star770,	 the	 Court	 rejected	 “gross	
unreasonableness”	 as	 an	 inappropriate	 interpretation	 of	 section	 6(2)(h)	 under	 section	
33(1)	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 and	 instead	 adopted	 a	 “contextual	 reasonableness”	 standard	
under	PAJA.771	The	case	was	an	application	for	leave	to	appeal	against	a	judgment772	of	the	
Supreme	 Court	 of	 Appeal,	 concerning	 the	 allocation	 of	 fishing	 quotas	 by	 the	 Chief	
Director	 in	 the	 Department	 of	 Environmental	 Affairs	 and	 Tourism.	 The	 decision	 was	
																																								 																				
767 Currie Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 172. 
768 Currie Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 173. 
769 Craig "Administrative Law" in (2003) 414, quoted in Currie Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 173. 
770 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 1. 
771 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 644. 
772 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd and another [2003] 
2 All SA 616 (SCA). 
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taken	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 delegated	 decision-making	 power	 under	 section	 18	 of	 the	 Marine	
Living	 Resources	 Act	 18	 of	 1998.	 The	 applicant,	 Bato	 Star	 Fishing	 (Pty)	 Ltd,	 was	
dissatisfied	with	the	allocation	it	had	received	in	the	2001	allocation	process	for	the	2002-
2005	 fishing	 seasons	 and	 sought	 to	 review	 the	 allocation	 decision.	 Bato	 Star	 was	 a	
medium-sized	black	empowerment	fishing	company	wanting	to	increase	its	fishing	rights.	
The	case	raised	the	question	of	the	extent	to	which	the	decision	of	the	Chief	Director	was	
susceptible	to	review	under	the	new	constitution,	and	critically	in	the	context	of	attempts	
at	 transformation	 in	 the	 fishing	 industry.	 The	 Court	 stated:	 “the	 manner	 in	 which	
transformation	 is	 to	 be	 achieved	 is,	 to	 a	 significant	 extent,	 left	 to	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	
decision-maker”.773	The	Court	then	went	on	to	discuss	the	question	of	whether	the	Chief	
Director’s	decision	was	a	decision	within	the	terms	of	s	6(2)(h)	of	PAJA	which	provides	
that	 a	 decision	 must	 not	 be	 “so	 unreasonable	 that	 no	 reasonable	 person”	 could	 have	
reached	 it.774	 The	 Court	 framed	 the	 reasonableness	 review	 based	 on	 Lord	 Cooke’s	
approach	in	Trader’s	Ferry.775		
It	 is	 clear	 from	 this	 judgment	 then,	 that	 reasonableness	 review	 under	 the	 right	 to	 just	
administrative	 action	 and	PAJA	 invokes	 a	 flexible	 standard,	depending	on	 the	 issues	 in	
each	 case.	 O’Regan	 J	 listed	 the	 factors	 that	 will	 be	 relevant	 to	 whether	 a	 decision	 is	
reasonable	or	not,	 such	as	 “the	nature	of	 the	decision,	 the	 identity	and	expertise	of	 the	
decision-maker,	 the	 range	 of	 factors	 relevant	 to	 the	decision,	 the	 reasons	 given	 for	 the	
decision,	the	nature	of	the	competing	interests	involved	and	the	impact	of	the	decision	on	
the	 lives	 and	 well-being	 of	 those	 affected.”	 776	 This	 means	 that	 “[a]lthough	 the	 review	
functions	 of	 the	 court	 now	 have	 a	 substantive	 as	 well	 as	 a	 procedural	 ingredient,	 the	
distinction	between	appeals	and	reviews”	is	retained.777	Furthermore,	it	appears	to	bring	
in	 a	 “substantive	 proportionality”	 review	 by	 incorporating	 aspects	 of	 “reasonable	
																																								 																				
773 Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 35. 
774 Paras 42-60. 
775 R v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Traders Ferry Ltd 1999 (1) All ER 129 (HL) 157; Bato 
Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 44. 
776 Para 45. 
777 Para 45. 
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equilibrium”.778	 Whether	 or	 not	 one	 agrees	 with	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 case,	 the	
interpretation	 of	 “reasonableness	 review”	 by	 the	 Court	 points	 to	 a	 respectful	 balance	
between	 the	 power	 of	 the	 executive	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 route	 which	 the	 goal	 of	 socio-
economic	transformation	should	take,	and	the	power	of	the	court	to	review	that	decision	
where	the	decision	will	not	reasonably	result	in	the	achievement	of	that	goal.779	
Accountability	for	decision-making	by	the	public	administration,	in	particular	in	relation	
to	the	delivery	of	public	goods	(socio-economic	rights)	is	a	critical	aspect	of	a	democratic	
developmental	state.	Whilst	it	is	the	purview	of	the	executive	to	determine	the	shape	and	
form	of	social	and	economic	policies,	if	they	are	not	delivered	in	a	manner	consistent	with	
the	purpose	and	intent	of	those	policies,	the	courts	should	be	empowered	to	examine	and	
question	 such	 administrative	 decisions.	 The	 administration	 is,	 after	 all,	 responsible	 for	
the	implementation	of	the	policies	that	the	state	devises	to	reduce	poverty	and	inequality.	
If	they	are	not	implemented	in	accordance	with	those	policies,	nor	achieve	the	objectives	
of	 the	policies	and	socio-economic	rights	are	thus	denied	or	negated,	 the	courts	should	
hold	those	administrators	to	a	higher,	substantive	standard	“reasonableness”.	I	deal	with	
the	 comparison	 between	 reasonableness	 review	 in	 administrative	 justice	 review	 and	
socio-economic	rights	in	chapter	six.	
5	5	3	3	Procedural	fairness	and	participatory	democracy	
As	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 two,	 the	 founding	 values	 of	 our	 constitutional	 democracy	 are	
accountability,	 responsiveness	 and	 openness.780	 In	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	
participatory	democracy	enables	the	voices	of	the	poor	and	marginalised	in	our	society	to	
have	 a	 say	 in	 the	 decisions,	 policies	 and	 laws	 that	 affect	 their	 daily	 lives.781	 The	
																																								 																				
778 Para 49. Hoexter “Just Administrative Action” in Bill of Rights Handbook 643 argue that Bato Star goes 
some way to a proportionality enquiry but stops short of it. De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
215, is of the opinion that a full-blown proportionality enquiry should only be conducted under a review for 
reasonableness where decisions impact on “fundamental rights” – and Bato Star did not fall into this category. 
779 Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 48. 
780 Section 1(d). 
781 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 115, 
where the Constitutional Court highlighted the importance and value of participation by marginalised groups in 
legislative processes in giving legitimacy to legislation and dignity to those who participate. See also the 
discussion of the eviction cases in chapters four and six. 
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Constitution	 expressly	 provides	 for	 public	 access	 to	 and	 participation	 in	 legislative	
processes,782	 as	 well	 as	 executive	 processes.783	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 in	 several	
cases	 underscored	 the	 centrality	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	
constitutional	 goals	 and	 values,784	 the	 necessity	 of	 this	 participation	 for	 purposes	 of	
informed	decision-making785	and	affirmed	the	duty	of	the	State	to	take	positive	measures	
to	 ensure	 that	 the	 public	 has	 the	 effective	 capacity	 and	 opportunity	 to	 participate	 in	
decision-making	 processes.786	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	 affirmed	 that	 the	
participation	 of	 the	 poor	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 their	 access	 to	 benefits	 and	 services	
serves	the	values	of	dignity	and	freedom	as	well	as	gives	substance	to	the	deliberative	and	
participatory	democracy	envisaged	in	the	Constitution.787	
A	number	of	socio-economic	rights	related	cases	have	gone	before	the	courts	in	relation	
to	 administrative	 justice	 and	 access	 to	 material	 benefits,	 which	 have	 asserted	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 participation	 of	 those	 affected	 by	 the	 decisions.	 These	 cases	 have	
affirmed	the	importance	of	administrative	justice	rights	of	affected	persons	in	relation	to	
the	rights	of	access	to	housing,788	water789	and	social	security.790		
																																								 																				
782 Sections 57, 59, 70, 72, 74, 116, 118, 160. 
783 Section 195(1)(e). Sections 50 and 51 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 affirm 
the application of the constitutional principles governing public administration to the provision of municipal 
services. 
784 In Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (1) BCLR 1 para 181. See also Doctors for 
Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) para 121; and Poverty 
Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) para 40. 
785 Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC) para 33. 
786 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) paras 
108, 112–117.  
787 Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) paras 
115, 234 and Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC) 
para 627 where Sachs J writes of the importance of dialogue and having a voice in public affairs, to the right to 
dignity:  
“The right to speak and to be listened to is part of the right to be a citizen in the full sense of the word. 
In a constitutional democracy dialogue and the right to have a voice on public affairs is constitutive of 
dignity.” 
788 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) 30; (right to procedural fairness when electricity 
supply disconnected by municipality); and Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 
312 (CC) (right to sanitation). 
789 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) (right to sufficient water and legality of pre-paid 
water meters).  
790 A number of successful court challenges were brought under administrative law by indigent individuals 
affected by the withdrawal of social security benefits amidst the ongoing systemic problems in the 
administration of social grants in the Eastern Cape: Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, 
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Section	33(1)	of	the	Constitution	gives	everyone	the	right	to	administrative	action	that	is	
“procedurally	fair”.	The	qualifier	of	“fairness”	in	this	instance,	is	not	a	substantive	one	in	
the	sense	of	rightness,	but	seeks	to	ensure	that	both	sides	are	listened	to	and	taken	into	
account.	The	importance	of	procedural	fairness	as	a	substantive	participatory	element	of	
administrative	justice,	is	eloquently	described	by	Hoexter:	
“Procedural	 fairness	 .	 .	 .	 is	concerned	with	giving	people	an	opportunity	to	participate	 in	
the	decisions	that	will	affect	them,	and	–	crucially	–	a	chance	of	influencing	the	outcome	of	
those	 decisions.	 	 Such	 participation	 is	 a	 safeguard	 that	 not	 only	 signals	 respect	 for	 the	
dignity	 and	 worth	 of	 the	 participants,	 but	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 improve	 the	 quality	 and	
rationality	of	administrative	decision-making	and	to	enhance	its	legitimacy.”791	
This	 definition	 points	 to	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 the	 requirement	 of	
procedural	 fairness,	 namely	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 dignity	 and	 empowerment	 of	
the	 individual	 through	respect	 for	 their	participation	 in	decisions	 that	affect	 them.	 In	a	
democratic	developmental	state,	 the	courts	and	the	public	administration	play	a	crucial	
role	in	facilitating	people’s	participation	in	decisions	that	affect	them.	The	institutions	of	
the	 courts	 and	 the	 administration	 need	 to	 create	 the	 space	 for	 voices	 to	 be	 heard	 and	
dignity	 to	be	upheld.	They	must	have	the	 institutional	capacity	and	 legitimacy	to	do	so	
and	 as	 they	 do	 so,	 capacity	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 those	 institutions	 will	 in	 turn	 be	 built.	
Furthermore,	this	spotlight	on	procedural	fairness	is	beneficial	to	the	interests	of	the	poor	
and	 vulnerable.	 Jagwanth,	 in	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 litigation	 under	 the	 right	 to	
administrative	 justice	 on	 the	 poor	 argues,	 “in	 a	 democracy,	 administrative	 justice	
attempts	to	balance	the	need	for	social	transformation	with	individual	fairness”.792	
The	principle	of	procedural	fairness	consists	of	two	main	components:	a	fair	hearing	(audi	
alteram	 partem)	 by	 an	 impartial	 decision-maker	 (nemo	 iudex	 in	 sua	 causa).	 These	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Eastern Cape 2000 (2) SA 849 (E); Mahambehlala v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern 
Cape Provincial Government 2001 (9) BCLR 899 (SE); Mbanga v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare 
2002 (1) SA 359 (SA); Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E); 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government v Ngxusa; Rangani v 
Superintendent-General, Department of Health and Welfare, Northern Province 1999 (4) SA 385 (T). 
791 Hoexter Administrative Law 326-7. (Footnote omitted.) 
792 Jagwanth “The Right to Administrative Justice" 4.  
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requirements	are	highly	context	sensitive	and	what	fairness	demands	will	be	interpreted	
in	 the	 specific	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case.793	 The	 provisions	 of	 PAJA	 frame	 the	
requirements	 and	 the	 common	 law	 remains	 relevant	 to	 their	 interpretation.	 Section	
3(2)(b)	 of	 PAJA	 details	 a	 set	 of	 minimum	 requirements	 that	 an	 administrator	 “must”	
extend	 to	 any	 person	 entitled	 to	 procedural	 fairness	 under	 section	 3(1).	 	 These	
requirements	 include	 “adequate	 notice	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 proposed	
administrative	action”	and	“a	reasonable	opportunity	to	make	representations”.794	Section	
3(4)(a)	 allows	 for	 departure	 from	 the	 minimum	 requirements	 of	 section	 3(2)(b)	 by	
providing	that	“[i]f	it	is	reasonable	and	justifiable	in	the	circumstances,	an	administrator	
may	 depart	 from	 any	 of	 the	 requirements	 referred	 to	 in	 subsection	 (2)”,	 while	 section	
3(4)(b)	 sets	 out	 the	 factors	 that	 an	 administrator	 must	 take	 into	 account	 in	 deciding	
whether	a	divergence	is	“reasonable	and	justifiable”.	
In	Mazibuko	v	City	of	Johannesburg795	(“Mazibuko”),	the	Court	firstly	had	to	consider	the	
applicants’	argument	that	the	City’s	decision	to	introduce	pre-paid	water	meters	in	a	poor	
community	 was	 a	 decision	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 administrative	 action	 as	 defined	 in	
PAJA.	 	 Section	 4(1)	 of	 PAJA	 stipulates	 that	 all	 administrative	 decisions	 that	 affect	 the	
public	 must	 be	 preceded	 by	 public	 participation.	 Moreover,	 the	 applicants	 pointed	 to	
section	 4(2)(e)	 of	 the	 Municipal	 Systems	 Act	 32	 of	 2000,	 which	 places	 a	 duty	 on	 the	
Council	 to	 consult	 the	 local	 community	 about	 the	 “level,	 quality,	 range	 and	 impact	 of	
municipal	services”	and	the	“available	options”	for	the	delivery	of	services.		The	applicants	
argued	 that	 because	 the	 City	 did	 not	 hold	 a	 public	 enquiry	 or	 a	 notice	 and	 comment	
procedure	 before	 implementing	 the	 decision	 to	 introduce	 pre-paid	meters,	 it	 failed	 to	
comply	 with	 PAJA.	 The	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 decision	 properly	 construed	 was	 a	 policy	
decision	 taken	 by	 the	 municipality	 within	 its	 executive	 powers,	 which	 is	 expressly	
excluded	 in	 paragraphs	 (cc)	 and	 (dd)	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 “administrative	 action”	
																																								 																				
793 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (4) BCLR 347 (CC) para 114.  As Ngcobo J 
stated in Zondi, “[t]he overriding consideration will always be what does fairness demand in the circumstances 
of a particular case.” See also Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 
(Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC) para 101; and President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) para 219. 
794 Section 3(2)(b)(i) and (ii) respectively. 
795 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) paras 127-134. 
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contained	 in	 section	 1	 of	 PAJA.	 In	 any	 event,	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 consultation	
undertaken	with	the	community	on	the	implementation	of	the	pre-paid	metres	in	terms	
of	the	Municipal	Systems	Act	was	“thorough	and	comprehensive”.796		
Various	scholars	have	critiqued	the	Court’s	interpretation	of	“administrative	action”	and	
the	reasoning	behind	its	decision	in	Mazibuko.797	Mazibuko	demonstrates	the	confluence	
of	public	administration,	policy	and	legislative	regulation	and	was	unhelpful	in	its	use	of	
the	 term	 “executive”	 to	 describe	 the	 action	 taken	 by	 the	municipality.	 The	 court	 in	 its	
reasoning	did	not	distinguish	between	narrow	and	broad	policy	formulation,	as	was	done	
in	SARFU	and	Permanent	Secretary,	Department	of	Education	and	Welfare,	Eastern	Cape	v	
Ed-U-College	 (PE)	 (Section	 21)	 Inc	 (“Permanent	 Secretary”).798	 This	 dual	 nature	 of	 the	
executive,	 in	 an	 institutional	 and	 a	 functional	 sense,	 is	 essential	 to	 the	 application	 of	
administrative	law	and	a	heightened	accountability	over	state	decisions.	In	a	sense,	most	
state	decisions	or	acts	involve	a	degree	of	policy,	therefore	a	distinction	between	policy	in	
a	wide	and	narrow	sense	still	provides	procedural	accountability	over	aspects	of	executive	
action,	as	should	have	been	the	case	in	Mazibuko.			
In	 Joseph	v	City	of	 Johannesburg799	 	 (“Joseph”),	 the	 city	had	disconnected	 the	electricity	
supply	to	an	apartment	building	when	the	owner	of	the	building	failed	to	pay	his	account.	
It	 was	 common	 cause	 that	 the	 city	 had	 followed	 a	 fair	 procedure	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
owner,	 by	 sending	 him	 notices	 about	 the	 arrears	 and	 informing	 him	 of	 possible	
disconnection	before	taking	the	decision.	However,	the	residents	of	the	building	had	no	
contractual	 relationship	 with	 the	 city	 as	 the	 supply	 of	 electricity	 was	 in	 bulk	 to	 the	
building	 and	 not	 to	 the	 individual	 apartments.	 They	 paid	 the	 owner	 directly	 for	 their	
																																								 																				
796 Para 134. 
797 See for example Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights 466-480; Maree “Administrative authorities” in 
Administrative Justice in SA 30, 48; and G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-Law Adjudication” 
(2010) 3 CCR 111 – 139. 
798 See also President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); and Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 18 where 
the court distinguished between policy formulation and policy and legislation implementation in determining 
whether the exercise of certain executive powers could constitute administrative action. O’Regan stated:  
“However, policy may also be formulated in a narrower sense where a member of the executive is 
implementing legislation. The formulation of policy in the exercise of such powers may often constitute 
administrative action.” 
799 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC). 
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electricity	supply.	The	issue	before	the	court	then	became	whether	the	city’s	decision	to	
disconnect	the	electricity	impacted	on	any	of	the	rights	of	the	tenants	thereby	obligating	
the	 city	 to	 act	 in	 a	 procedurally	 fair	 manner	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 tenants	 before	
disconnecting	their	power	supply,	as	required	by	section	3(1)	of	PAJA.	
The	Constitutional	Court	in	Joseph	extended	the	meaning	of	“rights”	under	section	3(1)	of	
PAJA	by	holding	 that	 the	 term	 includes	 “legal	 entitlements	 that	have	 their	basis	 in	 the	
constitutional	 and	 statutory	 obligations	 of	 government”.800	 The	 court	 held	 that	 the	
tenants	had	no	contractual	rights	with	the	city	that	were	impacted	upon,	nor	did	it	decide	
on	whether	 any	 of	 the	 tenants’	 fundamental	 rights	 (housing	 or	 dignity)	were	 infringed	
upon.	Instead,	the	court	found	that	the	city	had	constitutional	and	legislative	obligations	
to	provide	basic	municipal	services,	including	electricity,	to	everyone	in	its	jurisdiction.801	
The	 tenants	 therefore	had	 a	 correlative	 “public	 law	 right”	 to	 such	 services.802	 Since	 the	
city’s	decision	to	disconnect	the	power	supply	impacted	adversely	on	their	rights,	section	
4	of	PAJA	also	applied	to	the	decision	with	respect	to	the	tenants.	Joseph	thus	expanded	
the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 and	 administrative	 action	 under	 PAJA	
beyond	traditional	categories	of	rights.		
This	extended	application	of	administrative	justice	to	“public	law	rights”	as	administrative	
action	 in	 Joseph,	 supports	 a	broader	 administrative	 accountability	 vital	 to	 a	democratic	
developmental	 state.	 Procedurally	 fair	 administrative	 procedures	 and	 participation	 in	
decision-making	 leads	 to	 just	 substantive	 outcomes	 and	 trust	 in	 the	 public	
administration,	 both	 vital	 to	 a	 functioning	 participatory	 democracy.	 In	 Joseph	 the	
Constitutional	Court	stressed	the	importance	of	participation	within	the	branch	of	 local	
government:		
																																								 																				
800 Para 43. 
801 Para 35. 
802 Para 40. 
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“Compliance	 by	 local	 government	 with	 its	 procedural	 fairness	 obligations	 is	 crucial	
therefore,	not	only	 for	the	protection	of	citizens’	rights,	but	also	to	 facilitate	trust	 in	the	
public	administration	and	in	our	participatory	democracy.”803	
Skweyiya	 J	 in	 Joseph	 located	 the	 content	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 in	 the	 basic	 values	 and	
principles	governing	a	responsive	and	accountable	public	administration,	in	section	195(1)	
of	the	Constitution	-	he	stated	that	the	following	principles	were	particularly	relevant	to	
procedural	fairness:	
(d) Services	must	be	provided	impartially,	fairly,	equitably	and	without	
bias.	
(e) People’s	 needs	 must	 be	 responded	 to,	 and	 the	 public	 must	 be	
encouraged	to	participate	in	policy-making.	
(f) Public	administration	must	be	accountable.	
(g) Transparency	must	be	fostered	by	providing	the	public	with	timely,	
accessible	and	accurate	information.”804	
	
The	 court	 stressed	 that	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 “is	 fundamental	 to	 the	
realisation	 of	 these	 constitutional	 values,	 and	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 our	 transition	 to	 a	
constitutional	 democracy”.805	 It	 established	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 right	 to	 just	
administrative	action,	under	the	Constitution	and	PAJA,	should	embrace	the	principles	of	
good	 governance.	 Capacitated,	 efficient	 and	 autonomous	 state	 institutions	 are	
characteristic	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	seeking	to	effectively	address	people’s	
needs.	
The	court	 also	 recognised	 the	 legitimate	concern	of	 “administrative	paralysis”	 raised	by	
the	respondents	in	Joseph.806	The	Court	emphasised	that	administrative	efficiency	in	the	
public	administration	 is	 important	 to	democracy,	and	courts	 should	not	 impose	unduly	
																																								 																				
803 Para 46.   
804 Para 44.  
805 Para 45. 
806 See also Premier Mpumalanga, and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, 
Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) para 41. 
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burdensome	administrative	requirements	on	them.	The	Court	stated	however,	“the	issue	
of	 administrative	 efficiency	 informs	 the	 content	 of	 the	 duties	 imposed	 under	
administrative	 law	rather	 than	the	scope	of	 the	application	of	administrative	 law.”	 807	 It	
went	on	to	state	that	the	practical	considerations	mentioned	by	the	respondents	should	
not	 determine	 the	 scope	 of	 administrative	 action,	 but	 rather	 “inform	 the	 content	 of	
procedural	 fairness.”808	 Efficiency	 and	 capacity	 considerations	 are	 indeed	 an	 important	
aspect	 of	 any	 contextual	 determination	 of	 the	 content	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 in	 a	
democratic	developmental	state.	 	However,	the	Court	in	 Joseph	stated:	“[i]t	 is	plain	that	
the	 reach	 of	 administrative	 law	 would	 be	 unjustifiably	 curtailed	 if	 it	 did	 not	 regulate	
administrative	 decisions	 which	 affect	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 rights,	 properly	 understood,	 at	
least	for	the	purposes	of	procedural	fairness.”809		
5	6	Conclusion		
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 substantive	 adjudication	 of	 the	 right	 to	
administrative	 justice	 will	 enhance	 the	 responsiveness	 of	 the	 state	 to	 conditions	 of	
poverty	and	inequality	in	South	Africa	and	move	us	closer	to	a	democratic	developmental	
state.	 The	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 advances	 an	 efficient	 and	 effective	
administration,	 accountability	 for	 decision-making	 and	 for	 participatory	 democracy	 to	
thrive.		
I	examined	the	evolving	realm	of	administrative	law	in	international	law,	in	the	context	of	
a	changing	situation	of	global	governance	and	the	global	economy.	Administrative	law	is	
becoming	a	powerful	force	for	accountability	and	participation	in	decision-making	at	an	
international	level.	I	discussed	the	modern	purpose	of	the	growing	body	of	international	
law	 and	 jurisprudence	 in	 the	 area	 of	 administrative	 law,	 as	 one	 of	 addressing	 the	
substantial	 socio-economic	challenges	 the	world	 faces	 through	attempts	 to	 regulate	 the	
global	 economic	 order	 and	 ongoing	 infringement	 of	 rights	 by	 the	 public	 and	 private	
spheres.		
																																								 																				
807 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) para 29. 
808 Para 29. 
809 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) para 45. 
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The	 significant	 advancement	 of	 South	 African	 administrative	 law	 from	 a	 procedurally	
focused	area	of	law	towards	a	more	substantive	conception	of	review	has	been	largely	due	
to	 the	 administrative	 justice	 provisions	 in	 the	 draft	 and	 the	 final	 Constitution.	 I	
considered	 the	 scope	 and	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 the	 requirements	 of	 “lawfulness”,	
“reasonableness”	and	“procedural	fairness”,	under	the	right	to	“just	administrative	action”	
in	 section	 33(1),	 in	 furthering	 the	 aims	 of	 transformative	 constitutionalism	 in	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state.	 I	 argued	 that,	 in	 a	 similar	 way	 to	 the	 international	
evolution	of	the	concept	of	administrative	justice	from	a	procedural	to	a	substantive	one,	
in	the	South	African	context	the	shift	in	how	administrative	justice	is	both	perceived	and	
practiced,	has	been	driven	by	the	notion	that	administrative	decision-making	must	also	
assist	 in	 addressing	 the	 socio-economic	 needs	 of	 people.	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 essential	
elements	of	section	33	are	capable	of	bringing	about	“justice”	not	purely	in	a	procedural	or	
“means”	sense,	but	also	in	an	“ends”	sense.		
The	 courts	 post-democracy,	 have	 interpreted	 the	 notion	 of	 “legality”	 in	 relation	 to	
administrative	decision-making,	with	sufficient	breadth	and	flexibility	in	order	to	further	
socio-economic	 transformation	 under	 a	 constitutional	 dispensation.	 The	
conceptualisation	of	 “reasonableness”	 as	 a	 standard	of	 review	 in	 administrative	 law	has	
also	 shifted	 significantly	 towards	 a	 more	 substantive	 conception	 of	 review.	 I	 then	
examined	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 evolving	 jurisprudence	 for	 cases	 involving	 review	 of	
administrative	action	where	socio-economic	rights	are	impacted	(“overlap	cases”).	These	
cases	demonstrate	a	 role	 for	 the	notion	of	 “legality”	 to	 support	 the	 realisation	of	 socio-
economic	 rights	 and	 complementary	 standards	 of	 reasonableness	 review	 under	 the	
different	 constitutional	 provisions.	 The	 reasonableness	 standard	 of	 review	 under	
administrative	 justice	 includes	 a	 procedural	 as	 well	 as	 a	 substantive	 element,	 both	 of	
which	are	necessary	 to	 fulfil	 the	 ideals	of	a	 transformative	constitution	 in	a	democratic	
developmental	state.		
Finally,	 I	 examined	 the	 “procedural	 fairness”	 requirement	 in	 the	 “overlap”	 cases,	 as	 a	
participatory	 element	 of	 administrative	 justice	 that	 is	 compatible	 with	 socio-economic	
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rights	and	critical	to	a	participatory	democracy.	The	Constitutional	Court	has	repeatedly	
affirmed	 that	 deliberative	 and	 participatory	 democracy	 seeks	 to	 enhance	 and	 deepen	
representative	 democracy	 and	 the	 values	 of	 freedom	 and	 dignity,	 by	 expanding	 the	
opportunities	for	people’s	active	participation	in	decision-making	processes,	including	in	
relation	 to	cases	dealing	with	 their	access	 to	public	goods	 (socio-economic	 rights).	 It	 is	
about	 more	 than	 merely	 “participating	 in	 periodic	 elections	 and	 in	 the	 formal	
mechanisms	 created	 for	 allowing	 citizens	 input	 in	 the	 institutions	 of	 representative	
democracy”,810	 but	 also	 going	 beyond	 to	 creating	 numerous	 fora	 for	 dialogue	 and	
mechanisms	for	participation.	The	aim	is	 to	promote	greater	participation	 in	the	public	
and	 private	 institutions	 that	 affect	 diverse	 aspects	 of	 people’s	 lives.	 Those	 particularly	
disadvantaged	groups,	who	are	not	easily	able	to	participate	in	deliberative	processes	as	
peers	 or	 political	 equals,	 must	 be	 given	 real	 and	 “meaningful”	 opportunities	 for	
participation.811		
In	order	for	socio-economic	transformation	in	a	democratic	developmental	state	to	have	a	
real	 impact	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 poor	 and	 marginalised,	 meaningful	 participation	 in	
administrative	decision-making	is	required.	Opportunities	for	informed	participation	can	
lead	to	transparent,	accountable	dialogue	and	debate	on	key	policy	choices	to	address	the	
impact	of	poverty	and	inequality.	This	resonates	with	a	constitutional	democracy,	which	
requires	decisions	to	be	considered	in	the	light	of	certain	fundamental	norms	and	values.	
The	 adjudication	 of	 human	 rights	 norms	 in	 the	 courts	 is	 therefore	 also	 a	 significant	
opportunity	 for	 deliberation	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 rights	
from	the	perspective	of	 the	adjudicators	and	experts	as	well	as	 the	perspective	of	 those	
whose	rights	are	affected,	as	required	in	a	participatory	democracy.		
The	 purpose	 of	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 chapter	 was	 to	 explore	 the	 participatory	 role	 and	
substantive	 content	 of	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 in	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 state.	 I	 argued	 for	 a	 substantive	 right	 to	 just	 administrative	
action	 to	 further	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 of	 public	 institutions,	 or	 those	
																																								 																				
810 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 30. 
811 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 32. 
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performing	public	roles,	and	to	facilitate	empowerment	of	poor	and	vulnerable	people	in	
the	delivery	of	social	and	economic	goods.	Administrative	justice	has	a	critical	role	to	play	
alongside	socio-economic	rights,	as	an	integrated	human	rights	approach	to	poverty,	in	a	
South	African	democratic	developmental	state.	True	transformation	can	only	take	place	
in	a	democratic	developmental	state,	where	participatory	democracy	is	alive	and	well,	and	
where	 the	 procedural	 and	 substantive	 safeguards	 of	 administrative	 justice,	 are	 also	
essential	“means”	and	“ends”	in	themselves.	The	next	chapter	will	examine	the	interaction	
and	 complementarity	 between	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 a	
South	African	democratic	developmental	state.		
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CHAPTER 6: Socio-economic rights and administrative justice -  
Reducing poverty in a democratic developmental state 
	
6	1	Introduction	
This	 final	 chapter	 aims	 to	 consolidate	 and	 strengthen	 the	 complementarity	 of	 socio-
economic	rights	and	the	right	 to	administrative	 justice	 to	 implement	 the	Constitution’s	
transformative	 mandate	 and	 thereby	 ensure	 better	 outcomes	 for	 the	 poor,	 in	 a	
democratic	 developmental	 South	 African	 state.	 The	 sections	 below	 examine	 the	
interrelatedness	between	certain	elements	of	socio-economic	rights	and	the	right	to	just	
administrative	action	discussed	in	chapters	four	and	five.	I	seek	to	enhance	the	discourse	
and	 jurisprudence	 of	 socio-economic	 and	 administrative	 justice	 rights	 as	 an	 integrated	
human	 rights	 approach	 to	 addressing	 poverty,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.	I	focus	on	the	cases	in	which	both	administrative	justice	rights	and	
socio-economic	 rights	 have	 been	 discussed	 or	 alluded	 to	 by	 the	 courts	 and	 provide	
possible	interactive,	interpretative	approaches	to	their	scope	of	application,	the	nature	of	
the	obligations,	 reasonableness	 review	and	participatory	remedies.812	 	 In	some	cases	 the	
rights	 work	 alongside	 one	 another	 and	 supportively	 enhance	 the	 jurisprudence	 and	
developmental	 outcomes	 and	 in	 other	 instances	 they	 intertwine	 substantively	 and	
jurisprudentially.		
																																								 																				
812 Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association (Mukhwevho Intervening) 2001 (7) 
BCLR 652 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Jaftha v 
Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA, Amici Curiae) 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC); Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); Residents of 
Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC); Abahlali 
Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of Kwazulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC); Head of 
Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC); Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC); Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary 
School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). G Quinot & S Liebenberg 
“Narrowing the band: Reasonableness review in administrative justice and socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
in South Africa” (2011) 22 (3) Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663, 639, 641, 648-652. Quinot and Liebenberg 
refer to these cases as “overlap” cases.  
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I	begin	with	an	overview	of	 the	South	African	 jurisprudence	on	 the	 interdependence	of	
rights,	 in	 particular	 in	 poverty-related	 Constitutional	 Court	 cases.	 This	 links	 to	 the	
international,	 multidimensional	 and	 integrated	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 poverty	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 three.	 I	 then	 propose	 an	 adjudicatory	 role	 for	 the	 courts	 when	
dealing	 with	 socio-economic	 issues,	 and	 characteristics	 that	 it	 should	 embody	 as	 a	
judicial	institution	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	As	outlined	in	chapters	two,	four	
and	 five,	 in	order	 for	a	democratic	developmental	 state	 to	 truly	and	strongly	emerge	 in	
South	Africa,	we	must	 cultivate	 the	 following	 aspects:	 participatory	 democracy;	 human	
capabilities;	 autonomous	 institutions;	 state	 capacity;	 and	 social	 and	 economic	 policies	
that	 systemically	 progress	 developmental	 outcomes.	 Macro-economic	 policy	 must	 be	
designed	and	driven	through	coordinated,	but	not	corrupted	or	captured,	public-private	
partnerships,	however	that	element	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	dissertation	and	will	not	
be	discussed	here.813	 Finally,	 I	 apply	 this	 adjudicatory	 approach	 to	 a	 set	 of	 cases	where	
socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 are	 complementary	 in	 addressing	 the	
ongoing	challenge	of	poverty	and	inequality	in	South	Africa.	
6	2	South	African	jurisprudence:	Interdependence	of	human	rights	
In	 chapter	 three	 I	 described	 the	 multi-dimensional	 conception	 of	 poverty	 from	 a	
development	economics	perspective	and	related	it	to	the	international,	integrated	human	
rights	 approach	 to	 poverty.	 This	 integrated	 human	 rights	 approach	 considers	 the	
realisation	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 civil	 political	 rights	 as	 equally	 crucial	 to	 the	
alleviation	 of	 poverty.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 set	 out	 the	 South	 African	 jurisprudence	 on	 the	
interdependence	of	human	 rights	 in	 the	 context	 of	 addressing	poverty,	 as	 a	normative,	
interpretive	background	to	the	specific	focus	on	the	interaction	between	socio-economic	
																																								 																				
813 See numerous instances of state corruption and “capture” in national government departments and State-
Owned Enterprises (‘SOE’) uncovered over the past few years by the public protector, academics, researchers 
and investigative journalists: M Mutize & S Gossel “Corrupt state owned enterprises lie at the heart of South 
Africa’s economic woes” Mail & Guardian (2017-06-20) <https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-20-corrupt-state-
owned-enterprises-lie-at-the-heart-of-south-africas-economic-woes> (accessed 22-09-2017); Scorpio & 
amaBhungane “How McKinsey and Trillian ripped R1.6bn from Eskom – and planned to take R7.8bn more” 
Daily Maverick (2017-09-14) https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-14-scorpio-amabhungane-
how-mckinsey-and-trillian-ripped-r1.6bn-from-eskom-and-planned-to-take-r7.8bn-more/#.WcuArUyB1Z3 
(accessed 22-09-2017); H Bhorat, M Buthelezi, I Chikpkin, S Duma, L Mondi, C Peter, M Qobo, M Swilling & H 
Friedenstein Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is being stolen State Capacity Research Project (2017). 
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rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 chapter.	 This	
interdependence	acknowledges	the	multi-dimensional	nature	of	poverty,	and	lends	itself	
to	mitigating	 poverty	 in	 its	 varied	manifestations	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	
from	these	different	rights	angles.814	
6	2	1	Socio-economic	rights	and	the	rights	to	life,	freedom,	equality	and	dignity	
The	various	rights	protected	in	the	South	African	Bill	of	Rights	have	been	recognised	by	
the	 Constitutional	 Court	 as	 interdependent	 and	 interrelated.815	 In	 Government	 of	 the	
Republic	of	South	Africa	v	Grootboom	 (“Grootboom”),	Yacoob	 J	explains	 the	relationship	
between	civil	and	political	rights	and	social	and	economic	rights	broadly,	in	the	context	of	
addressing	 poverty	 and	 inequality,	 as	 being	 “interrelated	 and	 mutually	 supporting”.816	
Liebenberg	 argues	 that	 a	 substantive	 interpretative	 approach	 to	 human	 rights	 which	
“surfaces	 the	 interrelated	 values	 and	 rights	 at	 stake	 in	 particular	 cases	 promotes	 the	
transformative	ethos	of	the	Constitution”.817	
The	 inclusion	 of	 justiciable	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	
means	 that	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 conditions	 experienced	 by	 the	 poor	 can	 be	
scrutinised	 and	 ameliorated	 via	 adjudication,	 alongside	 civil	 and	 political	 rights.	 For	
example,	 in	 the	Khosa	 v	Minister	 of	 Social	 Development;	Mahlaule	 v	Minister	 of	 Social	
Development	(“Khosa”)	cases	 involving	the	rights	of	non-citizens	to	access	social	grants,	
the	 Court	 found	 that	 a	 number	 of	 rights	 were	 at	 stake.	 The	 court	 emphasised	 the	
																																								 																				
814 See S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights (2010) 51-54 and 142, and the discussion on comparative 
international law in cases where express, justiciable socio-economic rights provisions do not exist and positive 
socio-economic duties are thus derived from various other rights, for example the right to life by the Indian 
Supreme Court. On the other hand, in jurisdictions such as South Africa, where justiciable socio-economic 
rights are incorporated in the Constitution, interpretative inter-linkages between various rights remain 
important for purposes of enhancing the transformative potential of the Constitution and as an 
acknowledgement of the multifaceted experience and interconnected dimensions of poverty. 
815 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) paras 58-67, 80, 84, 86, 90 and 94-5; Mohamed v 
President of the Republic of South Africa (Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa 
Intervening) 2001 (7) BCLR 685 (CC) para 54; Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 23 and 83; Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v 
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) para 41; Kaunda v President of the RSA 2004 (10) 
BCLR 1009 (CC) para 274; Union of Refugee Women v Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 (4) 
BCLR 339 (CC) para 111; and Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC) paras 148-
154. 
816 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 23. 
817 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 142. 
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interconnectedness	 of	 the	 rights	 in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 as	 a	 factor	 in	 ascertaining	 the	
reasonableness	of	a	measure.818	Apart	from	the	socio-economic	right	to	social	assistance,	
the	 case	 was	 also	 said	 to	 have	 affected	 the	 rights	 to	 life,	 dignity,	 and	 equality.819	 The	
courts’	 interpretive	 approach	 in	 cases	 addressing	 circumstances	 of	 poverty,	 has	 taken	
cognisance	of	 the	 interdependence	between	all	 rights	 in	 the	Bill	of	Rights,	 in	particular	
socio-economic	rights	and	civil	and	political	rights	such	as	the	right	to	life,820	the	right	to	
freedom	and	security	of	the	person,821	the	right	to	equality822	and	the	right	to	dignity.823		
6	2	2	Interdependence	of	participatory	rights	and	socio-economic	rights	
In	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 that	 acknowledges	 the	 deep	 entrenchment	 of	
disempowerment	 of	 the	 poor	 and	marginalised,	 participatory	 rights	 are	 also	 intimately	
linked	to	socio-economic	rights.	As	discussed	in	chapter	three,	effective	participation	in	
																																								 																				
818 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) paras 40-44. 
819 Para 40; See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 
paras 23 and 83. 
820 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 52, 142; and M Pieterse “A different shade of red: Socio-economic 
dimensions of the right to life in South Africa” (1999) 15 SAJHR 372–385. See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) 
BCLR 665 (CC) paras 326–7; and Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 
(CC) para 31. The Indian Supreme Court has used the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Indian Constitution 
to inculcate substantive content in the right to life (art 21) of the Indian Constitution. The Court has thereby 
interpreted the right to life to include the basic necessities of life: Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator 
(1981) 2 SCR 516 (adequate nutrition, clothing, reading facilities); Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 
(1985) 3 SCC 545 (right to a livelihood); Shanti Star Builders v Narayan K. Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520; and 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 123 (right to shelter); 
Paramanand Katara v Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286; and Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of 
West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 (right to health care); and Unnikrishnan J P v State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 
SCC 645 (right to education). See the discussion of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme 
Court pertaining to socio-economic rights in Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights notes 217–239 and 
accompanying text 121-125. 
821 See generally S Liebenberg “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” Acta Juridica 
2008 1 149-170. See also Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC) 
para 82.  
822 The equality clause in the Bill of Rights section 9(2) states: “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment 
of all rights and freedoms”. See S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt “The Interrelationship between Equality and Socio-
Economic Rights under South Africa’s Transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335-361; and C Albertyn 
“Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253–276. See also Minister of 
Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC). For a discussion of the interpretation of substantive 
equality rights in Canadian cases to protect equal access to welfare and other socio-economic benefits by 
disadvantaged groups, see Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 125-126 and footnotes. 
823 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 82-83; Daniels 
v Scribante 2017 (8) BCLR 949 (CC) for example paras 2, 3, 23 and 25. See S Liebenberg “The Value of 
Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” (2005) 21(1) SAJHR 1. See also discussion by Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 128-129 regarding the Colombian Court’s granting of relief in cases where socio-economic 
rights’ violation affects the enjoyment of civil and political rights such as the right to life, personal integrity or 
dignity and when particular groups do not enjoy the basic conditions for a dignified life. 
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social,	economic	and	political	 life	 requires	a	person	to	at	 least	have	their	basic	material	
needs	 met,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 those	 needs	 are	 met	 should	 be	
determined	 through	 participatory	 mechanisms,	 as	 circular	 means	 and	 ends	 to	
overcoming	poverty.	Thus	 the	 rights	 of	 access	 to	 information	 (s	 32)	 and	 administrative	
justice	 (s	 33)	 have	 an	 equally	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	 state	 in	 giving	poor	people	 a	platform	 to	be	heard	 and	 to	participate	 in	
socio-economic	decisions	that	affect	their	lives	and	rights.824	
Scott	distinguishes	between	 “organic”	 and	 “related”	 interdependence	of	 rights.825	 Socio-
economic	 rights	 and	 particpatory	 rights	 are	 not	 sub-sets	 of	 each	 other	 but	 rather	
“mutually	 reinforcing”	 but	with	 distinct	 roles	 to	 play.	 The	 interdepence	 between	 these	
rights,	as	Scott	points	out,	is	based	on	the	acutal	social	experience	of	human	beings	living	
in	poverty.	Osmani	on	the	other	hand	discusses	the	various	ways	in	which	human	rights	
are	 relevant	 to	 poverty:	 constitutive	 relevance;	 instrumental	 relevance	 -	 causative	 or	
evaluative;	 and	 constraint-based	 relevance.826	 Socio-economic	 rights	 and	 participatory	
rights	are	both	constitutive	of	and	instrumental	to	reducing	poverty.	Participatory	rights	
are	instrumental,	for	example,	as	a	means	of	evaluating	the	extent	and	success	of	poverty	
reduction	 measures	 through	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 poor.	 According	 to	 the	OHCHR	
Guidelines,	there	are	four	stages	of	participation	in	poverty	reduction	policy	formulation:	
preference	assessment;	policy	choice;	policy	implementation;	and	monitoring,	assessment	
																																								 																				
824 See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 53, 126-127 and footnotes on the application of the principles of 
procedural fairness in American cases where the protection of social benefits was sought. See also cases on 
administrative justice and participation of the poor in decision-making in a number of successful court 
challenges that were brought under administrative law by indigent individuals affected by the withdrawal of 
social security benefits amidst the ongoing systemic problems in the administration of social grants in the 
Eastern Cape. See also cases involving administrative justice and housing and basic services: Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC); Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 
212 (CC) 30; and Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) 28.  
825 See chapter three. C Scott “The interdependence and permeability of human rights norms: Towards a 
partial fusion of the international covenants on human rights” Osgoode Hall Law Journal Vol 27(4) 1989 770-
878, 794-798. 
826 See chapter three. S Osmani S Evolving Views on Poverty: Concept, Assessment and Strategy Poverty and 
Social Development Papers No.7 (2003) Asian Development Bank 21-22. 
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and	 accountability.827	 Participatory	 rights	 should	 facilitate	 involvement	 in	 all	 stages	 of	
policy	formulation	as	well	as	implementation.	
Despite	 the	 well-established	 international	 categorisation	 of	 civil-political	 and	 socio-
economic	rights,828	there	are	not	impermeable	boundaries	between	the	different	rights	in	
the	 South	 African	 Bill	 of	 Rights.829	 By	 applying	 a	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 human	
rights	norms,	the	interaction	and	interconnectedness	of	various	rights	in	achieving	social	
justice	 has	 been	 recognised	 by	 the	 South	 African	 Courts,	 including	 their	 common	
underlying	 values.	 The	 ongoing	 interpretation	 of	 rights,	 instead	 of	 confining	 rights,	
should	 endeavour	 to	 develop	 their	 content	 and	 scope	 in	 a	 way	 which	 enhances	 their	
interdependence	and	recognises	the	multi-dimensional,	complex	nature	of	the	experience	
of	poverty	and	inequality.830		
In	 the	 next	 sections,	 I	 analyse	 the	 achievements,	 shortcomings	 and	 potential	 of	 the	
interwoven	jurisprudence	on	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice,	to	advance	
poverty	reduction	in	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state.	I	firstly	outline	the	
separation	 of	 powers	 and	 political-legal	 context,	 which	 should	 inform	 the	 adjudicative	
approach	the	courts	adopt	in	these	cases	in	order	to	frame	the	interpretive	analysis.	I	then	
identify	 key	 interdependent	 features	 of	 each	 set	 of	 rights,	 which	 could	 conceivably	
enhance	the	future	integrated	interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	
justice	 in	 cases	 confronting	 poverty	 reduction.	 I	 focus	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 rights	 to	
																																								 																				
827 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Principles and Guidelines for a Human 
Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies (2006) 14-15 <http://www.ohchr.org/ EN/Issues/ 
Poverty/DimensionOfPoverty/Pages/Guidelines.aspx> (accessed 10-05-2017). 
828 Scott (1989) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 27(4); C Scott “Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the 
Category of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 633-700; C Scott 
“Towards the Institutional Integration of the Core Human Rights Treaties” in Valerie Oosterveld and Isfahan 
Merali (eds) Reaching Beyond Words: Giving Meaning to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001) 7-38.  
829 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 53. As Liebenberg points out, some rights do not fit neatly into either 
category, but fall into both or neither. For example labour rights are recognised in both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (art 22), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966 (art 8). Property rights are not recognised in either, but in some regional treaties such as 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 (art 1, 
Protocol 1), the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 (art 21), and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 1981 (art 14). The right to administrative justice is not recognised in any of the international 
human rights covenants or regional conventions. The right has only been inferred from the European human 
rights jurisprudence, namely from the fair hearing provision (art 6(1)) in the European Convention and the 
“right to good administration” in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000.  
830 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 54. 
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education,	 social	 security,	 housing	 and	 related	 basic	 services,	 where	 the	
interconnectedness	of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	in	the	context	of	
poverty	has	been	most	vivid.	
6	3	Adjudicating	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	in	a	democratic	
developmental	state	
In	 order	 to	 reframe	 the	 potential	 role	 of	 the	 courts	 and	 an	 interdependent	 socio-
economic	 rights/administrative	 justice	 adjudication	 to	 effectively	 tackle	 poverty	 and	
inequality	in	South	Africa,	it	is	necessary	to	broadly	restate	the	goals	and	characteristics	
of	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 This	 framework	 is	 largely	 based	 on	 Peter	 Evans’	
depiction	 of	 the	 21st	 century	 developmental	 state831	 and	 Amartya	 Sen’s	 conception	 of	
multi-dimensional	poverty	and	development,832	outlined	in	chapters	two	and	three.	
Firstly,	 democratic	 participation	 is	 the	 foundational	 aim	 of	 democratic	 developmental	
states.	Along	the	lines	of	Sen,	developmental	policies	are	public	policies	that	are	able	to	
provide	 people	 with	 the	 freedom	 to	 make	 decisions	 to	 pursue	 the	 most	 appropriate	
strategies	to	achieve	their	values	and	goals.833	These	choices	especially	refer	 to	the	style	
and	quality	of	life	that	they	would	prefer	to	maintain,	and	the	capacity	to	take	full	control	
of	their	lives.	Therefore,	Sen’s	notion	of	“enhancing	human	capabilities”	is	a	central	goal	
of	the	democratic	developmental	state,	both	as	a	means	and	an	end	to	addressing	poverty	
and	inequality.	Enhancement	of	human	capabilities	is	then	not	just	a	welfare	goal	but	also	
an	 important	 driver	 of	 sustained	 and	 inclusive,	 democratic	 development.834	 Jennifer	
Nedelsky’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 autonomy	 reveals	 both	 the	 social	 and	 the	 individual	
nature	of	human	beings835	 and	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	Sen’s	 theory	of	building	 capabilities.	
Participation	 is	 critical	 to	 both	 democracy	 and	 autonomy.	 The	 term	 “autonomy”	
																																								 																				
831 P Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state: potentialities and pitfalls” in O Edigheji (ed) 
Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa (2010). 
832 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999). 
833 Sen Development as Freedom 36-43. 
834 O Edigheji (ed) Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa (2010) 13. See also S Van 
Der Berg A capabilities approach to the judicial review of resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-
economic rights LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2015). 
835 J Nedelsky “Reconceiving autonomy” (1989) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7-36. 
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encompasses	 the	 importance	 of	 social	 context	 in	 defining	 “who”	 we	 are	 as	 well	 as	 the	
capacity	 to	 choose	 one’s	 own	 life.	 The	 active	 ingredients	 that	 nurture	 “autonomy”	 can	
exist	 in	 social	 and	 intimate	 relationships	 and	 should	 be	 supported	 through	 formal	
structures	 of	 authority,	 such	 as	 the	 courts,	 the	 executive	 and	 the	 legislature.	 Sen	
developed	 the	 similar	 concept	 of	 “agency”	 to	 promote	 the	 idea	 that	 vulnerable	
individuals,	groups	and	communities	can	and	should	be	their	own	agents	of	change	and	
not	only	passive	recipients	of	resources.	836	
Secondly,	 the	 state	 capacities	 required	 for	 the	 enhancement	 of	 human	 capabilities	 and	
the	 realisation	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 are	 the	 effective	 and	 efficient	 provision	 of	
collective	goods.	The	effective	and	efficient	provision	of	public	goods,	 including	health,	
education,	social	welfare,	housing,	food	and	water,	is	necessary	to	provide	a	social	safety	
net	 alongside	 macro-economic	 policy.	 The	 design,	 development	 and	 delivery	 of	 these	
public	 goods	 is	 dependent	 on	 government	administrative	 capacity	 and	 institutions	 that	
are	 “autonomous”	 and	 anchored	 on	 “active	 democratic	 structures”.837	 This	 requires	 the	
public	 administration	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 skilled.	 The	 courts’	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	justice	adjudication	assesses	government	action	in	delivering	public	goods	
for	defects	in	access	and	outcomes	for	those	in	need.	The	public	administration	and	the	
executive	policy-makers	must	also	be	“autonomous”	in	the	sense	that	they	act	on	behalf	
of	citizens	and	are	not	acting	as	a	state	captured	by	private	interests.838	At	the	same	time,	
the	 legislative,	 executive	 and	 judicial	 arms	must	be	 “active	democratic	 structures”.	One	
ordinarily	 thinks	 of	 the	 legislature	 as	 democratic	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 participation	 of	 the	
																																								 																				
836 Sen Development as Freedom 11. 
837 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a Democratic Developmental 
State in South Africa 38. 
838 See Public Protector “State of Capture Report No.2 of 2016/17” (14-10-2016) Public Protector South 
Africa <http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-17/State_Capture_ 14October2016.pdf> 
(accessed 29-11-2016). See for example the social grants crisis and allegations of corruption by the Minister 
of Social Development and the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) alluded to in: AllPay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 
and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer 
of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 
(CC); Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and Black Sash Trust v 
Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC). Discussed 
further below. 
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elected	 representatives	 and	 the	general	public	 in	 law-making.	 Similarly	 the	executive	 is	
constitutionally	 compelled	 to	 consult	 the	 public	 on	 policy-making.839	 Based	 on	 Sen’s	
development	theory,	strategies	and	policies	cannot	be	solely	 formulated	by	technocrats,	
but	must	be	derived	from	democratically	organised	public	deliberation.	Deliberative	and	
participatory	democratic	institutions	are	essential	to	a	South	African	developmental	state.	
Public	policy	for	human	development	must	be	conceptualised	and	implemented	through	
deliberative	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 broadly	 collaborative	 between	 all	 sectors	 of	 society:	
Evans	refers	to	this	as	“synergistic	state-society	relations”.840	
The	 judiciary	 is	a	South	African	institution	that	 is	 less	“democratised”,	but	 is	capable	of	
designing	 and	 enforcing	 innovative	 participatory	 mechanisms	 and	 remedies,	 such	 as	
“meaningful	 engagement”.	 The	 novel	 development	 of	 the	 court’s	 jurisprudence	 around	
“meaningful	 engagement”,	 attempts	 to	 include	 the	 voices	 of	 the	 poor	 in	 the	 decisions	
affecting	 them.841	 Young’s	 experimentalist	 and	managerial	 review,	 and	 “catalytic	 court”	
model,	 reflect	 such	 conceptions	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 judiciary	 in	 a	 transformative	
constitutional	democracy.842	The	democratic	experimentalist	form	of	review	described	by	
Ray,	and	based	on	the	public	law	litigation	model	of	Charles	Sabel	and	William	Simon,843	
focuses	on	 the	 role	 the	courts	 can	play	 in	 initiating	and	managing	processes	where	 the	
state,	 litigants	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 can	 develop	 substantive	 standards	 and	 novel,	
experimental	 remedies.844	 This	 more	 “democratised”	 formulation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	
judiciary	 acknowledges	 the	 important	 contribution	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 to	 the	
empowerment	of	the	poor,	over	and	above	the	amelioration	of	the	material	conditions	of	
life.	 Both,	 it	 is	 argued,	 are	 means	 and	 ends	 for	 real	 and	 lasting	 socio-economic	
transformation	in	a	South	African	democratic	developmental	state.	
																																								 																				
839 Section 195(1)(e). 
840 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in South Africa 38. 
841 See section 6 5 below. 
842 K Young “A typology of economic and social rights adjudication: Exploring the catalytic function of judicial 
review” ICON (2010) Vol 8 No 3 395-407. 
843 C Sabel & W Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harv L Rev 
1016. See further discussion in 6 4 1 below. 
844 B Ray Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, Participation, and Democracy in South Africa's Second Wave 
(2016) 219-224. See further discussion in 6 5 1 below. 
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Finally,	 disaggregated	 developmental	 outcomes	 are	 necessary	 to	 demonstrate	 socio-
economic	progress,	at	an	individual,	group	and	systemic	level.845	As	sketched	in	chapter	
three,	multi-dimensional	poverty	indicators	have	improved	somewhat	since	the	advent	of	
democracy	 in	 South	Africa.	However	many	millions	 of	 people	 still	 live	 in	 conditions	of	
poverty	without	 adequate	 housing,	 quality	 education,	 basic	 services	 and	 suffering	 from	
ill-health,	 and	 social	 exclusion.	 This	 relates	 to	 the	 international	 obligations	 of	 “result”	
discussed	above,	as	well	as	to	those	rights	subject	to	progressive	realisation.846	Similar	to	
the	 Sustainable	 Development	 Goals,	 developmental	 outcomes	 should	 indicate	 an	
improved	 proportional	 trajectory	 for	 poor	 individuals	 and	 groups,	 over	 time.	 An	
incremental,	substantive	 interpretation	and	systemic	 implementation	of	socio-economic	
rights	 will	 aid	 this	 advancement,	 as	 well	 as	 ensure	 accountability	 for	 improvement	 in	
outcomes	over	time,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
6	4	Characteristics	of	adjudication	in	a	democratic	developmental	state	
For	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 to	 flourish,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	
profoundly	 reconceptualise	 the	 role	 of	 the	 judiciary	 within	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	
doctrine	and	strike	a	better	balance	between	 judicial	 “activism”	and	deference	 in	 socio-
economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	adjudication.847	In	chapter	four,	I	suggested	a	
reinvigorated	model	of	 judicial	prowess	and	an	experimentalist,	substantive	approach	to	
socio-economic	rights	adjudication	that	would	better	serve	the	transformative	project.	In	
this	section	I	expand	on	this	judicial	review	model	and	approach	–	which	I	refer	to	as	the	
“democratic	incremental”	approach	–	and	then	apply	it	to	an	interdependent	adjudication	
																																								 																				
845 See Presidency Development Indicators (2014) 4 <http://www.dpme.gov.za/publications/ 
Reports%20and%20Other%20Information%20Products/Development%20Indicators%202014.pdf> (accessed 
16-06-2017). 
846 Sections 26(2), 27(2) and 29(1)(b). 
847 See generally Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights; Ray Engaging Social Rights; Young (2010) ICON 385-
420; D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa” (2011) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 614; J De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003); H 
Corder (1998) “Administrative justice: A cornerstone of South Africa's democracy” (1998) 14 SAJHR 38; D 
Dyzenhaus “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in M Taggart (ed) The Province of 
Administrative Law (1997); C Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 484 ; K O'Regan “Breaking Ground: Some thoughts on the seismic shift in our administrative 
law” (2004) 121 SALJ 424; H Corder “Towards Administrative Justice” in Empowerment and Accountability 
(1991); E Mureinik “Reconsidering review: Participation and accountability” (1993) Acta Juridica 35. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 229	
 
of	 socio-economic	 and	 administrative	 justice	 rights,	 to	 further	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.	
Democratisation	 of	 the	 courts;	 increased	 accountability	 of	 the	 executive	 and	 the	
administration	 for	 effective	policy	design	 and	delivery	 of	 public	 goods;	 and	 substantive	
interpretation	 of	 socio-economic	 and	 administrative	 justice	 rights	 to	 individually	 and	
systemically	 address	 the	 multi-dimensional	 challenges	 of	 poverty,	 are	 all	 necessary	
building	blocks	of	the	South	African	democratic	developmental	state.	I	discuss	next	how	
democratic	 experimentalist,	 substantive	 incremental,	 managerial	 and	 autonomous	
approaches	 to	 the	 interdependent	 adjudication	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	 justice,	 relate	 to	 these	 elements	 of	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	state.	
6	4	1	Democratic	experimentalism	
“Democratic	 experimentalism”	 is	 a	 model	 for	 operationalising	 participatory	 democracy	
through	 institutional	mechanisms	 that	make	 public	 authorities	more	 responsive	 to	 the	
needs	 of	 people	 via	 effective	 service	 delivery.	 The	 “democratic	 experimentalist	 review”,	
described	by	Charles	Sabel	and	William	Simon,	serves	to	democratise	judicial	review	and	
minimise	 the	 tension	with	 judicial	 competence	by	creating	opportunities	 for	 legislative,	
executive	and	non-governmental	responses	to	judicial	cases	dealing	with	socio-economic	
rights.848	 Experimentalist	 review	 depends	 on	 a	 participatory	 and	 iterative	 remedial	
process	 in	 which	 parties	 and	 various	 stakeholders	 identify	 solutions	 to	 the	 violations	
found	by	the	court.	This	 form	of	review	“combines	more	flexible	and	provisional	norms	
with	procedures	 for	ongoing	 stakeholder	participation	 and	measured	accountability”.849	
The	court	does	not	specify	remedial	measures	but	instead	manages	a	process	whereby	the	
parties	themselves	resolve	the	issues	in	the	case.	
																																								 																				
848 Sabel & Simon (2004) Harv L Rev 1016; Ray Engaging Social Rights 27-28; M Tushnet “Social welfare 
rights and the forms of judicial review” 82 Texas Law Review (2004) 1895. 
849 Sabel & Simon (2004) Harv L Rev 1019. 
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An	 experimentalist	 review	 approach	 recognises	 a	 strong	 right,	 but	 does	 not	 itself	
delineate	the	substance	of	the	right,	rather	it	determines	a	process	for	experimenting	with	
substantive	norms	to	fulfil	the	legal	rights	obligation.	The	court	in	this	way	cedes	control	
to	 the	 participants	 to	 determine	 the	 specific	measures	 and	 to	 jointly	 adjust	 them	 over	
time	 as	 results	 appear.	 However,	 it	 does	 provide	 a	 strong	 remedy	 in	 that	 remedies	 in	
these	 cases	 will	 usually	 involve	 a	 structural	 interdict.	 A	 participatory	 remedial	 process	
necessarily	 makes	 judicial	 enforcement	 more	 democratic	 too.	 	 Experimentalism	
democratises	 judicial	 review	 through	 the	 provision	 of	 opportunities	 for	 private	 parties	
and	 other	 interested	 stakeholders	 to	 participate	 in	 crafting	 human	 rights	 norms	 by	
specifying	remedies	for	constitutional	violations.	
Experimentalism	 also	 particularly	 targets	 the	 executive	 by	 creating	 a	 mechanism	 to	
democratise	 executive	 decision-making	 processes	 through	 judicial	 enforcement.	 Sabel	
and	 Simon	 describe	 the	 experimental	 remedial	 process	 in	 public-law	 litigation	 as	 a	
mechanism	 for	 opening	 up	 bureaucratic	 administrations	 to	 democratic	 participation	 in	
policy	 development	 and	 implementation.	 They	 characterise	 this	 as	 “destabilisation	
rights”,	which	force	public	institutions	to	engage	with	stakeholders	and	citizens	directly	
and	constructively	and	to	take	heed	of	their	views.850	This	way	participation	can	lead	to	
the	empowerment	of	people,	as	well	as	amelioration	of	conditions	of	poverty.	
However,	as	Liebenberg	and	Young	argue,	 in	practice	weak-form	remedies	 can	serve	 to	
further	marginalise	poor	people	and	tax	their	already	depleted	resources.851	 I	agree	with	
their	 view,	 and	 therefore	 argue	 that	 substantive	 judicial	 interpretation	 must	 guide	
procedural	 obligations	placed	on	 the	 executive	 to	determine	 concrete	benefits	 together	
with	affected	communities	and	their	representatives.	Landau	also	rejects	this	weak-form	
review	and	its	 idealised	judicial-political	engagement	because	“the	intended	recipient	of	
the	dialogue	is	unlikely	to	respond	effectively”.852	The	state	often	lacks	the	capacity	–	in	
																																								 																				
850 Sabel & Simon (2004) Harv L Rev 1055-1056. 
851 S Liebenberg and K G Young “Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights: Can Democratic Experimentalism 
Help?” in H A Garcia, K Klare and L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical 
Inquiries (2015) Chapter 13. 
852 D Landau “The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement” 53 Harv L Rev (2012) 192. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 231	
 
terms	 of	 skills	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 resources	 and	 willingness	 to	 fulfil	 such	 dialogic	
obligations.853	 Conditions	 and	 mechanisms	 that	 make	 court	 enforcement	 more	
democratic,	 must	 work	 alongside	 those	 that	 meet	 basic	 needs	 and	 make	 progressive	
realisation	 possible.	 Sabel	 and	 Simon	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 insufficient	 evidence	 of	 the	
superiority	of	the	experimentalist	model	in	achieving	results	above	other	alternatives,	but	
they	 conclude	 that	 experimentalist	 approaches	 have	 “functional	 jurisprudential	
properties”	 that	 are	 manifestly	 favourable	 to	 the	 uncertainty	 and	 complexity	 that	
surrounds	public	policy	issues.854	
Both	 democratic	 experimentalism	 and	 Young’s	 “catalytic	 court”	 model	 identify	
adjudicative	 approaches	 that	 allow	 courts	 to	 maintain	 a	 strong	 judicial	 role	 and	 also	
mitigate	 the	 democratic-legitimacy	 and	 institutional	 competence	 concerns	 of	
commentators	 on	 the	 justiciability	 of	 socio-economic	 rights.	 The	discernible	 pattern	 of	
tension	 in	 the	 second	 wave	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 cases	 demonstrates	 the	 court’s	
strong	 aversion	 to	 developing	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 whilst	
firmly	 exercising	 strong	procedural	 authority.	 In	 a	democratic	developmental	 state,	 the	
Court	should	combine	a	strong	substantive	interpretative	role	with	an	active	democratic	
remedial	role.	
6	4	2	Substantive	incrementalism	and	systemic	transformation	
Despite	the	remarkable	number	of	eviction	cases	that	the	Court	has	adjudicated,	there	is	
a	 dearth	 of	 substantively	 rich	 discussion	 on	 what	 section	 26	 fully	 entails	 and	 whether	
particular	 policies	 or	 legislation	 comply	 with	 it.	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 has	
demonstrated	 a	 reluctance	 to	 interpret	 housing	 legislation	 and	 policies	 in	 accordance	
with	an	elaborated	set	of	constitutional	principles.	Between	the	first	and	second	wave	of	
socio-economic	 rights	 that	 came	 before	 the	 courts,	 the	 interpretive	 approach	 lacked	
substantive	 content.	 Liebenberg	 has	 suggested	 a	 stronger	 interpretive	 role,	 but	 more	
																																								 																				
853 See for example Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and Black 
Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC). 
854 C Sabel & W Simon “Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State” (2011) Geo L Rev 53, 
78.  
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flexible	 and	contextually	based.	Other	 commentators	have	pushed	 for	 a	minimum	core	
interpretation	of	socio-economic	rights,	which	the	court	outright	rejected	in	Mazibuko	v	
City	of	Johannesburg	(“Mazibuko”).855		
I	suggest	a	substantive	incremental	approach	to	socio-economic	rights	that	begins	with	a	
delineation	of	 the	minimum	 level	 required	of	 a	 right	 and	 then	expands	upon	 that	over	
time,	 based	 on	 the	 cases	 that	 are	 brought	 before	 the	 court.	 In	 addition,	 the	minimum	
level	should	be	substantively	interpreted	via	participation	of	various	stakeholders	and	the	
litigants,	 as	 described	 in	 the	 experimentalist	 mode.	 The	 incremental	 approach	 also	
promotes	 systemic	 reform	 because	 principles	 can	 be	 applied	 at	 scale	 over	 time,	 for	
example	the	requirement	that	Cities	plan	and	budget	for	emergency	accommodation	for	
people	 that	might	be	 evicted	 from	public	or	private	 land,	under	 section	26.	Over	 time,	
this	 right	 should	be	 expanded	 to	 include	more	 long-term,	permanent	 solutions	beyond	
the	 minimal	 temporary	 accommodation,	 emergency	 requirement.	 They	 could	 also	
eventually	 cover	 principles	 of	 spatial	 justice	 and	 integration	 and	 the	 requirement	 that	
social	housing	projects	be	attached	to	larger	housing	developments	in	well-located	urban	
areas,	 for	 example.	 Constitutional	 norms	 thus	 develop	 incrementally,	 in	 phases	 and	
through	engagements	between	the	courts,	litigants,	technical	experts,	the	legislature	and	
the	 executive.	 The	 key	 features	 of	 this	 model	 are:	 a	 judicial	 role	 that	 emphasises	
democratic	 processes	 and	 incremental	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 socio-economic	
rights	 through	 engagement	 amongst	 courts,	 political	 branches	 and	 civil	 society.	 This	
model	is	elaborated	further	below.	
The	 Court	 is	 required	 to	 proactively	 interpret	 constitution-enforcing	 legislation	 and	
policy,	 for	 example	 PIE	 in	 Port	 Elizabeth	 Municipality	 v	 Various	 Occupiers856	 (“PE	
Municipality”)	 and	 HIV	 treatment	 policy	 in	 Minister	 of	 Health	 v	 Treatment	 Action	
Campaign	 (No	 2)857	 (“TAC”).	 In	 City	 of	 Johannesburg	 Metropolitan	 Municipality	 v	 Blue	
																																								 																				
855 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) para 39. D Bilchitz "Giving socio-economic rights teeth; the minimum core and its 
importance" (2002) SALJ 484. 
856 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
857 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
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Moonlight	Properties	39	(Pty)	Ltd858	(“Blue	Moonlight”)	and	Occupiers	of	Erven	87	and	88	
Berea	v	De	Wet859	(“Occupiers	Berea”),	the	court	relied	primarily	on	an	interpretation	of	
the	Housing	Act	and	found	that		“the	City	has	a	duty	to	plan	and	budget	proactively	for	
situations	like	that	of	the	Occupiers”.860	The	Court	in	Occupiers	Berea	stated	that	it	was	
the	 duty	 of	 the	 court,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 just	 and	 equitable	 enquiry,	 “to	 be	 proactive	 in	
gathering	information	about	all	the	relevant	circumstances,	considering	that	information	
and	 arriving	 at	 a	 just	 and	 equitable	 order	 in	 the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case.”861	 The	
judgments	 imply	 that	 all	 levels	 of	 government	 are	 required	 to	 be	 proactive	 in	 fulfilling	
their	obligations,	and	the	courts	must	be	proactive	in	holding	the	state	accountable.	This	
can	happen	at	the	inquiry	and	the	remedial	stages.	
In	 the	 unqualified	 education	 rights	 cases,	 the	 courts	 have	 adopted	 a	more	 substantive	
incremental	 approach.862	 Courts	 have	 outlined	 the	 broader	 values	 underlying	 the	 right	
and	 asserted	 the	 immediate	 realisation	 principle.	 The	 cases	 have	 thus	 far	 positively	
shaped	the	content	of	the	right	to	education	as	well	as	broader	systemic,	transformational	
impacts.	 	 These	 include:	 the	 improvement	 of	 state	 institutional	 capacities;	 the	
provisioning	 of	 required	 inputs	 for	 education	 such	 as	 textbooks,	 learner	 transport	 and	
infrastructure;	 the	 creation	 of	 partnerships	 in	 the	 implementation	 process;	 the	
recognition	of	participatory	democratic	processes	for	determining	school	policies;	and	the	
advancement	of	public	processes	to	determine	solutions	to	address	underlying	structural	
issues.863	These	 judgments	 are	 the	building	blocks	 in	 the	development	 of	 a	 substantive	
incremental	jurisprudence	and	provide	the	impetus	for	further	systemic	reform.	
																																								 																				
858 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
859 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC). 
860 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) BCLR 
150 (CC) para 67. 
861 Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet (CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017) para 55. 
862 See for example: Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 
(3) BCLR 177 (CC); Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All 2016 (4) SA 63 (SCA). 
863 See Open Society Foundation Strategic Litigation Impacts: Equal Access to Quality Education (2017) 57-73. 
The OSF report uses the following typology in assessing impact: (1) material outcomes; (2) policy changes or 
jurisprudential shifts; and (3) agenda change as a result of litigation. See also F Veriava The Limpopo Textbook 
Crisis 2012 <http://www.section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-2012-Limpopo-Textbook-
Crisis1.pdf> (accessed 09-10-2017); F Veriava The contribution of the courts and of civil society to the 
development of a transformative constitutionalist narrative for the right to basic education LLD thesis 
University of Pretoria (2017). 
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6	4	3	Managerialism		
A	managerial	role	for	the	courts	was	described	in	PE	Municipality,864	and	then	reflected	in	
both	Olivia	Road865	and	Joe	Slovo.866	Ray	argues	that	the	Court’s	decision	to	ignore	more	
substantive	 issues	 in	 these,	 and	 other	 eviction	 cases,	 and	 rather	 focus	 on	 procedural	
control	 over	 the	 effects	 rather	 than	 the	 substance	 of	 housing	 policies,	 represents	 a	
preference	 for	managerial	 judging	over	 a	 substantive	 approach.867	 In	Blue	Moonlight,868	
the	 court	 employed	 a	 robust	 version	 of	 this	 managerial	 approach,	 by	 temporarily	
preventing	 the	 eviction	 of	 occupiers	 from	 private	 land	 and	 then	 requiring	 the	 City	 of	
Johannesburg	to	adapt	its	housing	policy	to	include	provision	for	private	evictions.	
I	 do	 not	 propose	 a	 purely	 “managerial”	 proceduralised	 model	 devoid	 of	 substance,	 as	
applied	 in	 Olivia	 Road869	 and	 Maphango	 v	 Aengus	 Lifestyle	 Properties	 (Pty)	 Ltd870	
(“Maphango”),	 but	 see	 the	 value	 of	 the	 managerial	 approach	 to	 ensure	 that	 state	
institutions	 fulfil	 their	 obligations	 based	 on	 the	 court’s	 decision.	 The	 Court’s	 use	 of	
procedural	 techniques	 and	 flexible	 balancing	 tests	 is	 the	 hallmark	 of	 the	 “managerial”	
approach.871	The	court	 should	develop	 the	substantive	 side	of	 the	managerial	approach,	
by	incorporating	an	interpretation	of	what	the	right	entails	and	thereby	considering	what	
it	 is	 trying	 to	achieve.	 In	 Juma	Musjid,872	 the	court	had	 to	balance	 the	 substance	of	 the	
right	 to	 education	and	 the	 right	 to	property,	 through	 the	 innovative	use	of	meaningful	
engagement.	The	court’s	use	of	meaningful	engagement	in	this	and	other	cases	generates	
a	framework	for	applying	the	managerial	role	to	the	policy	and	decision-making	context.	
This	is	discussed	in	more	detail	below.	
																																								 																				
864 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
865 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). 
866 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC). Ray 
Engaging Social Rights 89, 128. 
867 Ray Engaging Social Rights 110. 
868 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC). 
869 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). 
870 2012 (5) BCLR 449 (CC). 
871 See sections 4 3 and 4 4 above. Young (2010) ICON 402-407. 
872 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and Another v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO and Others 
2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). 
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More	recently,	in	the	social	security	AllPay873	cases	and	the	case	of	Black	Sash	Trust	and	
Another	 v	 Minister	 of	 Social	 Development	 and	 Another	 ‘(Black	 Sash	 Trust’)874,	 the	
Constitutional	 Court	 boldly	 formulated	 remedies	 that	 have	 both	 experimentalist	 and	
managerial	 features.	 In	 the	AllPay	 cases	 the	Court	 retained	 a	 supervisory	 role	 over	 the	
matter,	until	November	2015,	when	SASSA	filed	a	report	to	the	Court	stating	that	it	would	
not	award	a	new	contract	but	intended	to	take	over	the	payment	function	of	social	grants	
from	1	April	2017,	which	was	the	date	when	the	suspension	of	invalidity	ended.		On	that	
basis,	 the	Court	 discharged	 its	 supervisory	 role.	 	However,	 just	 prior	 to	 1	 April	 2017,	 it	
became	 apparent	 that	 SASSA	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 pay	 the	 grants.	 A	 public	 interest	
organisation,	 the	 Black	 Sash	 therefore	 instituted	 an	 application	 on	 behalf	 of	 all	 grant	
beneficiaries	requesting	that	the	Court	reinstitute	its	oversight	role	to	ensure	that	SASSA	
complies	with	its	constitutional	obligations	to	pay	the	social	grants	
The	Court	declared	that	SASSA	and	CPS	are	under	a	constitutional	obligation	to	ensure	
payment	of	social	grants	to	grant	beneficiaries	from	1	April	2017	until	an	entity	other	than	
CPS	 is	able	 to	do	so	and	that	a	 failure	 to	do	so	would	 infringe	upon	the	rights	of	grant	
beneficiaries	of	access	to	social	assistance	under	section	27(1)(c)	of	the	Constitution.		The	
initial	declaration	of	invalidity	of	the	contract	was	also	further	suspended	for	a	12-month	
period	from	1	April	2017.		The	Court	thus	issued	a	structural	order	requiring	the	Minister	
of	 Social	 Development	 and	 SASSA	 to	 make	 periodic	 reports	 on	 progress	 towards	 the	
payment	of	social	grants.		The	Court	provided	for	the	establishment	of	a	committee	made	
up	 of	 lawyers	 and	 technical	 experts	 to	 evaluate	 and	 make	 regular	 reports	 on	 the	
distribution	 of	 the	 grants.	 	 Finally,	 the	 Court’s	 order	 also	 made	 provision	 for	 the	
involvement	 of	 the	 Auditor-General	 to	 monitor	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 interim	
contract.			
	
																																								 																				
873 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC). 
874 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC). 
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6	4	4	Autonomous	institutions	
Scholars	 of	 the	 developmental	 state,	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 have	 highlighted	 its	
organisational	 features,	 namely	 the	 capacity	 to	 formulate	 and	 implement	 a	
developmental	 agenda	 and	 structural	 characteristics,	 namely	 the	 autonomy	 of	 state	
institutions.	These	 attributes	 enable	 the	developmental	 state	 to	define	 and	promote	 its	
strategic	 developmental	 goals,	 in	 an	 “embedded”	 sense	where	 the	 state	 and	 society	 are	
bound	 to	 work	 together	 in	 a	 way	 that	 “provides	 institutionalised	 channels	 for	 the	
continual	negotiation	and	renegotiation	of	goals	and	policies”875,	but	not	to	purely	profit	
themselves.	 According	 to	 Evans,	 institutional-societal	 “embedded”	 autonomy	 requires	
coherent	 state	 agencies	 not	 only	 to	 formulate,	 but	 also	 to	 implement	 coherent	
developmental	 goals,	 such	 as	 those	 articulated	 in	 the	National	Development	 Plan	 2030	
(‘NDP’).876		
Mkandawire	 defines	 the	 developmental	 state	 as	 one	 where	 the	 main	 theoretical	
underpinning	 is	 “developmentalist”,	 where	 the	 state	 must	 ensure	 socio-economic	
progress.	 The	 institutional	 capacity	 required	 is	 dependent	 on	 technical,	 administrative	
and	 political	 factors,	 in	 order	 for	 the	 state	 to	 implement	 policies	 effectively.	 This	 state	
form	 must	 be	 wisely	 and	 sturdily	 autonomous	 in	 devising	 long-term	 socio-economic	
policies,	 uncaptured	 by	 private	 sector	 interests.	 Finally,	 this	 state	 must	 remain	
transparent	and	accountable	in	order	for	it	to	gain	and	maintain	the	support	of	key	social	
actors	and	not	allow	illegitimate	state	capture.877	
It	 is	necessary	 to	 recognise	 that	 these	 rights	exist	 in	a	broader	context	of	public	policy,	
macroeconomics	and	politics.878	The	rise	to	prominence	of	the	Public	Protector	in	South	
Africa,	 since	Thuli	Madonsela	 took	up	office,	was	 largely	due	 to	her	 fearless	holding	of	
																																								 																				
875 Evans P Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (1995) 12. 
876National Planning Commission NDP Executive Summary (2012) <http://www.gov.za/issues/ national-
development-plan-2030> (accessed 29-06-2017). 
877 T Mkandawire “Thinking about developmental states in Africa” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (2001) 
289-313, 290. 
878 R Hirschl & E Rosevear “Constitutional Law meets Comparative Politics: Socio-economic Rights and Political 
Realities” in T Campbell, K D Ewing, & A Tomkins The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptial Essays 
(2011) 207-228, 220-221. 
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public	institutions	and	figures	such	as	the	State	President	Jacob	Zuma,	to	account.	In	the	
Constitutional	 Court	 case	 to	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 Public	
Protector	were	binding,	Economic	Freedom	Fighters	v	Speaker	of	 the	National	Assembly;	
Democratic	Alliance	v	Speaker	of	the	National	Assembly879	(“EFF”),	the	Court	held	that	the	
remedial	 action	 taken	 by	 the	 Public	 Protector	 against	 President	 Jacob	 Gedleyihlekisa	
Zuma	 in	 terms	 of	 section	 182(1)(c)	 of	 the	 Constitution	 was	 binding.880	 Although	 the	
conduct	of	the	President	does	not	constitute	“administrative	action”	for	purposes	of	this	
dissertation,	the	principles	of	democratic	accountability	as	stated	by	Mogoeng	CJ	apply	to	
all	public	actors:881	
“One	of	the	crucial	elements	of	our	constitutional	vision	is	to	make	a	decisive	break	from	
the	 unchecked	 abuse	 of	 State	 power	 and	 resources	 that	 was	 virtually	 institutionalised	
during	the	apartheid	era.	To	achieve	this	goal,	we	adopted	accountability,	the	rule	of	law	
and	the	supremacy	of	the	Constitution	as	values	of	our	constitutional	democracy.	For	this	
reason,	public	office-bearers	ignore	their	constitutional	obligations	at	their	peril.	This	is	so	
because	 constitutionalism,	 accountability	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 constitute	 the	 sharp	 and	
mighty	sword	that	stands	ready	to	chop	the	ugly	head	of	impunity	off	its	stiffened	neck.”	
What	 is	 required	 in	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 where	 there	 are	
enduring	challenges	of	poverty	and	inequality	and	swelling	corruption,	is	a	collaborative	
and	 substantive	 approach	 to	 finding	 systemic	 solutions,	 effectively	 implementing	 them	
and	holding	the	state	to	account.	This	fits	well	with	Young’s	notion	of	a	catalytic	court,	as	
opposed	to	a	supremacist	court.882	I	refer	to	it	as	“democratic	incrementalist”	adjudicative	
approach,	which	lends	itself	to	furthering	a	democratic	developmental	state.	The	courts	
have	 been	 exemplary	 in	 holding	 steadfastly	 to	 the	Constitution	 and	 being	 a	 bastion	 of	
independent,	autonomous	institutions.	
																																								 																				
879 2016 (5) BCLR 618 (CC). 
880 There are currently a number of cases against the State President, brought by a variety of civil society 
organisations and political parties, challenging for example, the President’s appointment of the Chief of 
Prosecutions, the recent Cabinet reshuffle in March 2017 (largely seen as linked to putting in place acolytes 
who will assist in allocating government tenders to a host of interconnected, corrupt private companies), and 
so on. See Biznews “#Zupta vs South Africa” http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2016/11/21/zupta-south-
africa-6-legal-battles/ (accessed on 27-06-2017). 
881 Para 1. 
882 Young (2010) ICON 418-420. 
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6	5	Democratic	incrementalism	
In	 a	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 collaboration	 amongst	 all	
stakeholders	is	critical	to	transforming	the	enduring	poverty	and	inequality.	The	judiciary	
can	 be	 inspired	 to	 display	 an	 increasingly	 proactive,	 democratic	 and	 participatory	
approach,	 without	 usurping	 the	 functions	 of	 the	 other	 arms	 of	 government	 or	 going	
beyond	 its	 technical	 capacity.	 This	 approach,	 which	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 judicial	 prowess,	 as	
opposed	 to	 judicial	 deference,	 permits	 the	 Court	 to	 use	 its	 skills	 at	 different	 levels	 of	
review	 ranging	 in	depth	of	 substance,	 range	of	 engagement	 and	 selection	of	 remedy	as	
appropriate	to	the	context	of	each	particular	case.883	The	democratic	experimentalist	and	
managerial	 styles	 of	 review	 have	 the	 most	 potential	 to	 enhance	 and	 strengthen	 this	
approach	 of	 the	 courts	 in	 the	 socio-economic	 rights/administrative	 justice	
jurisprudence.884		
Judicial	prowess	means	that	the	courts	possess	the	boldness,	skill,	tenacity	and	flexibility	
to	 determine	 the	 most	 suitable	 judicial	 approach	 in	 each	 given	 case.	 This	 must	 be	
underpinned	 by	 a	 robust	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	justice	and	an	active-democratic,	experimentalist	methodology.	These	two	
roles	 can	 be	 in	 tension.	 A	 “democratic	 incrementalist”	 review	 model	 allows	 different	
perspectives	 to	 be	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 socio-economic	 problems	 and	 their	 solutions,	
within	a	particular	factual	situation	as	well	as	beyond,	to	similar	situations.			
Such	jointly	crafted	solutions	may	have	broader	policy	and	resource	implications,	but	will	
only	touch	on	social	policy	aspects	and	not	on	matters	of	macro-economic	policy.	Socio-
economic	 rights	 adjudication	 should	 facilitate	 the	 determination	 of	 the	minimum	 and	
incremental	content	of	the	multiplicity	of	public	goods	such	as	health,	water,	education,	
housing,	required	to	support	 the	populace	who	are	poor	and	 in	need.	But	 it	should	not	
																																								 																				
883 See for example Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Occupiers of 
51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 (5) BCLR 
475 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC). See 
also Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) para 64. 
884 See sections 4 3 and 4 4 above. Young (2010) ICON 402-407; and K Young “The Avoidance of Substance 
in Constitutional Rights” V (2014) CCR 233. 
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enter	 the	 territory	 of	 macro-economic	 policy,	 for	 example,	 trade	 or	 industrial	 policy.	
Determination	 of	 economic	 policy	 most	 likely	 to	 produce	 higher	 rates	 of	 investment,	
growth	 and	 sustainable,	 inclusive	 development	 would	 be	 beyond	 the	 technical	 policy	
know-how	of	judges,	lawyers,	and	litigants.	Macro-economic	policy,	as	opposed	to	social	
policy,	is	then	largely	left	only	to	the	executive	branch	of	government	to	determine,	with	
support	from	technical	experts.		
Furthermore,	 participatory	 rights	 are	 important	 in	 the	 four	 stages	 of	 poverty	 reduction	
policy	 formulation	 described	 in	 chapter	 three:	 “preference	 revelation;	 policy	 choice;	
implementation;	 and	monitoring,	 assessment	 and	 accountability”.885	 Before	 policies	 are	
formulated,	people	must	be	able	to	express	their	preferences	and	the	objectives	they	want	
to	achieve.	Policy	choice	 is	when	policies	are	 formulated	and	resources	allocated.	These	
two	stages	occur	 in	the	domain	of	the	executive	arm	of	government,	with	support	 from	
the	administration.	The	implementation	of	policies	is	also	primarily	the	responsibility	of	
the	executive	arm	of	the	State,	and	the	public	administration	is	responsible	for	creating	
opportunities	to	enable	the	poor	to	exercise	their	right	to	participate.	At	the	final	stage	of	
participation,	monitoring	and	evaluation	of	the	impact	of	policies	is	the	way	in	which	the	
State	 and	 other	 duty-bearers	 can	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 their	 obligations.	 This	
assessment	stage	can	also	be	conducted	with	the	participation	of	affected	communities.	
The	 courts’	 key	 role	 in	 a	democratic	developmental	 state,	 is	 to	 interrogate	 and	 enforce	
meaningful	participation	of	the	poor	in	policy	and	decision-making	processes	and	rights	
interpretation,	as	well	as	holding	the	State	and	other	duty-bearers	accountable.	
6	5	1	Democratic	incrementalism:	An	adjudicatory	approach	
In	 Chapter	 four	 I	 identified	 a	 relative	 dearth	 of	 substance	 in	 the	 courts’	 approach	 to	
interpreting	 socio-economic	 rights.	 	 A	 possible	 evolving	 approach	 could	 incorporate	
democratic	experimentalist	and	substantive	incremental	elements	in	the	development	of	
the	 content	 of	 a	 socio-economic	 right.	 	 The	 first	 part	 of	 the	 test	 would	 entail	 a	
determination	of	the	broad	purposes	and	underlying	values	of	the	right	in	question.	For	
																																								 																				
885 OHCHR Guidelines 14-15. 
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example,	 the	Constitutional	Court	 in	 Juma	Musjid886	highlighted	 the	broad	purposes	of	
the	right	to	education.	The	second	part	would	identify	the	needs	of	poor	and	vulnerable	
people,	 in	 the	 particular	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case,	 based	 on	 the	 perspective	 of	 those	
directly	 affected.	 The	 third	 part	 would	 identify	 the	 different	 interventions	 required	 to	
meet	 these	needs,	again	based	on	the	evidence	accumulated	via	a	participatory	 inquiry.	
The	Court	may	order	and	oversee	this	inquiry	or	it	could	delegate	the	inquiry	to	another	
institution	 or	 tribunal,	 as	 appropriate.	 Such	 an	 evidence-based	 inquiry	 relies	 on	 the	
effective	 participation	 of	 the	 affected	 parties,	 technical	 experts,	 lawyers,	 amicus,	 public	
officials	and	other	relevant	stakeholders.	The	inquiry	should	be	determined	on	a	case-by-
case	basis	depending	on	the	context	in	which	a	particular	deprivation	occurs.	
At	the	remedial	stage,	the	Court	would	employ	an	experimentalist	approach	to	guide	and	
supervise	the	process	of	negotiation	to	develop	a	context-based	remedy.		The	court	would	
issue	 structural	 supervisory	 orders	 and	 establish	 a	 committee	 or	 task	 team	 or	 another	
kind	of	participatory	process	such	as	public	hearings	or	court	appointed	commissions,	to	
determine	a	remedy,	establish	guidelines	for	the	process	of	implementation	and	monitor	
the	 implementation	of	 the	 remedy.	There	 are	numerous	examples	 in	 the	South	African	
jurisprudence	where	participatory	processes	such	as	committees	or	task	teams	including	
government,	 civil	 society	 and	 experts	 have	 cooperatively	 developed	 solutions	 for	 rights	
violations.887	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 stark	 example	 where	 the	 participatory,	 structural	
remedy	was	unsuccessful	in	protecting	socio-economic	rights	were	the	AllPay	cases	in	the	
much-publicised	 social	 security	 saga.888	 Thus,	 at	 the	 remedial	 stage,	 and	 during	 the	
negotiation	 that	 occurs	 between	 the	 different	 stakeholders,	 the	 government	 should	
provide	details	of	concrete	measures,	processes	and	time-frames	that	will	be	adopted,	any	
																																								 																				
886 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) para 41.   
887 Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
(‘Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability’)2011 (5) SA 87 (WCC).   
888 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC); Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) 
and Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 
1089 (CC). 
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potential	constraints,	for	example	budgetary	and	administrative	capacity	constraints,	and	
how	they	will	deal	with	such	constraints.			
Experimentalist	 remedies	 can	 address	 the	 institutional	 concerns	 regarding	 the	
substantive	approach	to	socio-economic	rights	adjudication,	by	including	government	as	
part	of	the	process	of	seeking	solutions.		Government	is	then	more	likely	to	comply	with	
the	 court	 order.	 This	 participative	 approach	 will	 also	 ideally	 find	 better	 and	 more	
grounded	 solutions	 for	 broader	 systemic	 change,	 through	 engagement	 with	 different	
stakeholders	in	the	four	stages	of	poverty	reduction	policy	formulation	described	above.			
I	have	 therefore	proposed	a	conception	of	 judicial	 review	where	 the	courts	play	a	more	
robust	 role	 in	 developing	 the	 substantive	 contours	 of	 rights	 and	 encouraging	
participation	 in	 socio-economic	decision-making.	 The	 integrated	 rights-based	 approach	
to	poverty	described	above,	supports	the	interaction	between	socio-economic	rights	and	
administrative	 justice	 to	 incrementally	 achieve	 developmental	 outcomes.	 There	 is	
evidence	of	considerable	potential	in	the	jurisprudence,	as	well	as	a	democratic	necessity,	
especially	 in	 the	current	context	of	growing	corruption.	But	 there	 is	also	a	 tension	 that	
plays	 out	 in	 the	 courts’	 understanding	 and	 application	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 separation	 of	
powers	 and	 their	 concomitant	 judicial	 role	 conception.889	 A	 democratic	 developmental	
state	can	guide	the	elucidation	of	a	new	understanding	of	the	separation	of	powers	and	
judicial	role	conception,	within	the	current	South	African	socio-political	context.890	
In	 the	next	 section	 I	make	 recommendations	 to	guide	 the	South	African	Constitutional	
Court’s	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 adjudication,	 within	 the	
ambitious	framework	and	goals	of	a	democratic	developmental	state.	The	transformative	
role	of	 the	courts	 in	a	democratic	developmental	state	necessitates	recognition	that	 the	
empowerment	of	 the	poor	 includes	actual	material	and	psycho-socio-political	elements,	
as	illustrated	by	the	multi-dimensional	human	rights	approach	to	poverty.	The	judiciary	
can	 “democratise”	 itself	 by	 facilitating	 the	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 socio-economic	
																																								 																				
889 Young (2010) ICON 418-420. 
890 See Ray Engaging with Social Rights 8; R Hirschl “From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative 
Constitutional Studies” 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2013). 
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rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 and	 ensuring	 direct	 relief	 to	 the	 poor,	 through	 the	
participation	of	poor	litigants,	legal	and	technical	experts,	in	the	tradition	of	deliberative	
and	 participatory	 democracy,	 and	 democratic	 experimentalism.	 In	 this	 way	 the	
adjudication	of	socio-economic	rights	can	truly	achieve	the	over-arching	goals	to	reduce	
poverty	and	inequality,	of	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
6	 6	How	 can	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 contribute	 to	 the	
realisation	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	in	SA?	
I	now	turn	to	the	interpretative	and	remedial	tools	that	the	South	African	judiciary	may	
utilise	 to	 support	 an	 interdependent	 adjudication	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	justice,	in	meeting	the	aims	of	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
6	6	1	Enhancing	democratic	accountability	and	participation	
The	scope	of	 socio-economic	 rights	applies	 to	 the	actions	or	 inactions	of	 the	executive,	
the	legislature	as	well	as	private	actors.891	As	discussed	in	chapter	four,	according	to	the	
Constitutional	 Court	 and	 its	 interpretation	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 doctrine,	 a	
considerable	margin	of	discretion	must	be	given	to	the	state	in	deciding	how	to	go	about	
fulfilling	 socio-economic	 rights.	 A	 court,	 circumscribed	 by	 certain	 boundaries,	 can	
evaluate	 the	 “reasonableness”	of	 the	measures	 that	 the	 state	 adopts.892	Moreover,	 given	
that	both	legislative	and	other	measures	must	be	taken,	reasonableness	can	be	evaluated	
in	 relation	 to	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 legislative	 programme	 as	 well	 as	 its	
implementation.	The	former	is	the	domain	of	the	legislature	and	the	latter	the	domain	of	
the	executive	and	the	administration.	As	stated	in	Grootboom:	
“Legislative	measures	by	themselves	are	not	likely	to	constitute	constitutional	compliance.	
Mere	 legislation	 is	not	enough.	The	state	 is	obliged	 to	act	 to	achieve	 the	 intended	result,	
and	 the	 legislative	 measures	 will	 invariably	 have	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 appropriate,	 well-
directed	 policies	 and	 programmes	 implemented	 by	 the	 executive.	 These	 policies	 and	
programmes	 must	 be	 reasonable	 both	 in	 their	 conception	 and	 implementation.	 The	
																																								 																				
891 Section 8 of the Constitution. 
892 See chapter four. 
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formulation	of	a	programme	is	only	the	first	stage	in	meeting	the	state’s	obligations.	The	
programme	must	 also	 be	 reasonably	 implemented.	 An	 otherwise	 reasonable	 programme	
that	 is	 not	 implemented	 reasonably	 will	 not	 constitute	 compliance	 with	 the	 state’s	
obligations.”893		
In	the	three	early	socio-economic	rights	cases	of	Grootboom894,	TAC895	and	Khosa896,	the	
Constitutional	Court	focused	on	the	reasonableness	of	the	legislative	and	other	measures	
in	relation	to	the	inclusivity	of	their	conceptualisation,	as	opposed	to	the	reasonableness	
of	 their	 implementation	 via	 executive	 action.	 In	Mazibuko897	 the	 court	 dismissed	 the	
arguments	 of	 the	 Phiri	 residents	 that	 the	 free	 basic	 water	 supply	 of	 6	 kilolitres	 per	
household	per	month	(or	25	litres	per	person	per	day)	was	insufficient	to	meet	their	basic	
needs,	 and	 held	 that	 the	 policy	 was	 reasonable,	 despite	 substantial	 evidence	 and	
argument	 to	 the	 contrary	 from	 technical	 experts	 and	 the	 community	 themselves.	 This	
case	focused	on	the	reasonableness	of	the	policy	measures	for	implementing	the	right	to	
water,	 and	 the	 Court	 gave	 a	 particularly	 narrow	 reading	 of	 its	 own	 application	 of	 the	
reasonableness	standard	in	the	cases	of	Grootboom898	and	TAC.899	
The	second	wave	cases	have	come	before	the	courts	over	disputes	regarding	the	particular	
implementation	choices	of	the	executive’s	programmes	to	realise	socio-economic	rights,	
in	particular	in	relation	to	housing,	basic	services,	social	security	and	education	rights.900	
The	Constitutional	Court’s	requirement	that	programmes	must	also	be	reasonable	in	their	
implementation	of	 the	 socio-economic	 right	 leads	one	 to	conclude	 that	 if,	 for	 example,	
																																								 																				
893 Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 42 [emphasis added]. 
894 The Grootboom case turned on the State’s lack of legislative and policy measures designed to provide 
temporary emergency shelter for people in a situation of homelessness.  
895 The Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) case turned on the fact 
that the government’s policy on the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT) was not 
comprehensive. 
896 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 
(CC) para 49. In Khosa the Constitutional Court concluded that conferring benefits of the social security system 
on citizens only was not reasonable because it violated the equality rights of permanent residents by excluding 
them from the scheme. The Court placed emphasis on the interconnectedness of the rights in the Bill of Rights 
and the importance of ascertaining the reasonableness of a measure by virtue of its impact on other rights, in 
particular the rights to life, dignity and equality. 
897 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). 
898 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
899 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
900 See chapter 4.  
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the	 benefits	 of	 the	 government’s	 social	 assistance	 programme	 do	 not	 reach	 the	 people	
who	are	eligible	for	such	assistance,	the	programme	may	not	pass	constitutional	muster	
and	barriers	 to	accessibility	must	be	reduced.901	Although	 it	 is	up	to	 the	 legislature	and	
the	 executive	 to	 decide	 on	 “the	 precise	 contours	 and	 content	 of	 the	 measures	 to	 be	
adopted”,	they	must	still	ensure	that	the	measures	adopted	are	reasonable	in	that	they	in	
fact	deliver	to	those	in	need	(“achieve	the	intended	result”).902	
The	majority	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 cases	 that	 have	 come	 before	 the	 Constitutional	
Court	 have	 been	 on	 the	 right	 to	 housing,	 in	 particular	 in	 relation	 to	 evictions	 of	 poor	
communities	 from	public	and	private	 land,	and	 then	also	 in	 relation	 to	housing-related	
rights,	 namely	 the	 provision	 of	 electricity,	 water	 and	 sanitation.	 These	 cases	 have	
established	 the	 significance	 of	 participatory	 rights	 for	 poor	 people	 when	 government	
wishes	 to	 implement	 housing-related	 policy	 and	 law.	 The	 Court	 has	 been	 at	 pains	 to	
ensure	 via	 its	 orders	 that	 poor	 people	 are	 able	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 state’s	 decisions	
affecting	the	provision	of	services	to	them.	In	evictions	cases	such	as	Occupiers	of	51	Olivia	
Road,	Berea	Township	and	197	Main	Street,	Johannesburg	v	City	of	Johannesburg903	(“Olivia	
Road”)	and	Residents	of	Joe	Slovo	Community,	Western	Cape	v	Thubelisha	Homes904	(“Joe	
Slovo”),	the	Constitutional	Court	required	a	process	of	mediated	engagement	between	the	
parties,	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 “reasonable”	 implementation	 of	 housing	 and	 basic	
services.	 The	 process	 of	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 on	 the	 measures	 to	 be	 adopted	 to	
realise	socio-economic	rights	in	these	cases,	goes	to	the	heart	of	the	“reasonableness”	of	
such	 measures,	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 implementation.	 In	 other	 cases,	 participatory	
processes	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 social	 policies,	 for	 example	 in	
																																								 																				
901 See the latest cases on the delivery of social grants: Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 
2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC 
Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC). For a discussion of the social security cases brought under 
administrative law by indigent individuals in the Eastern Cape see S Jagwanth The Right to Administrative 
Justice: The Impact of Litigation on the Poor unpublished paper presented at the Foundation for Human Rights 
Conference Celebrating a Decade of Democracy: A focus on the last ten years of South Africa's Democracy and 
the advancement of rights (Durban, 22-25 January 2004) (copy on file with author); N de Villiers "Social Grants 
and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act" (2002) 18 SAJHR 320; C Plaskett "Standing, Welfare Rights 
and Administrative Justice" (2000) 11 SALJ 647. 
902 Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 41, 42. 
903 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). 
904 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC). 
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Doctors	for	Life	International	v	The	Speaker	of	the	National	Assembly905	(“Doctors	for	Life”)	
and	Mazibuko.906	
The	scope	of	the	right	to	administrative	justice,	as	discussed	in	chapter	five,	is	focused	on	
the	 administrative	 action	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 public	 administration,	 in	 other	 words	 the	
exercise	of	public	power	by	all	organs	of	state	(or	private	actors)	excluding	the	legislature,	
the	judiciary	and	the	arena	of	policy-making,	oftentimes	in	the	delivery	of	socio-economic	
rights.	 The	 exercise	 of	 such	 power	 is	 mediated	 by	 the	 requirements	 of	 lawfulness,	
reasonableness	and	procedural	fairness,	in	relation	to	both	the	process	and	outcomes	of	
the	 administrative	 action	 in	 question.	 There	 is	 a	 complementary	 overlap	 in	 scope	 here	
with	 respect	 to	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	 implementation	 measures	 to	 realise	 socio-
economic	rights.	Such	 implementation	-	as	opposed	to	the	conceptualisation	of	policies	
by	 the	 executive	 -	 and	 the	 responsibility	 for	 ensuring	 participation	 in	 relation	 to	 that	
implementation,	falls	squarely	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	public	administration.		
In	the	case	of	Olivia	Road,	the	court	dealt	simultaneously	with	procedural	fairness	under	
PAJA	and	meaningful	 engagement	 as	 a	matter	of	 reasonableness	under	 section	26.	The	
judgement	of	 the	Constitutional	Court	 firstly	dealt	with	 the	 reasons	 for	 its	 engagement	
order	 and	 the	 purpose	 and	 nature	 of	 such	 engagement.	 It	 affirmed	 the	 principle	 that	
serious	engagement	should	take	place	 in	good	 faith	between	public	officials	and	people	
facing	potential	homelessness	due	 to	an	eviction,	 for	 the	purposes	of	 finding	a	humane	
and	pragmatic	solution.	However	the	court	chose	not	to	decide	on	the	arguments	raised	
by	 the	occupiers	 that	 the	 issuing	of	 the	 section	 12(4)(b)	notices	by	 the	City	 constituted	
administrative	 action	 and	 was	 therefore	 subject	 to	 the	 hearing	 or	 public	 inquiry	
procedures	in	terms	of	section	3,	alternatively	section	4	of	PAJA.	It	is	unfortunate	that	the	
court	 chose	not	 to	 take	up	 the	opportunity	 to	 clarify	 the	applicability	of	public	 inquiry	
and	 other	 procedures	 provided	 for	 in	 section	 4	 of	 PAJA,	 in	 the	 circumstances	 of	 an	
eviction,	which	is	a	result	of	an	administrative	action	that	adversely	affects	rights.	
																																								 																				
905 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC). 
906 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). 
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The	requirements	under	the	right	to	just	administrative	action	can	serve	to	enhance	the	
interpretation	of	the	“reasonableness”	of	implementation	measures	when	socio-economic	
rights	must	 be	 realised	 for	 people	 living	 in	 poverty.	 Their	 participation	 is	 necessary	 in	
order	to	ensure	the	best	possible	outcome,	and	is	a	necessary,	empowering	element	of	the	
democratic	developmental	state.	The	institutions	of	government,	namely	the	courts,	the	
administration,	 the	 legislature,	 the	 executive,	 organs	 of	 state	 as	 well	 as	 private	 actors	
exercising	 public	 power,	 need	 to	 become	 more	 active,	 democratic	 and	 accountable,	
structures.907	They	need	to	be	capable	of	hearing	the	voices	of	poor	and	vulnerable	people	
and	 thereby	 enable	 socio-economic	 transformation.	 It	 would	 be	 unreasonable	 to	 do	
otherwise.	
The	 distinctiveness	 and	 the	 interconnectedness	 between	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	
socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	(“related	interdependence”)	are	tangible,	
for	 example,	when	we	explore	 the	 right	of	 access	 to	water.	The	 right	may	be	denied	 in	
terms	not	only	of	access	to	the	socio-economic	right	in	section	27(1)(b)	but	also	in	terms	
of	 the	 right	 to	 just	 administrative	 action	 when	 local	 government	 organs,	 for	 varying	
reasons,	 are	 unable	 to	 implement	 these	 services.	 The	 distinction	 would	 be	 the	
disconnection	of	existing	water	 services	as	compared	 to	 the	 failure	 to	provide	access	 to	
water	at	all	–	negative	and	positive	obligations	in	relation	to	the	implementation	of	socio-
economic	 rights	 by	 the	 administration.	 	 This	 also	 provides	 a	 comparison	 between	 the	
right	of	access	to	water	and	the	right	to	just	administrative	action	when	decisions	relating	
to	cut-offs	are	made.908		
In	a	democratic	developmental	state,	the	capacity	of	the	state	to	effectively	and	efficiently	
deliver	 socio-economic	 rights,	 such	as	 the	 right	 to	water,	and	 to	enable	 the	meaningful	
																																								 																				
907 Evans “Constructing the 21st century developmental state” in Constructing a democratic developmental 
state in SA 38. See discussion in chapter two. 
908 See M Kidd "Not a Drop to Drink: Disconnection of Water Services for Non-payment and the Right of Access 
to Water" (2004) 20 SAJHR 119-37. See for example Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern 
Metropolitan Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (W) where the applicants, residents of an apartment block in 
Hillbrow, were granted urgent interim relief after the municipal water supply to their building was discontinued 
by the respondent. Budlender AJ based his decision on the right of everyone to have access to “sufficient food 
and water” in s 27 of the Constitution. See also Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) 30; 
and Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) in relation to electricty cut-offs without prior 
notice to the tenants. 
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participation	 of	 affected	 people	 in	 both	 the	 conceptualisation	 and	 implementation	 of	
such	 rights,	 is	 critical.	 Poverty	 can	 then	 be	 addressed	 by	 both	material	 alleviation	 and	
political	empowerment.	This	speaks	to	the	multi-dimensional	nature	of	poverty	and	the	
integrated	human	rights	approach	to	poverty.	The	state	and	the	courts	have	a	vital	role	to	
play	 in	 facilitating	 participation	 of	 the	 poor	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 and	
ensuring	accountability	for	the	actual	delivery	of	rights.	
The	courts	can	support	a	democratic	developmental	state	by	adopting	a	more	robust	and	
participatory	 adjudicative	 approach.	 The	 approach	 requires	 the	 courts	 to	 engage	
substantively	with	 the	 content	 of	 rights,	 as	well	 as	 to	 proactively	 engage	 relevant	 state	
role-players,	 litigants	and	technical	experts	 in	participatory	processes	to	assist	the	court	
to	delineate	the	content	and	monitor	implementation.	Similar	to	the	methods	the	court	
has	applied	in	a	number	of	cases,	the	court	can	request	state	parties	(and	private	parties)	
to	provide	reports	on	engagement	with	affected	communities,	and	the	court	can	also	join	
other	 relevant	parties	 to	provide	evidence	of	 engagement.909	These	engagement	 reports	
inform	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 various	 views	on	 the	 content	 of	 rights	 and	potentially	help	 to	
produce	 a	 consensus	 view	 on	 the	 principles,	 values,	 norms,	 intended	 results	 and	
minimum	requirements	of	rights.	The	courts	can	then	enforce	these	in	their	judgements	
and	orders	and	ensure	the	implementation	of	orders	is	monitored	by	appropriate	bodies,	
either	through	supervisory	orders	or	by	Chapter	9	institutions	such	as	the	South	African	
Human	Rights	Commission	(‘SAHRC’).	
6	6	2	Individual	rights	and	developmental	outcomes	
The	main	distinction	drawn	by	international	law	between	socio-economic	rights	and	civil	
and	 political	 rights	 is	 the	 different	 nature	 of	 state’s	 obligations	 with	 regard	 to	 their	
implementation.	It	is	firstly	alleged	that	socio-economic	rights	are	mainly	positive	rights	
																																								 																				
909 See for example approaches in: Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) 30; Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Ahmed Asruff 
Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 761; Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and 
Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 
(CC); Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet (CCT108/16) [2017] ZACC 18 (8 June 2017).  
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that	do	not	just	require	the	state’s	abstention	from	violating	the	rights	of	its	citizens,	as	
would	be	 the	case	with	most	civil	 and	political	 rights.	This	 supposition	 is	based	on	 the	
assumption	 that	 positive	 measures	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	
always	 require	 resources	whereas	civil	 and	political	 rights	are	 for	 free	because	 the	 state	
has	only	to	abstain	from	certain	behaviours.	Even	though	this	contention	might	be	true	in	
several	 instances,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	 both	 civil	 and	 political	 rights	 and	 socio-
economic	rights	include	negative	as	well	as	positive	obligations	and	require	resources	for	
their	 implementation.	For	 example,	 criminal	 justices	 rights,	 as	 civil	 and	political	 rights,	
contain	the	positive	duty	of	the	state	to	provide	a	police	force	and	correctional	services,	
while	the	right	to	housing	includes	the	negative	duty	to	refrain	from	arbitrary	evictions.910		
The	 categorisation	of	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 in	 international	 law	 is	 unclear,	
but	I	consider	it	to	fall	in	to	a	civil	and	political	rights	categorisation	for	the	purposes	of	
this	 dissertation.911	 At	 first	 glance,	 administrative	 justice	 appears	 to	 deal	 largely	 with	
decisions	 that	 deprive	 someone	 of	 rights	 –	 similar	 to	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 negative	
protection	of	rights	discussed	above.	At	the	same	time	those	decisions	which	determine	
what	 that	 person's	 rights	 will	 be,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 failure	 to	 take	 an	 administrative	
decision,912	 are	 also	 defined	 as	 “administrative	 action”	 under	 PAJA.	 The	 “promotion”	
element	 of	 the	 state’s	 obligations	 under	 section	 7(2)	 of	 the	Constitution	 also	 embodies	
positive	 elements	 that	 are	 potentially	 important	 to	 administrative	 law	 decision-making	
and	imply	that	administrators	must	actively	promote	socio-economic	rights	realisation	in	
their	 decision-making.913	 An	 interpretation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 via	 a	
																																								 																				
910 I Rautenbach "The limitation of rights and 'reasonableness' in the right to just administrative action and the 
rights to access to adequate housing, health services and social security" (2005) 4 TSAR 627, 644-645. 
911 See chapter five. 
912 In a number of cases concerning grants, the courts declared the right of litigants to relief where there was a 
failure to take decisions in applications for social grants. See for example Mahambehlala v Member of the 
Executive Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2001 (9) BCLR 899 (SE); Mbanga v 
Member of the Executive Council for Welfare 2002 (1) SA 359 (SA); Vumazonke and others v Member of the 
Executive Council for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province SECLD 25 November 2004 (Case Nos. 
110/04, 826/04, 143/04, 2541/03) unreported. 
913 See Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 (1) SA 21 (SCA), an instance where the right to 
administrative justice, socio-economic rights and the right to dignity intersected to protect the rights of asylum-
seekers, in certain instances, to employment and study. By using the right to administrative justice, the court 
directed the administration to exercise its powers in such a way that access would be decided upon based on 
the applicants’ particular circumstances of need. 
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“substantive	 proportionality”	 test	 in	 cases	 where	 socio-economic	 rights	 are	 concerned	
would	then	enable	this.914	
In	 chapters	 four	 and	 five,	 I	 sought	 to	 delineate	 the	 obligations	 under	 the	 right	 to	
administrative	justice	as	compared	to	the	obligations	under	the	socio-economic	rights,	in	
order	 to	provide	a	better	understanding	of	 their	 function	and	 impact	 in	cases	 involving	
the	 amelioration	 of	 conditions	 for	 the	 poor	 and	 vulnerable	 sectors	 of	 society,	 in	 a	
democratic	developmental	state.	The	right	to	just	administrative	action	could	be	used	to	
place	stronger	positive	obligations	on	the	state	to	make	decisions	on	the	distribution	of	
public	 goods	 in	 cases	 where	 a	 person’s	 socio-economic	 rights	 are	 affected.	 The	
qualifications	 of	 “within	 available	 resources”	 and	 “progressive	 realisation”	 would	 not	
apply	 in	 such	 cases,	 as	 they	 would	 under	 socio-economic	 rights.	 For	 example,	 when	
applicants	for	social	grants	are	denied	a	grant	either	because	a	social	security	official	did	
not	 make	 a	 decision	 or	 refused	 to	 award	 the	 grant	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 lack	 of	 particular	
required	documentation,	the	right	to	just	administrative	action	should	place	emphasis	on	
the	imperative	end,	to	provide	social	assistance	to	people	in	need.		
If	 the	 courts	 use	 a	 proportionality	 version	 of	 review	 for	 reasonableness	 where	
administrative	decisions	impact	on	fundamental	socio-economic	rights,	it	would	provide	
a	wider	 avenue	 for	 individual	 redress	 for	 those	whose	 basic	 needs	 have	 not	 been	met,	
than	under	socio-economic	rights.915	Therefore,	in	certain	cases	the	negative	and	positive	
obligations	 under	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 can	 be	 mutually	
supportive.	 In	other	cases,	 the	“substantive	proportionality”	 test	as	applied	to	a	positive	
obligation	under	administrative	justice,	can	be	a	powerful	tool	in	individual	cases	where	
socio-economic	 rights	 are	 affected.	 The	 drawback	 is	 that	 these	 cases	may	 not	 advance	
systemic	socio-economic	transformation	through	policies,	programmes	and	legislation,	as	
required	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
																																								 																				
914 See chapter five. 
915 See De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa 124. In both instances, the section 33 
right would still be subject to the limitations clause in section 36. 
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In	a	democratic	developmental	state,	the	capacity	of	the	state	to	deliver	socio-economic	
goods,	such	as	the	right	to	water,	is	critical.	It	is	critical	because	it	is	the	means	by	which	
poverty	will	 be	 reduced	 at	 an	 individual	 level	 and	 in	 a	more	 structural	 sense,	 at	 scale.	
Based	on	the	description	in	chapters	four	and	five	and	the	analysis	in	this	chapter,	I	argue	
that	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 can	work	 interactively,	 alongside	
one	another,	to	facilitate	the	state’s	delivery	of	material	needs	to	individuals	as	well	as	to	
alleviate	 poverty	 systemically.	 Policies	 and	 laws	 that	 address	 the	 various	 dimensions	 of	
poverty	must	be	developed	to	reduce	poverty	over	time	and	for	developmental	outcomes	
to	be	achieved.	That	 is	 the	role	and	function	of	the	executive	and	legislature,	as	well	as	
the	judiciary,	as	I	argued	in	chapter	four.	The	courts’	incremental	substantive	adjudicative	
approach	should	hold	the	executive	and	the	legislature	accountable	when	they	have	failed	
to	develop	poverty	 reduction	policies	and	 laws,	or	when	those	policies	and	 laws	do	not	
achieve	 the	 desired	 developmental	 outcomes.	 Affected	 communities	 and	 non-
governmental	 organisations	 as	 litigants,	 provide	 the	 courts	 with	 the	 opportunity	 and	
obligation	 to	 then	 assist	 the	 other	 branches	 of	 government	 to	 address	 the	 gaps	 and	
failures,	 in	 a	 collaborative	 manner,	 by	 drawing	 out	 more	 substantive	 principles	 from	
individual	cases	to	support	others	in	similar	situations.	
The	 administration	 also	 has	 an	 equally	 powerful	 systemic	 role	 to	 play	 in	 addressing	
poverty	 in	a	democratic	developmental	 state,	by	ensuring	 that	 it	 is	 efficient,	 that	 it	has	
capacity	to	implement	decision-making	and	delivery	of	services	to	people	in	such	a	way	
that	it	enhances	their	developmental	outcomes,	participation	and	empowerment.	This	is	
also	 the	broader	ambit	of	administrative	 justice	 that	 is	about	more	 than	simply	 judicial	
review,	but	a	host	of	other	mechanisms	to	realise	administrative	justice	in	a	capable	and	
democratic,	 developmental	 state.	 Training	 of	 public	 officials	 in	 the	 administration,	 the	
establishment	 of	 administrative	 tribunals	 (such	 as	 a	 Social	 Security	 Tribunal)	 and	 the	
publication	 of	 administrative	 guidelines,	 are	 examples	 of	 mechanisms	 to	 support	
administrative	justice	achieve	intended	socio-economic	impact,	outside	of	the	courts.	
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6	6	3	“Reasonableness	review”	and	substantive	interpretation	of	rights	
The	inter-linkages	between	the	concept	of	“reasonableness”	in	socio-economic	rights	and	
administrative	 justice	 jurisprudence916	must	be	examined	 in	the	context	of	 the	tenets	of	
the	 doctrine	 of	 separation	 of	 powers.	 The	 requirement	 of	 “reasonable”	 administrative	
action,	as	compared	to	the	requirement	of	“reasonable”	measures	under	socio-economic	
rights	 obligations,	 and	 their	 respective	 relationship	 to	 “reasonableness”	 in	 the	 general	
limitations	clause	section	36	needs	to	be	understood	and	harmonised	for	purposes	of	this	
dissertation.917	The	concomitant	question	of	 the	appropriate	 level	of	 judicial	 scrutiny	of	
administrative	 decision-making	 in	 relation	 to	 poverty	 alleviation	 and	 the	 deference	
granted	to	the	legislature	and	executive	in	determining	the	measures	appropriate	to	the	
realisation	of	obligations	under	the	socio-economic	rights	provisions,	in	the	context	of	a	
democratic	developmental	state,	are	closely	related.	
Justice	 O’Regan	 identifies	 different	 levels	 of	 scrutiny	 for	 reasonableness	 review,	 and	
describes	 a	 “more	 intensive	 scrutiny”	 under	 socio-economic	 rights.	 As	 described	 in	
chapters	 four	 and	 five,	 rationality	 review	 has	 been	 applied	 in	 cases	 such	 as	
Pharmaceutical	Manufacturers	Association	of	South	Africa:	In	Re	Ex	Parte	President	of	the	
Republic	of	South	Africa918	 (“Pharmaceutical	Manufacturers”),	Prinsloo	v	Van	der	Linde919	
(“Prinsloo”)	 and	 Jooste	 v	 Score	 Supermarket	 Trading920	 (“Jooste”)	 and	 a	 range	 of	 other	
cases;	whilst	the	more	intensive	scrutiny	of	reasonableness	has	been	applied	in	the	socio-
economic	 rights	cases	 such	as	Grootboom	 and	TAC.	O’Regan	explains	 that	 the	 levels	of	
scrutiny	appropriate	to	the	different	types	of	jurisdiction,	should	be	determined	with	due	
regard	to	the	following	factors:	“expertise	of	the	tribunal,	polycentric	decisions,	the	need	
for	 an	 efficient	 administration,	 the	 constitutional	 commitment	 to	 responsiveness,	
transparency	and	accountability”.921	
																																								 																				
916 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 639-663. 
917 K Iles "Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal limitations clause" (2004) 20 SAJHR 448-65.  
918 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC). 
919 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). 
920 1999 (2) BCLR 139 (CC). 
921 O'Regan (2004) 121 SALJ 436-437. 
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A	number	of	articles	have	addressed	this	issue	squarely.922	Wesson	appraises	the	evolving	
socio-economic	 rights	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 South	 African	 Constitutional	 Court	 and	
counters	 previous	 depictions	 of	 the	 Court’s	 approach	 as	 constituting	 an	 administrative	
law	approach	 to	 the	 adjudication	of	 socio-economic	 rights.923	He	 is	 of	 the	opinion	 that	
under	 administrative	 law	 applying	 a	 stricter	 test	 than	 Wednesbury,	 the	 Court	 in	
Grootboom	 would	 have	 found	 that	 the	 state’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 its	 obligation	 under	
section	 26(1)	 and	 (2)	 constituted	 an	 entirely	 reasonable	 interpretation	 of	 those	
provisions.924	 He	 suggests	 that	 Grootboom,	 TAC	 and	 Khosa	 should	 rather	 be	 read	 as	
ensuring	that	vulnerable	sectors	of	society	are	not	ignored.	Grootboom,	he	further	argues,	
establishes	“a	relationship	of	collaboration	between	the	state	and	the	judiciary,	 in	terms	
of	which	each	branch	of	government	brings	its	particular	skills	to	bear	on	the	problem	of	
remedying	such	omissions”.925		
As	 described	 in	 chapter	 four,	 the	 Court’s	 approach	 has	 focused	 on	 “structural	 good	
governance	standards”	in	its	reasonableness	test,	instead	of	delving	into	the	substance	of	
socio-economic	 rights	and	 the	concrete	basic	needs	 they	 seek	 to	address.	 926	Brand	and	
others	have	argued	that	the	Court	has	adopted	this	weak-form	review	approach	because	
of	its	concerns	about	its	role	in	relation	to	the	political	branches	of	government	as	well	as	
“a	 formalist	 understanding	 of	 law”.927	 But	 of	 more	 concern	 to	 the	 democratic	
developmental	 enterprise,	 is	 that	 the	 transformative	 agenda	 of	 the	 Constitution	 is	
																																								 																				
922 See Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review; Rautenbach (2005) 4 TSAR 627; M Wesson 
"Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional 
Court" (2004) 20 SAJHR 284-307; D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence, or ‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in Botha H, Van der Walt A & Van der Walt J (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33. See also O'Regan (2004) 121 SALJ 437 
where she highlights this as a difficult question that requires investigation in relation to administrative law “in 
the context of an overall constitutional framework of values”. 
923 Wesson (2004) 20 SAJHR 289.  
924 Wesson (2004) 20 SAJHR 292. 
925 Wesson (2004) 20 SAJHR 284. 
926 Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” in Rights and Democracy (2004) 33. 
927 Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” in Rights and Democracy (2004) 51. Ray Engaging with Social 
Rights. 
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significantly	 undermined,	 philosophically,	 politically	 and	practically,	 due	 to	 the	Court’s	
proceduralisation	of	its	adjudication	of	socio-economic	rights.928	
Indeed,	the	Constitutional	Court’s	approach	to	socio-economic	rights	thus	far	mimics	in	
many	ways	an	administrative	law	review	approach.	The	focus	on	procedural	rather	than	
substantive	 fairness	 in	 administrative	 law	 is	 intended	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 the	 principle	 of	
separation	of	powers.	By	generally	limiting	their	deliberations	to	the	procedure	by	which	
the	 decision	 was	 reached	 and	 not	 usually	 considering	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 decision,	
courts	in	administrative	law	proceedings	are	able	to	retain	the	distinction	between	appeal	
and	 review.	 The	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 Bato	 Star	 Fishing	 (Pty)	 Ltd	 v	 Minister	 of	
Environmental	 Affairs	 and	 Tourism929	 (“Bato	 Star	 Fishing”)	 however	 established	 a	more	
balanced	approach	in	which	reasonableness	review	in	administrative	law	sometimes	has	
substantive	 implications,	 and	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 procedural	 enquiry.	 The	 content	 of	 the	
reasonableness	 standard	 consists	 of	 a	 circumstance-based	 enquiry	 considering	 various	
factors,	including:	“the	nature	of	the	decision,	the	identity	and	expertise	of	the	decision-
maker,	 the	 range	of	 factors	 relevant	 to	 the	decision,	 the	 reasons	given	 for	 the	decision,	
the	nature	of	the	competing	interests	involved	and	the	impact	of	the	decision	on	the	lives	
and	well-being	of	those	affected”.930	Reasonableness	review	is	 thus	a	contextual	 inquiry,	
involving	 both	 the	 normative	 context	 and	 the	 factual	 context.	 The	 normative	 context	
refers	to	the	other	constitutional	provisions	relevant	to	the	case.	At	the	same	time,	Bato	
Star	 reaffirmed	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 appeals	 and	 review	 and	 the	
care	that	the	court	should	take	“not	to	usurp	the	functions	of	administrative	agencies”.931	
These	 renditions	 of	 judicial	 adjudication	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	
justice	lead	us	to	believe	that	the	courts	will	not	decide	on	matters	of	social	and	economic	
policy	but	have	 limited	 themselves	 to	determining	whether	 the	 correct	procedures	 and	
principles	of	good	governance	have	been	followed	in	making	the	decision,	or	in	designing	
																																								 																				
928 See also D Bilchitz "Giving socio-economic rights teeth; the minimum core and its importance" (2002) SALJ 
484; T Roux "Understanding Grootboom - A response to Cass R. Sunstein" (2002) 12 Constitutional Forum 
112-22 . 
929 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC). 
930 Para 45. 
931 Para 45. 
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and	 implementing	 the	 measures.	 However,	 the	 picture	 is	 not	 all	 bleak	 and	 has	 the	
potential	 to	 evolve	 substantially.	 The	 courts,	 albeit	 tentatively	 and	 superficially,	 have	
turned	 to	 the	 substance	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 when	 probing	 the	 reasonableness	 of	
legislative	 and	 other	 measures	 designed	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 socio-economic	 rights.932		
Despite	 the	 paucity	 of	 satisfactory	 descriptions	 of	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 socio-
economic	rights	in	its	jurisprudence,	the	courts	have	considered	the	substantive	content	
indirectly	by	identifying	those	who	do	not	have	access	to	a	particular	good	or	service	-	in	
other	words	who	do	not	have	their	basic	needs	met	-	and	recognising	that	“those	whose	
needs	are	most	urgent”	or	“those	in	desperate	need	and	living	in	intolerable	conditions”933	
must	not	be	excluded	 from	government	programmes.	The	 substantive	 interpretation	of	
rights	as	well	as	the	identification	of	people	who	are	most	vulnerable	and	in	need	of	the	
fulfilment	of	those	rights,	fits	with	the	intent	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	in	its	
efforts	to	provide	a	social	safety	net	and	address	long-term,	structural	poverty.	
Quinot	 and	 Liebenberg	 propose	 a	 “unified	 model	 of	 reasonableness	 review”	 for	 cases	
where	 administrative	 and	 non-administrative	 measures	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 socio-
economic	 rights.934	 They	 suggest	 that	 the	 various	 reasonableness	 standards	 found	 in	
different	provisions	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	can	be	interpreted	in	a	coherent	way.	In	terms	of	
their	proposed	model,	reasonableness	review	under	the	different	provisions	overlap,	but	
don’t	perform	the	same	function.	The	standards	interact	in	a	way	that	is	able	to	support	
the	 essential	 advantages	 of	 a	 reasonableness	 model	 of	 review	 and	 a	 more	 substantive	
conception	of	review.	They	are	of	the	view	that	the	constitutional	jurisprudence	on	socio-
economic	 rights	 has	 insufficiently	 elaborated	 a	 “substantive	 account	 of	 the	 normative	
purposes	 and	 values	 promoted	 by	 these	 rights”.935	 However	 they	 argue	 that	 it	 remains	
possible	 for	 such	 an	 account	 to	 be	 developed	 under	 a	 single	 model	 of	 reasonableness	
review	 across	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 cases.	 This	 requires	 the	
development	 of	 reasonableness	 standards	 for	 forms	 of	 public	 action,	 based	 on	 proper	
																																								 																				
932 The courts have rejected the concept of “minimum core obligations” but see chapter four for examples of 
recent cases where the substance of socio-economic rights is discussed. 
933 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 43-44, 68. 
934 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 653. 
935 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 653. 
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consideration	of	the	factual	and	normative	context.	
Their	model	is	based	on	the	Bato	Star	assessment	of	reasonableness,	where	the	court	will	
engage	with	the	substance	of	the	administrative	decision	at	stake,	however	not	in	order	to	
assess	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	 decision	 taken	 on	 the	 merits,	 but	 whether	 or	 not	 that	
decision	 “falls	within	 a	 band	 of	 reasonable	 decisions”,	 936	 based	 on	 the	merits.	 In	 cases	
where	non-administrative	action	impacts	on	socio-economic	rights,	namely	executive	or	
legislative	measures,	 the	model	 of	 review	 applied	will	 depend	on	whether	 the	 case	 is	 a	
breach	of	a	negative	duty	 imposed	by	 the	 relevant,	qualified	 socio-economic	 right,	or	a	
breach	of	a	positive	duty.937	Where	there	has	been	a	breach	of	a	negative	duty,	the	court	
would	 apply	 the	 strict	 proportionality	 analysis	 under	 the	 general	 limitations	 clause	
analysis	 in	 section	 36.	 However,	 where	 a	 positive	 duty	 has	 been	 breached,	 the	
reasonableness	 analysis	 takes	 place	 within	 the	 relevant	 right,	 namely	 the	 internal	
reasonableness	test	of	sections	26(2)	or	27(2).938	
I	 submit	a	complementary	proposal	 to	 this	outlining	how	the	 judiciary,	as	a	 “pro-active	
democratic”	 institution	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state,	 can	 implement	 such	 a	
reasonableness	review	model.	As	proposed	in	the	substantive,	democratic	incrementalist	
adjudicatory	approach	above,	the	judiciary	in	such	cases	can	assist	to	delineate	the	values	
and	conceptual	content	of	the	socio-economic	goods	with	reference	to	international	law	
and	the	South	African	context.	Together	with	people	affected	by	the	issues	and	a	broader	
range	 of	 technocrats	 and	 experts,	 the	 courts	 can	 facilitate	 the	 crafting	 of	 the	 exact	
delineation	 of	 what	 must	 be	 delivered	 and	 how	 it	 must	 be	 delivered.	 The	 courts	 can	
activate	 this	 at	 the	 review	 stage	 by	 requesting	 reports	 and	 recommendations	 from	 the	
various	parties	to	the	litigation	and	by	joining	other	relevant	parties	to	the	proceedings.	
At	 the	remedial	 stage,	 this	would	be	accommodated	through	the	process	of	meaningful	
engagement	and	participatory,	structural	interdicts.		
																																								 																				
936 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 653. 
937 Quinot & Liebenberg (2011) Stellenbosch Law Review 653. 
938 See A Pillay “Reviewing Reasonableness: An Appropriate Standard for Evaluating State Action and 
Inaction?” (2005) 122 SALJ 419 420; D Davis “To defer and when? Administrative Law and Constitutional 
Democracy” (2006) Acta Juridica 33; Young (2010) 8 I CON 385. 
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6	6	4	Participatory	remedies	and	their	enforcement	
Under	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 Courts	 have	 wide	 powers	 to	 make	 orders	 that	 are	
appropriate,	 just	 and	 equitable	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 effective	 relief	 when	 rights	 are	
infringed	 or	 threatened.939	 This	 includes	 constitutional	 remedies	 such	 as	 orders	 of	
invalidity,940	and	 the	development	of	 traditional	common	 law	remedies.941	The	 range	of	
remedial	options	open	to	the	courts	include:	those	merely	requiring	the	State	to	respect	a	
right	in	the	negative	sense	of	non-interference;	those	requiring	that	the	State	has	a	duty	
to	protect	the	rights	against	encroachment	by	others;	those	requiring	the	State	to	actively	
promote	 particular	 rights	 by	 developing	 policies	 to	 this	 effect;	 or	 the	 courts	 can	make	
concrete	 orders	 for	 State	 agencies	 to	 fulfil	 the	 individual	 claimant’s	 rights.942	
Furthermore,	court	orders	may	be	declaratory	(stating	that	laws	or	actions	are	in	breach	
of	a	rights	obligation,	but	leaving	it	to	the	state	to	devise	a	remedy);	mandatory	(requiring	
specific	actions	to	be	taken)	or	supervisory	(requiring	the	relevant	agency	to	report	back	
within	a	set	time-frame).943	
All	the	usual	remedies	are	also	obtainable	in	respect	of	infringements	to	socio-economic	
rights	and	administrative	justice.944	However,	concerns	have	been	raised	by	a	number	of	
commentators,	firstly,	in	relation	to	the	tentativeness	of	the	orders	granted	by	the	courts	
in	respect	of	socio-economic	rights945	and	secondly,	in	relation	to	the	lack	of	compliance	
with	 such	 orders	 in	 respect	 of	 both	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 just	
																																								 																				
939 Sections 38 and 172(1)(b). See also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 41-52; J Klaaren "Judicial 
Remedies" in M Chaskalson, J Kentridge, J Klaaren, G Marcus, M Spitz and S Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa (2004). See the discussion in chapters three and four. 
940 Section 172(2)(a). 
941 Section 173. 
942 In Zulu and Others v eThekwini Municipality 2014 (8) BCLR 971 (CC) para 62. See the recent case Black 
Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC). 
943 T Roux "Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African Constitutional Court" 
in S Gloppen (ed) Democratisation and the Judiciary (2004); S Gloppen Social Rights Litigation as 
Transformation: South African Perspectives (2005) . 
944 Section 8 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, entitled “Remedies in proceedings for judicial 
review”, is the first option for a complainant in search of a judicial administrative-law remedy. The section 
allows a court or tribunal to grant “any order that is just and equitable”, including a number of remedies that 
are specifically listed. See Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed 515-596 for a fuller discussion of these remedies. 
945 See generally M Pieterse M “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 
SAJHR 396-399, 383; Brand “What are socio-economic rights for?” in Rights and Democracy 33. See chapter 
four. 
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administrative	 action.946	 The	 doctrine	 of	 separation	 of	 powers	 rears	 its	 head	 yet	 again	
when	one	examines	the	South	African	jurisprudence	on	the	judicial	enforcement	of	socio-
economic	rights	and	administrative	justice.	In	relation	to	both	sets	of	rights,	as	described	
in	chapters	four	and	five,	problems	of	institutional	roles	and	competence,	poly-centricity	
of	 decision-making	 and	 policy-making	 and	 enforcement	 arise	 mostly	 in	 relation	 to	
remedies.		
In	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 cases	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 “explore	 the	
possibilities	 of	 productive	 inter-institutional	 interaction”	 within	 a	 more	 expansive	 and	
malleable	 notion	 of	 separation	 of	 powers	 and	 judicial	 prowess	 -	 allowing	 for	 the	
innovative	 development	 of	 remedies.947	 Such	 remedies,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state	should	substantively	enforce	individual	access	to	public	benefits,	and	
ensure	 through	 participatory	 and	 supervisory	 orders,	 resolutions	 to	 socio-economic	
issues.	 These	 remedies	 should	 not	 usurp	 the	 roles	 of	 other	 arms	 of	 government	 but	
should	 rather	 seek	 to	 include	 the	 deliberations	 of	 relevant	 organs,	 institutions	 and	
affected	persons	in	solutions	at	an	individual	and	systemic	level.		
Despite	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 remedial	 powers	 available	 to	 the	 courts,	 the	 Constitutional	
Court	has	in	the	past	been	severely	criticised	for	the	cautious	use	of	its	remedial	arsenal	
and	 for	 being	 overly	 deferential	 in	 socio-economic	 rights	 cases.948	 In	 the	 case	 of	
unconstitutional	 infringements	 of	 the	 negative	 aspect	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 the	
appropriate	remedy	in	most	cases	will	be	a	declaration	of	invalidity	of	the	infringing	law	
																																								 																				
946 De Villiers  (2002) 18 SAJHR 320; Plaskett (2000) 11 SALJ 647; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights; 
Jagwanth “The Right to Administrative Justice". See also: Kate v MEC, Dept of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) 
All SA 745 (SE);  Vumazonke and others v Member of the Executive Council for Social Development, Eastern 
Cape Province SECLD 25 November 2004 (Case Nos. 110/04, 826/04, 143/04, 2541/03) unreported. 
947 Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 411 [footnotes omitted]. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) para 165; Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 
(11) BCLR 1211 (CC) para 42; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 
paras 101, 106; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) para 18; Bel Porto School 
Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC) para 181; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 41-10; SAJHR 18 (2002) 177; K Pillay "Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement 
of Socio-economic Rights" (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 255; C Scott & P Alston "Adjudicating 
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's 
Promise" (2000) 16 SAJHR 206-68; W Trengove "Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights" 
(1999) 1(4) ESR 8 . 
948 Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 414. 
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or	 conduct.949	 Where	 breaches	 of	 the	 positive	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 rights	 are	
concerned,	 two	 remedies	 have	 been	 employed	 by	 the	 courts	 namely,	 the	 structural	
interdict	and	declaratory	relief.	
The	 difficulties	 experienced	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 effectively	 promoting	 the	
interests	of	the	most	vulnerable	members	of	society	and	the	transformative	vision	of	the	
Constitution,	requires	a	more	robust,	experimentalist	and	managerial	remedial	approach	
of	the	Court	in	order	to	produce	faster	relief	to	people	without	access	to	basic	needs.950	A	
more	effective	approach	would	be	for	the	Court,	in	certain	cases,	to	word	orders	in	clear	
and	specific	terms,	such	as	the	orders	in	the	social	security	cases	of	Khosa	and	Black	Sash	
and	 to	 exercise	 supervisory	 jurisdiction.951	 Supervisory	 jurisdiction	 involves	 courts	
requiring	 the	 legislature	or	 executive	 to	 report	back	 to	 them	on	 the	measures	 taken	 to	
comply	with	a	court	order.	In	this	way,	a	dynamic	relationship	of	collaboration	between	
the	judiciary	and	the	other	branches	of	government	on	the	intricacies	of	implementation	
may	be	instigated	and	accountability	for	execution	of	orders	enhanced.952	The	courts	have	
exceedingly	done	so	more	recently,	for	example	in	the	Pheko953	and	AllPay/Black	Sash954	
judgments.	 This	 “inter-institutional	 collaboration”	 is	 vital	 for	 transparency	 and	
accountability	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
																																								 																				
949 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) para 67 (infringement of the right to 
housing Magistrates’ Court Act remedied by declaration of invalidity and reading in.) 
950 See also M Swart “Left Out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the Poor” 
(2005) SAJHR 215. 
951 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 
(CC) para 98 (where the words “or permanent resident” were read into certain sections of the Social 
Assistance Act 59 of 1992). Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC). See 
also: Wesson (2004) 20 SAJHR 306-307; Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 414; Trengove (1999) 1(4) ESR 8. 
952 Wesson (2004) 20 SAJHR 307; Pieterse (2004) 20 SAJHR 414; Trengove (1999) 1(4) ESR 10. 
953 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2015 (6) BCLR 711 (CC); Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (No 3) 2016 (10) BCLR 1308 (CC). See chapter four. 
954 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC); Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) 
and Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 
1089 (CC). 
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Commentators	have	 argued	 that	 administrative	 law	proceedings	 are	 ineffective	because	
they	provide	little	or	no	relief	for	successful	applicants.955	In	the	post-constitutional	era,	
the	courts	have	not	granted	substantive	relief	in	a	number	of	cases	when	administrative	
law	principles	have	been	breached	and	rather	set	the	decision	of	the	administrative	body	
aside	 and	 referred	 it	 back	 to	 the	 official	 or	 body	 for	 reconsideration.956	 However,	 the	
courts	have	stepped	beyond	their	deference	to	administrative	bodies,	for	example,	in	the	
area	 of	 social	 security	 benefits	 by	 granting	 arrear	 payments	 as	well	 as	 interest	 on	 their	
claims	to	applicants	who	were	denied	their	rights	to	administrative	justice.957	They	have	
also	 intervened	 in	 the	 social	 grants	 delivery	 system	 to	 ensure	 that	 millions	 of	 people	
continue	to	receive	poverty	alleviation	measures	to	which	they	are	legally	entitled.958		
These	 remedial	 actions	 illustrate	 how	 the	 constitutional	 principles	 of	 justification	 and	
accountability	 can	be	utilised	 to	bring	 substantive	 relief	 in	 cases	where	 socio-economic	
rights	and	administrative	justice	intersect.	With	administrative	law	traditionally	showing	
reluctance	to	grant	substantive	relief	in	the	case	of	a	successful	administrative	challenge,	
it	has	not	been	seen	as	an	effective	tool	for	social	justice.959	However,	the	social	security,	
education	 and	 housing	 cases	 illustrate	 that	 innovative	 remedies	 can	 be	 created	 in	
administrative	law,	based	on	the	constitutional	values	of	justification	and	accountability	
whilst	still	respecting	the	distinction	between	appeal	and	review.	
Non-compliance	 with	 such	 court	 orders	 remains	 a	 problem	 though,	 as	 seen	 in	 the	
AllPay960	 cases.	 In	 Jayiya,	 the	 court	 noted	 that	 “[w]holesale	 non-compliance	with	 court	
																																								 																				
955 Hoexter (2000) 17 SALJ 484; Jagwanth “The Right to Administrative Justice" 17. 
956 See Premier, Mpumalanga Executive Committee, Association of State-aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 
and Erf One Six Seven Orchards CC v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 104 (SCA) . 
Section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA also provides that a court may only substitute its decision for that of the decision-
maker in exceptional circumstances. 
957 The court in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Government [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA) appears to 
have rejected the payment of interest on back-pay and contempt proceedings. See discussion of these cases 
in: Jagwanth “The Right to Administrative Justice" 19; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights; De Villiers 18 SAJHR 
320; Plaskett (2000) 11 SALJ 647. 
958 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 (5) BCLR 543 (CC) and Black Sash Trust v Minister 
of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 1089 (CC). 
959 Jagwanth “The Right to Administrative Justice" 19. 
960 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC); AllPay 
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orders	is	a	distressing	phenomenon	in	the	Eastern	Cape	that	has	caused	the	courts	in	that	
province	 to	 try	and	devise	ways	of	coming	 to	 the	assistance	of	 social	welfare	applicants	
whom	the	provincial	government	has	failed.”961	The	applicant	in	this	case	firstly	claimed	a	
lump	 sum	 back-payment	 of	 her	 disability	 grant	 and	 interest	 thereupon	 by	 way	 of	
constitutional	damages	and	secondly	she	attempted	to	hold	the	state	liable	for	contempt	
of	 court.	 Conradie	 J	 refused	 to	 order	 the	 payment	 of	 interest	 on	 back	 pay	 as	 part	 of	
constitutional	damages	or	hold	the	state	liable	for	contempt	of	court	where	state	officials	
had	 failed	 to	 carry	 out	 their	 obligations	 because	 this	 kind	 of	 relief	 was	 not	 generally	
provided	for	under	PAJA.	In	a	significant	decision,	Froneman	J	in	the	Eastern	Cape	High	
Court	in	Kate	declared	government	officials	in	contempt	of	court	for	failing	to	obey	court	
orders	and	ordered	the	respondent	 to	pay	 the	applicant	 the	outstanding	amount	of	her	
social	 grant	 as	 well	 as	 interest	 on	 the	 monthly	 amount	 she	 should	 have	 received.962	
Froneman	 J	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 since	 the	 remedies	 in	 PAJA	 are	 couched	 in	 wide,	
open-ended	 and	 permissive	 terms,	 these	 remedies	 do	 not	 preclude	 appropriate	
constitutional	 relief	 under	 section	 38.	 In	 the	 SCA,	 the	 court	 re-affirmed	 an	 award	 for	
constitutional	 damages	 to	 recompense	 Kate	 for	 the	 breach	 of	 her	 right	 to	 social	
security.963	 In	 the	Black	 Sash	 case,	 the	Minister	 of	 Social	Development	was	 joined	 as	 a	
party	to	the	case	 in	her	 individual	capacity,	and	the	Constitutional	Court	 is	considering	
whether	 to	 hold	 her	 personally	 liable	 for	 the	 costs	 incurred	 in	 the	 case.	
The	Constitutional	Court	ordered	an	investigation	into	the	Social	Development	Minister's	
personal	liability	over	the	social	grants	matter	and	sought	feedback	within	14	days.964	
Ultimately,	 the	proof	of	efficacy	of	 remedies	 for	 rights’	breaches	 is	whether	 it	holds	 the	
state	accountable	and	leads	to	a	sustained	change	in	the	situation	for	poor	litigants.	In	a	
democratic	 developmental	 state,	 the	 administration,	 the	 executive	 and	 the	 legislature	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency 2015 (6) BCLR 653 (CC). 
961 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Government [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA). See also Swart (2005) 
SAJHR 215. 
962 Kate v MEC, Dept of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) All SA 745 (SE).  
963 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA) 33. 
964 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 (9) BCLR 
1089 (CC). 
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must	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 their	 functions,	 for	 ensuring	 participatory	 democratic	
principles	are	upheld,	and	for	bringing	about	systemic,	socio-economic	transformation	in	
a	 coherent,	 incremental	 and	directed	manner.	Remedies	 are	 the	 tool	 the	 courts	use,	 to	
hold	 the	 other	 spheres,	 organs	 of	 state	 and	 the	 private	 sector,	 to	 their	 tasks.	 In	 cases	
where	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights	 are	 concerned,	 the	 duty	 of	 the	
courts	 is	 even	 greater.	 Participatory	 remedies	 such	 as	 meaningful	 engagement	 and	
enforcement	through	supervisory	measures,	 in	cases	of	administrative	justice	and	socio-
economic	 rights,	 can	 serve	 to	 enhance	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 accountability	 of	
state	 insitutions	 in	a	democratic	developmental	 state.	The	 judiciary	 in	South	Africa	has	
been	extremely	powerful	in	holding	the	legislature,	the	executive	and	the	administration,	
in	 all	 spheres	 of	 government,	 to	 account	 and	 thereby	 upholding	 constitutional	
democracy.	The	remedies	at	its	disposal,	alongside	the	legitimacy	that	it	has	managed	to	
gain	 through	 its	 independent	 and	 professional	 stance,	 provide	 a	 strong	 platform	 for	
furthering	socio-economic	transformation	in	a	participatory	democracy.		
6	7	Conclusion	
The	 rights-based	 approach	 to	multi-dimensional	 poverty,	 founded	 on	 the	 international	
human	rights	framework,	encompasses	socio-economic	rights	as	well	as	civil	and	political	
rights.	The	approach	considers	all	 these	 rights	 to	be	 indivisible,	 inter-related	and	 inter-
dependent.	 Furthermore,	 it	 includes	 strong	demands	 for	participation	 in	decisions	 that	
affect	 peoples’	 lives,	 and	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 structural	 causes	 of	
poverty,	 focusing	 on	 discrimination,	 exclusion	 and	 inequality.	 The	 evolving,	
interdependent	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 poverty	 in	 the	 South	 African	 jurisprudence,	
also	 acknowledges	 the	 critical	 role	 of	 civil,	 political,	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
participatory	 rights	 in	 reducing	poverty	 in	 the	 country.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 examined	 the	
interface	between	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	in	addressing	a	multi-
dimensional	conception	of	poverty,	in	a	democratic	developmental	state.		
Building	on	the	model	of	 judicial	prowess	and	an	experimentalist,	substantive	approach	
to	socio-economic	rights	adjudication	proposed	in	chapter	four,	in	this	section	I	discuss	a	
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“democratic	 incremental”	 approach	 to	 the	 adjudication	 of	 socio-economic	 and	
administrative	justice	rights.	The	characteristics	of	this	approach	involve	experimentalist,	
substantive	 incremental,	 pro-active,	 managerial	 and	 autonomous	 adjudicatory	 modes.		
The	 interdependent	 adjudication	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice,	
utilising	a	“democratic	incremental”	approach,	can	contribute	to	the	realisation	of	a	South	
African	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 The	 democratisation	 of	 the	 courts	 and	
intensified	 accountability	 of	 the	 executive	 and	 the	 administration	 for	 effective	 policies	
and	distribution	of	public	goods,	can	better	 serve	 the	 transformative	project	of	a	South	
African	democratic	developmental	state.	It	also	requires	an	interdependent,	participatory	
and	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	 socio-economic	 and	 administrative	 justice	 rights	 that	
individually	and	systemically	address	the	multi-dimensional	challenges	of	poverty.		
I	 proposed	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	
justice	is	complementary	in	that	socio-economic	rights	apply	to	the	actions	or	inactions	
of	the	executive,	the	legislature	as	well	as	private	actors,	and	the	right	to	administrative	
justice	applies	to	administrative	action.	Under	the	sets	of	rights	together,	the	courts	can	
evaluate	the	conceptualisation	as	well	as	the	implementation	of	law	and	policy	that	seeks	
to	address	poverty	and	 inequality,	 through	the	various	stages	of	policy	 formulation	and	
implementation.	This	ensures	transparency	and	accountability	for	the	effective	provision	
of	socio-economic	goods	to	people	affected	by	poverty.		
I	 then	 advocated	 for	 a	 judicial	 interpretation	 of	 the	 “reasonableness”	 requirements	
attached	 to	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 (in	 relation	 to	 socio-
economic	 rights)	 that	elucidates	 the	 substance	of	decisions	and	measures	 taken	 to	give	
effect	to	material	needs.	The	courts	have	thus	far	only	considered	the	substantive	content	
of	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	in	a	limited	number	of	cases	over	the	
past	 few	 years.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 court	 should	 expand	 upon	 the	 values,	 norms	 and	
obligations	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 in	 order	 to	 guide	 efforts	 to	 address	 long-term,	
structural	poverty,	as	the	aim	of	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
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Finally,	I	considered	the	range	of	innovative	remedial	options	the	courts	have	applied	in	a	
complementary	way	in	socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	cases.	They	have	
required	the	State	to:	respect	a	right	in	the	negative	sense	of	non-interference;	protect	the	
rights	 against	 infringement	 by	 others;	 actively	 promote	 particular	 rights	 by	 developing	
and	 implementing	 policies;	 and	 fulfil	 the	 individual	 claimant’s	 rights.	 I	 espoused	 the	
evolution	 of	 the	 courts’	 use	 of	 supervisory	 orders	 (structural	 interdicts)	 to	 ensure	
transparency	and	accountability	of	the	State	 in	 fulfilling	 its	duties	 in	cases	where	socio-
economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	are	concerned.	I	also	supported	the	expansion	
of	“meaningful	engagement”	orders	to	the	various	socio-economic	rights,	as	participatory	
mechanisms	of	empowerment	for	poor	people,	alongside	administrative	procedures.	This	
is	 required	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state	 built	 on	 openness,	 accountability	 and	
responsiveness.	
The	 various	 institutional	 role-players	 in	 the	 South	 African	 democratic	 developmental	
system	 of	 government	 have	 a	 combined	 obligation	 to	 design	 comprehensive	 poverty	
reduction	 policies	 and	 laws	 and	 to	 execute	 poverty	 reduction	measures.	 From	 a	multi-
dimensional,	 human	 rights-based	 poverty	 perspective,	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-
economic	 rights	 work	 interdependently	 to	 ensure	 that	 both	 the	 empowerment	 and	
material	dimensions	are	addressed.	An	interconnected	view	of	the	role	of	socio-economic	
rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	 poverty	 is	 needed	 to	 guide	 the	
development	of	policy	and	law	by	the	executive	and	the	legislature,	as	well	as	the	review	
thereof	by	the	judiciary,	within	a	democratic	developmental	state.	
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
	
7	1	Introduction	
The	 central	 focus	 of	 this	 dissertation	 was	 to	 examine	 the	 interdependence	 of	 socio-
economic	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 in	 addressing	 poverty	 under	
constitutional	 law	 and	 international	 law,	 in	 a	 South	African	 democratic	 developmental	
state.	 The	 hypothesis	 behind	 the	 research	 is	 based	 on	 an	 integrated	 human	 rights	
approach	to	poverty,	as	asserted	by	the	South	African	courts	and	framed	in	international	
law.	 It	 affirms	 that	 socio-economic	 and	 administrative	 justice	 rights	 are	 profoundly	
complementary	and	can	be	strengthened	as	tools	for	addressing	poverty	in	a	democratic	
developmental	state.	This	analysis	was	accomplished	within	the	recognised	framework	of	
a	transformative	Constitution	that	seeks	to	remedy	South	Africa’s	past,	to	strive	towards	
the	 egalitarian,	 empowered	 transformation	 of	 our	 society	 and	 to	 attain	 the	 concrete	
alleviation	of	the	realities	of	poverty	and	hardship.	
Full	transformation	from	an	apartheid	society	requires	both	a	reconfiguration	of	the	legal-
political	 structures	 that	 upheld	 it,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 redress	 of	 the	 devastating	 social	 and	
economic	consequences	of	its	policies	and	laws.	The	inclusion	of	justiciable	civil,	political	
and	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 of	 the	 South	 African	 Constitution	
symbolises	 this	 understanding.	 The	 realisation	 of	 political	 and	 socio-economic	
transformation	requires	collaboration	between	the	legislature,	the	executive,	the	judiciary	
and	 all	 organs	 of	 state,	 as	well	 as	 the	 private	 sector,	 to	 “respect,	 protect,	 promote	 and	
fulfil”	the	Bill	of	Rights	in	its	entirety.	South	African	citizens	and	residents,	and	broader	
civil	society,	are	also	vested	with	rights	to	pressurise	state	and	non-state	actors	to	enforce	
these	mandates	through	litigation,	the	political	process,	involvement	in	public	policy,	law	
and	administrative	decision-making	processes	and	political	action.	
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7	2	Transformative	constitutionalism	in	a	democratic	developmental	state	
This	dissertation	is	built	on	the	theoretical	discourse	of	transformative	constitutionalism	
and	 participatory	 democracy,	 which	 underpin	 the	 South	 African	 democratic	
developmental	state,	discussed	 in	chapter	 two.	Over	 the	past	decade,	 the	South	African	
developmental	 state,	 as	 postulated	 in	 the	 National	 Development	 Plan:	 Vision	 2030	
(‘NDP’),	has	surpassed	the	notion	of	a	South	African	welfare	state.	A	developmental	state	
has	 effective	 state	 capacity,	 synergistic	 state-society	 relations,	 a	 social	 welfare	 net	 and	
intervenes	 strategically	 in	 the	 economy	 to	 promote	 socio-economic	 development.	 A	
fundamental	 feature	 of	 the	 South	African	democratic	 developmental	 state	 described	by	
Evans,	 is	 that	 it	must	be	people-oriented	and	capable	of	addressing	 the	socio-economic	
needs	 of	 its	 entire	 population,	 especially	 the	 poor,	 marginalised	 and	 historically	
disadvantaged.	 It	 must	 also	 necessarily	 be	 accountable,	 responsive	 and	 open.	 It	 is	 the	
current	 conception	 of	 the	 South	 African	 state	 that	 should	 guide	 the	 courts	 and	 the	
development	 of	 policy	 and	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 poverty	 reduction,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	
substance	and	process.		
Various	policies	and	programmes	have	sought	to	advance	socio-economic	transformation	
over	the	past	two	decades,	but	the	state	has	failed	to	adequately	implement	them	all.	The	
NDP	is	still	contested	ground	and	with	the	almost	daily	uncovering	of	state	corruption	in	
government	 and	 State	Owned	 Enterprises	 (‘SOE’),	 the	 democratic	 developmental	 state	
project	has	been	 severely	undermined	over	 the	 last	decade	 since	President	 Jacob	Zuma	
became	 South	 Africa’s	 president.	 The	 state	 no	 longer	 functions	 as	 an	 “autonomous	
institution”	in	the	interests	of	its	citizens,	but	is	captured	by	substantial	local	and	foreign	
private	 interests.	 The	media,	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 courts	 have	 continued	 to	 play	 their	
independent	 roles	 in	 exposing	 the	 extensive	 corruption	 and	 holding	 the	 state	
accountable.	It	is	the	combined	obligation	of	these	various,	key	institutional	role-players	
in	 the	South	African	democratic	developmental	 state	 to	continue	 to	ensure	 that	critical	
resources	needed	for	poverty	reduction	are	channelled	appropriately	and	effectively.	
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7	3	Integrated	human	rights	approach	to	poverty	
The	multi-faceted	 situation	 of	 poverty	 in	 South	Africa,	 described	 in	 chapter	 three,	 has	
been	 significantly	 ameliorated	 in	 the	 time	 of	 formal	 democracy,	 but	 still	 requires	
widespread	redress.	The	normative	values	in	the	Constitution,	and	in	particular	the	Bill	of	
Rights,	have	a	critical	role	to	play	in	advancing	poverty	reduction	through	the	courts,	the	
legislature	and	 the	executive.	The	 international	and	national	human	rights	discourse	 in	
relation	 to	poverty	 reduction,	 illustrates	 that	 the	 reduction	of	poverty	 requires	a	multi-
dimensional	approach	in	policy	and	law.	The	multi-dimensional	nature	of	poverty	from	a	
development	economist’s	perspective	is	directly	linked	to	the	various	socio-economic	and	
civil	 and	 political	 rights	 identified	 in	 international	 human	 rights	 law	 and	 in	 the	 South	
African	Bill	 of	Rights.	Both	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	civil	 and	political	 rights,	 such	as	
the	 right	 to	 freedom	 of	 information	 and	 administrative	 justice,	 are	 relevant	 to	 poverty	
reduction.	 As	 Sen	 points	 out	 in	Development	 as	 Freedom,965	 the	 reduction	 of	 poverty	
needs	to	be	tangibly	felt	and	experienced,	through	an	individual	experience	of	autonomy	
and	 empowerment	 and	 through	 a	 systemic	 experience	 of	 improvement	 in	 the	 living	
conditions	of	poor	people.		
This	dissertation	examined	the	interconnectedness	of	socio-economic	rights	and	the	right	
to	 just	 administrative	 action	 in	 addressing	 multi-dimensional	 poverty	 in	 a	 democratic	
developmental	state.	A	number	of	cases	related	to	the	rights	to	social	security,	education,	
housing	and	water	in	particular,	that	have	come	before	the	Constitutional	Court	over	the	
past	 22	 years,	 demonstrated	 the	 potential	 complementarity	 between	 socio-economic	
rights	and	the	right	to	just	administrative	action	in	addressing	poverty.	In	chapters	four	
and	five	 I	 investigated	the	conceptual	 foundations	and	 jurisprudence	of	socio-economic	
rights	 and	 administrative	 justice	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 transformative	 Constitution	 and	 a	
democratic	developmental	state.	I	then	discussed	in	chapter	six,	the	ways	in	which	they	
are	mutually	supportive	and	reinforcing	as	partners	 in	 the	project	of	poverty	reduction,	
with	distinct	but	interconnected	roles	to	play.	
																																								 																				
965 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999). 
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7	4	Substantive	rights	and	participatory	democracy	
In	order	for	the	full	impact	of	the	rights	in	the	Constitution	to	be	felt	amongst	the	poor,	
substance	 must	 be	 given	 to	 these	 rights,	 and	 not	 mere	 procedural	 form	 and	 hollow	
rhetoric.	In	order	to	get	closer	to	achieving	this,	the	content	of	socio-economic	rights	and	
administrative	 justice	 must	 be	 substantively	 interpreted	 through	 “democratising”	 the	
Courts,	by	involving	litigants,	experts,	the	legislature	and	the	executive	in	incrementally	
developing	 the	 principles,	 norms	 and	 content	 of	 such	 rights.	 I	 proposed	 a	 role	 for	 the	
courts,	 which	 I	 termed	 “judicial	 prowess”,	 depicting	 a	 flexible,	 skillful	 and	 context-
appropriate	 adjudicatory	 approach	 that	 does	 not	 undermine	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	
doctrine.	 This	 adjudicatory	 role	 in	 relation	 to	 cases	 where	 socio-economic	 rights	 and	
administrative	 justice	 meet,	 could	 be	 further	 enhanced	 by	 applying	 a	 “democratic	
incrementalist”	approach.	In	the	context	of	a	democratic	developmental	state,	this	type	of	
review,	 would	 simultaneously	 allow	 for	 an	 incremental	 substantive	 interpretation	 of	
rights	by	the	courts	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	and	the	participation	of	various	roleplayers	
including	the	executive,	litigants	and	technical	experts.	It	is	modelled	on	the	democratic	
experimentalist	and	managerial	modes,	but	with	a	stronger	substantive	interpretive	role	
for	the	judiciary	and	other	relevant	stakeholders.	
The	 primary	 role	 of	 socio-economic	 rights	 is	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 material	 needs	 of	
people,	 namely	 water,	 housing,	 income	 (social	 security),	 education	 and	 food.	 Socio-
economic	 rights	have	been	used	as	 a	 tool	 in	 litigation	and	 in	monitoring	and	advocacy	
related	to	the	government’s	obligations	to	secure	for	all	members	of	society	a	basic	set	of	
goods	 –	 education,	 social	 security,	 health	 care,	 food,	water,	 shelter,	 access	 to	 land	 and	
housing.	 Justiciable	 socio-economic	 rights	 are	 able	 to	 assist	 in	 monitoring	 the	 State’s	
realisation	of	 its	constitutional	obligations	to	the	poor,	and	ultimately	holding	the	State	
accountable	 for	 these	 obligations.	 However,	 there	 are	 limits	 to	 what	 these	 rights	 have	
been	able	to	achieve.	This	is	due,	in	particular,	to	the	reluctance	of	the	court	to	interpret	
the	 substantive	 content	 of	 these	 rights,	 the	 deference	 the	 courts	 have	 shown,	 and	 the	
difficulties	experienced	in	relation	to	the	enforcement	of	remedies.		
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Sen’s	conception	of	“human	capabilities”	takes	socio-economic	rights	beyond	this	primary	
role	 into	 the	 creation	 of	 agency	 and	 empowerment	 through	 people’s	 participation	 in	
decision-making	regarding	their	basic	needs.	The	court’s	adjudicatory	approach	to	socio-
economic	rights	should	thus	include	a	participatory	dimension	by	ensuring	that	litigants,	
communities	 and	 affected	 parties	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 conceptualisation	 and	
implementation	of	their	socio-economic	rights.	The	voices	of	the	poor	and	vulnerable	are	
a	legitimate	aspect	of	our	participatory	democracy	and	should	be	given	opportunities	to	
be	 heard	 beyond	 the	 formalised	 elective	 and	 legislative	 processes.	 Their	 participation	
should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 policy	 formulation	 processes,	 programmatic	 processes	 and	
administrative	 decision-making.	 Various	 cases	 before	 the	 courts	 over	 the	 past	 two	
decades	have	affirmed	the	 importance	of	participatory	democracy	 in	South	Africa’s	new	
dispensation.	 Participatory	 remedies	 such	 as	 meaningful	 engagement,	 also	 promote	
participatory	 democracy,	 whilst	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 structural	 enforcement	 orders	
advance	the	principles	of	accountability,	responsiveness	and	openness.		
The	primary	 role	 of	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 is	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	 right	 of	
people	who	are	recipients	of	government	services	to	participate	in	the	decisions	affecting	
their	 access	 to	 such	 services	 and	 to	 compel	 government	 actors	 to	 justify	 their	 conduct	
with	 reference	 to	 their	 constitutional	 obligations.	 A	 South	 African	 analysis	 of	 the	
potential	(and	actual	practice)	of	administrative	law	illustrates	the	critical	role	that	it	can	
play	in	poverty	reduction	in	relation	to	access	to	material	benefits,	as	well	as	reinforcing	
economically	 impoverished	 people’s	 sense	 of	 empowerment	 and	 autonomy	 over	 their	
lives.		
The	 rising	 field	 of	 “global	 administrative	 law”	 is	 useful	 to	 understanding	 the	 broader	
purpose	and	substantive	content	of	administrative	law	in	an	increasingly	globalised	world	
and	 in	 a	 democratic,	 developmental	 state.	 The	 basis	 of	 global	 administrative	 law	 is	 an	
accountability	deficit	created	by	the	emergence	of	transnational	regulatory	power.966	The	
scope	 includes	 substantive	 law	 that	 defines	 the	 powers	 and	 limits	 of	 regulators	 under	
																																								 																				
966 Kingsbury (2009) European Journal of International Law 16. 
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human	 rights	 treaties	 and	 case	 law	 describing	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 state	
organs	 can	 interfere	 with	 individual	 liberties.	 The	 normative	 bases	 of	 global	
administrative	law	thus	resonate	with	the	intersection	between	administrative	justice	and	
socio-economic	rights	under	a	transformative	constitution	in	a	democratic	developmental	
state.	These	normative	conceptions	are:	internal	administrative	accountability;	protection	
of	individual	rights	or	the	rights	of	states;	and	the	promotion	of	democracy.	
Global	administrative	law	comprise	some	broad	basic	legal	principles	and	requirements	of	
both	 a	 procedural	 and	 a	 substantive	 nature.	 The	 first	 foundational	 principle	 is	 the	
requirement	of	procedural	participation	and	transparency.	This	encompasses	the	right	of	
affected	 individuals	 to	 have	 their	 views	 and	 relevant	 information	 considered	 before	 a	
decision	is	taken.	Participation	in	global	administrative	proceedings	has	 included	NGOs	
representing	 affected	 social	 and	 economic	 interests,	 who	 apply	 pressure	 for	 access	 to	
information	 and	 “decisional	 transparency”.	 They	 also	 promote	 accountability	 of	
administrative	decision-making.	The	second	requirement	is	that	of	providing	reasons	for	
administrative	 decisions.	 Finally,	 when	 individual	 rights	 are	 affected,	 global	
administrative	 law	should	embody	substantive	standards	for	administrative	action,	such	
as	 “proportionality,	 rational	 relation	 between	 means	 and	 ends,	 use	 of	 less	 restrictive	
means,	 or	 legitimate	 expectations”.967	 Interference	 with	 many	 individual	 rights	 can	 be	
justified,	 but	 only	 if	 the	 interference	 is	 proportionate	 to	 the	 legitimate	public	 objective	
pursued.	
The	right	to	administrative	 justice	 is	an	 important	participatory	and	substantive	vehicle	
for	 protecting	 socio-economic	 rights	 in	 the	 South	 African	 Courts.	 Recently,	 in	 cases	
relating	 to	 education,	 water,	 housing	 and	 basic	 services,	 the	 interpretation	 of	
administrative	 justice	 requirements	 of	 procedural	 fairness	 and	 reasonableness	 in	
particular,	have	brought	mixed	results	for	the	realisation	of	socio-economic	rights	for	the	
poor.	 Since	 administrative	 law	 and	 administrative	 justice	 rights	 comprises	 the	 general	
principles	 of	 law	which	 regulate	 the	organisation	of	 administrative	 institutions	 and	 the	
																																								 																				
967 Kingsbury B “The concept of ‘law’ in global administrative law” The European Journal of International Law 
(2009) 20(1) 23-57. 
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fairness	 and	 efficacy	 of	 the	 administrative	 process,	 it	 has	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	
facilitating	poor	people’s	right	to	be	heard	and	to	participate	in	socio-economic	decision-
making	 that	 affects	 their	 rights.	 Furthermore,	 the	 right	 to	 reasonable	 administrative	
action	 has	 the	 potential	 of	 forcing	 the	 administration	 to	 account	 for	 their	 actions	 in	
relation	 to	 socio-economic	 rights,	based	on	 the	 substantive	and	procedural	 elements	of	
the	right	to	administrative	justice.	
Socio-economic	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 to	 administrative	 justice	 are	 distinct,	 interlinked,	
interdependent	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing	 in	 the	 context	 of	 overcoming	 poverty	 and	
inequality,	 in	 a	 democratice	 developmental	 state.	 The	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	
foundations	 laid	out	 in	this	dissertation,	underpin	the	argument	that,	 for	an	 individual,	
family	or	community	to	be	freed	from	the	cycle	of	poverty,	their	material	needs	must	be	
met	 and	 they	must	 be	 able	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 decisions	 that	 affect	 their	 lives.	 Sen’s	
“human	 capabilities”	 theory	 embodies	 this	 conception	 of	 poverty,	 alongside	 an	
interdependent	human	rights	approach	to	poverty.	It	also	speaks	to	the	important	role	of	
process	and	substance	in	the	realisation	of	rights.	
In	 order	 to	 strengthen	 this	 complementarity,	 the	 courts	 should	 apply	 a	 democratic	
incrementalist	adjudicatory	method	to	 the	 interpretation	and	enforcement	of	 these	sets	
of	rights,	 in	poverty-related	cases.	This	requires	the	 judiciary	to	continue	to	expand	the	
use	 of	 “meaningful	 engagement”	 as	 a	 participatory	 tool	 in	 the	 interpretation	 and	
implementation	 of	 other	 socio-economic	 rights	 besides	 housing	 and	 education	 rights.	
Collaboration	 amongst	 litigants,	 the	 executive	 branch,	 civil	 society	 organisations	 and	
technical	 experts,	 facilitated	 by	 the	 courts,	 promotes	 participatory	 democracy	 and	
emboldened	 solution-finding	 to	 socio-economic	 issues,	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 democratic	
experimentalism.	The	content	of	rights	can	thus	be	determined	incrementally,	beginning	
with	 a	minimal	 level	 of	 basic	 needs,	 by	 relevant	 roleplayers	 in	 each	 case,	 and	 applied	
systemically	beyond	the	parties	to	the	case.	The	courts	can	thus	begin	to	build	a	body	of	
jurisprudence	in	the	third	wave	of	socio-economic	rights	cases,	that	engages	more	deeply	
and	 “democratically”	 with	 the	 substance	 of	 socio-economic	 rights,	 and	 incrementally	
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determines	 needs	 and	 necessary	 public	 responses.	 Administrative	 justice	 rights	 and	
structural	 enforcement	orders	 then	procedureally	 support	 the	courts	 to	ensure	 that	 the	
executive	and	the	administration	delivers	on	those	promises.	
7	5	Conclusion	
At	this	moment	 in	South	Africa’s	history,	whilst	 the	public	coffers	are	 looted	by	private	
interests	in	collusion	with	elected	and	public	officials,	and	the	majority	of	the	population	
continue	to	live	in	poverty,	the	courts	have	a	critical	role	to	play.	While	there	are	many	of	
those	holding	prime	Cabinet	positions,	or	 in	the	employ	of	government	departments	or	
SOE’s,	or	securing	state	contracts	who	are	part	of	this	insidious	web	of	state	capture,	our	
independent	 judiciary	 is	 the	 last	 beacon	 holding	 this	 democratic	 developmental	 state	
accountable	to	the	people	it	is	meant	to	serve.		
This	dissertation	thus	sought	to	expound	the	judicial	 interpretation	and	enforcement	of	
socio-economic	rights	and	administrative	justice	and	their	interactive	potential	to	address	
poverty	and	inequality.	A	complementary	judicial	interpretation	of	these	rights	is	possible	
by	engaging	more	substantively	and	collaboratively	with	the	normative	content	of	socio-
economic	rights	and	the	right	to	just	administrative	action.	Courts	as	“active	democratic”	
institutions	can	also	enhance	the	elements	of	participatory	democracy	and	accountability	
to	better	serve	the	transformative	project	of	the	Constitution.	The	right	to	administrative	
justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights	 are	 complementary	 tools	 to	 tackle	 poverty	 and	
inequality	 in	 a	 democratic	 developmental	 state.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 developing	 the	
interlinkages	 between	 administrative	 justice	 and	 socio-economic	 rights	 supports	 the	
vision	of	a	democratic	developmental	state	and	effective	socio-economic	transformation.		 	
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
S.	Rosa	LLD	 The	Means	and	the	Ends	of	Justice	 307	
 
S	27	Social	Security	(4)	
AllPay	Consolidated	 Investment	Holdings	 (Pty)	Ltd	and	Others	 v	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	 the	
South	 African	 Social	 Security	 Agency	 and	 Others	 2014	 (1)	 BCLR	 1	 (CC)	 (‘AllPay	 1’);	 AllPay	
Consolidated	Investment	Holdings	(Pty)	Ltd	v	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	the	South	African	Social	
Security	 Agency	 (No	 2)	 2014	 (6)	 BCLR	 641	 (CC)	 (‘AllPay	 2’);	 AllPay	 Consolidated	 Investment	
Holdings	(Pty)	Ltd	v	Chief	Executive	Officer	of	the	South	African	Social	Security	Agency	2015	(6)	
BCLR	653	 (CC)	 (‘AllPay	 3’);	Black	Sash	Trust	 v	Minister	 of	 Social	Development	 [2017]	ZACC	8;	
2017	(5)	BCLR	543	(CC)	and	Black	Sash	Trust	v	Minister	of	Social	Development	(Freedom	Under	
Law	NPC	Intervening)	2017	(9)	BCLR	1089	(CC)	(‘Black	Sash’)	
S	29	Education	(7)	
Head	of	Department:	Mpumalanga	Department	of	Education	v	Hoërskool	Ermelo	2010	(2)	BCLR	
99	(CC)	(‘Hoërskool	Ermelo’);	Governing	Body	of	the	Juma	Musjid	Primary	School	v	Ahmed	Asruff	
Essay	NO	2011	(8)	BCLR	761	(‘Juma	Musjid’);	KwaZulu-Natal	Joint	Liaison	Committee	v	Member	
of	the	Executive	Council,	Department	of	Education,	KwaZulu-Natal	2013	(6)	BCLR	615	(CC)	(‘KZN	
Joint	Liaison	Committee’);	Head	of	Department,	Department	of	Education,	Free	State	Province	v	
Welkom	 High	 School;	 Head	 of	 Department,	 Department	 of	 Education,	 Free	 State	 Province	 v	
Harmony	 High	 School	 2013	 (9)	 BCLR	 989	 (CC)	 (‘Welkom’);	MEC	 for	 Education	 in	 Gauteng	
Province	and	Other	v	Governing	Body	of	Rivonia	Primary	School	and	Others	2013	(12)	BCLR	1365	
(CC)	 (‘Rivonia’);	 Federation	 of	 Governing	 Bodies	 for	 South	 African	 Schools	 v	 Member	 of	 the	
Executive	Council	for	Education,	Gauteng	2016	(8)	BCLR	1050	(CC)	(‘FEDSAS’);	Hotz	v	University	
of	Cape	Town	[2017]	ZACC	10	(‘Hotz’)	
S	35	Medical	treatment	for	arrested,	detained	and	accused	persons	(1)	
Lee	v	Minister	of	Correctional	Services	2013	(2)	BCLR	129	(CC)	(‘Lee’)	
	
	
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
